identifies mental states with occurrences involving parts of physical objects.

Hobbes's political philosophy takes as its starting point an extremely pessimistic view of man's nature. According to Hobbes, the basic motivation of mankind is a
perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.

Given the universality of this desire for power, life in the state of nature, before the imposition of civil laws backed by sovereign force, must be a perpetual struggle for possessions, supremacy, and glory. In this state, the outcome of one's predatory efforts is always uncertain, and life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." To avoid this intolerable situation, the law of nature, which dictates self-preservation, commands men to surrender their liberty (although not their ability to defend their lives or persons) to a single sovereign. By covenanting, or contracting, to lend their
force to the sovereign's endeavors, they first create the conditions under which
the enforcement of laws, and so too the institutions of property and justice, are possible.

Thus is born Leviathan, the great artificial being of the commonwealth, whose
soul is sovereignty.

Hobbes's account does not point inevitably to any single form of government, but allows that the sovereignty may reside in a single ruler (monarchy), a group (aristocracy), or the entire population (democracy). He does insist, however, that whatever form the sovereign body takes, its power must be absolute. The reason for this is that the purpose of the original covenant is to create an authority strong enough to protect each member of the populace from the depredations of the others.

Given this initial intent, any attempt to separate from the sovereign the ability to
tax, legislate, or deploy the military, to challenge or punish the sovereign's actions in any other way to limit his power, must violate the original agreement. There may be a risk that the sovereign will abuse his power, but for Hobbes (though not for Locke) this risk is far outweighed by the security and orderly existence that this power makes possible.


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**THE INTRODUCTION**

[1] Nature (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world) is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial world. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within, why may we not say that all animals (mammals that move themselves by give and take) have an artificial life? For what is the art but a spring, and the nerves, but so many strings, and the joints, but so many living motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer? Art is yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE (in Latin commonia), which is but an artificial man, though of greater nature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates and other officers of justice and execution, artificial joints; reward and punishment (by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty every joint and member is moved to perform his duty) are the nerves, that do that same in the body natural; the good and riches of all the particular members are the strength; salus populi (the people's health) his business; counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested into it; are the memory, equity and laws, an artificial reason and soul, accord, health, wisdom, knowledge, and civil wars, death. Lastly, the parts and constituents by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that flesh, or in Latin, as make man, pronounced by God in the creation.

[2] To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider first, the matter thereof, and the artificer, both which is man. Secondly, how and by what means it is made; what are the rights and just power or authority of a sovereign; and what it is that presereth and discomfileth it. Thirdly, lastly what is the kingdom of darkness.

[3] Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, that reidism is received, not by reading of books, but of men. Consequently whereunto, those persons that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise take great delight in showing what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs. But there is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains; and that is, these arguments, read thy self, which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance either the barbarous state of men in power towards their inferiors, or to encourage men of low degree to a sanguine behaviour towards their betters, but to teach us that for the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man to the thoughts and passions of another, whosever looketh into himself and considereth what he doth, when he does think, opinio, reason, hope, fear, &c., and upon what grounds, he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men, fear, hope, and not the similitude of the object of the passions, which are

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*The Leviathan* was a Biblical scion under the pen name of R. H. C. (Reprinted with permission from E. C. Curley, *Copyright 1994 by Hackett Publishing Company*. Reprinted with permission.)
the things desired, feared, hoped, &c; for these the constitution individual and particular education do so vary; and they are so easy to be kept from us, whether in the characters of man's heart, blotted and confounded as they are with discordant hearts. And though by men's actions we do discover their design sometimes, yet if, by which case may come to be altered, is to discovery without a key, and by for the sake itself a good or evil man.

[4] But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves him only with his acquittance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole state, must be hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science, yet when I shall have set down my own reader orderly and perspicuously, the pains left another will he only to consider if he else not find the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admitted no other demonstration.

Part One
OF MAN

CHAPTER I

Of Sense

[1] Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly, and afterwards in train, or dependence upon one another. Singly, they are every one a separate, of some quality or other accident, of a body without us, which is commonly called an object. Which object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other part of a man's body, and by diversity of working produces diversity of appearances.

[2] The original of them all is that which we call Sensa. (For there is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense.) The rest are derived from that original.

[3] To know the natural cause of sense is not very necessary to the business now in hand, and I have elsewhere written of some at the large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place.

[4] The cause of sense is the external body, or object, which presents the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in the taste and touch, or mediate, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of nerves and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavours of the heart to deliver itself, which endeavours, because outward, secret, or matter without. And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call sense and understand, to the tongue and palate, in a sound; and to the rest of the body, in heat, cold, hardness, softness, and such other qualities as we discern by feeling. All which qualities called
or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more dimly and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But this fancy, which signifies appearance, and is as proper to one sense as to another, is nothing but deceiving sense, and is found in men and many other beasts, as well sleeping as waking.

[3] The decay of sense in men waking is not the decay of the motion made by the stars; which stars do no less affect our nerves by their virtue, by which they are visible, nor any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in our memory of the past is obscured and made weak, as the voice of a man is in the noise of the day.

From whence it followeth that the longer the time after the night or sense of the object, the weaker is the imagination. For the continual change of change, and the confusion of time and place in the parts which in sense were moved, so that distance of time and place do erace one and the same effect in the whole part: For as, at a great distance of place, that which doth appear dim and without distinction of the smaller parts, and as voices grow weak and we lose (for example) of cities we have seen, many particular trifles or marks of the memory are lost in many particular circumstances. This deceiving sense, when we would express it, or fancy it, as I mean fancy itself, we call imagination, as I said before; but when we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory. So that names.

[4] Much memory, or memory of many things, is called experience. Again, imagine or by parts, or by sense, or by the senses, or by the mind (which is the imaging the whole object, or our consciences, as when one imagines a man himself; horse, which he hath seen before. The other is compounded, as when from the sight of a man we compound the image of his own person with the image of the animal; or another man, as when a man imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexander; or a hollowed and compound imagination, and properly but a fiction of the mind. There be also other notions which rise in men (though waking) from the great impression made in sense from passing upon the sun, the impression leaves an image of the sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being long since, the impression by being long, and being attention upon formal images of the man shall in the dark (tho' awake) have the images of lines and angular figures, which kind of fancy hath no particular name, as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into men's discourse.

[5] The imaginations of them that sleep are those we call dreams. And these the mind of our imaginations have been before, either totally or by parts, in the sense. And because the brain and nerves, which are the necessary organs of sense, are as benumbed in sleep as not easily to be moved by the action of external objects, there can do nothing but imagine and extinguish imagination, and therefore no dream, but what proceeds from the action of the inward parts of man's body, which inward parts, for the connexion they have with

and other organs, when they be dismembered, do keep the same in motion; and applying to them there formerly made appear as if a man were waking, save by the action of the other external organs, that sense being now benumbed, so as there is no new object which is applied is not sufficient to preserve them with a more vigorous impression, a dream must needs be more of a change of appearance, than are our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to the sense of sense, than are our waking thoughts.

For my part, I consider that in dreams I do not lose sense sense of dreaming. For in dreams I do not lose sense sense of dreaming. For in dreams, though I fancy it, I think of the same persons, places, objects, and actions that I do in waking; for I remember so long a train of coherent thoughts dreaming as at other times, so that I am perhaps of two or at other times, so that I am perhaps of two or three days thoughts. I am well satisfied that being awake I know I dream often observe the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the fact waking I often observe the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the fact. I am well satisfied that being awake I know I dream sometimes of my waking thoughts.
punished, for the false belief they have that they can do such mischief, joined with their purpose to do it if they can, their trade being nearer to a new religion than to a craft or science, and for fairies and walking ghosts, the opinion of them has so been taught, that the trade of reasoning, of fantasy, of holy water, and other such inventions of ghastly men.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt but God can make unnatural apparitions. But that he does it so often as men need to fear such things more than they fear the stay or change of the course of nature, which he also can stay and change, is no point of Christian faith. But evil men, under pretext that God can do anything, are so bold as to say anything when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; it is the part of a wise and believe them no further than right reason makes that which they say appear credible. If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and with it prognostics from dreams, false prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience.

[9] And this ought to be the work of the schools; but they rather nourish such doctrine. For (not knowing what imagination or the senses are) what they receive, they teach, some saying that imaginations rise of themselves and have no cause, others that they rise most commonly from the will, and that good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man by God, and evil thoughts when the Devil, or that good thoughts are perceived into a man by God, and evil ones by the Devil. Some say the senses receive species of things and deliver them to the common sense, and the common sense delivers them to the fancy, and the fancy to the memory, and the memory to the judgment, the handling of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood.

[10] The imagination that is raised in man (or any other creature endued with the faculty of imagining) by words or other voluntary signs is that we generally call standing, and is common to man and beast. For a dog by custom will understand the call or the rating of his master; and so will many other beasts. That understanding which is peculiar to man is the understanding not only his will, but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech; and of this kind of understanding I shall speak hereafter (cf. iv, v).

CHAPTER III

Of the Consequence or Train of Imaginations

[1] By Consequence, or Train of thoughts, I understand that succession of one thought to another which is called (to distinguish it from discourse in words) mental discourse.

[2] When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, his next thought after, is not altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently. But as we have no imagination wherever we have not formerly had sense, in what or in parts, so we have no transition from one imagination to another, hereof we never had the like before in our senses. The reason whereof is this. All fancies are motional within us, relics of those made in the sense; and those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense continue also together after sense, insomuch as the former coming again to take place and be predominant, the latter followeth by coherence...