


Max-matching vs. Min-cover


Theorem. The largest number of edges in a matching does not exceed the smallest number of vertices in a cover

Proof.

Since each vertex in a cover C incident with at most one edge in matching M, then $C \ge M$.

max-matching is in P min-cover is in NP





There are n men and n women. Each one has a complete ordered preference list for those of the other sex. Men's preferences Women's preferences 1-2413 1-2143 2-3142 2-4312 3 - 2 3 1 4 3-1432 4 - 4 1 3 2 4-2143 The goal is to pair the men with the women. Does a matching exist? What criteria to use?

Does a matching exist?

It's a <u>complete</u> bipartite graph

every man-woman edge is present

so clearly there's a perfect matching

by Hall's Theorem

What criteria to use?

More Than One Notion of What Constitutes A "Good" Pairing


Maximizing total satisfaction

Maximizing the minimum satisfaction

Minimizing maximum difference in mate ranks

Maximizing people who get their first choice





Stable Matchings								
	and women is called stable is no unstable pairs.							
Men's preferences 1 - 3 1 2 2 - 3 2 1 3 - 1 2 3	Women's preferences 1 - 3 2 1 2 - 2 1 3 3 - 2 3 1							
Stable matching: (1,2) (2,3) (3,1)	Unstable matching: (1,3) (2,2) (3,1) Find the unstable pair (2,3)							
	(2,3)							

National Residency Match

- About 4000 hospitals try to fill 20,000+ positions.
- Students apply and interview at hospitals in the fall.
- In February, students and hospitals state their preferences
 - Each student submits rank-order list of hospitals
- Each hospital submits rank-order list of students
- Computer algorithm generates an assignment.

Matching applications galore!


What are the common features of these problems?

- Two sides of the market to be matched.
- Participants on one or both sides care about to whom they are matched.
- For whatever reason, money cannot be used to determine the assignment.

Examples

- Housing assignment
- Fraternity/sorority rush
- MBA course allocation
- Dating websites
- College admissions
- Judicial clerkships
- Military postings
- NCAA football bowls

Given a set of preference lists, how do we find a stable matching?



Gale-Shapely Theorem (1965)

Theorem.

Stable matching is always possible.

We will prove this theorem by presenting an algorithm that always returns a stable matching.

Basic principle: Man proposes, woman disposes

Algorithm: a general idea

Each unattached man proposes to the highest-ranked woman in his list, who has not already rejected him.

If the man proposing to her is better than her current mate, the woman dumps her current partner, and becomes engaged to the new proposer.

Continue until all men are attached, and we get a stable matching.

Stable Matching Algorithm

LIST={1,...,n}: list of unattached men. cur(m): highest ranked woman in m's list, who has not rejected him.

Take a man, say, Bob, from the LIST. Bob proposes to Alice, where Alice = cur(Bob).

If Alice unattached, Bob and Alice are engaged.

If Alice is engaged to, say, John, but prefers Bob, she dumps John, and Bob and Alice are engaged. Otherwise, she rejects Bob.

The rejected man rejoins LIST, and updates his cur. Stop when LIST is empty.

Exercise

Given these preferences. Find a stable matching.

Men's preferences				Women's preferences					
1	2	4	1	3	1	2	1	4	3
2	3	1	4	2	2	4	3	1	2
3	2	3	1	4	3	1	4	3	2
4	4	1	3	2	4	2	1	4	3
		Mar	n pro	poses	woman o	disp	oses	3	

Exercise												
Given these preferences. Find a stable matching.												
Men's preferences							Women's preferences					
1	2	4	1	3			1	2	1	4	3	
2	3	1	4	2			2	4	3	1	2	
3	2	3	1	4			3	1	4	3	2	
4	4	1	3	2			4	2	1	4	3	
Algorithm												
			1	2	4							
			2	3								
			3	2								
			4	4		1						

For any given instance of the stable marriage problem, the Gale-Shapley algorithm terminates, and, on termination, the engaged pairs constitute a stable matching. First we make the following simple observations: (1) The engagement always forms a matching. (2) Once a woman is engaged, she remains engaged. (3) Each new engagement is a better man for her. A man cannot be rejected by all women. Because if he is, then all women must be engaged, which is impossible. The algorithm terminates in at most n² iterations.

Remains to prove the matching is always stable.

Why is it stable?

Suppose the resulting matching has a unstable pair (Mark, Laura).

Mark must have proposed to Laura at some point.

During the algorithm, Laura also rejected Mark in favor of some she prefers more.

Laura's current partner must be more desirable than Mark.

Thus, the pair (Mark, Laura) is not unstable.

Question about this algorithm

Notice that our algorithm is asymmetrical. It does not treat men and women the same way.

Do you think this algorithm is better for the men or for the women?

If you reverse the roles, would it lead to better results for the women, or the men?

Answer: The algorithm is better for the men. In fact it's the best possible.

This algorithm matches every man with his best woman!

Thus, this is the man-optimal algorithm.

Theorem: Gale-Shapley algorithm finds MAN-OPTIMAL stable matching!

Man m is a valid partner of woman w if there exists some stable matching in which they are married.

Man-optimal assignment: every man receives best valid partner.

<u>Theorem</u>: Gale-Shapley algorithm finds MAN-OPTIMAL stable matching!

Proof (by contradiction): Let Tom be paired <u>Tom-Amy</u> with someone other than his best partner. <u>Steve-Lucy</u> Thus he is the first man rejected by a valid partner, say Amy.

Μ

When Tom is rejected, Amy gets engaged with Steve. Amy prefers Steve to Tom.

Steve not rejected by any valid partner, since Tom is the first to be rejected by valid partner. Thus, Steve prefers Amy to Lucy. But Amy prefers Steve to Tom.

Thus (Amy, Steve) is unstable pair in M.


<u>Theorem</u>:


Gale-Shapley algorithm finds WOMAN-PESSIMAL matching.


Each woman married to the worst valid partner.


How would you fix this?


Woman proposes, man disposes




















Fleury's Algorithm

The postponing of the use of bridges is really the critical feature of this algorithm, and its purpose is to avoid becoming trapped in some component of G.


Checking for bridges is expensive, so the algorithm might run in $O(E^2)$ time.







The answer is yes!




Showing that a graph is not Hamiltonian


There are three simple rules that based on observation that any Hamiltonian cycle must contain exactly two edges incident on each vertex.

Rule 1. If a vertex has degree 2, both edges must be on a cycle.

Rule 2. No cycles can be formed until all the vertices have been visited

Rule 3. Once we use two edges at a vertex, all other (unused) incident edges must be removed from consideration.





The Hamiltonian cycle

No property is known to efficiently verify existence of a Hamiltonian cycle/path for general graphs.

Here is a sufficient condition:

Theorem: If G is a simple graph with $n \ge 3$ vertices such that the degree of every vertex is at least n/2, then G has a Hamiltonian cycle.

Theorem: If G is a simple graph with $n \ge 3$ vertices such that the deg(u) + deg(v) $\ge n$ for every pair of nonadjacent vertices u and v, then G has a Hamiltonian cycle.

Hamiltonian problem is NP

This is a well known NP-complete problem

For general graph, we can not find an exactly linear time complexity algorithm to find a Hamiltonian cycle or path.

However, if such a path exist we can verify it in polynomial time.



Vertex Cover Stable Matching Gale-Shapely theorem Euler Cycle Hamiltonian Cycle

Here's What You Need to Know...