

The Case for Explainability of Real-Time Systems and their Analyses

Bjorn Andersson

Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213



Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute [Distribution Statement A] Approved for public release and unlimited distribution.

Copyright 2022 Carnegie Mellon University.

This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under Contract No. FA8702-15-D-0002 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center.

The view, opinions, and/or findings contained in this material are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Government position, policy, or decision, unless designated by other documentation.

NO WARRANTY. THIS CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE MATERIAL IS FURNISHED ON AN "AS-IS" BASIS. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY MATTER INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OR MERCHANTABILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, OR RESULTS OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE MATERIAL. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM FROM PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT.

[DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] This material has been approved for public release and unlimited distribution. Please see Copyright notice for non-US Government use and distribution.


This material may be reproduced in its entirety, without modification, and freely distributed in written or electronic form without requesting formal permission. Permission is required for any other use. Requests for permission should be directed to the Software Engineering Institute at permission@sei.cmu.edu.

DM22-0896




Motivation













We have a safety method implemented using a black box where we enter information about the aircraft, the pilot, and the route. The black box tells us before takeoff if it is safe or unsafe to fly. Now, it says that it is safe.

Why should I

trust that this

flight is safe?






I have heard that there is real-time software in airplanes these days to ensure safe flights. I would feel safer boarding the airplane if the air hostess could explain how that works.

I wish that the academic community had developed explainable verification.


Problem: How to get developers and certifiers to trust FMs



Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute The Case for Explainability of Real-Time Systems and their Analyses © 2022 Carnegie Mellon University

Problem: How to get developers and certifiers to trust FMs


Why should I trust this? Some tool that I have never heard of and it is based on some theory that I have never heard of. There are 100s of theories and 1000s of tools, I can't learn all of them.



Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute The Case for Explainability of Real-Time Systems and their Analyses © 2022 Carnegie Mellon University

Problem: How to get developers and certifiers to trust FMs


And maybe the model that is taken as input is unfaithful to reality and maybe the model that is taken as input does not represent the developer's mental model of the real system.





Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute The Case for Explainability of Real-Time Systems and their Analyses © 2022 Carnegie Mellon University





Explanation of Analysis












































How much should one trust the FM tool that outputs answers?




If one does not know how the FM tool works, why should one trust it?




A Potential Future: A World With Explainability





A Potential Future: A World With Explainability





A Potential Future: A World With Explainability























occurs?


Explanability has the potential to make practitioners trust FM tools

Explanability has the potential to make sure our research becomes more valuable to practitioners




What Could an Explanation Look Like?



































Explanation of Input







Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute The Case for Explainability of Real-Time Systems and their Analyses © 2022 Carnegie Mellon University
















Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute




Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute





Thread 1
 t=now()+5
 while (1) {
 delay_until(t)
 do_work(1)
 t=t+5
 }


Thread 2
 t=now()+8
 while (1) {
 delay_until(t)
 do_work(4)
 t=t+8
 }




Developer












Thread 2 t=now()+8+rand(0,inf) while (1) { delay_until(t) do_work(rand(0,4)) t=t+8+rand(0,inf) }





Developer




Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute







Thread 2 t=now()+8+rand(0,inf) while (1) { delay_until(t) do_work(rand(0,4)) t=t+8+rand(0,inf) }




Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute


The Case for Explainability of Real-Time Systems and their Analyses \circledcirc 2022 Carnegie Mellon University


Developer

Thread 1
 t=now()+5+rand(0,inf)
 while (1) {
 delay_until(t)
 do_work(rand(0,1))
 t=t+5+rand(0,inf)
 }


```
Thread 2
  t=now()+8+rand(0,inf)
  while (1) {
    delay_until(t)
    do_work(rand(0,4))
    t=t+8+rand(0,inf)
  }
```










Thread 1 t=now()+11+rand(0,inf)while (1) { delay until(t) do work (rand(0, 4))t=t+11+rand(0,inf)Thread 2 t=now()+13+rand(0,inf)while (1) { delay until(t) do work(rand(0, 3)) t=t+13+rand(0,inf)













Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute

The Case for Explainability of Real-Time Systems and their Analyses \circledcirc 2022 Carnegie Mellon University











Problem: How to get developers and certifiers to trust FMs Solution: Use Explanations

I see that you have used a FM tool that uses explanations and how you used the explanations. So I trust that it is SAFE.



Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute The Case for Explainability of Real-Time Systems and their Analyses © 2022 Carnegie Mellon University

Problem: How to get developers and certifiers to trust FMs Solution: Use Explanations



Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute The Case for Explainability of Real-Time Systems and their Analyses © 2022 Carnegie Mellon University



Explainability of real-time systems and their analysis:

has the potential to make research results valuable to practitioners

is a new, rich, area of research