Market-making with Search and Information Frictions

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- How should we expect these changes to affect ...
 - market liquidity? (bid-ask spreads, price impact, volume, ...)
 - o consumer surplus/welfare??

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- Predictions from model with only search frictions true when both frictions are present?
- Challenge: existing lit studies two frictions in isolation, need unified framework...

- Develop a unified framework to study a dynamic asset market with:
 - asymmetric information
 - trading frictions

where

- dealers learn over time from market-wide trading activity
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- dealers learn over time from market-wide trading activity
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• Key result: more frequent trading opportunities slows down dealers' learning

- \Rightarrow speeding up trading does not necessarily improve market liquidity
 - $\bullet~$ e.g., bid-ask spreads can $\uparrow~$ or $\downarrow~$
- $\Rightarrow\,$ the value of speed depends on severity of info frictions
 - e.g., trading speed more valuable for investment grade vs. high yield bonds

Literature

Market-making with asymmetric information

- "Small" informed traders, dealers learn from individual trades: Glosten-Milgrom(1985), ...
- "Large" informed trader, dealers learn from aggregate trade: Kyle(1985),...
- This paper: "small" informed traders, dealers learn from aggregate trade, search & market power

Market-making with search frictions

- Full info: Duffie, Garleanu & Pedersen(2005), Lagos & Rocheteau(2009)...
- Private info, private values: Spulber(1996), Lester, Rocheteau & Weill (2015)...
- This paper: private information about common values (adverse selection), learning

Decentralized trading with adverse selection

- Idiosyncratic: Inderst(2005), Guerrieri-Shimer-Wright(2010), Camargo & Lester(2014), Lauermann & Wolinsky(2016), Kim (2017)...
- Aggregate: Wolinsky(1990), Blouin & Serrano(2001), Duffie, Malamud & Manso(2009), Golosov, Lorenzoni & Tsyvinski(2014)...
- This paper: Learning from market-wide activity, effect of info frictions on bid-ask spread

the economic environment

- Discrete time, infinite horizon
- A market for a single asset, quality (state of the world) is either I or h

• A continuum of traders

- can hold $q \in \{0,1\}$ units of the asset
- with probability 1δ in each period, asset matures (game ends)
- $\bullet\,$ traders have private info about asset quality + their own preferences
- A continuum of dealers
 - can hold unrestricted positions (long or short)
 - less informed (ex ante) about asset quality, but learn from trading activity

Given state of world $j \in \{I, h\}$,

- trader *i* who owns an asset receives:
 - flow payoff $\omega_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}$ per period
 - terminal payoff c_i upon maturity, with $c_h > c_l$

with

- $\omega_t \sim F(\omega) =$ market-wide liquidity shock, mean zero, iid over time
- $\varepsilon_{i,t} \sim G(\varepsilon) = \text{idiosyncratic liquidity shock, mean zero, iid over time}$
- For each unit he holds, dealer receives:
 - payoff v_i at maturity, with $v_h > v_l$
 - no liquidity shocks

- Each period, trader meets a dealer with probability π
- Dealer offers to buy at bid price B_t , sell at ask price A_t
 - Monopolist case: single dealer makes a take-it-or-leave-it-offer
 - 2 Competitive case: two or more dealers engage in Bertrand competition
 - Solution Mixed case: probability α_m of monopolist meeting, $\alpha_c = 1 \alpha_m$ comp meeting

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- Trader accepts or rejects
 - if she rejects, no trade occurs in that period

After trades occur in each period, dealers observe total trading volume

Two sources of uncertainty for dealers:

- asset quality: common value
- aggregate liquidity shock: private value

 \Rightarrow volume is a noisy signal about asset quality

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Dealers are informationally small and all have common beliefs

• Beliefs summarized by $\mu_t \equiv \operatorname{Prob}_t(j = h)$

characterizing equilibrium

Outline

We need to characterize:

- Traders' behavior: when to buy/sell
- Dealers' behavior: optimal bid and ask prices
- Evolution of dealers' beliefs
- Distribution of assets across traders & dealers

Traders' Optimal Behavior

- $W_{j,t}^q \equiv$ value of owning $q \in \{0,1\}$ units of quality $j \in \{l,h\}$ asset at t
- Given bid and ask prices (B_t, A_t) and shocks $(\varepsilon_{i,t}, \omega_t)$,
 - Owner should sell if $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ sufficiently small, hold otherwise:

$$B_t + W_{j,t+1}^0 \ge \varepsilon_{i,t} + \omega_t + W_{j,t+1}^1$$

• Non-owner should buy if $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ sufficiently large, do nothing otherwise:

$$-A_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} + \omega_t + W_{j,t+1}^1 \ge W_{j,t+1}^0$$

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• $R_{j,t} = W_{j,t}^1 - W_{j,t}^0 \equiv$ reservation value at t when quality is $j \in \{l, h\}$

• Owner *i* sells iff

$$\varepsilon_{i,t} \leq \underline{\varepsilon}_{j,t} \equiv B_t - R_{j,t+1} - \omega_t$$

• Non-owner *i* buys iff

$$\varepsilon_{i,t} \geq \overline{\varepsilon}_{j,t} \equiv A_t - R_{j,t+1} - \omega_t$$

• Reservation values satisfy

$$R_{j,t} = (1 - \delta)c_j + \delta \mathbb{E}[R_{j,t+1}] + \delta \pi \mathbb{E}\left[\underbrace{\Omega_{j,t+1}}_{\text{Net option value}}\right]$$

where

$$\Omega_{j,t} = \underbrace{\max\{B_t - R_{j,t+1} - \omega_t - \varepsilon_{i,t}, 0\}}_{\text{option to sell}} - \underbrace{\max\{-A_t + R_{j,t+1} + \omega_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}, 0\}}_{\text{option to buy}}$$

 $N_{j,t}^q$ = measure of traders holding $q \in \{0,1\}$ units of asset when quality is $j \in \{l,h\}$

$$\begin{split} N_{j,t+1}^{1} &= \left\{ N_{t}^{1} \left[\underbrace{1-\pi}_{\text{no meeting}} + \underbrace{\pi \left(1 - G(\underline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}) \right)}_{\text{meeting, no sell}} \right] + N_{t}^{0} \underbrace{\pi \left(1 - G(\overline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}) \right)}_{\text{meet & buy}} \right\} \\ N_{j,t+1}^{0} &= \left\{ N_{t}^{1} \pi G(\underline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}) + N_{t}^{0} \left[1 - \pi + \pi G(\overline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}) \right] \right\}. \end{split}$$

Dealers observe past volume

 \Rightarrow they know N_t^q when setting (B_t, A_t) .

Dealer chooses (A_t, B_t) to maximize

$$\mathbb{E}_{j,\omega}\left[\frac{N_t^0}{N_t^0+N_t^1}\left(1-G(\overline{\varepsilon}_{j,t})\right)(A_t-v_j)+\frac{N_t^1}{N_t^0+N_t^1}G(\underline{\varepsilon}_{j,t})(v_j-B_t)\right]$$

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Notice pricing problem is static and separable

- No dynamic inventory considerations
 - · dealers can hold unrestricted positions, have deep pockets

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Notice pricing problem is static and separable

- No dynamic inventory considerations
 - · dealers can hold unrestricted positions, have deep pockets
- No motive for experimentation
 - continuum of traders & dealers
 - support of shocks is "large enough"
 - shocks are uncorrelated with state of the world

No Experimentation

As a result, optimal prices satisfy:

$$A_{t} = \mathbb{E}_{j} v_{j} + \underbrace{\frac{1 - \mathbb{E}_{j,\omega} \left[G\left(\overline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}\right) \right]}{\mathbb{E}_{j,\omega} \left[g\left(\overline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}\right) \right]}}_{\text{market power}} + \underbrace{\mu_{t} (1 - \mu_{t}) (v_{h} - v_{l}) \frac{\mathbb{E}_{\omega} \left[g\left(\overline{\varepsilon}_{h,t}\right) - g\left(\overline{\varepsilon}_{l,t}\right) \right]}{\mathbb{E}_{j,\omega} \left[g\left(\overline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}\right) \right]}}_{\text{asymmetric information}}$$

$$B_{t} = \mathbb{E} v_{j} - \frac{\mathbb{E}_{j,\omega} \left[G\left(\underline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}\right) \right]}{\mathbb{E}_{j,\omega} \left[g\left(\underline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}\right) \right]} - \mu_{t} (1 - \mu_{t}) (v_{h} - v_{l}) \frac{\mathbb{E}_{\omega} \left[g\left(\underline{\varepsilon}_{l,t}\right) - g\left(\underline{\varepsilon}_{h,t}\right) \right]}{\mathbb{E}_{j,\omega} \left[g\left(\underline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}\right) \right]}.$$

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$$B_{t} = \mathbb{E}_{j}v_{j} - \frac{\mathbb{E}_{j,\omega}\left[G\left(\underline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}\right)\right]}{\mathbb{E}_{j,\omega}\left[g\left(\underline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}\right)\right]} - \underbrace{Cov\left(\frac{g\left(\underline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}\right)}{\mathbb{E}_{j,\omega}\left[g\left(\underline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}\right)\right]}, v_{j}\right)}\right)$$

Bertrand competition \Rightarrow zero profits (*a la* Glosten-Milgrom)


$$A_t = \frac{\mathbb{E}_{j,\omega} \left[v_j \left(1 - G(\overline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}) \right) \right]}{\mathbb{E}_{j,\omega} \left[\left(1 - G(\overline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}) \right) \right]}$$

$$B_t = \frac{\mathbb{E}_{j,\omega} \left[v_j G(\underline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}) \right]}{\mathbb{E}_{j,\omega} \left[G(\underline{\varepsilon}_{j,t}) \right]}$$

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asymmetric information

Monopoly vs. Competitive (Ask) Prices



Two key differences:

- Competitive price has no markup/market power term.
- PDF vs. CDF:
 - · Monopolist's optimal price depends on mass of marginal investors
 - Competitive price requires equal profits on average

Evolution of Beliefs

Information: Dealers see volume at end of t (buys and sells), or equivalently

$$\underline{\varepsilon}_t = B_t - R_{t+1} - \omega_t$$
 or $\overline{\varepsilon}_t = A_t - R_{t+1} - \omega_t$

where $R_{t+1} = R_{j,t+1}$ if asset is of quality j

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Beliefs then evolve according to

$$\mu_{t+1} = \frac{\mu_t f\left(\omega_{h,t}^{\star}\right)}{\mu_t f\left(\omega_{h,t}^{\star}\right) + (1-\mu_t) f\left(\omega_{l,t}^{\star}\right)} = \frac{\mu_t}{\mu_t + (1-\mu_t) \frac{f\left(\omega_t + R_{j,t+1}(\mu_{t+1}) - R_{l,t+1}(\mu_{t+1})\right)}{f\left(\omega_t + R_{j,t+1}(\mu_{t+1}) - R_{h,t+1}(\mu_{t+1})\right)}}$$

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
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
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Learning process depends on $R_{h,t+1} - R_{l,t+1}$


• Trading typically more informative when the reservation values are very different




• Belief evolution depends on basic signal extraction



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• Belief evolution depends on basic signal extraction



- Belief evolution depends on basic signal extraction
- Easy to see signal extraction problem more difficult if reservation values close together

- Traders buy and sell according to $R_j(\mu)$, $\underline{\varepsilon}_j(\mu, \omega)$, and $\overline{\varepsilon}_j(\mu, \omega)$
- 2 Dealers price according to $A(\mu)$ and $B(\mu)$
- Solution Demographics evolve according to $N_i^0(\mu, \omega)$ and $N_i^1(\mu, \omega)$

a tractable case

The Uniform-Uniform Model

Assumptions:

- $v_j = c_j$ for $j \in \{I, h\}$
- 2 $\varepsilon_{i,t} \sim U(-e,e)$ and $\omega_t \sim U(-m,m)$

 \bigcirc e and m are sufficiently large s.t. thresholds are always interior

$$\alpha_c > 0$$

Uniform distributions simplify both learning and pricing

- learning: dealers either learn nothing or everything
- pricing: linear demand and supply functions

Given simple rules for pricing, updating beliefs and prices, we can...

- characterize (unique) equilibrium
- study relationship between search frictions and learning
- explore implications for liquidity, gains from trade, ...

Recall: updating equation depends on

$$\frac{f(\omega_l^{\star})}{f(\omega_h^{\star})} = \frac{f(S-R_l)}{f(S-R_h)}$$

Guess and verify


$$\mu'(\mu, S) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } S \in \Sigma_l(\mu) \equiv [-m + R_l(0), -m + R_h(\mu)) \\ \mu & \text{if } S \in \Sigma_b(\mu) \equiv [-m + R_h(\mu), m + R_l(\mu)] \\ 1 & \text{if } S \in \Sigma_h(\mu) \equiv (m + R_l(\mu), m + R_h(1)]. \end{cases}$$

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
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Learning in the Uniform-Uniform Model

In candidate eqm, learning process summarized by $\mathbb{P}(quality revealed)$:

$$p(\mu) = \frac{R_h(\mu) - R_l(\mu)}{2m}$$



How does a higher π affect $R_h - R_l$?

$$R_h - R_l = (1 - \delta) (c_h - c_l) + \delta \mathbb{E}[R'_h - R'_l] + \delta \pi \mathbb{E}(\Omega'_h - \Omega'_l)$$

where Ω_i = option value of selling – option value of buying

Result

 $R_h - R_l$ is decreasing in π .

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 $R_h - R_l$ is decreasing in π .

- $\Omega_h' \Omega_l' < 0$: Option to sell (buy) is worth less (more) when quality is high
- Higher π increases the weight of the net option value, bringing R_h and R_l closer
- Intuition: investors behave more alike in two states when more opportunities to trade

Putting it together:

- Time to learn $(\frac{1}{p(\mu)})$ is decreasing in $R_h(\mu) R_l(\mu)$
- 2 $R_h(\mu) R_l(\mu)$ is decreasing in trading frequency (π)

$$\Rightarrow \frac{1}{\textit{p}(\mu)}$$
 is increasing in π

Result

Ceteris paribus, dealers learn more slowly in markets with more frequent trading opportunities

Implication #1: Search Frictions and Bid-ask Spreads

Implied bid-ask spread σ given current beliefs $\mu \in (0, 1)$:

$$\sigma(\mu) = e - \alpha_c \sqrt{e^2 - 4Cov(r_j, v_j)}$$

where

$$r_{j}=p(\mu)R_{j}\left(\mathbf{1}_{j=h}
ight)+\left(1-p(\mu)
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where

$$r_j = p(\mu)R_j(\mathbf{1}_{j=h}) + (1 - p(\mu))R_j(\mathbf{1}_{j=l}).$$

Result

() Spread is
$$\bigcap$$
-shaped in μ , maximized at $\mu = 1/2$.

2 Holding μ fixed, spread is decreasing in π .

Therefore, two opposing effects on spread from decreasing search frictions ($\pi \uparrow$):

- Static: spread ↓ as competition ↑
- **Dynamic:** $(R_h R_l) \downarrow \Rightarrow$ learning slows \Rightarrow more uncertainty \Rightarrow spread \uparrow

Numerical simulation: j = h, $\mu = 1/2$, $\pi \in \{0.25, .75\}$.




Figure: Average Spread Over Time




Figure: Average Beliefs Over Time

- $\pi \uparrow$ causes fall in spread in current period
- $\pi \uparrow$ causes slower learning, higher spreads in **future periods**

Implication #2: The Value of Trading Speed Across Assets

How much would customers pay (ex ante) to increase π ? How does it depend on μ ?

$$W^1 = \mu W^1_h(\mu) + (1-\mu) W^1_l(\mu)$$

Result

When π and δ are sufficiently large, $\frac{\partial^2 W^1}{\partial \pi \partial \mu} > 0$ for $\mu \in [0.5, 1]$

- Trading speed can be more valuable for assets with less informational sensitivity
- Consistent with less migration of HY bonds to electronic platforms

numerical analysis

Relax previous assumptions on distributions, valuations:

- $\omega_t \sim N(0, \sigma_{\omega}^2)$ $\varepsilon_{i,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\varepsilon}^2)$
- $v_j = c_j + \xi$

Additional, higher order terms complicate analysis

But, model easily solved computationally


- Guess $R_j(\mu)$ for j = I, h
- Given R_j , determine dealers' evolution of beliefs μ^+
- Given future beliefs and R_j , compute $A(\mu)$ and $B(\mu)$
- Update guess of R_j until convergence

- Model period set to one week
- Distributions of shocks: $\omega_t \sim N(0, \sigma_{\omega}^2)$ $\varepsilon_{i,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\varepsilon}^2)$
- No gains from trade (on average) between dealers and investors ($v_j = c_j$)
- Remaining parameters approximate evidence from AAA-rated 5-year corporate bond

Parameter	Value	Target	Source
$v_h - v_l$	\$0.95	Impact of rating downgrade	Feldhutter (2012b)
μ_0	0.5	Probability of (AAA $ ightarrow$ AA) downgrade	S&P
$\sigma_{\omega}^2=\sigma_{\varepsilon}^2$	0.16	Avg. gains to trade	Feldhutter (2012a)
δ	0.9	sensitivity	


Frictions, beliefs, and spreads

• Initial beliefs $\mu_0 = 0.5$ and true quality j = h



- $\pi \uparrow$ causes fall in spread in current period
- π \uparrow causes slower learning, higher spreads in **future periods** spreads

Effect of π on volume and price impact (low π , med π , high π)




• Price impact behaves similarly to spreads, but not volume

• Note: spreads and volume can move in same direction, as in data

stationary version

Stationary Version

- Asset quality j changes over time (with probability $\rho = 0.05\%$)
- Other elements exactly the same as before
- \Rightarrow Non-trivial belief distribution in the long run (stochastic steady state)



low π =0.55, med π = 0.75, high π = 0.95

Welfare

Reducing trading frictions causes:


- more opportunities to trade (meetings)
- but potentially less trades per meeting


Welfare

Reducing trading frictions causes:

- more opportunities to trade (meetings)
- but potentially less trades per meeting

Under this calibration, first effect dominates second.





Wider spreads do not imply lower welfare

A dynamic model with two canonical frictions

• asymmetric information and infrequent trading opportunities/market power

Frictions interact in novel ways

- mitigating one could lead to wider spreads
- model helpful for understanding recent changes in OTC markets

Next steps

- Effects of reducing information frictions, increasing transparency?
- Empirically disentangling the two frictions?

- From individual trader, dealer can learn at most $R_{j,t} + \omega_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}$
- From market volume, dealer will learn $R_{j,t} + \omega$
- Since ε_{i,t} independent of the state, j, information in market volume dominates information that can be learned from a single trade
 - dominates in sense that dealer unwilling to pay any cost to learn $R_{j,t} + \omega_t + \varepsilon$

► Back

Corporate Bond Market (from SIFMA report)

