Ockham’s Razor: A New Justification, Project Web Page

Participants:

Kevin T. Kelly, Professor, Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University
Hanti Lin, Australian National University, Canberra
Konstantin Genin, Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University

Associates:

Oliver Schulte, Professor, Computer Science, Simon Fraser University
Wei Luo, Computer Science, Simon Fraser University
Conor Mayo-Wilson, Ludwig Maximilians University, Munich

Mentions in the Blogosphere

Introduction

Philosophy of science, statistics, and machine learning all recommend the selection of simple theories or models on the basis of empirical data, where simplicity has something to do with minimizing independent entities, principles, causes, or equational coefficients. This intuitive preference for simplicity is called Ockham's razor, after the fourteenth century theologian and logician William of Ockham. But in spite of its intuitive appeal, how could Ockham's razor help one find the true theory? For, in an updated version of Plato's Meno paradox, if we already know that the truth is simple, we don't need Ockham's help. And if we don't already know that the truth is simple, what entitles us to assume that it is?

Here is a new answer to that question. It is hopeless to provide an a priori explanation how simplicity points at the truth immediately, since the truth may depend upon subtle empirical effects that have not yet been observed or even conceived of. The best that Ockham's razor could guarantee a priori is to keep us on the straightest possible path to the truth, allowing for unavoidable twists and turns along the way as new effects are discovered. In fact, it is possible to define empirical simplicity and efficient convergence to the truth so that Ockham’s razor is the uniquely most efficient strategy for converging to the truth. That result is called the Ockham efficiency theorem. This project is devoted to extending, refining, and understanding the significance of the Ockham efficiency theorem.

There is currently no other non-circular explanation of how Ockham’s razor helps one find true theories better than alternative methods. “Overfitting” explanations of Ockham’s razor have to do with choosing a false theory to obtain more accurate predictions. Bayesian explanations of Ockham’s razor are based on a circular appeal to a prior bias toward simple possibilities. And pointing out that simple theories are more testable, explanatory, or unified does not explain why one should assume that the truth has these desirable formal properties.

The Basic Idea

The following sketch is only a specific illustration of the Ockham efficiency theorem. Objections should be addressed to the full published versions of the argument in (Kelly 2007b, 2007c, 2008a).
  1. Suppose that the problem is to infer the true degree of a polynomial curve.


  2. The degree of a polynomial curve is understood to be n if and only if the curve’s degree n term has a non-zero coefficient and all of the curve’s terms of higher degree have zero coefficients.


  3. The data presented for the true curve Y = f(X) are not exact; they consist of increasingly tight open intervals around Y for each specified value of X.


  4. Every finite set of such intervals around a curve of degree n is compatible with a curve of degree n + 1.


  5. Ockham’s razor says to conclude the lowest polynomial degree compatible with the intervals presented so far (or to suspend judgment with “?”) and never to suspend judgment again until one’s current answer is no longer simplest.


  6. Ockham’s razor converges to the true degree, if there is one, and at worst retracts or takes back its answer n times when the true answer is n (constant curves have degree 0). Also, each retraction occurs precisely when the previous answer is refuted.


  7. In general, a method maps each finite set of open intervals that might be provided as data to either a guess at the polynomial degree or to “?”.


  8. A convergent method converges to the true polynomial degree, whatever it happens to be, as the arbitrarily precise data accumulate.


  9. Every convergent method retracts at least n times in some presentation of data for a curve of polynomial degree n the truth is n and these retractions occur at least as late as when the next lower degree is refuted. For nature can first present intervals around a constant curve, until the convergent method says “degree 0” (else, nature presents complete information about a curve of degree zero and the method fails to converge to the true answer). At that point, nature can tilt the flat curve to make it properly linear without violating any of the finitely many intervals presented so far and can continue to present ever tighter intervals until the method says “degree 1”, etc.


  10. So Ockham’s razor is efficient in terms of total retractions and the times at which the retractions occur, where efficiency of method M means that for all n, the worst case retraction and retraction time bounds achieved by M over all worlds of polynomial degree n are no greater than the corresponding bounds achieved by an arbitrary convergent method M’.


  11. Moreover, whatever happened in the past, Ockham’s razor is efficient from that point onward. For even if Ockham’s razor has already been violated so that getting on the Ockham path demands a retraction, nature can still force that retraction later anyway. So Ockham’s razor is perfectly efficient, in the game theoretic sense of being efficient no matter what has happened earlier.


  12. Furthermore, for each method that violates Ockham’s razor, the violator is beaten by Ockham at the moment of violation, in the sense that the violator does worse in terms of worst-case timed retractions in each polynomial degree compatible with the data. For nature can force the violator back to the lowest polynomial degree compatible with the data and, thereafter, through every successive polynomial degree, for the violator produces an extra retraction, in each polynomial degree compatible with the data, compared with a method that hews to the Ockham path from that point onward.


Hence, we have:

Ockham Efficiency Theorem, beta version:

The following statements are equivalent:
  1. M is always Ockham.

  2. M always converges efficiently to the truth.

  3. No convergent method ever beats M.
Refinements to the beta version of the Ockham Efficiency Theorem:

  1. partially ordered simplicity degrees (Kelly 2007c, 2008a),
  2. cumulative errors as a cost (Kelly 2007c),
  3. unique definition of simplicity in terms of questions (Kelly 2007c, 2008a),
  4. axiomatic (non-unique) approach to simplicity (Kelly 2009c),
  5. answers that cut across simplicity degrees; e.g., “polynomial degree is even” (Kelly 2007c, 2008a),
  6. Ockham’s razor as a Nash equilibrium (Mayo-Wilson 2009),
  7. Ockham efficiency for stochastic methods (Kelly and Mayo-Wilson 2010a),
  8. Bayesian and neo-Bayesian methods whose outputs are degrees of belief (work with Hanti Lin reported in Kelly 2010),
  9. A modal logical framework for inductive knowledge (Kelly 2014).
  10. Gemera; theory of simplicity (PSA submission Kelly, Genin, and Lin 2014).
  11. Stochastic data and statistical inference (work in progress).

Research Developments

Ockham’s razor in causal discovery
One important application area that depends heavily on Ockham’s razor is causal inference from correlational data. In causal inference the theories matter for prediction---getting a causal arrow backwards can throw predictions way off. It is shown (Kelly and Mayo-Wilson 2009b) that any method that converges to true causal structure in linear causal models can be force to flip a given causal arrow in its conclusions any number of times. Hence, causal inference from correlational data cannot be reliable. But the usual Ockham techniques do converge efficiently to the truth in the sense described above. So the Ockham efficiency theorem is the only non-circular foundation on the books for this important application.

Ockham efficiency extended to stochastic scientific methods
The Ockham efficiency theorems published thus far show that a deterministic version of Ockham’s razor is more efficient than all deterministic competitors. But is a familiar fact in game theory that one can often improve worst-case performance by adopting a random strategy (as in rock-paper-scissors). The manuscript (Kelly and Mayo-Wilson 2010a) shows that the deterministic versions of Ockham’s razor are, indeed, efficient against arbitrary stochastic strategies with discrete states. Indeed, only trivial variants of the deterministic Ockham strategy are efficient. The result is entirely parallel to the deterministic Ockham efficiency theorem. Surprisingly, no independence assumptions are required.

Ockham’s razor as a game-theoretic equilibrium During the course of the work on stochastic methods, analogies between the Ockham efficiency theorem and standard game theory became more apparent, raising the natural question whether the theorem is an application of Nash’s theorem for two-person zero-sum games. In (Mayo-Wilson 2009), it is shown that Nash’s assumptions are violated by the theorem but, nonetheless, Ockham’s razor can be portrayed as a unique Nash equilibrium of a generalized sort.

Ockham’s razor for Bayesians
The Ockham efficiency theorems are stated in terms of theory choice, raising the question how they apply when methods adopt degrees of belief over theories. (Kelly 2010).

New solution to the Lottery paradox, with applications to conditional logic
The work on Ockham efficiency for Bayesians suggested a new solution to Kyburg's Lottery Paradox with applications to conditionals and default reasoning. The idea is described comprehensively in (Lin 2010), (Lin and Kelly 2011), (Lin and Kelly 2013), (Lin 2013). The basic idea is to project a natural, classical logic onto Bayesian credal states and then to require that acceptance rules preserve that logic. Not only is the lottery paradox solved thereby. Unanticipated diachronic paradoxes related to conditional logic and default reasoning are anticipated and solved as well. It is also shown that these advantages cannot be obtained by any approach to acceptance that is preserved under question refinement.

Ockham's razor meets epistemic logic.
Epistemic logic is supposed to be the logic of the modal operator "i knows that p". Standard models of epistemic logic are essentially models of true belief with some extra principles imposed in an ad hoc fashion. That situation is rectified in (Kelly 2013). Knowledge that p is modeled as convergence to the truth by means of a learning method that would have eliminated error eventually if p had been false. It is shown that this interpretation validates a weakened version of the standard system S4 but does not validate axioms leading up to S5, such as the Brouwersche axiom, or axioms .2, .4, or 5. It is also shown that the argument for Fitch's paradox of knowability is invalid, and that deductive closure of knowability is closely tied to venerable topics in the philosophy of science, such as articulation of untestable theories by auxiliary hypotheses that make them testable and the slogan that there is no logic of discovery. It is also shown how inductive knowledge does not require deductive closure or consistency and how common inductive knowledge can spread through a community via straightforward, feasible, inferences. Finally, it is shown how refining the definition of knowledge to include retraction-minimal learning whenever feasible results in an explanation of Ockham's razor in terms of truth-conduciveness, rather than as an independent, "justification" condition for knowledge.

Pending: Axiomatic, non-unique simplicity
From the outset, the idea was to define simplicity as uniquely as possible. But that idea now appears to have been a mistake: forcing a unique simplicity ranking on worlds when the problem does not do so has resulted in weaker Ockham efficiency theorems than necessary. Also, it seems philosophically wrong to impose structure where the question as presented lacks structure. Our current approach is to adopt a loose, axiomatic approach to simplicity and to treat existence and uniqueness as a separate question. Our current approach to proving existence for simplicity is to first construct a default theory from a given method and then to construct simplicity out of the order of sequential firability of defaults. That approach is currently under active investigation. The current theory is described here.

Pending: Ockham’s razor in statistical inference.
A major goal of the project is to lift the Ockham efficiency theorem one more time from stochastic methods receiving deterministic data (Kelly and Mayo-Wilson 2009a) to stochastic methods receiving stochastic data (statistical theory choice). We now have some interesting animations of statistical retractions by Bayesian conditioning and BIC. The animations were programmed in Mathematica by new team member Konstantin Genin.

Project Workshops

2012, June 22,23: Foundations for Ockham's Razor, CFE, Carnegie Mellon University.

2013, June 7,8: Logic and Ockham's Razor, CFE, Carnegie Mellon University.

2014, Jun 7, 8: Simplicity and Causal Discovery.

Online Tutorials

Seth Casana (2005) Animated tutorial on Ockham Efficiency.

Konstantin Genin and Kevin T. Kelly (2013) Animated statistical retractions in Mathematica.

Publications

Kevin T. Kelly (2013) "A Computational Learning Semantics for Inductive Empirical Knowledge", forthcoming, Logical/Informational Dynamics, a Festschrift for Johan van Benthem: Alexandru Baltag and Sonja Smets, edsDordrecht: Springer.

Hanti Lin and Kevin T. Kelly (2013) "Comments on Leitgeb's Stability Theory of Belief", forthcoming, Studies in Logic.

Hanti Lin (2013) Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning, Ph.D. Dissertation, Dept. of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University.

Hanti Lin and Kevin T. Kelly (2011) "Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning", Journal of Philosophical Logic,41:957-981.

Hanti Lin and Kevin T. Kelly (2011) "A Geo-logical Solution to the Lottery Paradox", Synthese 186: 531-575.

Hanti Lin (2010) A New Theory of Acceptance that Solves the Lottery Paradox and Provides a Simplified Probabilistic Semantics for Adams' Logic of Conditionals. M.S. Thesis, Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University.

Kevin T. Kelly and Conor Mayo-Wilson (2010b) , "Causal Conclusions that Flip Repeatedly and their Justification", Proceedings of Twenty-Sixth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Peter Grunwald and Peter Spirtes, eds. pp. 277-286.

Kevin T. Kelly and Conor Mayo-Wilson (2010a) “Ockham Efficiency Theorem for Stochastic Empirical Methods”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 39: pp. 679-312.

Kevin T. Kelly (2010) "Simplicity, Truth, and Probability", in Handbook on the Philosophy of Statistics, Prasanta Bandyopadhyay and Malcolm Forster, eds., Dordrecht: Elsevier.

Conor Mayo-Wilson (2009) A Game Theoretic Argument for Ockham's Razor, M.S. thesis, Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University .

Kevin T. Kelly (2009) “Argument, Inquiry, and the Unity of Science”, forthcoming in Sciences and Methods, Bijoy Mukherjee, ed., Kolkata: Asiatic Society.

Kevin T. Kelly and Conor Mayo-Wilson (2008) Review of Gilbert Harman's and Sanjeev Kulkarni's Reliable Reasononing. Notre Dame Philosophical Review.

Kevin T. Kelly (2008b) “Five Answers”, in Epistemology: 5 Questions, V. Hendricks and D. Pritchard, eds., Copenhagen : Automatic Press.

Kevin T. Kelly (2008a) “Ockham’s Razor, Truth, and Information”, in Handbook of the Philosophy of Information, J. van Bethem and P. Adriaans, eds., Dordrecht : Elsevier.

Kevin T. Kelly (2007d) “Simplicity, Truth, and the Unending Game of Science”, in Infinite Games: Foundations of the Formal Sciences V. S. Bold, B. Löwe, T. Räsch, and J. van Benthem eds, Roskilde : College Press, pp. 223-270.

Kevin T. Kelly (2007c) “How Simplicity Helps You Find the Truth Without Pointing at it”, in Philosophy of Mathematics and Induction, V. Harazinov, M. Friend, and N. Goethe, Dordrecht : Springer.

Kevin T. Kelly (2007b) “Ockham’s Razor, Empirical Complexity, and Truth-finding Efficiency”, Theoretical Computer Science, 383: 270-289.

Kevin T. Kelly (2007a) “A New Solution to the Puzzle of Simplicity”, Philosophy of Science 74: 561-573.

Kevin T. Kelly (2004) "Justification as Truth-finding Efficiency: How Ockham's Razor Works", Minds and Machines 14: 485-505.

Kevin T. Kelly (2002b) “A Close Shave with Realism: Ockham's Razor Derived from Efficient Convergence”, manuscript.

Kevin T. Kelly (2002a) “Efficient Convergence Implies Ockham's Razor”, Proceedings of the 2002 International Workshop on Computational Models of Scientific Reasoning and Applications, Las Vegas, USA, June 24-27.

Kevin T. Kelly and Clark Glymour (2004) “Why Probability Does Not Capture the Logic of Scientific Justification”, in Christopher Hitchcock, ed., Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science, London: Blackwell.

Talks

Kelly (2013) "Ockham's Razor as the Most Direct Path to the Truth", Gesellschaft fuer Wissenschaftsphilosophie 2013, Leibniz University, Hannover, Germany.

Kelly and Lin (2013) “Qualitative Reasoning that Tracks Jeffrey Conditioning”, Progic, Luwig-Maximilians University, Munich, Autumn.

Kelly (2013) “A Computational Learning Semantics for Inductive Common Knowledge”, Sendai University, Japan, Winter.

Kelly and Lin (2013) “A Multi-Agent Learning Semantics for Inductive Common Knowledge” , Workshop on Social Dynamics of Information Change, University of Amsterdam.

Kelly (2013) “Knowability, Inquiry, and Epistemic Logic”, University of Kyoto, Japan, Winter 2013.

Kevin T. Kelly (2013) "A Hyper-intensional Learning Semantics for a Modal Logic of Inductive Knowledge", Games, Interactive Rationality, and Learning, University of Lund, Sweden.

Kevin T. Kelly (2013) "A Learning Semantics for Inductive Knowledge", Special Symposium, Copenhagen Association for Dynamics, Interaction, Logic, Language, and Computation.

Kevin T. Kelly, Hanti Lin, and Konstantin Genin (2013) "Empirical Complexity and Truth", Plenary Talk, Modes of Explanation, Institute for the Study of Coherence and Emergence, Paris.

Kevin T. Kelly (2013) "From Questions to Simplicity and Empirical Belief Revision", Logic in Questions and Inquiry, Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, Sorbonne, Paris.

Kevin T. Kelly and Hanti Lin (2013) "The Geometry of Propositional Belief", Nicod Institute, Sorbonne, Paris.

Kevin T. Kelly (2013) "The Topology of Inquiry", CMU Summer School in Logic and Methodology

Kevin T. Kelly (2013) "From Questions to Simplicity and Empirical Belief Revision, Workshop on the Logic of Ockham's Razor, Center for Formal Epistemology, CMU.

Kevin T. Kelly and Hanti Lin (2012) "Ockham's Razors", CADILLAC, University of Copenhagen.

Kevin T. Kelly and Hanti Lin (2012) "A Happy Marriage Between Propositional and Probabilistic Reasoning", Filosofiska Foereningen, Lund. We love the poster!

Kevin T. Kelly (2012) "Learning Models for Modal Epistemic Logic or Invasion of the Epistemic Parasites!", Games, Interactive Rationality and Learning (GIRL), Lund.

Kevin T. Kelly (2012) "Tutorial on Ockham's Razor'', Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU, Munich. [mp4]

Kevin T. Kelly and Hanti Lin (2012) "Doxastic Engineering'', Roundtable on Acceptance, Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximiliens University, Munich. [mp4]

Kevin T. Kelly (2012) "Tutorial on Ockham's Razor", Ludwig Maximiliens University , Munich.

Kevin T. Kelly (2012) "An Erotetic Theory of Simplicity and its Relation to Truth'', Interrogative Models of Inquiry Workshop, Sorbonne, Paris.

Kevin T. Kelly (2012) "Simplicity, Truth, and Ockham's Razor'', Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximiliens University , Munich.

Kevin T. Kelly (2012) "The Bayesian Miracle'', Workshop on Radical Uncertainty, Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximiliens University , Munich. [mp4]

Kevin T. Kelly (2012) "Topological Epistemology'', Logic and Interactive Rationality three day seminar, ILLC, Amsterdam.

Kevin T. Kelly and Hanti Lin (2012) "Uncertain Acceptance and Contextual Dependence on Questions'', LogicCiC Seminar Series, ILLC, University of Amsterdam.

Kevin T. Kelly and Hanti Lin (2012) "Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning'', LogicCiC Seminar Series, ILLC, University of Amsterdam.

Kevin T. Kelly and Hanti Lin (2012) "Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning'', University of Groeningen.

Kevin T. Kelly and Hanti Lin (2012) "Simplicity, Truth, and Ockham's Razor'', Universityof Groeningen.

Kevin T. Kelly (2012) "A Logical Explanation of Ockham's Razor in Theory Choice", First CSLI Workshop on Logic, Rationality, and Interaction

Kevin T. Kelly (2012) "The Topology of Inquiry", CMU Summer School in Logic and Methodology

Kevin T. Kelly (2012) "Ockham's Razor and Truth", Workshop on the Foundations of Ockham's Razor, Center for Formal Epistemology, CMU.

Kevin T. Kelly (2012) "Belief Revision, Ockham's Razor, and Truth-Conduciveness", Tribute to Horacio Arlo-Costa, Sociedad Argentina De Analysis Filisofico, 2012.

Kevin T. Kelly and Hanti Lin (2012) "Ockham's Razors", Copenhagen Association for Dynamics, Interaction, Logic, Language, and Computation.

Conor Mayo-Wilson (2011) "Specialization in the Sciences and the Acquisition of Truth" 7th Annual Episteme Conference, June 24th, 2011, Carnegie Mellon University.

Conor Mayo-Wilson (2011) "Efficient Experimentation", 14th Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, July 2011, Nancy, France.

Hanti Lin and Kevin T. Kelly (2011) "Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning", Logic and Methodology Workshop, CSLI, Stanford.

Hanti Lin and Kevin T. Kelly (2011) "Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning", Formal Epistemology Workshop, USC, Los Angeles, CA.

Kevin T. Kelly and Hanti Lin (2011) "An Erotetic Theory of Empirical Simplicity and its Connection with Truth", Beth/Vienna Circle Lecture: University of Amsterdam.

Hanti Lin (2010) "A Logical Theory of Belief Without Certainty", Logic, Mathematics, and Physics Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of Western Ontario, May 7-8 2010.

Kevin T. Kelly (2010) "Ockham's Razor and Truth", keynote address, Logic, Mathematics, and Physics Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of Western Ontario, May 7-8 2010.

Kevin T. Kelly (2010) "How Does Simplicity Help Science Find True Laws", Workshop on Laws of Nature: Their Nature and Knowability, Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, Waterloo, Ontario.

Hanti Lin (2010) "A New Probabilistic Semantics for Conditional Logic", Logic, Mathematics, and Physics Graduate Conference, University of Western Ontario, Canada.

Conor Mayo-Wilson(2009) "Ockham Efficiency Theorem for Random Empirical Methods", FEW 2009, Pittsburgh, PA.

Kevin T. Kelly (2008) “Relations of Ideas are Matters of Fact: A Unified Theory of Theoretical Unification”, Ideals of Proof workshop, Nancy , France .

Kevin T. Kelly (2008) “Ockham’s Razor Without Circles, Evasions, or Magic”, Department of History and Philosophy of the Sciences, Sorbonne, Paris, France .

Conor Mayo-Wilson (2008) “Theoretical Virtues and the Repeated Game of Science”, 10th annual Rocky Mountain Philosophy Conference.

Conor Mayo-Wilson (2008) “Mixed Strategies in Formal Learning Theory and Ockham's Razor”, Decisions, Games, and Logic 08, Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation, Amsterdam .

Kevin T. Kelly (2008) “Unity of Science Without Dogma”, Keynote Lecture, Conference on Sciences and Methods, Asiatic Society, Kolkata , India .

Kevin T. Kelly (2008) “Simplicity, Truth, and Causation: A New Explanation of Ockham’s Razor”, Platinum Anniversary Lecture on Causation, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata , India .

Kevin T. Kelly (2008) “Ockham’s Razor in Causal Discovery: A New Explanation”, National Institute of Science, Technology, and Development Studies, University of Delhi , India .

Kevin T. Kelly (2007) “Simplicity and Truth”, Department of Philosophy, University of Jaipur, India .

Kevin T. Kelly (2007) “Simplicity and Truth: an Alternative Explanation of Ockham's Razor”, Keynote address, 8th International Conference on Intelligent Data Engineering and Automated Learning (IDEAL'07), Birmingham , UK , Fall 2007. Power point lecture.

Kevin T. Kelly (2007) “Truth-conduciveness Without Reliability: A Non-Theological Explanation of Ockham’s Razor”, Working Group in History and Philosophy of Logic, Mathematics, and Science, University of California , Berkeley .

Kevin T. Kelly (2007) “Ockham’s Razor Without Circles, Evasions, or Magic'', Formal Epistemology Workshop, Pittsburgh .

Kevin T. Kelly (2006) “A New Solution to the Puzzle of Simplicity”, Philosophy of Science association biennial meeting, Vancouver.

Kevin T. Kelly (2006) "Philosophical Logic and Reliability", Philosophical Logic Symposium, Carnegie Mellon.

Kevin T. Kelly (2005) “Ockham's Razor: What it is, what it isn't, how it works, and how it doesn't”, plenary tutorial, Second Annual Formal Epistemology Workshop, University of Texas, Austin. Power point lecture.

Kevin T. Kelly (2005) “Ockham's Razor: What it is, What it isn't, How it Works and How it Doesn't.'' Symposium on Logic in the Humanities, Stanford University , Spring 2006.

Kevin T. Kelly (2005) “Ockham, Complexity, and Truth”, American Mathematical Society, Santa Barbara.

Kevin T. Kelly (2005) “Learning, Simplicity, Truth, and Misinformation”, invited presentation, International Workshop on the Philosophy of Information, Amsterdam , Netherlands , Spring 2005.

Kevin T. Kelly (2004) “Ockham's Razor, Efficiency, and the Infinite Game of Science”, Plenary Lecture, Foundations of the Formal Sciences 2004: Infinite Game Theory, Bonn , Germany

Kevin T. Kelly (2004) “Ockham's Razor”, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh.

Kevin T. Kelly (2004) “How Ockham's Razor Helps You Find the Truth”, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, U.C. Irvine.

Kevin T. Kelly (2002) “Efficient Convergence Implies Ockham's Razor”, International Workshop on Computational Models of Scientific Reasoning and Applications, .

Kevin T. Kelly (2001) “Simplicity Deduced from Efficient Convergence”, 40th Anniversary Conference, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh .

Graduate Seminars

80-600 Simplicity, Carnegie Mellon, Department of Philosophy, Fall 2008.

Grant Support

Pending: John Templeton Foundation grant 24145, Simplicity, Truth, and Ockham's Razor.

2009-2011: NSF grant 0740681, Ockham's Razor: A New Justification, Division of Social and Economic Sciences, Program for History and Philosophy of Science Engineering and Technology