# ALEXEY KUSHNIR

Associate Professor of Economics

Tepper School of Business

Carnegie Mellon University

Tepper Quad, 5228

412 268 60 79, akushnir@andrew.cmu.edu

My primary research interest lies in the
domain of *Microeconomics* and, specifically, the fields of
*Mechanism Design, Optimal Taxation, *and *Market Design*.
In mechanism design, my work focuses on robust mechanisms,
i.e., mechanisms that are not sensitive to the fine details of
the environment. In particular,
**[2]** shows that in standard social choice environments with private types Bayesian incentive compatibility
(BIC) is equivalent to dominant strategy incentive compatibility
(DIC). Subsequent papers (**[6]**
and ** [7]**) extend this result
to environments with correlated types and non-linear utilities. In
conjunction with the BIC-DIC equivalence, **[8]**
analyzes also a purely mathematical question when a transformation of closed sets coincides with the intersection of their
images.

My research also
studies incentive compatibility constraints—the crucial constraints
in mechanism design that ensure that agents communicate their
privately held information truthfully. Paper **[9]** simplifies incentive compatibility
constraints in often complex multi-dimensional environments. My
another paper **[3]** develops a novel geometric approach to mechanism design that exploits classical results from convex analysis and majorization theory to provide a tractable analysis of generally complex resource and incentive constraints.
A subsequent paper
**[4]** extends the geometric approach
to environments with interdependent values.

My
research in optimal taxation (**[10]**) studies income taxation policy in the
presence of non-competitive markets. It develops a theoretical
analysis of the optimal income tax schedule in the presence of
endogenous prices and takes it to the data.

My work in the area of market design focuses on the analysis of signaling mechanisms
in some labor markets and online dating platforms. This endeavor shows that the introduction of private signals facilitates match formation for a wide range of environments (**[1]**). Nevertheless, there are instances when signaling precludes match formation (**[5]**).

- Coles, P., Kushnir A., & Niederle, M. (2013). Preference
signaling in matching markets.
**American Economic Journal: Microeconomics**, 5(2), 99-134. - Gershkov, A., Goeree, J. K., Kushnir, A., Moldovanu, B., & Shi, X. (2013). On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation.
**Econometrica**, 81(1), 197-220. - Goeree, J. K. & Kushnir, A. (2020). A geometric approach to mechanism design. Working Paper.
- Goeree, J. K. & Kushnir, A. (2016). Reduced form implementation with
value interdependencies.
**Games and Economic Behavior**, 99, 250-256. - Kushnir, A. (2013). Harmful signaling in matching markets.
**Games and Economic Behavior**, 80, 209-218. - Kushnir, A. (2015). On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types.
**Economics Letters**, 133, 4-6. - Kushnir, A. & Liu, S. (2019). On the equivalence of Bayesian
and dominant strategy implementation for environments with
non-linear utilities.
**Economic Theory**, 67(3), 1-28. - Kushnir, A. & Liu, S. (2020). On linear transformations of
intersections.
**Set-Valued and Variational Analysis,**28, 475-489. - Kushnir, A. & Lokutsievskiy, S. (2020). When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?
**Theoretical Economics**, forthcoming. Working paper. - Kushnir, A. & Zurbrickas, R. (2020). Optimal income taxation and endogenous prices. Working paper.