Description: Description: isa profil 



Assistant Professor of Economics

College of Administrative Science, Koç University
Rumelifeneri Yolu, Sariyer, Istanbul, 34450,


Curriculum Vitae

Google Scholar Profile




Ph.D. in Economics, Carnegie Mellon University


M.A. in Economics, Sabanci University


B.Sc. in Mathematics, Bilkent University




Technical Change, Wage Inequality and Taxes, American Economic Review, Volume 105 No. 10 (2015) 30613101 (joint with Laurence Ales and Christopher Sleet)

This paper considers the normative implications of technical change for tax policy design. A task-to-talent assignment model of the labor market is embedded into an optimal tax problem. Technical change modifies equilibrium wage growth across talents and the substitutability of talents across tasks. The overall optimal policy response is to reduce marginal income taxes on low to middle incomes, while raising those on middle to high incomes. The reform favors those in the middle of the income distribution, reducing their average taxes while lowering transfers to those at the bottom.



Optimal Taxation of Families : Mirrlees Meets Becker

I study the optimal taxation of families in an environment in which (i) characteristics of a family, labor productivity and desire for children, are only observable by the family, and (ii) child-rearing requires both goods and parental time. Potential parents simultaneously decide labor income and number of children. The government uses information on family income and family size to construct an optimal tax system via a combination of an income tax schedule with child tax credits. I observe that the parental time and the cost of goods involved in child-rearing have distinct impacts on the shape of optimal child tax credits. As a quantitative analysis, I calibrate my model to the US data and show that child-rearing costs translate into a pattern of optimal credits that is U-shaped in income. In particular, the credits are decreasing in the first three quarters of the income distribution and increasing afterwards. In addition, the credits are decreasing by family size owing to economies of scale in the impact of child-rearing costs. For median-income families, the credit for the second child equals 64% of the credit for the first child. I find that the optimal tax schedule generates a welfare gain equal to 1.3% of aggregate consumption.


Discriminatory Auctions with Resale (joint with Isa Hafalir)

We consider multi-unit discriminatory auctions where ex-ante symmetric bidders have single-unit demands and resale is allowed after the bidding stage. When bidders use the optimal auction to sell the items in the resale stage, the equilibrium without resale is not an equilibrium. We find a symmetric and monotone equilibrium when there are two units for sale, and, interestingly, show that there may not be a symmetric and monotone equilibrium if there are more than two units.




- Carnegie Mellon University: Intermediate Microeconomics (Syllabus) (UG), Evaluation: 4.67/5

Teaching Assistant:

- Carnegie Mellon University: Game Theory for Economists (UG), Principles of Economics (UG), Advanced Macroeconomic Theory (UG), Emerging Markets (UG), Intermediate Microeconomics (UG), Microeconomics (PhD), Game Theory and Applications (PhD), Contract Theory (PhD), Macroeconomics (MBA)

- Sabanci University: Microeconomics II (MA), Games and Strategies (UG), Economics of Information (UG)

- Bilkent University: Statistics for Lawyers (UG), Intermediate Calculus I & II (UG), Introduction to Calculus II (UG), Linear Algebra and Differential Equations (UG)




Prof. Christopher Sleet

Tepper School of Business

Carnegie Mellon University

(412) 268-9938,


Prof. Laurence Ales

Tepper School of Business

Carnegie Mellon University

(412) 268-7058,


Prof. Isa Hafalir

Tepper School of Business

Carnegie Mellon University

(412) 268-5456,



Reference letters can be requested directly from:

Lawrence Rapp

Assistant Director of Ph.D. Student Services

Phone: (412) 268-1319,