Definitions in propositional proofs

Eliminating definitions and Skolem functions in first-order logic

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Start with a standard axiomatic proof system for propositional logic, with modus ponens the only rule of inference.

Add definitions: iteratively introduce new variables P_{φ} and axioms $P_{\varphi} \leftrightarrow \varphi$.

Naive elimination of definitions can be exponential. Can one do better? In other words:

Are extended Frege systems p-equivalent to Frege systems?

This is a major open question.

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First-order logic

Let Γ be a set of first-order sentences in a language L, and let R_0, R_1, R_2, \ldots denote new relation symbols.

Definition 0.1 Say that Γ has an efficient elimination of definitions if there is a polynomial p(x) such that if d is a proof of a formula ψ in L from

 $\Gamma \cup \{ \forall \vec{x}_0 \ (R_0(\vec{x}_0) \leftrightarrow \varphi_0(\vec{x}_0)), \dots, \\ \forall \vec{x}_k \ (R_k(\vec{x}_k) \leftrightarrow \varphi_k(\vec{x}_k)) \},$

where each φ_i involves at most R_0, \ldots, R_{i-1} , then there is a proof d' of ψ from Γ using only formulae in L, with $|d'| \leq p(|d|)$.

This definition is monotone in Γ : if Γ has an efficient elimination of definitions and $\Gamma' \supseteq \Gamma$ then so does Γ' .

Eliminating definitions

Theorem 0.2 $\{\exists x, y \ (x \neq y)\}$ has an efficient elimination of definitions.

Notes:

- Proof is not difficult (and may be folklore)
- Relies on equality
- Similar tricks have been used elsewhere

Corollary 0.3 First-order logic (with equality) has efficient elimination of definitions if and only if propositional logic does as well.

Corollary 0.4 One can eliminate " \leftrightarrow " efficiently from standard first-order proof systems.

The proof

Add constants a, b, with $a \neq b$. Code each natural number i as a sequence of values $a, a, \ldots, a, b, a, \ldots, a, a$ with b in the *i*th position.

Recursively define a sequence of formulae $\hat{\varphi}_i(\vec{z}, \vec{x})$ such that

- for each j < i, $\hat{\varphi}_i(\bar{j}, \vec{x})$ is equivalent to $\varphi_j(\vec{x})$, and
- $\hat{\varphi}_{i+1}$ is used only once in the definition of $\hat{\varphi}_i$.

For example, suppose φ_{i+1} is the formula

$$R_i(\vec{t}) \wedge \neg R_i(\vec{s})$$

Use a and b as truth values. Let $\theta(v, v')$ be

$$\begin{split} \forall \vec{x}, y \; ((R(\vec{x}) \leftrightarrow y = a) \rightarrow \\ (\vec{x} = \vec{t} \rightarrow y = v) \land (\vec{x} = \vec{s} \rightarrow y = v')). \end{split}$$

Then φ_{i+1} is equivalent to

$$\forall v, v' \ (\theta(v, v') \to (v = a \land v' \neq a)).$$

More generally:

- Put formulae in prenex form.
- If ↔ is not in the language, use positive and negative representations of each definition.

Skolem functions

A Skolem axiom has the form

$$\forall \vec{x}, y \; (\varphi(\vec{x}, y) \to \varphi(\vec{x}, f(\vec{x}))),$$

"if anything satisfies $\exists y \ \varphi(\vec{x}, y), \ f(\vec{x})$ does."

These can be eliminated from first-order proofs.

- Model-theoretic argument is easy.
- Syntactic arguments are harder, and worse than exponential.

Pudlák: Is there an example of a single Skolem axiom that cannot be eliminated efficiently?

Eliminating Skolem functions

Let Γ be a set of first-order sentences in a language L.

Definition 0.5 Say that Γ has an efficient elimination of Skolem functions if there is a polynomial p(x) such that if d is a proof of a formula ψ in L from

 $\Gamma \cup \{ \forall \vec{x}_0, y \; (\varphi_0(\vec{x}_0, y) \to \varphi_0(\vec{x}_0, f_0(\vec{x}_0))), \dots, \\ \forall \vec{x}_k, y \; (\varphi_k(\vec{x}_k, y) \to \varphi_k(\vec{x}_k, f_k(\vec{x}_k))) \},$

where each φ_i involves at most f_0, \ldots, f_{i-1} , then there is a proof d' of ψ from Γ using only formulae in L, with $|d'| \leq p(|d|)$.

By internalizing the model-theoretic argument, e.g. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory has efficient an elimination of Skolem functions.

How little can we get away with?

Coding finite functions

Definition 0.6 Say a set of sentences Γ codes finite functions (efficiently) if for each n there are

- a definable element, " \emptyset_n ";
- a definable relation, " $x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1} \in dom_n(p)$ ";
- a definable function, " $eval_n(p, x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1})$ "; and
- a definable function, " $p \oplus_n (x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1} \mapsto y)$ "

such that, for each n, Γ proves

- $\vec{x} \notin dom_n(\emptyset_n)$
- $\vec{w} \in dom_n(p \oplus (\vec{x} \mapsto y)) \leftrightarrow (\vec{w} \in dom_n(p) \lor \vec{w} = \vec{x})$
- $eval_n(p \oplus_n (\vec{x} \mapsto y), \vec{x}) = y$
- $\vec{w} \neq \vec{x} \rightarrow eval_n(p \oplus_n (\vec{x} \mapsto y), \vec{w}) = eval_n(p, \vec{w}),$

and such that the lengths of all the definitions and proofs are bounded by a polynomial in n.

Intuition: $eval_n(p, x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1})$ means $p(x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1})$.

Any "sequential" theory meets these criteria.

The main theorem

Theorem 0.7 Suppose Γ codes finite functions. Then Γ has an efficient elimination of Skolem functions.

Notes:

- Use forcing to describe a generic extension of the universe with a new Skolem function.
- Conditions are finite partial functions approximating the Skolem function being added.
- This is familiar to set theorists, but a novel application to weak theories.
- Need to express the forcing relation in the underlying language.
- Only the iterated version needs definitions.

Outline of the argument:

- If Γ plus the Skolem axiom proves φ, Γ proves "φ is forced."
- If φ does not mention the Skolem function, then Γ proves φ .

The forcing definition

Let us deal with a single Skolem axiom. Cond(p) says p is a condition:

$$\forall \vec{x} \in dom(p) \; \forall y \; (\varphi(\vec{x}, y) \to \varphi(\vec{x}, p(x))).$$

For terms t involving f, define t^p inductively as follows:

- $x^p \equiv x$, for each variable x (other than p),
- $(g(t_0, \ldots, t_m))^p \equiv g(t_0^p, \ldots, t_m^p)$, for each function symbol g of L, and
- $(f(t_0,\ldots,t_n))^p \equiv p(t_0^p,\ldots,t_n^p).$

Define " t^p is defined" inductively as follows:

- " x^p is defined" is always true.
- " $(g(t_0, \ldots, t_m))^p$ is defined," where g is a function symbol of L, is true if and only if t_0^p, \ldots, t_m^p are all defined.
- " $(f(t_0, \ldots, t_n))^p$ is defined" is true if and only if t_0^p, \ldots, t_n^p are all defined and $t_0^p, \ldots, t_n^p \in dom(p)$.

The forcing definition (cont'd)

If p and q are conditions, say $p \leq q$, "p is stronger than or equal to q," if p extends q as a function:

 $\forall \vec{x} \ (\vec{x} \in dom(q) \to \vec{x} \in dom(p) \land p(\vec{x}) = q(\vec{x})).$

Define the relation $p \Vdash \theta$ inductively:

p ⊨ R(t₀,...,t_m) ≡ ∀q ≤ p ∃r ≤ q (t^r₀,...,t^r_m are all defined and R(t^r₀,...,t^r_m)).
p ⊨ θ ∧ η ≡ p ⊨ θ and p ⊨ η.
p ⊨ θ → η ≡ ∀q ≤ p (q ⊨ θ → q ⊨ η).
p ⊨ ¬θ ≡ ∀q ≤ p q ⊭ θ.
p ⊨ ∀x θ ≡ ∀x p ⊨ θ.
The quantifiers involving q and r range over conditions.

" θ is forced", written $\Vdash \theta$, means $\forall p \ (p \Vdash \theta)$,

The main lemmata

Lemma 0.8 (monotonicity) For each formula θ of L_f , Γ proves $p \Vdash \theta \land q \preceq p \rightarrow q \Vdash \theta$. Lemma 0.9 For each formula θ of L_f , Γ proves $p \Vdash \theta \leftrightarrow \forall q \preceq p \exists r \preceq q \ r \Vdash \theta$. Corollary 0.10 For each formula θ of L_f , Γ proves $\Vdash (\theta \leftrightarrow \neg \neg \theta)$. Lemma 0.11 For any term t of L_f , Γ proves $\forall q \exists r \preceq q \ (t^r \ is \ defined)$. Lemma 0.12 For each formula θ of L_f , if θ is provable in classical first-order logic, then Γ proves $\Vdash \theta$. Lemma 0.13 Γ proves $\Vdash \forall \vec{x}, y \ (\varphi(\vec{x}, y) \rightarrow \varphi(\vec{x}, f(\vec{x})))$. Lemma 0.14 For each formula θ of L, Γ proves $(p \Vdash \theta) \leftrightarrow \theta$.

For nested Skolem axioms, use an iteration, with definitions.

Questions

- 1. Can one eliminate definitions efficiently in the propositional case?
- 2. Can one eliminate Skolem functions efficiently in pure first order logic?
- 3. What can one say about first-order definitions in the absence of equality?
- 4. What can one say about eliminating " \leftrightarrow " in the absence of equality?
- 5. What can one say about intuitionistic theories?
- 6. Are there other interesting applications of forcing arguments "low down"?