Associate Professor of Economics
Tepper School of Business
Carnegie Mellon University
Tepper Quad, 5228
412 268 6079,

My primary research interest lies in the domain of Microeconomics and, specifically, the fields of Mechanism and Market Design. In mechanism design, my work focuses on robust mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that are not sensitive to the fine details of the environment. In particular, I analyze the conditions under which a central planner can rely on robust mechanisms without sacrificing objectives such as efficiency or revenue maximization (see [1], [2], [3], [4]). In addition, my research extends to studying incentive-compatibility constraints and revenue-maximizing mechanisms in often difficult multi-dimensional environments (see [5], [6], [7], [8]). My work also develops an innovative geometric approach to mechanism design using classical tools from convex analysis ([9] and [10]). In market design, my earlier work focuses on the analysis of existing signaling mechanisms that have been employed for many years in job markets for new economists and new doctors ([11] and [12]). More recently, I have been interested in studying the allocation of course schedules to students in a many-to-many matching context ([13]). This work proposes a novel allocation mechanism that uses fake money and competitive equilibrium to allocate courses to students. I have also pursued successful research projects on subjects such as optimal income taxation ([14]), international trade ([15]), and organizational economics ([16]).

Research statement

Educational statement

  1. Gershkov, A., Goeree, J. K., Kushnir, A., Moldovanu, B., & Shi, X. (2013). On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation. Econometrica, 81(1), 197-220.
  2. Kushnir, A. (2015). On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types. Economics Letters, 133, 4-6.
  3. Kushnir, A. & Liu, S. (2019). On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with non-linear utilities. Economic Theory, 67, 617-644.
  4. Kushnir, A. & Liu, S. (2020). On linear transformations of intersections. Set-Valued and Variational Analysis, 28, 475-489.
  5. Kushnir, A. & Lokutsievskiy, S. (2021). When is a monotone function cyclically monotone? Theoretical Economics, 16(3), 853-879.
  6. Krishnamoorthy, V. & Kushnir, A. (2023) A simple characterization of supply correspondences. Mathematics of Operations Research.
  7. Kushnir, A. & Shourideh, A. (2023). Optimal auctions in multi-dimensional environments. Work in progress.
  8. Kushnir, A. & Michelson, J. (2023). Characterizing multi-dimensional auctions through simulations. Working paper.
  9. Goeree, J. K. & Kushnir, A. (2023). A geometric approach to mechanism design. Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 1(2), 321-347.
  10. Goeree, J. K. & Kushnir, A. (2016). Reduced form implementation with value interdependencies. Games and Economic Behavior, 99, 250-256.
  11. Coles, P., Kushnir A., & Niederle, M. (2013). Preference signaling in matching markets. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(2), 99-134.
  12. Kushnir, A. (2013). Harmful signaling in matching markets. Games and Economic Behavior, 80, 209-218.
  13. Kornbluth, D. and Kushnir, A. (2023). Undergraduate course allocation through competitive markets. R&R American Economic Review.
  14. Kushnir, A., Tarasov, A. & Zubrickas, R. (2021). On equilibrium in monopolistic competition with endogenous labor, Economics Letters, 201, 109774.
  15. Kushnir, A. & Zurbrickas, R. (2024). Optimal labor income taxation with the dividend effect. Economic Theory (accepted).
  16. Schweyer, A., Fan, A., Ford, E., Kang, J. & Kushnir, A. (2022) Decentralized Workforce: Fundamental Drivers and Engagement in the New Workplace, Incentives Research Foundation report.