Protocol Composition Logic (PCL)

Summary:

PCL is a logic for proving security properties of network protocols. Two central results for PCL are a set of composition theorems and a computational soundness theorem. In contrast to traditional folk wisdom in computer security, the composition theorems allow proofs of complex protocols to be built up from proofs of their constituent sub-protocols. The computational soundness theorem guarantees that, for a class of security properties and protocols, axiomatic proofs in PCL carry the same meaning as reduction-style cryptographic proofs. Tool implementation efforts are also underway. PCL and a complementary model-checking method have been successfully applied to a number of internet, wireless and mobile network security protocols developed by the IEEE and IETF Working Groups. This work identified serious security vulnerabilities in the IEEE 802.11i wireless security standard and the IETF GDOI standard. The suggested fixes have been adopted by the respective standards bodies.

PCL has been the topic of invited talks at premier venues including ASL'01, MFPS'03, ICALP'05, LCC'06, and ASIAN'06. It has been taught in security courses at a number of universities including Aachen, CMU, Penn, Stanford, and Texas. 3 papers on this work have been invited to special issues of journals, which are compilations of the best papers presented at the respective venues.

The following paper and set of slides provides an overview of this project. For further details, please read the other papers included below.


Publications:

    Methodology     Applications
  • C. He, M. Sundararajan, A. Datta, A. Derek, J. C. Mitchell, A Modular Correctness Proof of TLS and IEEE 802.11i, in Proceedings of 12th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security , pp. 2-15, November 2005. (Invited to ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Special Issue of Selected Papers from CCS'05.) [ Paper ]    Award Paper

  • M. Backes, A. Datta, A. Derek, J. C. Mitchell, M. Turuani, Compositional Analysis of Contract-Signing Protocols, in Proceedings of 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 94-110, June 2005. [ Paper ]
  • C. Meadows, D. Pavlovic, Deriving, attacking and defending the GDOI protocol, in Proceedings of 9th European Symposium On Research in Computer Security, pp. 53-72, September 2004. [ Paper ]

Tool Support:

Other Talks: