The Mind–Brain Identity Theory

A COLLECTION OF PAPERS
COMPILED, EDITED AND FURNISHED
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

C. V. Borst

CONTRIBUTORS
D. M. Armstrong, Kurt Baier, Robert Coburn, James Cornman
Herbert Feigl, Paul Feyerabend, J. M. Hinton, Norman Malcolm
Thomas Nagel, U. T. Place, Richard Rorty, Jerome Shaffer
J. J. C. Smart, Ernest Sosa, J. T. Stevenson, Charles Taylor

MACMILLAN
Foreword by the General Editor

The series of which the present volume is the second member is to consist largely but not entirely of material already published elsewhere in scattered sources. It is as a series distinguished by two guiding ideas. First, the individual editors of the various constituent volumes select and collect contributions to some important controversy which in recent years has been, and which still remains, alive. The emphasis is thus upon controversy, and upon the presentation of philosophers in controversial action. Second, the individual editors are encouraged to edit extensively and strongly. The idea is that they should act as firm, fair, and constructive chairmen. Such a chairman gives shape to a discussion and ensures that the several contributors are not merely heard, but heard at the moment when their contributions can be most relevant and most effective. With this in mind the contributions as they appear in these volumes are arranged neither in the chronological order of their first publication nor in any other and arbitrary sequence, but in such a way as to provide and to reveal some structure and development in the whole argument. Again, and for similar reasons, the editorial introductions are both substantial and forthcoming.

They can be seen as representing a deliberate rejection, at least within this special limited context, of the ‘throw-a-reading-list-at-them, send-them-away, and-see-next-week-whatever-they-havemade-of-it’ tutorial traditions of some ancient British universities.

The problem to which the Mind–Brain Identity Theory is offered as a solution was set by Descartes. For it was Descartes who persuaded modern philosophy to put enormous weight upon a fundamental distinction between mind and matter, consciousness and stuff. The problem is to say how the two can be, and are, related. Among the traditional answers have been epiphenomenalism, parallelism, and interactionism. The first of these urges that consciousness is some sort of result or property of a certain sort of material thing, but is incapable of any reciprocal effect on matter. Among the analogies
Sensations and brain processes

J. J. C. Smart

This paper\(^1\) takes its departure from arguments to be found in U. T. Place's\(^2\) Is consciousness a brain process?\(^2\) I have had the benefit of discussing Place's thesis in a good many universities in the United States and Australia, and I hope that the present paper answers objections to his thesis which Place has not considered and that it presents his thesis in a more nearly unobjectionable form. This paper is meant also to supplement the paper 'The "Mental" and the "Physical"'\(^3\) by H. Feigl,\(^4\) which in part argues for a similar thesis to Place's.

Suppose that I report that I have at this moment a roundish, blurry-edged after-image which is yellowish towards its edge and is orange towards its centre. What is it that I am reporting? One answer to this question might be that I am not reporting anything, that when I say that it looks to me as though there is a roundish yellow-orange patch of light on the wall I am expressing some sort of temptation, the temptation to say that there is a roundish yellow-orange patch on the wall (though I may know that there is not such a patch on the wall). This is perhaps Wittgenstein's view in the Philosophical Investigations (see sections 367, 370). Similarly, when I 'report' a pain, I am not really reporting anything (or, if you like, I am reporting in a queer sense of 'reporting'), but am doing

\(^1\) This is a very slightly revised version (which first appeared in The Philosophy of Mind, ed. V. G. Chappell (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1966)) of a paper which was first published in the Philosophical Review, xlviii (1959) pp. 141-56. Since that date there have been criticisms of my paper by J. T. Stevenson (see Paper VI), to which I have replied in Paper VII, and by G. Pitcher and by W. D. Joske, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, xxxvii (1966) pp. 150-60, to which I have replied in the same volume of that journal, pp. 252-4.

\(^2\) British Journal of Psychology, xlvii (1956) pp. 44-50; reprinted in this volume as Paper II. (Page references are to the reprint in this volume).

\(^3\) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, i, pp. 279-497.

\(^4\) Some philosophers of my acquaintance, who have the advantage over me in having known Wittgenstein, would say that this interpretation of him is too behaviouristic. However, it seems to me a very natural interpretation of his printed words, and whether or not it is Wittgenstein's real view it is certainly an interesting and important one. I wish to consider it here as a possible rival both to the 'brain-process' thesis and to straight-out old-fashioned dualism.


\(^6\) On this point, see Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam. 'Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis', in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, u pp. 3-36.
one sort of thing left outside the physicalist picture, and for various reasons I just cannot believe that this can be so. That everything should be explicable in terms of physics (together of course with descriptions of the ways in which the parts are put together—roughly, biology is to physics as radio-engineering is to electromagnetism) except the occurrence of sensations seems to me to be frankly unbelievable. Such sensations would be "nomological danglers", to use Feigl's expression. It is not often realised how odd would be the laws whereby these nomological danglers would dangle. It is sometimes asked, "Why can't there be psycho-physical laws which are of a novel sort, just as the laws of electricity and magnetism were novelties from the standpoint of Newtonian mechanics?" Certainly we are pretty sure in the future to come across new ultimate laws of a novel type, but I expect them to relate simple constituents: for example, whatever ultimate particles are then in vogue. I cannot believe that ultimate laws of nature could relate simple constituents to configurations consisting of perhaps billions of neurons (and goodness knows how many billion billions of ultimate particles) all put together for all the world as though their main purpose in life was to be a negative feedback mechanism of a complicated sort. Such ultimate laws would be like nothing so far known in science. They have a queer smell to them. I am just unable to believe in the nomological danglers themselves, or in the laws whereby they would dangle. If any philosophical arguments seemed to compel us to believe in such things, I would suspect a catch in the argument. In any case it is the object of this paper to show that there are no philosophical arguments which compel us to be dualists.

The above is largely a confession of faith, but it explains why I find Wittgenstein's position (as I construe it) so congenial. For on this view there are, in a sense, no sensations. A man is a vast arrangement of physical particles, but there are not, over and above this, sensations or states of consciousness. There are just behavioural facts about this vast mechanism, such as that it expresses a temptation (behaviour disposition) to say "there is a yellowish-red patch on the wall" or that it goes through a sophisticated sort of wince, that is, says "I am in pain." Admittedly Wittgenstein says that though the sensation "is not a something", it is nevertheless "not a nothing either" (section 304), but this need only mean that the word "ache" has a use. An ache is a thing, but only in the innocuous sense in which

---

* Wittgenstein did not like the word "disposition". I am using it to put in a nutshell (and perhaps inaccurately) the view which I am attributing to Wittgenstein. I should like to repeat that I do not wish to claim that my interpretation of Wittgenstein is correct. Some of those who knew him do not interpret him in this way. It is merely a view which I find myself extracting from his printed words and which I think is important and worth discussing for its own sake.

* See Place, p. 43; above; and Feigl, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ii, p. 390.
that the logic of a sensation statement is the same as that of a brain-process statement. All it claims is that in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain process. Sensations are nothing over and above brain processes. Nations are nothing 'over and above' citizens, but this does not prevent the logic of nation statements being very different from the logic of citizen statements, nor does it ensure the translatability of nation statements into citizen statements. (I do not, however, wish to assert that the relation of sensation statements to brain-process statements is very like that of nation statements to citizen statements. Nations do not just happen to be nothing over and above citizens, for example. I bring in the 'nations' example merely to make a negative point: that the fact that the logic of A-statements is different from that of B-statements does not ensure that A's are anything over and above B's.)

**Remarks on Identity**

When I say that a sensation is a brain process or that lightning is an electric discharge, I am using 'is' in the sense of strict identity. (Just as in the – in this case necessary – proposition '7 is identical with the smallest prime number greater than 5.') When I say that a sensation is a brain process or that lightning is an electric discharge I do not mean just that the sensation is somehow spatially or temporally continuous with the brain process or that the lightning is just spatially or temporally continuous with the discharge. When on the other hand I say that the successful general is the same person as the small boy who stole the apples I mean only that the successful general I see before me is a time slice of the same four-dimensional object of which the small boy stealing apples is an earlier time slice. However, the four-dimensional object which has the general-I-see-before-me for its late time slice is identical in the strict sense with the four-dimensional object which has the small-boy-stealing-apples for an early time slice. I distinguish these two senses of 'is identical with' because I wish to make it clear that the brain-process doctrine asserts identity in the strict sense.

I shall now discuss various possible objections to the view that

---


---

**Sensations and brain processes**

the processes reported in sensation statements are in fact processes in the brain. Most of us have met some of these objections in our first year as philosophy students. All the more reason to take a good look at them. Others of the objections will be more recondite and subtle.

**Objection 1.**

Any illiterate peasant can talk perfectly well about his after-images, or how things look or feel to him, or about his aches and pains, and yet he may know nothing whatever about neurophysiology. A man may, like Aristotle, believe that the brain is an organ for cooling the body without any impairment of his ability to make true statements about his sensations. Hence the things we are talking about when we describe our sensations cannot be processes in the brain.

**Reply.**

You might as well say that a nation of sluggards, who never saw the Morning Star or knew of its existence, or who had never thought of the expression 'the Morning Star', but who used the expression 'the Evening Star' perfectly well, could not use this expression to refer to the same entity as we refer to (and describe as) 'the Morning Star'.

You may object that the Morning Star is in a sense not the very same thing as the Evening Star, but only something spatio-temporally continuous with it. That is, you may say that the Morning Star is not the Evening Star in the strict sense of 'identity' that I distinguished earlier.

There is, however, a more plausible example. Consider lightning. Modern physics tells us that lightning is a certain kind of electrical discharge due to ionisation of clouds of water vapour in the atmosphere. This, it is now believed, is what the true nature of lightning is. Note that there are not two things: a flash of lightning and an electrical discharge. There is one thing, a flash of lightning, which is described scientifically as an electrical discharge to the earth from a cloud of ionised water molecules. The case is not at all like that of explaining a footprint by reference to a burglar. We say that what lightning really is, what its true nature as revealed by science is, is an electrical discharge. (It is not the true nature of a footprint to be a burglar.)

To forestall irrelevant objections, I should like to make it clear

---


12 See Place, p. 47, above; also Feigl in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, ii, p. 438.
that by ‘lightning’ I mean the publicly observable physical object lightning, not a visual sense-datum of lightning. I say that the publicly observable physical object lightning is in fact the electrical discharge, not just a correlate of it. The sense-datum, or rather the having of the sense-datum, the ‘look’ of lightning, may well in my view be a correlate of the electrical discharge. For in my view it is a brain state caused by the lightning. But we should no more confuse sensations of lightning with lightning than we confuse sensations of a table with the table.

In short, the reply to Objection 1 is that there can be contingent statements of the form ‘A is identical with B’, and a person may well know that something is an A without knowing that it is a B. An illiterate peasant might well be able to talk about his sensations without knowing about his brain processes, just as he can talk about lightning though he knows nothing of electricity.

**Objection 2.**

It is only a contingent fact (if it is a fact) that when we have a certain kind of sensation there is a certain kind of process in our brain. Indeed it is possible, though perhaps in the highest degree unlikely, that our present physiological theories will be as out of date as the ancient theory connecting mental processes withgoings on in the heart. It follows that when we report a sensation we are not reporting a brain process.

**Reply.**

The objection certainly proves that when we say ‘I have an after-image’ we cannot mean something of the form ‘I have such a and a such a brain process.’ But this does not show that what we report (having an after-image) is not in fact a brain process. ‘I see lightning’ does not mean ‘I see an electrical discharge.’ Indeed, it is logically possible (though highly unlikely) that the electrical discharge account of lightning might one day be given up. Again, ‘I see the Evening Star’ does not mean the same as ‘I see the Morning Star’, and yet ‘The Evening Star and the Morning Star are one and the same thing’ is a contingent proposition. Possibly Objection 2 derives some of its apparent strength from a ‘Fido’ – Fido theory of meaning. If the meaning of an expression were what the expression named, then of course it would follow from the fact that ‘sensation’ and ‘brain process’ have different meanings, that they cannot name one and the same thing.

**Objection 3.**

Even if Objections 1 and 2 do not prove that sensations are something over and above brain processes, they do prove that the qualities of sensations are something over and above the qualities of brain processes. That is, it may be possible to get out of asserting the existence of irreducibly psychic processes, but not out of asserting the existence of irreducibly psychic properties. For suppose we identify the Morning Star with the Evening Star. Then there must be some properties which logically imply that of being the Morning Star, and quite distinct properties which entail that of being the Evening Star. Again, there must be some properties (for example, that of being a yellow flash) which are logically distinct from those in the physicalist story.

Indeed, it might be thought that the objection succeeds at one jump. For consider the property of ‘being a yellow flash’. It might seem that this property lies inevitably outside the physicalist framework within which I am trying to work (either by ‘yellow’ being an objective emergent property of physical objects, or else by being a power to produce yellow sense-data, where ‘yellow’ in this second instantiation of the word, refers to a purely phenomenal or introspectible quality). I must therefore digress for a moment and indicate how I deal with secondary qualities. I shall concentrate on colour.

First of all, let me introduce the concept of a normal peripient. One person is more a normal peripient than another if he can make colour discriminations that the other cannot. For example, if A can pick a lettuce leaf out of a heap of cabbage leaves, whereas B cannot though he can pick a lettuce leaf out of a heap of beetroot leaves, then A is more normal than B. (I am assuming that A and B are not given time to distinguish the leaves by their slight difference in shape, and so forth.) From the concept of ‘more normal than’ it is easy to see how we can introduce the concept of ‘normal’. Of course, Eskimos may make the finest discriminations at the blue end of the spectrum, Hottentots at the red end. In this case the concept of a normal peripient is a slightly idealised one, rather like that of ‘the mean sun’ in astronomical chronology. There is no need to go into such subtleties now. I say that ‘This is red’ means something roughly like ‘A normal peripient would not easily pick this out of a clump of geranium petals though he would pick it out of a clump of lettuce leaves.’ Of course it does not exactly mean this: a person might know

---

13 I think this objection was first put to me by Professor Max Black. I think it is the most subtle of any of those I have considered, and the one which I am least confident of having satisfactorily met.
the meaning of ‘red’ without knowing anything about geraniums, or even about normal percipients. But the point is that a person can be trained to say ‘This is red’ of objects which would not easily be picked out of geranium petals by a normal perciwnt, and so on. (Note that even a colour-blind person can reasonably assert that something is red, though of course he needs to use another human being, not just himself, as his ‘colour meter’. This account of secondary qualities explains their unimportance in physics. For obviously the discriminations and lack of discriminations made by a very complex neurophysiological mechanism are hardly likely to correspond to simple and non-arbitrary distinctions in nature.

I therefore elicitauc colours as powers, in Locke’s sense, to evoke certain sorts of discriminatory responses in human beings. They are also, of course, powers to cause sensations in human beings (an account still nearer Locke’s). But these sensations, I am arguing, are identifiable with brain processes.

Now how do I get over the objection that a sensation can be identified with a brain process only if it has some phenomenal property, not possessed by brain processes, whereby one half of the identification may be, so to speak, pinned down?

Reply.
My suggestion is as follows. When a person says, ‘I see a yellowish-orange after-image’, he is saying something like this: ‘There is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an orange illuminated in good light in front of me, that is, when I really see an orange.’ (And there is no reason why a person should not say the same thing when he is having a veridical sense-datum, so long as we construe ‘like’ in the last sentence in such a sense that something can be like itself.) Notice that the italicized words, namely ‘there is something going on which is like what is going on when’, are all quasi-logical or topic-neutral words. This explains why the ancient Greek peasant’s reports about his sensations can be neutral between dualistic metaphysics or my materialistic metaphysics. It explains how sensations can be brain processes and yet how a man who reports them need know nothing about brain processes. For he reports them only very abstractly as ‘something going on which is like what is going on when . . .’. Similarly, a person may say ‘someone is in the room’, thus reporting truly that the doctor is in the room, even though he has never heard of doctors. (There are not two people in the room ‘someone’ and the doctor.) This account of sensation statements also explains the

sensations and brain processes

singular elusive of ‘raw feels’ – why no one seems to be able to pin any properties on them. Raw feels, in my view, are colourless for the very same reason that something is colourless. This does not mean that sensations do not have plenty of properties, for if they are brain processes they certainly have lots of neurophysiological properties. It only means that in speaking of them as being like or unlike one another we need not know or mention these properties.

This, then, is how I would reply to Objection 3. The strength of my reply depends on the possibility of our being able to report that one thing is like another without being able to state the respect in which it is like. I do not see why this should not be so. If we think cybernetically about the nervous system we can envisage it as able to respond to certain likenesses of its internal processes without being able to do more. It would be easier to build a machine which would tell us, say on a punched tape, whether or not two objects were similar, than it would be to build a machine which would report where the similarities consisted.

Objection 4.
The after-image is not in physical space. The brain process is. So the after-image is not a brain process.

Reply.
This is an ignorantio elenchii. I am not arguing that the after-image is a brain process, but that the experience of having an after-image is a brain process. It is the experience which is reported in the introspective report. Similarly, if it is objected that the after-image is yellow-orange, my reply is that it is the experience of seeing yellow-orange that is being described, and this experience is not yellow-orange something. So to say that a brain process cannot be yellow-orange is not to say that a brain process cannot be the experience of having a yellow-orange after-image. There is, in a sense, no such thing as an after-image or a sense-datum, though there is such a thing as the experience of having an image, and this experience is described indirectly in material object language, not in phenomenal language, for there is no such thing. We describe

15 Dr J. R. Smythies claims that a sense-datum language could be taught independently of the material object language (‘A Note on the Fallacy of Phenomenological Fallacy’, British Journal of Psychology, xlvi (1957) pp. 141–4). I am not so sure of this: there must be some public criteria for
the experience by saying, in effect, that it is like the experience we have when, for example, we really see a yellow-orange patch on the wall. Trees and wallpaper can be green, but not the experience of seeing or imagining a tree or wallpaper. (Or if they are described as green or yellow this can only be in a derived sense.)

Objection 5.
It would make sense to say of a molecular movement in the brain that it is swift or slow, straight or circular, but it makes no sense to say this of the experience of seeing something yellow.

Reply.
So far we have not given sense to talk of experiences as swift or slow, straight or circular. But I am not claiming that ‘experience’ and ‘brain process’ mean the same or even that they have the same logic. ‘Somebody’ and ‘the doctor’ do not have the same logic, but this does not lead us to suppose that talking about somebody telephoning is talking about someone over and above, say, the doctor. The ordinary man when he reports an experience is reporting that something is going on, but he leaves it open as to what sort of thing is going on, whether in a material solid medium or perhaps in some sort of gaseous medium, or even perhaps in some sort of non-spatial medium (if this makes sense). All that I am saying is that ‘experience’ and ‘brain process’ may in fact refer to the same thing, and if so we may easily adopt a convention (which is not a change in our present rules for the use of experience words but an addition to them) whereby it would make sense to talk of an experience in terms appropriate to physical processes.

Objection 6.
Sensations are private, brain processes are public. If I sincerely say ‘I see a yellowish-orange after-image’, and I am not making a verbal mistake, then I cannot be wrong. But I can be wrong about a brain process. The scientist looking into my brain might be having an illusion. Moreover, it makes sense to say that two or more people are observing the same brain process but not that two or more people are reporting the same inner experience.

a person having got a rule wrong before we can teach him the rule. I suppose someone might accidentally learn colour words by Dr Smythies’ procedure. I am not, of course, denying that we can learn a sense-experimental language in the sense that we can learn to report our experience. Nor would Place deny it.

---

Sensations and brain processes

Reply.
This shows that the language of introspective reports has a different logic from the language of material processes. It is obvious that until the brain-process theory is much improved and widely accepted there will be no criteria for saying ‘Smith has an experience of such-and-such a sort’ except Smith’s introspective reports. So we have adopted a rule of language that (normally) what Smith says goes.

Objection 7.
I can imagine myself turned to stone and yet having images, aches, pains, and so on.

Reply.
I can imagine that the electrical theory of lightning is false, that lightning is some sort of purely optical phenomenon. I can imagine that lightning is not an electrical discharge. I can imagine that the Evening Star is not the Morning Star. But it is. All the objection shows is that ‘experience’ and ‘brain process’ do not have the same meaning. It does not show that an experience is not in fact a brain process.

This objection is perhaps much the same as one which can be summed up by the slogan: ‘What can be composed of nothing cannot be composed of anything.’ The argument goes as follows: on the brain-process thesis the identity between the brain process and the experience is a contingent one. So it is logically possible that there should be no brain process, and no process of any other sort either (no heart process, no kidney process, no liver process). There would be the experience but no ‘corresponding’ physiological process with which we might be able to identify it empirically.

I suspect that the objector is thinking of the experience as a ghostly entity. So it is composed of something, not of nothing, after all. On his view it is composed of ghost stuff, and on mine it is composed of brain stuff. Perhaps the counter-reply will be that the experience is simple and uncompounded, and so it is not composed of anything after all. This seems to be a quibble, for, if it were taken seriously, the remark ‘What can be composed of nothing cannot be composed of anything’ could be recast as an a priori argument against Democritus and atomism and for Descartes and infinite divisibility. And it seems odd that a question of this sort could be

10 I owe this objection to Dr C. B. Martin. I gather that he no longer wishes to maintain this objection, at any rate in its present form.

17 Martin did not make this reply, but one of his students did.
settled a priori. We must therefore construe the word ‘composed’ in a very weak sense, which would allow us to say that even an indivisible atom is composed of something (namely, itself). The dualist cannot really say that an experience can be composed of nothing. For he holds that experiences are something over and above material processes, that is, that they are a sort of ghost stuff. (Or perhaps ripples in an underlying ghost stuff.) I say that the dualist’s hypothesis is a perfectly intelligible one. But I say that experiences are not to be identified with ghost stuff but with brain stuff. This is another hypothesis, and in my view a very plausible one. The present argument cannot knock it down a priori.

**Objection 8.**
The ‘beetle in the box’ objection (see Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, section 293). How could descriptions of experiences, if these are genuine reports, get a foothold in language? For any rule of language must have public criteria for its correct application.

**Reply.**
The change from describing how things are to describing how we feel is just a change from uninhibitedly saying ‘this is so’ to saying ‘this looks so.’ That is, when the naïve person might be tempted to say ‘There is a patch of light on the wall which moves whenever I move my eyes’ or ‘A pin is being stuck into me’, we have learned to resist this temptation and say ‘It looks as though there is a patch of light on the wallpaper’ or ‘It feels as though someone were sticking a pin into me.’ The introspective account tells us about the individual’s state of consciousness in the same way as does ‘I see a patch of light’ or ‘I feel a pin being stuck into me’: it differs from the corresponding perception statement in so far as it withdraws any claim about what is actually going on in the external world. From the point of view of the psychologist, the change from talking about the environment to talking about one’s perceptual sensations is simply a matter of disinhibiting certain reactions. These are reactions which one normally suppresses because one has learned that in the prevailing circumstances they are unlikely to provide a good indication of the state of the environment. To say that something looks green to me is simply to say that my experience is like the experience I get when I see something that really is green. In my reply to Objection 3, I pointed out the extreme openness or generality of statements which report experiences. This explains why

I have considered a number of objections to the brain-process thesis. I wish now to conclude with some remarks on the logical status of the thesis itself. U. T. Place seems to hold that it is a straight-out scientific hypothesis. If so, he is partly right and partly wrong. If the issue is between (say) a brain-process thesis and a heart thesis, or a liver thesis, or a kidney thesis, then the issue is a purely empirical one, and the verdict is overwhelmingly in favour of the brain. The right sorts of things don’t go on in the heart, liver, or kidney, nor do these organs possess the right sort of complexity of structure. On the other hand, if the issue is between a brain-or-liver-or-kidney thesis (that is, some form of materialism) on the one hand and epiphenomenalism on the other hand, then the issue is not an empirical one. For there is no conceivable experiment which could decide between materialism and epiphenomenalism. This

---

28 The ‘beetle in the box’ objection is, if it is sound, an objection to any view, and in particular the Cartesian one, that introspective reports are genuine reports. So it is no objection to a weaker thesis that I would be concerned to uphold, namely, that if introspective reports ‘experiences’ are genuinely reports, then the things they are reports of are in fact brain-processes.


21 Paper II. For a further discussion of this, in reply to the original version of the present paper, see Paper V.
latter issue is not like the average straight-out empirical issue in science, but like the issue between the nineteenth-century English naturalist Philip Goss and the orthodox geologists and palaeontologists of his day. According to Goss, the earth was created about 4000 B.C. exactly as described in Genesis, with twisted rock strata, 'evidence' of erosion, and so forth, and all sorts of fossils, all in their appropriate strata, just as if the usual evolutionist story had been true. Clearly this theory is in a sense irrefutable: no evidence can possibly tell against it. Let us ignore the theological setting in which Philip Goss's hypothesis had been placed, thus ruling out objections of a theological kind, such as 'what a queer God who would go to such elaborate lengths to deceive us'. Let us suppose that it is held that the universe just began in 4004 B.C. with the initial conditions just everywhere as they were in 4004 B.C., and in particular that our own planet began with sediment in the rivers, eroded cliffs, fossils in the rocks, and so on. No scientist would ever entertain this as a serious hypothesis, consistent though it is with all possible evidence. The hypothesis offends against the principles of parsimony and simplicity. There would be far too many brute and inexplicable facts. Why are pterodactyl bones just as they are? No explanation in terms of the evolution of pterodactyls from earlier forms of life would any longer be possible. We would have millions of facts about the world as it was in 4004 B.C. that just have to be accepted.

The issue between the brain-process theory and epiphenomenalism seems to be of the above sort. (Assuming that a behaviouristic reduction of introspective reports is not possible.) If it be agreed that there are no cogent philosophical arguments which force us into accepting dualism, and if the brain-process theory and dualism are equally consistent with the facts, then the principles of parsimony and simplicity seem to me to decide overwhelmingly in favour of the brain-process theory. As I pointed out earlier, dualism involves a large number of irreducible psycho-physical laws (whereby the 'nomological danglers' dangle) of a queer sort, that just have to be taken on trust, and are just as difficult to swallow as the irreducible facts about the palaeontology of the earth with which we are faced on Philip Goss's theory.


---

IV The nature of mind

D. M. Armstrong

Men have minds, that is to say, they perceive, they have sensations, emotions, beliefs, thoughts, purposes, and desires. What is it to have a mind? What is it to perceive, to feel emotion, to hold a belief, or to have a purpose? In common with many other modern philosophers, I think that the best clue we have to the nature of mind is furnished by the discoveries and hypotheses of modern science concerning the nature of man.

What does modern science have to say about the nature of man? There are, of course, all sorts of disagreements and divergencies in the views of individual scientists. But I think it is true to say that one view is steadily gaining ground, so that it bids fair to become established scientific doctrine. This is the view that we can give a complete account of man in purely physico-chemical terms. This view has received a tremendous impetus in the last decade from the new subject of molecular biology, a subject which promises to unravel the physical and chemical mechanisms which lie at the basis of life. Before that time, it received great encouragement from pioneering work in neurophysiology pointing to the likelihood of a purely electro-chemical account of the working of the brain. I think it is fair to say that those scientists who still reject the physico-chemical account of man do so primarily for philosophical, or moral, or religious reasons, and only secondarily, and half-heartedly, for reasons of scientific detail. This is not to say that in the future new evidence and new problems may not come to light which will force science to reconsider the physico-chemical view of man. But at present the drift of scientific thought is clearly set towards the physico-chemical hypothesis. And we have nothing better to go on than the present.

For me, then, and for many philosophers who think like me, the moral is clear. We must try to work out an account of the nature of mind which is compatible with the view that man is nothing but a physico-chemical mechanism.

1 Inaugural lecture of the Challis Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney (1965); slightly amended (1968).