Associate Professor of Economics
Tepper School of Business
Carnegie Mellon University
Tepper Quad, 5228
412 268 60 79,


My primary research interest lies in the domain of Microeconomics and, specifically, the fields of Mechanism Design, Optimal Taxation, and Market Design. In mechanism design, my work focuses on robust mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are not sensitive to the fine details of the environment. In particular, [2] shows that in standard social choice environments with private types Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) is equivalent to dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DIC). Subsequent papers ([6] and [7]) extend this result to environments with correlated types and non-linear utilities. In conjunction with the BIC-DIC equivalence, [8] analyzes also a purely mathematical question when a transformation of closed sets coincides with the intersection of their images.

My research also studies incentive compatibility constraints—the crucial constraints in mechanism design that ensure that agents communicate their privately held information truthfully. Paper [9] simplifies incentive compatibility constraints in often complex multi-dimensional environments. My another paper [3] develops a novel geometric approach to mechanism design that exploits classical results from convex analysis and majorization theory to provide a tractable analysis of generally complex resource and incentive constraints. A subsequent paper [4] extends the geometric approach to environments with interdependent values.

My research in optimal taxation  ([10])  studies income taxation policy in the presence of non-competitive markets. It develops a theoretical analysis of the optimal income tax schedule in the presence of endogenous prices and takes it to the data.

My work in the area of market design focuses on the analysis of signaling mechanisms in some labor markets and online dating platforms. This endeavor shows that the introduction of private signals facilitates match formation for a wide range of environments ([1]). Nevertheless, there are instances when signaling precludes match formation ([5]).

  1. Coles, P., Kushnir A., & Niederle, M. (2013). Preference signaling in matching markets. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(2), 99-134.
  2. Gershkov, A., Goeree, J. K., Kushnir, A., Moldovanu, B., & Shi, X. (2013). On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation. Econometrica, 81(1), 197-220.
  3. Goeree, J. K. & Kushnir, A. (2020). A geometric approach to mechanism design. Working Paper.
  4. Goeree, J. K. & Kushnir, A. (2016). Reduced form implementation with value interdependencies. Games and Economic Behavior, 99, 250-256.
  5. Kushnir, A. (2013). Harmful signaling in matching markets. Games and Economic Behavior, 80, 209-218.
  6. Kushnir, A. (2015). On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types. Economics Letters, 133, 4-6.
  7. Kushnir, A. & Liu, S. (2019). On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with non-linear utilities. Economic Theory, 67(3), 1-28.
  8. Kushnir, A. & Liu, S. (2020). On linear transformations of intersections. Set-Valued and Variational Analysis, 28, 475-489.
  9. Kushnir, A. & Lokutsievskiy, S. (2020). When is a monotone function cyclically monotone? Theoretical Economics, forthcoming. Working paper.
  10. Kushnir, A. & Zurbrickas, R. (2020). Optimal income taxation and endogenous prices. Working paper.