Contract-Based Verification of Timing Enforcers

[Extended Abstract]

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ABSTRACT

A timing enforcer not only allocates CPU cycles to threads but also uses timers to enforce time budgets. An approach for verifying safety properties of timing enforcers at the source code level is presented. We assume that the enforcer is implemented as a set of entry functions that are executed atomically on critical system-level events, such as arrival and departure of periodic jobs. The key idea is to express the safety property as an invariant, and prove that it is inductive across all the entry functions. The approach is validated by proving correctness of the enforcement of CPU cycle budgets for tasks by a mixed-criticality scheduler called ZSRM that is implemented in C. The inductiveness of the necessary ZSRM invariants is proved by expressing them as function contracts using the ACSL specification language, and verifying the contracts using the FRAMA-C tool.

Keywords

Contracts; Deductive Verification; Real-Time Scheduling

1. INTRODUCTION

We focus on the verification of a class of software that rely on the use of timers and clocks to implement their functionality. We call them Software with Timers and Clocks (STACs). STACs are at the heart of many real-time embedded software that perform safety-critical functions in systems we use in our daily lives (e.g., automobiles). A prime example is a real-time thread scheduler. Verifying their correctness is therefore very important.

This challenge is complicated by several factors. First, the semantics of STACs involve time. Timers and clocks are implemented by an OS sub-system that keeps track of time using special hardware (e.g., High Precision Event Timer and the time stamp counters). This must be modeled soundly. Second, STACs can behave incorrectly due to numeric overflows, which can violate monotonicity of timestamps maintained in variables with finite program types (such as int). Many software verification tools treat finite types as unbounded ones (e.g., int as integers) which is unsound for detecting numeric overflows. Finally, STACs use pointers and memory operations substantially since they are often high-performance system software. For example, a scheduler typically maintains active threads as a linked list which is dynamically updated as threads are created and destroyed.

Verifying correctness of pointer-manipulating programs is known to be challenging for software verification tools.

In this paper, we propose an approach to verify STACs at the source code level. In particular, we focus on verifying the correctness of timing enforcers that not only allocate CPU cycles to threads, but also enforce timing budgets. Our target is the ZSRM [5] mixed-criticality scheduler. ZSRM schedules threads (a.k.a. tasks) that execute a procedure periodically (such as a periodic execution is called a job). For instance, a video processing tasks executes a frame processing procedure (job) every 50ms for a video running at 20 frames per second. Our approach works as follows:

– We model the enforcer as a set of three functions: (i) init is invoked once at the very beginning to initialize the enforcer to a proper state; (ii) job_arrive is invoked when a job arrives, i.e., when the time reached the next period of the corresponding job; and (iii) job_depart is invoked when a job departs, i.e., the corresponding job function completes execution. These functions execute atomically, i.e., all interrupts are disabled during their execution.

– An execution of the enforcer consists of an initial execution of init followed by arbitrary many executions of job_arrive and job_depart. The correctness of the enforcer is expressed as an invariant Inv that it must maintain. To this end, we need to prove that: (a) init ensures Inv; and (b) job_arrive and job_depart preserve Inv, i.e., assuming they are invoked in a state where Inv holds, they terminate in a state where Inv also holds. We can express this using the following three Hoare triples: \{T\}init{Inv}, \{Inv\}job_arrive{Inv}, and \{Inv\}job_depart{Inv}.

– Given an implementation of the enforcer in C, we use the ACSL contract language to express these Hoare triples as function contracts. We then use the FRAMA-C [6] tool to discharge the contracts. FRAMA-C essentially constructs a verification condition from the C code and the ACSL [2] annotations and then proves it using a backend SMT solver.

Our approach overcomes the challenges mentioned earlier as follows. First, ACSL and FRAMA-C enable us to be sound w.r.t. numeric overflows, since the semantics of ACSL handles these correctly. Second, ACSL and FRAMA-C also enable us to verify enforcer implementations in the presence of pointers and memory operations. In particular, the expressiveness of ACSL allows us to specify loop invariants and supporting assertions involving pointers and structures. Finally, we handle time by encoding the semantics of timers and clocks as part of our invariant. In this rest of this paper, we present our approach and some preliminary results. We conclude with a survey of related work, and thoughts on ongoing and future work.

2. ZSRM SCHEDULING

As introduced before, ZSRM schedules threads (aka tasks) that execute a specific procedure periodically. Each such
execution is called a job. Formally, a task \( \tau_i \) is a tuple \((T_i, C_i, W_i^0, W_i^1)\), where \( T_i \) is its period, \( C_i \) is its criticality, \( W_i^0 \) is the nominal worst-case execution time of a job, and \( W_i^1 \) is the overload worst-case execution of a job. Tasks are scheduled under preemptive fixed-priority scheduling policy where the job of a task is allowed to run until it completes or a job of a higher-priority task arrives and preempts it. This ensures that the job executing is the one with the highest priority ready to execute. Priorities are assigned to tasks at creation time and never changed. These priorities are assigned in a rate-monotonic [9] fashion, i.e., tasks with shorter periods are assigned higher priorities.

**ZSRM schedulability.** Consider any job \( J_i \) of task \( \tau_i \) \((T_i, C_i, W_i^0, W_i^1)\) ZSRM provides the following guarantee: \( J_i \) is guaranteed to receive \( W_i^1 \) units of CPU time by its deadline if no job \( J_j \) of any other task \( \tau_j \) with a criticality higher than \( \tau_i \) \((C_j > C_i)\) executes for more than \( W_j^0 \).

ZSRM works in two stages. First, an offline analysis is performed to either declare the system to be unschedulable, or compute for each task \( \tau_i \) a zero-slack instance \( Z_i \). Informally, this is the last time at which jobs \( J_k \) of tasks \( \tau_k \) with lower criticality than \( \tau_i \) \((C_k < C_i)\) must be stopped to guarantee that \( \tau_i \) can execute for \( W_i^1 \) before its deadline. Next, at runtime the ZSRM scheduler uses timers to enforce the zero-slack instances (stopped lower-criticality tasks) as well as enforce that no job of any task \( \tau_i \) executes beyond its \( W_i^1 \). In this paper we focus on proving the correctness of the budget enforcement that guarantees that no task \( \tau_i \) executes beyond its \( W_i^1 \).

### 3. ZSRM SCHEDULER

The ZSRM scheduler is implemented in C as a Linux kernel module. The main global data structure used is an array of reserve structures (cf. Fig. 1), where each element represents a CPU budget (or CPU reservation) associated with a specific task. The scheduler maintains two linked lists of reserve structures: (i) the list of all tasks ordered by priority: this is maintained via the rm_next field; and (ii) the list of all reserves (and hence tasks) with active jobs (i.e., ready to execute) sorted by priority: this is maintained via the next field. Pointers to the heads of the two lists are stored in global variables rm_head and readyq respectively. Note that while the lists are updated dynamically by modifying their heads and the next and rm_next fields, the memory for the list elements are allocated statically via the array.

The other fields of struct reserve are: (i) pid stores the task’s process id; (ii) rid stores the element’s index, i.e., for any \( i \), we have reserve_table[i].rid = i; (iii) since ZSRM schedules preemptively, a job’s execution can be split up into segments by jobs with higher priority; start_ns and stop_ns record the starting and stopping times (in nanoseconds) of the most recently completed or ongoing job segment; these are used to compute a running count of the actual time allocated to the job, which is recorded in current_exectime_ns; (iv) exectime_ns is the maximum time that can be allocated to the job; (v) period and priority are self-explanatory; (vi) period_timer is used to enforce periodic job arrivals; and (vii) enforcement_timer is used to limit the job’s execution time.

Even though the reserve_table array has a fixed size, not all its elements are used at all times. Unused elements are identified by distinguished field values, usually 0 or NULL. Initially, all elements are unused. As new tasks are added dynamically at runtime, via an entry function create_reserve, they are assigned to unused elements.

The scheduler has three other entry functions besides create_reserve: (i) init is called once when the kernel module is loaded; (ii) job_arrive is called every time a new job is activated periodically with the index of the corresponding task in reserve_table as argument; and (iii) job_depart is called when the currently executing job completes, again with the index of the corresponding task as argument. All entry functions execute without preemption, and the call to job_arrive preempts the currently executing job if its priority is lower than the arriving job. Once an entry function terminates, the job corresponding to *readyq is executed.

### 4. ZSRM SCHEDULER INVARIANTS

Semantically, the ZSRM scheduler can be modeled as a sequential C program that first calls init, and then the other three entry functions in arbitrary order. It behaves correctly if it maintains a specific set of invariants across invocations of its entry functions. In this section, we describe these invariants and show how they are expressed via predicates and contracts in ACSL [2]. The predicates presented in this paper assume that the size of the reserve_table array (i.e., MAX_RESERVES) is 10. This can be changed to any positive integer, and our approach would still be applicable.

**Basic Predicates.** The following predicates represent basic useful concepts:

- A pointer is either the address of an element of reserve_table or NULL.

```c
/*@predicate fp12 = elemNull(rm_head);*/
(@predicate fp11 = elemNull(readyq);*/
/*@predicate fp12 = elemNull(rm_head);*/
```
The rid fields of reserve_table elements are correct (note that $\Rightarrow$ denotes logical implication in ACSL):

@predicate fp14 = \forall int i; 0 <= i < 10 ==> reserve_table[i].rid = i;*/

Linked List Predicates. Recall that the scheduler maintains two linked lists of tasks via the next and rm_next fields of the reserve structure. The following two predicates state that these fields are either NULL or point to some element of reserve_table:

/*@predicate fp21 = \forall struct reserve *p; elem(p) ==> elemNull(p->next);*/

The next predicate states that if there are two elements $p$ and $q$ of reserve_table such that $p->next$ points to $q$ then $p->priority > q->priority$.

/*@predicate fp31 = \forall struct reserve *p, *q; elem(p) ==> elemNull(p->next); elem(q) ==> (p->next == q) ==> (p->priority >= q->priority);*/

Note that predicates fp11 and fp31 together imply that the linked list obtained by starting with readyq and following the next field has monotonically non-increasing priority values. This shows that the scheduler correctly implements the preemptive fixed priority policy since the task corresponding to *readyq is the one scheduled at the end of each entry function. In fact, fp31 is a stronger condition than we need since it holds even for elements of reserve_table that are unreachable from readyq. However, it is easier to verify. Note also that since the memory for the linked list is statically allocated, we do not have to define and prove list-reachability predicates, which are substantially harder, and require reasoning about separation among heap fragments.

The next predicate states that if there are two elements $p$ and $q$ of reserve_table such that $p->rm_next$ points to $q$ then $p->period_ns <= q->period_ns$.

/*@predicate fp32 = \forall struct reserve *p, *q; elem(p) ==> elem(q) ==> (p->rm_next == q) ==> (p->period_ns <= q->period_ns);*/

Thus, the list of tasks starting with rm_head and following the rm_next field is sorted in increasing order of periods. We now turn our attention to predicates that involve time.

Time-Related Predicates. In this paper, we focus on verifying that the scheduler correctly enforces the maximum time budget $W_i$ of each job. This time budget is precomputed and stored in the execute_time_ns field of the reserve structure corresponding to the job’s task. In addition, a running count of the actual time used by the job is maintained in the current_execute_time_ns field, which is updated every time the job is preemted. The enforcement of the time budget is then expressed by the following predicate:

/*@predicate zsrm3 = \forall int i; 0 <= i < 10 ==>
reserve_table[i].current_execute_time_ns <= reserve_table[i].execute_time_ns;*/

The actual enforcement of the budget is achieved by ensuring that whenever a job is scheduled, its enforcement_timer is set to go off at the job’s time budget expiry time, and that the handler function for this timer terminates the job by sending an appropriate signal. Recall that the job to be scheduled is always pointed to by readyq. Hence, this condition is expressed by the following predicate:

/*@predicate zsrm2 = elem(readyq) ==> (readyq->enforcement_timer.expiration.tv_nsec <= 1000000000L +
readyq->execute_time_ns - readyq->current_execute_time_ns);*/

We verify that current_execute_time_ns records the “actual” time allocated to a job correctly as follows: (i) we introduce a global “ghost” variable now to represent physical time, following Abadi and Lamport [1]; (ii) we introduce a function stac_time and ensure that it is the only function used by the scheduler to obtain the current clock value; (iii) we provide the following ACSL contract for stac_time:

/*@requires \true; @assigns now; @ensures now > \old(now) & & \result == now;*/

In essence, this contract states that stac_time returns the “actual” time and time increases strictly across multiple invocations. Next, we add another ghost field real_execute_time_ns to the reserve structure to represent the “actual” time allocated to a job. We also add ghost code to update real_execute_time_ns of the active job, whenever it is preempted, in a trivially correct way using the now variable directly. The following predicate states that current_execute_time_ns always over-approximates real_execute_time_ns, which is sufficient to prove that the scheduler enforces $W_i$ correctly.

/*@predicate zsrm1 = \forall int i; 0 <= i < 10 ==>
reserve_table[i].real_execute_time_ns <=
reserve_table[i].current_execute_time_ns;*/

Verifying Predicate Inductiveness. The overall predicate that prove inductive across each entry function is the conjunction of all the predicates presented so far. We refer to this predicate as zsrm. To prove that zsrm is inductive across a function foo we add the following ACSL contract to foo:

/*@requires zsrm; @assigns assigns-list; @ensures zsrm; */

Informally, this contract states that if foo is executed in a state that satisfies zsrm then the state after its execution also satisfies zsrm, in effect that zsrm is inductive across foo’s execution. We then verify that the implementation of foo satisfies this contract using FRAMA-C. Note that assigns-list in the contract denotes a set of locations potentially modified by foo and is specific to the body of foo itself.

5. VERIFICATION

We verified the inductiveness of the predicate zsrm presented in Sec. 4 across all four entry functions of the zsrm scheduler. We used FRAMA-C, a deductive verifier for ANSI C programs annotated with function contracts and loop invariants using ACSL. FRAMA-C works by generating Floyd-Hoare [7] style verification conditions (VCs) from the annotated C program, and proving that the VCs are valid using
backend theorem provers, such as Coq, Z3, or CVC. FRAMA-C uses WHY3 programs as an intermediate format to represent and prove the VCs. We used FRAMA-C Aluminium, and WHY3 version 0.87.1, the latest available at the time of our experiments. FRAMA-C can use multiple SMT solver in parallel to discharge each VC. We used Z3 v4.2.1, CVC3 v2.4.1 and CVC4 v1.4, with a timeout of 200 seconds. Since FRAMA-C runs multiple solvers in parallel, it benefits from multi-core processors. All our experiments were done on a Intel Xeon E5-2687W v3 machine with 20 cores (40 hyper-threads) running at 3.1 GHz, and 120 GB RAM.

The implementation of ZSRM we verified consisted of about 20 functions (4 entry functions and 16 supporting ones) spread over 1100 lines of pure C (i.e., no assembly) and 340 lines of ACSL annotations. In the end, FRAMA-C could verify all contracts in about 17 minutes. We now present some salient aspects of this verification effort.

- We annotated all functions in the scheduler with contracts derived from the ZSRM predicate. Each function’s contract was verified separately, but the verification was compositional. Thus, if function \texttt{foo} calls \texttt{bar}, then when verifying the contract of \texttt{foo} FRAMA-C uses the contract of \texttt{bar} at its callsite. This makes our verification more tractable.
- To successfully prove the inductiveness of ZSRM, we needed to strengthen it with the following extra predicate:

```c
/*@predicate zsrm4 = \forall i; 0 <= i < 10 ==> 
 (reserve_table[i].enforcement_timer.expiration.tv_sec + 
 1000000000L + 
 reserve_table[i].enforcement_timer.expiration.tv_nsec) <= reserve_table[i].exectime_ns;*/
```

This is necessary to rule out numeric overflows and underflows when timestamp counters are updated. Note that sound C semantics used by FRAMA-C enables us to explicitly detect and fix such issues.

- We detected three bugs in the scheduler implementation. One was an “off-by-one” error where we had a > comparison instead of a >=. Another was a potential NULL pointer dereference. The last was a missing return statement. Unlike model checking, we do not get counterexamples during deductive verification. Instead, a bug results in a failed proof for a VC, and is discovered by inspecting the VC manually.

- In addition to function contracts, we added 10 loop invariants to enable FRAMA-C to complete verification successfully. In most cases, the loop invariants were simple, and required modest effort to construct. One particularly complicated case involved multiple nested loops.

- In some cases, FRAMA-C required “supporting assertions” to complete successful verification. In essence, this allows the use of Hoare’s chaining rule. For example, consider a program \(c_1; c_2\) where \(c_1\) denotes sequential composition. Suppose we have to prove \(\{P\}c_1; c_2(\alpha)\). The VC generated for this may be too difficult for an SMT solver. However, suppose we add an assertion \(\alpha\) after \(c_1\). Then proving \(\{P\}c_1; c_2(\alpha)\) is reduced by FRAMA-C to proving \(\{P\}c_1(\{\alpha\})\) and \(\{\alpha\}c_2(\alpha)\) separately. The VCs for these two sub-proofs are simpler and in practice easier to discharge.

We believe that both the annotation level and the verification effort are comparable to other recent deductive source code verification efforts. Moreover, the effort is justified since it targets a critical, continuously used, and rarely-updated component of safety-critical systems and the effort is amortized over the long deployment of such systems.

**Related Work.** There has been a recent resurgence of deductive software verification [10] driven by well-designed contract specification languages such as ACSL and Ada 2012 [3], SMT solvers such as Z3 and CVC, and auto-active verifiers such as FRAMA-C and Boogie. This technique has been used to verify complex software ranging from container libraries, numeric programs, to full-fledged operating systems [4, 8]. Our work aims to build on this work to verify timing enforcers. Timing enforcers, such as ZSRM [5], are typically verified at the protocol/algorithmic level. Our goal is to push verification closer to its actual implementation. Finally, the use of deductive verification for real-time systems has been performed [1] but the focus has been on models. In contrast, we focus on source code.

**Ongoing and Future Work.** We are currently finishing up the verification of ZSRM. Currently, we assume that \texttt{stac_time} returns the precise value of physical time. Of course, this is impossible since all computation takes time, and the value returned by \texttt{stac_time} must be less than physical time at the point where control returns to its caller. We must model this appropriately using contracts. This in turn requires defining a formal semantics of STACs, which is one of our goals. Finally, we aim to validate our approach on other timing enforcers besides ZSRM.

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6. REFERENCES


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