On the Relationships Between Notions of Simulation-Based Security[*]

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Abstract

Several compositional forms of simulation-based security have been proposed in the literature, including universal composability, black-box simulatability, and variants thereof. These relations between a protocol and an ideal functionality are similar enough that they can be ordered from strongest to weakest according to the logical form of their definitions. However, determining whether two relations are in fact identical depends on some subtle features that have not been brought out in previous studies. We identify the position of a "master process" in the distributed system, and some limitations on transparent message forwarding within computational complexity bounds, as two main factors. Using a general computational framework, called Sequential Probabilistic Process Calculus (SPPC), we clarify the relationships between the simulation-based security conditions. Many of the proofs are carried out based on a small set of equivalence principles involving processes

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and distributed systems. These equivalences exhibit the essential properties needed to prove relationships between security notions and allow us to carry over our results to those computational models which satisfy these equivalences.

Keywords: simulation-based security, universal composability, reactive simulatability, black-box simulatability, process calculus

1 Introduction

Several current projects use ideal functionality and indistinguishability to state and prove compositional security properties of protocols and related mechanisms. The main projects include work by Canetti and collaborators on an approach called *universal composability* [9, 12–15] and work by Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner on a related approach that also uses *black-box simulatability* [4, 5, 7, 30]. Other projects have used the notion of equivalence in process calculus [19, 25, 26], a well-established formal model of concurrent systems. While some process-calculus-based security studies [1–3] abstract away probability and computational complexity, at least one project [24, 27, 28, 31] has developed a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for security purposes. The common theme in each of these approaches is that the security of a real protocol is expressed by comparison with an ideal functionality or ideal protocol. However, there are two main differences between the various approaches: the precise relation between protocol and functionality that is required, and the computational modeling of the entities (protocol, adversary, simulator, and environment). All of the computational models use probabilistic polynomial-time processes, but the ways that processes are combined to model a distributed system vary. We identify two main ways that these computational models vary: one involving the way the next entity to execute is chosen, and the other involving the capacity and computational cost of communication. We then show exactly when the main security notions differ or coincide.

In [9], Canetti introduced universal composability (UC), based on probabilistic polynomial-time interacting Turing machines (PITMs). The UC relation involves a real protocol and ideal functionality to be compared, a real and ideal adversary, and an environment. The real protocol realizes the ideal functionality if, for every attack by a real adversary on the real protocol, there exists an attack by an ideal adversary on the ideal functionality, such that the observable behavior of the real protocol under attack is the same as the observable behavior of the ideal functionality under attack. Each set of observations is performed by the same environment. In other words, the system consisting of the environment, the real adversary, and the real protocol must be indistinguishable from the system consisting of the environment, the ideal adversary, and the ideal functionality. The scheduling of a system of processes (or ITMs) is *sequential* in that only one process is active at a time, completing its computation before another is activated. The default process to be activated, if none is designated by process communication, is the environment. In the present work, we use the term *master process* for the default process in a system that runs when no other process has been activated by explicit communication.

In [30], Pfitzmann and Waidner use a variant of UC and a notion of black-box simulatability (BB) based on probabilistic polynomial-time IO automata (PIOA). In the BB relation between

a protocol and ideal functionality, the UC ideal adversary is replaced by the combination of the real adversary and a simulator that must be chosen independently of the real adversary. Communication and scheduling in the PIOA computational model are sequential as in the PITM model. While the environment is the master process in the PITM studies, the adversary is chosen to be the master process in the Pfitzmann-Waidner version of UC. In the Pfitzmann-Waidner version of BB the master process is the adversary or the simulator [30]. In a later version of the PIOA model (see, e.g., [4]), the environment is also allowed to serve as the master process, subject to the restriction that in any given system it is not possible to designate both the adversary/simulator and the environment as the master process. In proofs in cryptography, another variant of BB is often considered in which the simulator may depend on the real adversary or its complexity. We call this variant Weak BB (WBB) and the previous one Strong BB (SBB).

In [24, 28, 31, 32], Mitchell et al. have used a form of process equivalence, where an environment directly interacts with the real and ideal protocol. The computational model in this work is a probabilistic polynomial-time processes calculus (PPC) that allows concurrent (non-sequential) execution of independent processes. The process equivalence relation gives rise to a relation between protocols and ideal functionalities by allowing a simulator to interact with the ideal functionality, resulting in a relation that we call strong simulatability, SS [18]. The difference between SS and SBB is that in SBB, the environment and the adversary are separated while the SS environment also serves as the adversary.

Contribution of the paper.   In this paper, we clarify the relationships between the various security notions, which are obtained by the different ways the entities (environment, real/ideal adversary, simulator, real/ideal protocol) can be combined and quantified over. Besides the different placements of the master process, already mentioned above, we also identify another crucial issue for the relationships between the security notions: the ability to define a "forwarding" process that forwards communication from one process to another. While it seems intuitively reasonable that such a forwarder can be placed between two processes without changing the overall behavior of the system, this may violate complexity bounds if a polynomial-time forwarder must be chosen before the sending or receiving process. If the time bound of the sender, for example, exceeds the time bound of the forwarder, then some sent messages may be lost because the time bound of the forwarder has been exhausted. This is relevant to our study because some equivalence proofs require the existence of forwarders that cannot be exhausted.

When we started our investigation, one problem was that the above mentioned models were unsuitable for studying the relationships between the various security notions. The PITM model [8, 9] was too inexpressive to formulate all variants of the security notions due to a lack of a general computational model, i.e., a model of probabilistic polynomial-time systems defined independently of specific security notions. The PIOA model [5, 30] had some model specific peculiarities, such as a requirement that IO automata have to communicate through buffers. This would have made the formulations of the different security notions and the study of their relationships much more cumbersome. Also, as we show in Section 6, the model specific features have some rather counter-intuitive effects on the security notions. The PPC model [24, 32] was unsuitable for our purposes because of the non-sequential execution

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model. This motivated us to devise a new computational model, the sequential probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus (SPPC). This calculus can be considered to be a "meta-model" of PIOA and PITM. It (1) provides a compact syntax for writing equations between systems of communicating machines and (2) is flexible enough to capture different variants of security notions in a concise way. While our results will be formulated over SPPC, we also discuss, in Section 6, implications for and differences to other models. However, the main focus of our work are not details of specific models but the conceptual differences between the various security notions and the resulting relationships between these notions.

The rigorously defined formal basis for simulation-based security SPPC provides is a crucial prerequisite for the study carried out in the present paper. It allows us to devise an axiom system consisting of a small set of equivalence principals involving processes and distributed systems. Having such an axiom system at hand has several advantages: (i) It exhibits the essential properties needed to prove relationships between security notions. (ii) Many proofs are much more concise and simpler. (iii) Results proved based on the axiom system carry over to those models that satisfy the axioms. (iv) Failure of axioms in certain models brings out weaknesses in these models (see Section 6).

Our main results formulated over SPPC and the axiom system are summarized in Figure 2 (see page 55) and are further explained below. Each of the four boxes in this figure stands for a class of equivalent security notions. Specifically, if a real and ideal protocol are related by one notion in this class, then they are also related by all other notions in this class. A solid arrow from one class to another indicates that relations in the first class imply relations in the second class. The implication indicated by the dashed arrow is contingent on whether the aforementioned forwarding property holds for the processes in question.

1. Equivalences between security notions.

    (a) The different forms of Strong Simulatability and Strong Blackbox obtained by varying the entity that is the master process are all equivalent. This equivalence class, denoted SS/SBB, is depicted in the top-left box in Figure 2 and includes placements of the master process as considered for Strong Blackbox in [4, 30]

    (b) All variants of Universal Composability and Weak Blackbox in which the environment may be the master process are equivalent. This equivalence class, denoted UC/WBB$_{env}$, is depicted in the bottom-left box in Figure 2 and includes placements of the master process as considered for Universal Composability in [4, 9].

    (c) All variants of Universal Composability and Weak Blackbox in which the simulator and the adversary may be the master process, but not the environment are equivalent. This equivalence class, denoted UC/WBB$_{sim}$, is depicted in the top-right box in Figure 2 and includes placements of the master process as considered for Universal Composability in [30].

    (d) All variants of Weak Blackbox where the adversary may be the master process, but neither the environment nor the simulator may play this role are equivalent. This equivalence class, denoted WBB$_{adv}$, is depicted in the bottom-right box in Figure 2.

2. Implications between the classes.

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(a) SS/SBB implies UC/WBB$_{env}$. In particular, Strong Blackbox with placements of the master process as considered in [4, 30] implies Universal Composability with placements of the master process as considered in [4, 9].

(b) UC/WBB$_{env}$ implies WBB$_{adv}$.

(c) WBB$_{adv}$ implies UC/WBB$_{sim}$. In particular, Strong Blackbox with placements of the master process as considered in [4, 30] and Universal Composability with placements of the master process as considered in [4, 9] implies Universal Composability with placements of the master process as considered in [30].

3. Separations between the classes.

(a) The security notions in UC/WBB$_{env}$ are strictly weaker than those in SS/SBB in any computational model where the forwarding property (expressed precisely by the FORWARDER axiom) fails. Since this property fails in the PITM model [9] and the buffered PIOA model [4] (see Section 6), it follows that UC/WBB$_{env}$ does not imply SS/SBB in these models. This contradicts a theorem claimed in [4]. However, the forwarding property holds in SPPC and the buffer-free PIOA model for most protocols of interest. In these cases, UC/WBB$_{env}$ implies SS/SBB.

(b) The security notions in UC/WBB$_{sim}$ are strictly weaker than the notions in WBB$_{adv}$, and hence, the notions in UC/WBB$_{env}$ and SS/SBB. In particular, the Universal Composability relation with placements of the master process as considered in [30] does neither imply the Strong Blackbox relations with placements of the master process as considered in [4, 30] nor Universal Composability relations with placements of the master process as considered in [4, 9].

In Section 6, we point out implications of our results for other models and discuss differences between SPPC and these other models. For the PIOA model, we show that because of the buffers required in this model certain axioms do not hold and that UC does not imply SBB even in those cases where the FORWARDER axiom is satisfied and the environment may play the role of the master process. In other words, the buffers in the PIOA model are another reason—in addition to the FORWARDER axiom and the placement of the master process—for the separation between UC and SBB. This rather counter-intuitive behavior can be avoided if a buffer-free version of PIOA (BFPIOA) is considered. In this case, all our axioms hold true, and hence, all proofs based on these axioms immediately carry over to BFPIOA. In fact, for BFPIOA we obtain exactly the same relationships between the security notions as explained above (1.–3., see also Figure 2). For the PITM model, as mentioned, the problem is that most security notions that we study cannot be expressed directly. However, based on our results, several general points can be made. For example, the ITMs in the ITM model do not have a mechanism to block useless messages, such as the guard mechanism in SPPC or length functions in PIOA. As a result, the FORWARDER axiom fails in this model. It even fails for classes of protocols for which it is satisfied in the SPPC and BFPIOA model. Consequently, our results imply that UC does not imply SBB (SS) in this model, even for classes of protocols for which the implication holds in SPPC and BFPIOA.

We note that the present work concentrates on models for simulation-based security where processes run in polynomial time in the security parameter alone. Recently, several models

have been proposed in which the runtime of the processes may depend on the length of their input [8, 20, 23]. Many of the results proved in this work, in particular those involving the issue of placements of the master process, carry over to these models, and they have in fact already influenced design decisions made there.

Outline of the paper. In Section 2, we introduce the sequential polynomial-time process calculus SPPC. In Section 3, we show that every system and every part of a system can be turned into a process expression which exactly mimics a single interactive Turing machine. The security notions are defined in Section 4. The main results, i.e., the relationships between the security notions, are proved in Section 5, with consequences for the PIOA and PITM models developed in Section 6. In Section 7, we briefly consider a less prominent security notion, called *reactive simulatability* in [5] and *security with respect to specialized simulators* in [10], and relate it to the other notions. We conclude in Section 8. In [16], we also show general composition theorems for SPPC and prove that protocols that satisfy the FORWARDER property preserve this property when they are composed.

2 Sequential Probabilistic Process Calculus (SPPC)

In this section, we introduce Sequential Probabilistic Process Calculus (SPPC) as a language-based computational model for studying security notions. Before we formally define syntax (Section 2.3) and semantics (Section 2.4) of our computational model, we provide an informal description (Section 2.1) and introduce the notion of a probabilistic function (Section 2.2). Since most of the material in the subsequent sections can be followed with only the intuition provided in Section 2.1 in mind, readers might want to skip Section 2.2 to 2.4 when reading through the paper for the first time.

2.1 Informal Introduction of SPPC

Let us first note that the driving philosophy behind the design of SPPC is to specify details of the communication model (such as a specific order of activation of entities, insecure, authenticated, secure channels, specific buffers, synchronous communication, broadcasting, and corruption) as part of the protocol specification itself rather than to explicitly encode, and thus fix, these details in the overall computation model. SPPC is expressive enough to encode such details in the protocol specifications. This makes SPPC relatively simple and flexible. In particular, a variety of security notions can easily be formulated in SPPC.

We start by discussing how individual probabilistic polynomial-time machines are modeled in SPPC and then explain how to build and execute systems of interacting machines. Our exposition parallels that of related models [5, 9, 30].

Single probabilistic polynomial-time machines. In SPPC, single machines are of the form as depicted in Figure 3 (see page 56). Syntactically, these machines will later be represented by process expressions in what we call single machine normal form (see Section 3). For the time being, let us ignore the "guards" and t 3). he variables $x_1, \ldots, x_k$. Conceptually, a

single machine is a black-box with internal state that receives inputs, performs polynomially-bounded computation and then produces outputs. Inputs are received on input channels and outputs are written on output channels. More precisely, single machines are restricted to receiving one input and producing at most one output at a time. While this at first might appear to be a restriction, it is not really a problem since any machine that sends multiple messages can be converted to a machine that stores internally—possibly using internal buffers—the messages it wants to send, and then sends the messages one at a time on request. In fact, this style of communication corresponds exactly to the manner in which communication is defined in other *sequential* models, notably the PIOA and PITM models [9, 30]. Also, just as in these models, the overall runtime of a machine is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter and does not depend on the number or length of inputs sent to the machine.

The channels of a single machine in SPPC correspond to ports in the PIOA model and to tapes in the PITM model. However, while messages on channels (and ports) are removed when read, this is not the case for tapes. Nevertheless, tapes can be modeled by adding machines, one for each input channel, which simulate the tapes in the obvious way. The "main machine" will then receive its input from the "tape machines". In the PIOA model, buffer machines serve a similar purpose. Note that while in SPPC and the PIOA model, the number of input and output channels/ports is not restricted, in Canetti's PITM model only one pair of input/output and input/output communication tapes is considered.

In SPPC, machines can preprocess their input using *guards* (see Figure 3) which are deterministic polynomial-time machines that are placed on input channels. Given an input on the channel, a guard may accept or reject the input. If rejected, the process does not perform any further computation. If accepted, the process receives the output of the guard. This may be different from the input, e.g., a guard can eliminate unnecessary information or transform data. The computation performed by the guard may depend on the current internal state of the process. Its runtime is polynomially-bounded in the security parameter per invocation and is not factored into the overall runtime of the process using the guard. In particular, a guard can be invoked an unbounded number of times. Since guards allow a process to discard messages without incurring a computation cost, attempts to "exhaust" a process by sending many useless messages to the process can be defeated. Additionally, using guards we can simulate an unbounded number of "virtual" channel names by prefixing each message with a session id and/or party name and then stipulating that the guards accept only those messages with the right header information. Such an ability is required for systems with a polynomial number of machines, e.g., multiparty protocols, or with multiple instances of the same protocol. While mechanisms analogous to guards are absent in other models, notably [9, 30], a newer version of PIOA [6] has a length function that, when set to zero, prevents messages from being received by the machine. This corresponds to a guard which rejects all inputs and so can be used to help avoid exhaustion attacks. However, it does not help in the creation of a mechanism analogous to virtual channels.

As mentioned above, guards can be invoked an unbounded number of times without being exhausted and in every invocation their runtime is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter—the runtime could even depend on the length of the input. Hence, the runtime of a single machine including the guards is polynomially bounded in the security parameter *and* the number of invocations. However, the overall runtime of a single machine excluding the

guards is polynomially bounded in the security parameter alone, and hence, such a machine can produce at most polynomially many output messages overall in the security parameter. Now, since guards can only be triggered by messages sent by single machines, it follows that in a system of polynomially many machines guards are only invoked a polynomial number of times in the security parameter. As shown in Section 2.4.3, from this we can conclude that such systems can be simulated by a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine.

In SPPC, a machine may have auxiliary input, just like auxiliary input can be given to the interacting Turing machines in Canetti's model. This input is written on specific tapes before a (system of) machines is run. If such auxiliary input is used, it results in a non-uniform computational model. The tapes are represented by $x_1, \ldots, x_k$ (see Figure 3). Just like in Canetti's model, we only allow the environment machine to use auxiliary input. However, whether the environment machine is uniform or not does not affect the results presented in this paper (except for those in Section 7).

More formally, in SPPC a single machine is defined by a *process expression* $\mathcal{P}$. Such an expression corresponds to a description of an interacting Turing machine in the PITM model or an I/O automaton in the PIOA model. A process expression is always parameterized by the security parameter $\mathbf{n}$ and possibly so-called free variables $x_1, \ldots, x_k$, which represent the tapes for the auxiliary input mentioned above. Therefore, we sometimes write $\mathcal{P}(x_1, \ldots, x_k)$ instead of $\mathcal{P}$. A process expression with value i chosen for the security parameter and values $\vec{a}$ (the auxiliary inputs) substituted for its free variables $\vec{x}$ yields a *process* $\mathcal{P}(\vec{a})^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i}$. A process corresponds to an interacting Turing machine where the security parameter is written on the security parameter tape and the auxiliary input is written on the input tape. Hence, a process can perform computations as soon as it receives input on the input channels. As an expositional convenience, we will use the terms 'process expression' and 'process' interchangeably. A process expression is called *open* if it has free variables, and *closed* otherwise. Hence, open process expressions correspond to non-uniform machines and closed expressions to uniform ones.

Systems of interacting machines. In SPPC, a system of interacting machines is simply a multiset of single machines where an output channel of one machine connects directly to an identically-named input channel of another machine. The manner in which these machines are wired together is uniquely determined by the channel names since we stipulate that no two machines have the same input and output channel names respectively. After a machine M_1 has sent a message on an output channel, the machine waits to receive input on an input channel. The message sent on the output channel is immediately received by the machine M_2 that has an identically-named input channel. If the guards on the input channel of this machine accepts the message, then M_2 may perform some computation and produce one output message. While M_2 now waits for new input on its input channels, the output message (if any) is processed by the next receiving machine, and so on. If there is no receiving machine, or the guard of the receiving machine rejects the message, or no output message is produced, computation would halt since no machine is triggered. To avoid this, in a system of machines, one machine is always declared to be a master machine, also called *master process*, and this machine is triggered if no other machine is.

In SPPC, given process expressions $\mathcal{P}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{P}_n$, each representing a single machine, the combined system of machines is denoted by the process expression $\mathcal{P}_1 \upharpoonright \cdots \upharpoonright \mathcal{P}_n$. Instead of

interpreting $\mathcal{P}_1 \rceil \cdots \rceil \mathcal{P}_n$ as a system of n single machines, one can consider this system as a single machine (consisting of n sub-machines). This corresponds to the transformation, in the PIOA model, of a system of fixed, finite number of machines into a single machine. However, in SPPC we can apply such transformations to systems containing a polynomial number of machines as well.

With the bounded replication operator $!_{q(\mathbf{n})} \mathcal{P}$, where $q(\mathbf{n})$ is some polynomial in the security parameter and $\mathcal{P}$ is a process expression (representing a single machine or a system of machines), systems containing a polynomial number of machines can be described. The process expression $!_{q(\mathbf{n})} \mathcal{P}$ stands for a $q(\mathbf{n})$-fold concurrent composition $\mathcal{P} \rceil \cdots \rceil \mathcal{P}$. Note that in such a system, different copies of $\mathcal{P}$ have the same input and output channels. However, as discussed earlier, guards allow us to send messages to (virtual) channels of particular copies of a protocol. Bounded replication can be combined with concurrent composition to build bigger systems such as $!_{q_1(\mathbf{n})} (\mathcal{P}_1 \rceil \mathcal{P}_2 \rceil !_{q_3(\mathbf{n})} \mathcal{P}_3)$.

As described earlier, since our execution model is sequential, computation may not proceed if the currently executing machine produces no output, or a receiving machine rejects an input. In order to ensure that computation proceeds even in this case, we identify a master process by using a special input channel `start`. In case no output is produced by a machine, a fixed value is written on `start` thereby triggering the master process. The master process is also the first machine to be activated when execution starts.

Additionally, in studying security notions, it will be useful to define the output of a system. We do so by writing a bit, the output, onto an output channel named `decision`. The machine containing this channel is called the *decision process*. Given a process expression $\mathcal{R}(\overrightarrow{x})$ with free variables $\overrightarrow{x}$, we denote by $\texttt{Prob}[\mathcal{R}(\overrightarrow{a})^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i} \rightsquigarrow 1]$ the probability that $\mathcal{R}$ with security parameter i and substitution of values $\overrightarrow{a}$ for its variables $\overrightarrow{x}$ outputs a 1 on `decision`. Recall that $\mathcal{R}(\overrightarrow{a})^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i}$ denotes the process obtained from the process expression $\mathcal{R}$ by replacing the security parameter $\mathbf{n}$ by a value i and replacing the variables $\overrightarrow{x}$ by values $\overrightarrow{a}$. Two process expressions $\mathcal{P}(\overrightarrow{x})$ and $\mathcal{Q}(\overrightarrow{x})$ are called *equivalent* or *indistinguishable*, written $\mathcal{P}(\overrightarrow{x}) \equiv \mathcal{Q}(\overrightarrow{x})$, iff for every polynomial $p(\mathbf{n})$ there exists i_0 such that $|\texttt{Prob}[\mathcal{P}(\overrightarrow{a})^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i} \rightsquigarrow 1] - \texttt{Prob}[\mathcal{Q}(\overrightarrow{a})^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i} \rightsquigarrow 1]| \leq 1/p(i)$ for every $i \geq i_0$ and every tuple $\overrightarrow{a}$ of bit strings.

We call machines which are neither master nor decision processes *regular*. A machine which is both master and decision is called a *master decision process*. In what follows, by $\mathbf{R}$, $\mathbf{M}$, $\mathbf{D}$, and $\mathbf{MD}$ we denote the set of all closed regular processes, closed master processes, open or closed decision processes, and open or closed master decision processes, respectively.

2.2 Probabilistic Functions

A *probabilistic function* F from X to Y is a function of the form $X \times Y \rightarrow [0, 1]$ which satisfies the following two conditions:

1. The cardinality of the set $\{y \in Y \mid F(x, y) > 0\}$ is finite for every $x \in X$.

2. $\sum_{y \in Y} F(x, y) \leq 1$ for every $x \in X$.

We call F a *k-ary probabilistic function* if $X = Z^k = Z \times \cdots \times Z$ for some set Z.

We refer to X as the *domain* of F, to Y as the *codomain* of F, and to the set $\bigcup_{x \in X} \{y \in Y \mid F(x,y) > 0\}$ as the *range* of F.

If $\rightarrow$ is a probabilistic function, then instead of writing $\rightarrow (x,y) = p$ to say that x is mapped to y with probability p, we often write $p = \texttt{Prob}[x \rightarrow y]$ or $x \xrightarrow{p} y$ and say that x is reduced to y (by $\rightarrow$) with probability p.

Let $\rightarrow$ and $\Rightarrow$ be two probabilistic functions such that the range of $\rightarrow$ is a subset of the domain of $\Rightarrow$. Then, the composition $\rightarrow \circ \Rightarrow$ of $\rightarrow$ and $\Rightarrow$ defines the following probabilistic function: $\texttt{Prob}[x \rightarrow \circ \Rightarrow y] = \sum_z \texttt{Prob}[x \rightarrow z \Rightarrow y]$ for all x and y where z ranges over the range of $\rightarrow$ and $\texttt{Prob}[x \rightarrow z \Rightarrow y] = \texttt{Prob}[x \rightarrow z] \cdot \texttt{Prob}[z \Rightarrow y]$.

Let $\rightarrow$ be a probabilistic function such that domain and codomain coincide and let $i > 0$. Then, the probabilistic function $(\rightarrow)^i$ is defined by induction on i as follows: If $i = 0$, then $(\rightarrow)^0$ is the identity function, i.e., $\texttt{Prob}[x(\rightarrow)^0 y] = 1$ if $y = x$ and $\texttt{Prob}[x(\rightarrow)^0 y] = 0$ otherwise. For $i > 0$, we define $\texttt{Prob}[x(\rightarrow)^i y] = \texttt{Prob}[x \rightarrow \circ (\rightarrow)^{i-1} y]$.

Let $\rightarrow$ be a probabilistic function which satisfies the following conditions:

1. Domain and codomain of $\rightarrow$ coincide, say it is the set X.

2. The directed graph induced by $\rightarrow$, i.e., $(X, \{(x,y) \in X \times X \mid \texttt{Prob}[x \rightarrow y] > 0\})$ is cycle free except for self loops.

3. For every x we have $\texttt{Prob}[x \rightarrow x] \in \{0,1\}$.

Now, in case X is a finite set, the *transitive closure* $(\rightarrow)^+$ of $\rightarrow$ is defined to be the following probabilistic function:

$$\texttt{Prob}[x(\rightarrow)^+ y] = \sum_{i > 0} \sum_{\substack{z_1, \ldots, z_{i-1} \\ z_j \neq y \text{ for all } j}} \texttt{Prob}[x \rightarrow z_1 \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow z_{i-1} \rightarrow y]$$

for every x and y. Note that, since X is assumed to be a finite set, in the sums only a finite number of probabilities are different from 0.

Note that a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine with k input tapes and l output tapes *realizes a probabilistic function F* of the form $(\{0,1\}^*)^k \times (\{0,1\}^*)^l \rightarrow [0,1]$ where we define the size of the input to be the length of the input written on the *first* tape, i.e., the Turing machine runs in polynomial time in the length of the first component of the function it realizes.

2.3 Syntax of SPPC

We now introduce the syntax of SPPC, in particular, we define process expressions. For this, we first need to introduce terms and channels.

2.3.1 Terms

Let $\mathcal{V}$ be an infinite supply of *variables*. Variables are referred to by x, y, z and decorations thereof. We write $\vec{x}$ for the sequence $x_1, \ldots, x_k$ of variables. Bit strings, i.e., elements of $\{0,1\}^*$, are denoted by a, b, and decorations thereof. The empty bit string is referred to by ε. We write $\vec{a}$ to denote the sequence $a_1, \ldots, a_k$ of bit strings. Let $\mathbf{n}$ be the *security parameter*.

C-terms. A *C-term* $T = T(\vec{x})$ ("C" being reminiscent of "computation") is some representation of a probabilistic function of the form $(\{0,1\}^* \times (\{0,1\}^*)^k) \times \{0,1\}^* \to [0,1]$ which can be realized by a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine where the first component, $\{0,1\}^*$, in the domain $(\{0,1\}^* \times (\{0,1\}^*)^k)$ of this function takes the security parameter $\mathbf{n}$. The variables $\vec{x}$ are called *input variables* of $T(\vec{x})$ and the set of input variables of T is denoted by $\mathtt{var_{in}}(T)$. We write $p = \mathtt{Prob}[T^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i}(a_1, \ldots, a_k) \downarrow a]$ or simply $p = \mathtt{Prob}[T \downarrow a]$ to say that T outputs (*reduces* to) the bit string a on input $a_1, \ldots, a_k$ and security parameter i with probability p. We assume that the class of C-terms is complete in the sense that all probabilistic polynomial time realizable probabilistic functions can be described by some C-term. Obviously we can achieve this by simply taking representations of probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines to be C-terms.

C-terms will be used in processes of the form $\mathtt{out}(c, T)$ to compute a bit string which is then placed on the channel c.

M-terms. An *M-term* (also called *guard*) $t = t(\vec{x}; \vec{y})$ ("M" being reminiscent of "matching") with $\vec{x} = x_1, \ldots, x_k$ and $\vec{y} = y_1, \ldots, y_l$ is some representation of a (*deterministic*) function F of the form $(\{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \times (\{0,1\})^k) \times (\{0,1\}^* \times (\{0,1\}^*)^l) \to \{0,1\}$ that can be realized by a *deterministic* polynomial time Turing machine where the first component of the domain $(\{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \times (\{0,1\})^k)$ of this function takes the security parameter $\mathbf{n}$. The variables $\vec{x}$ are called *input variables* of t and the variables in $\vec{y}$, which are required to be distinct from the input variables, are called *output variables*. We refer to the input variables of t by $\mathtt{var_{in}}(t)$ and to the output variables of t by $\mathtt{var_{out}}(t)$. Intuitively, an M-term t works as follows: Given bit strings $\vec{a}$ for the input variables (the last k components of the domain of t), on receiving a bit string a (the second component of the domain of t) the term t either rejects a or accepts it (i.e., 0 or 1 is returned as the first component of the codomain $(\{0,1\}^* \times (\{0,1\}^*)^l)$ of t). In case t accepts, it produces l bit strings (the last l components of the codomain of t) which are substituted for the output variables $\vec{y}$. In case t rejects, this output is irrelevant. We assume that the class of M-terms is complete in the sense that all deterministic functions F realizable by a deterministic polynomial-time Turing machine can be described by some M-term. Obviously this is possible by taking representations of such Turing machines as M-terms.

For our purposes, M-terms with only one output variable would suffice. However, additional output variables make it more convenient to define certain processes.

M-terms will occur in processes of the form $P = \mathtt{in}(c, t).P'$. If a bit string a is received on channel c, the M-term t allows to parse a (maybe depending on external input) before P actually reads a, and computes substitutions for the output variables in case a is accepted by t. The output variables of t may occur in P'.

Often, t is of the form x which we will interpret as an M-term without input variables and output variable x. This M-term accepts any message and this message is substituted for x. The runtime of such an M-term is determined by the bandwidth of c, which is a polynomial in the security parameter (see below). Conversely, since the computation of an M-term is polynomial bounded in the security parameter, this polynomial could be considered the bandwidth of the channel the M-term operates on. Hence, one could dispense with explicitly assigning bandwidth to channels.

The purpose of M-terms was explained in Section 2.1 where M-terms where referred to as "guards". As explained there, one reason for introducing M-terms is that they allow us to create new virtual channels: An M-term can reject all messages that do not start with a certain bit string b where b stands for a session ID, i.e., it can check whether messages are of the form (b, x). When later different instances of a protocol are modeled, which all have their unique SID, then every instance will only accept a message that is prefixed with the correct SID. Also, every message returned by an instance will be prefixed by the SID of the instance. This will allow us to send/receive messages to/from specific instances of protocols without introducing channel variables as in π-calculus [25, 26].

2.3.2 Channels

A *channel* is a tuple c consisting of a *channel name* $\mathtt{name}(c)$, a *bandwidth* $\mathtt{bw}(c)$, and a *priority* $\mathtt{prior}(c)$. The bandwidth $\mathtt{bw}(c)$ is a polynomial in the security parameter and determines the maximum length of messages that can be sent through c. Strictly speaking, as also mentioned above, the bandwidth is not needed since M-terms implicitly bound the length of messages read from a channel. However, making this bound explicit is more convenient. The *priority* $\mathtt{prior}(c)$ of c can take the values high and low, and accordingly, we refer to *high* and *low* channels. A message on a high channel will be scheduled before a message on a low channel. The intuition is that high channels are used to update the internal state of a process, while low channels are used to communicate with external processes or internal subprocesses. In Section 2.1, we only referred to low channels and for the sake of presentation did not mention the internal step to update the internal state that is taken after the output on the low channel has been produced. Channels are usually referred to by c and decorations thereof. The set of channels is denoted by C. We assume that C contains the low channels $\mathtt{start}$ and $\mathtt{decision}$. The channel $\mathtt{start}$ will be used as input channel of what we will call the master process which is activated via the $\mathtt{start}$ channel if no further communication is possible. The environment, which is trying to distinguish a protocol from its ideal version, will use the $\mathtt{decision}$ channel to output its decision.

2.3.3 Sequential Process Expressions and Processes

A *sequential process expression* $\mathcal{P}$ is defined by the grammar depicted in Figure 1 where c_L and c_H stand for low and high channels, respectively, and t and T are M- and C-terms, respectively. We will require that high channels occurring in a sequential process expression $\mathcal{P}$ are internal. Internal and external channels are defined below. While in process calculus one typically refers to the operator ' $\|$ ' by the term "parallel composition", in cryptography "parallel composition" sometime means composition in a synchronous model. As the formal semantics will make precise, we mean "concurrent composition".

Expressions of the form $\mathcal{P}_{\mathtt{out}}$ are called *process expressions with initial output*. The notion *process expression* refers to both sequential process expressions and process expressions with initial output.

The set of channels occurring in a process expression $\mathcal{P}$ is denoted by $\mathsf{C}(\mathcal{P})$. A channel c is called *internal* in $\mathcal{P}$ if it occurs both in an expression of the form $\mathtt{in}(c, t).\mathcal{P}'$ and $\mathtt{out}(c, T)$; otherwise, it is called *external*. The set of internal and external channels of $\mathcal{P}$ is denoted by

$$
\begin{array}{rcll}
\mathcal{P} & ::= & \mathbf{0} & \text{(termination)} \\
& & \mathcal{S} & \text{(wait for input on different channels)} \\
& & (\mathcal{P} \parallel \mathcal{P}) & \text{(concurrent/parallel composition)} \\
& & !_{q(\mathbf{n})}\,\mathcal{P} & \text{(bounded replication)} \\
\mathcal{P}_{\text{out}} & ::= & (\mathcal{O}_L \parallel \mathcal{O}_H \parallel \mathcal{P}) & \text{(process with initial output)} \\
\mathcal{O}_H & ::= & \mathtt{out}(c_H, T) & \text{(output on high channel } c_H) \\
& & \mathbf{0} & \\
\mathcal{O}_L & ::= & \mathtt{out}(c_L, T) & \text{(output on low channel } c_L) \\
& & \mathbf{0} & \\
\mathcal{S} & ::= & \mathtt{in}(c_H, t).\mathcal{P} & \text{(wait for input on high channel } c_H) \\
& & \mathtt{in}(c_L, t).\mathcal{P}_{\text{out}} & \text{(wait for input on low channel } c_L) \\
& & (\mathcal{S} + \mathcal{S}) & \text{(wait for input on different channels)}
\end{array}
$$

Figure 1: Sequential Process Expressions

$\mathsf{C}_{\text{int}}(\mathcal{P})$ and $\mathsf{C}_{\text{ext}}(\mathcal{P})$, respectively. The set $\mathsf{C}_{\text{ext}}(\mathcal{P})$ is further partitioned into *input* ($\mathsf{C}_{\text{in}}(\mathcal{P})$) and *output* channels ($\mathsf{C}_{\text{out}}(\mathcal{P})$) in the obvious way.

Given a non-negative integer i (represented by a bit string), a *process* $P = \mathcal{P}^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i}$ of a process expression $\mathcal{P}$ is obtained from $\mathcal{P}$ by replacing every occurrence of $!_{q(i)}\,\mathcal{Q}^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i}$ by

$$
\overbrace{\mathcal{Q}^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i} \parallel \cdots \parallel \mathcal{Q}^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i}}^{q(i) \text{ times}}.
$$

We call i the *parameter associated with* P. In P, M-terms and C-terms are evaluated using i as the security parameter.

Note that modulo commutativity and associativity of the parallel composition operator " $\parallel$ ", a process P is of one of the following forms: P', $\mathtt{out}(c, T) \parallel P'$, $\mathtt{out}(c', T') \parallel P'$, or $\mathtt{out}(c, T) \parallel \mathtt{out}(c', T') \parallel P'$ where P' is a process obtained from a sequential process expression (i.e., without initial output), c is a high channel, and c' is a low channel. In other words, at most two messages are currently on channels (at most one on a high channel and at most one on a low channel). In what follows, we refer to processes such as P' by *processes without output*.

Since process expressions and processes are (formal) terms, we sometimes consider them as finite ordered trees with labeled nodes.

Given a process (expression) P, the set of free variables $\mathtt{free}(P)$ of P is the set of input variables of C-terms occurring in P which are not bound by an input expression. Formally, $\mathtt{free}(P)$ is defined inductively as follows:

- $\mathtt{free}(\mathbf{0}) = \emptyset$,

- $\mathtt{free}(\mathtt{in}(c, t).P) = \mathtt{free}(P) \setminus \mathtt{var}_{\text{out}}(t)$,

- $\mathtt{free}(\mathtt{out}(c, T)) = \mathtt{var}_{\text{in}}(T)$,

- $\texttt{free}(P \parallel Q) = \texttt{free}(P) \cup \texttt{free}(Q)$,

- $\texttt{free}(!_{q(\mathbf{n})} P) = \texttt{free}(P)$,

- $\texttt{free}(P + Q) = \texttt{free}(P) \cup \texttt{free}(Q)$.

We write $P(\overrightarrow{x})$ with $\overrightarrow{x} = x_1, \ldots, x_k$ to say that $\{x_1, \ldots, x_k\} \subseteq \texttt{free}(P)$. A process (expression) P is called *closed* if $\texttt{free}(P) = \emptyset$.

If $P(\overrightarrow{x})$ is a process (expression) and $\overrightarrow{a}$ is a sequence of bit strings (of the same length as $\overrightarrow{x}$), then $P(\overrightarrow{a})$ denotes the process (expression) obtained from $P(\overrightarrow{x})$ by replacing every free occurrence of x_i by a_i. The M-term and C-terms in $P(\overrightarrow{a})$ containing a free occurrence of x_i will be evaluated with x_i replaced by a_i.

Let P be a process and t be an M-term. If t accepts a bit string a, then, as explained, it (deterministically) produces bit strings $a_1, \ldots, a_k$ as output and these bit string are substituted for the output variables $\texttt{var}_{\texttt{out}}(t) = \{x_1, \ldots, x_k\}$ of t. We write $[a/t]P$ to denote the process obtained from P by substituting every free occurrence of x_i in P by a_i.

The *communication size* $\texttt{comsize}(P)$ of a process P is the number of occurrences of input and output processes in P; for instance, $\texttt{comsize}(\texttt{out}(c, T) \parallel \texttt{out}(c, T) \parallel \texttt{in}(c, t).\texttt{in}(c, t)) = 4$.

The *communication size* $\texttt{comsize}(\mathcal{P})(\mathbf{n})$ of a process expression $\mathcal{P}$ is a polynomial $q(\mathbf{n})$ such that $q(i) = \texttt{comsize}(\mathcal{P}^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i})$ for every i. Clearly, such a polynomial exists.

2.3.4 Contexts

A *context* $C[\,]$ is a process where exactly one leaf is labeled with $[\,]$.

The process $C[P]$ is obtained from the context $C[\,]$ by plugging the process P into the hole of $C[\,]$. This notation is used to refer to some subprocess P of a given process $P' = C[P]$.

Given a process P, we call a context $C[\,]$ an *input context* for P, if there exists a process of the form $\texttt{in}(c, t).Q$, called the *input process associated with* $C[\,]$, such that $C[\texttt{in}(c, t).Q] = P$ and on the path from the root of $C[\,]$ to its hole all nodes are labeled with '$\parallel$' or '$+$'. This implies that P is ready to receive input on channel c (with M-term t).

2.4 Semantics of SPPC

Processes have an interleaving semantics which is defined in terms of reductions. Roughly speaking, given a process P, the reduction is carried out by iteratively performing the following steps until nothing changes:

1. **Reduction.** All C-terms occurring in P where all the variables are replaced by bit strings are reduced. After this step, there is at most one message on a high channel and at most one message on a low channel in P, i.e., modulo commutativity and associativity of "$\parallel$", P is of the form P', $\texttt{out}(c, a) \parallel P'$, $\texttt{out}(c', a') \parallel P'$, or $\texttt{out}(c, a) \parallel \texttt{out}(c', a') \parallel P'$ where P' is a process without output, c is a high channel, and c' is a low channel.

2. **Communication.** In the first case (where no message is on any channel), the empty bit string ε is put on $\texttt{start}$ which is then read by the process. In case there is only one message on a (high or low) channel, then this message is read. In the last case (where

there is one message on a high channel and one on a low channel), the message a on the high channel c is read by the process. (Note that, by definition of process expressions, after reading a on c, the process does not produce new output and in the next iteration step, the message on the low channel will be read.)

The intuition is that high channels are used to update the current (internal) state of a process (and therefore have priority over low channels) while low channels are intended for communication with external processes or internal subprocesses.

In what follows, every single step is defined formally and the steps are put together in Section 2.4.3.

2.4.1 C-term Reduction

The reduction of C-terms occurring in a process is defined by the probabilistic function $\rightharpoonup$ on *closed* processes. For open processes $P(\overrightarrow{x})$, the free variables $\overrightarrow{x}$ are first substituted by bit strings.

Formally, $P \overset{p}{\rightharpoonup} Q$ is defined by structural induction on P where we assume that the security parameter associated with P is i:

- $\mathbf{0} \overset{1}{\rightharpoonup} \mathbf{0}$,

- $\mathtt{in}(c,t).P \overset{1}{\rightharpoonup} \mathtt{in}(c,t)P$,

- $\mathtt{out}(c,T) \overset{p}{\rightharpoonup} \mathtt{out}(c,a)$ if $p = \sum_{b \equiv a \bmod 2^{\mathtt{bw}(c)(i)}} \mathtt{Prob}[T \downarrow b]$,

- $P \parallel Q \overset{p}{\rightharpoonup} P' \parallel Q'$ if $P \overset{q}{\rightharpoonup} P'$, $Q \overset{q'}{\rightharpoonup} Q'$, and $p = q \cdot q'$,

- $P + Q \overset{1}{\rightharpoonup} P + Q$.

For the cases not covered above we define $P \overset{0}{\rightharpoonup} Q$. Note that since we assume P to be closed, all input variables of the C-term T have been substituted by bit strings.

2.4.2 Communication

To define the communication step, we first introduce a probabilistic function $\rightarrow_{(c,a)}$ on closed processes which describes how a message a on channel c is read by a process.

Formally, we define $P \overset{p}{\rightarrow}_{(c,a)} Q$ iff the following is true: Let N be the number of different input contexts $C[\ ]$ of P with associated input processes of the form $\mathtt{in}(c,t).P'$ such that t accepts a. In other words, N is the number of input expressions in P ready to receive input a on channel c. Then,

1. If $N = 0$, then $P = Q$ and $p = 1$, or $P \neq Q$ and $p = 0$.

2. If $N \neq 0$, then $Q = C[[a/t]P']$ and $p = 1/N$ for some $C[\ ]$ and $\mathtt{in}(c,t).P'$ as above, and otherwise $p = 0$.

Now, we are ready to define a *communication step* $\to$ on closed processes. We set $P \xrightarrow{p} Q$ if the following is true:

1. If $P = \mathtt{out}(\mathtt{decision}, a) \;||\; P'$ for some process P', then $P = Q$ and $p = 1$, or $P \neq Q$ and $p = 0$. (Since in P output was written on the channel $\mathtt{decision}$, no further step shall be taken.) Otherwise:

2. If P is a process without output, then $p = \mathtt{Prob}[P \to_{(\mathtt{start}, \varepsilon)} Q]$.

3. If $P = \mathtt{out}(c, a) \;||\; P'$ for some process P' without output, then $p = \mathtt{Prob}[P' \to_{(c,a)} Q]$.

4. If $P = \mathtt{out}(c, a) \;||\; \mathtt{out}(c', a') \;||\; P'$ where P' is a process without output and c is a high channel, then $p = \mathtt{Prob}[\mathtt{out}(c', a') \;||\; P' \to_{(c,a)} Q]$.

In all other cases, we define $P \xrightarrow{0} Q$.

2.4.3 The Complete Reduction of Processes

The probabilistic function $\Rightarrow$ defines the complete reduction of processes.

For all processes P, Q, and probabilities p we define

$$P \xrightarrow{p} Q \text{ iff } p = \mathtt{Prob}[P \to \circ (\to \circ \to)^+ Q].$$

The probability p that the decision returned by a closed process P is 1 is written $\mathtt{Prob}[P \rightsquigarrow 1]$ or $P \xrightarrow{p} 1$ and is defined as follows:

$$\mathtt{Prob}[P \rightsquigarrow 1] = \sum_Q \mathtt{Prob}[P \Rightarrow Q]$$

where Q ranges over all processes of the form $\mathtt{out}(\mathtt{decision}, 1) \;||\; Q'$ (modulo commutativity and associativity of '$||$').

The following theorem tells us that the computation of process expressions can be simulated by a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine, where the Turing machines use probabilistic transitions.

Theorem 1. *Let $\mathcal{P}(x_1, \ldots, x_k)$ be a process expression. There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine that for all processes Q (modulo associativity of '+' and '$||$') returns Q on input $i, \mathcal{P}(x_1, \ldots, x_k), a_1, \ldots, a_k$ (given on separate input tapes) with probability p iff $\mathcal{P}(a_1, \ldots, a_k)^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i} \xrightarrow{p} Q$. The Turing machine runs in polynomial time in the security parameter i.*

2.5 Indistinguishability of Process Expressions

Throughout the paper, we will need the well-established notion of indistinguishability. The indistinguishability of process expressions is defined as follows:

Definition 2. *Two sequential process expressions $\mathcal{P}(\overrightarrow{x})$ and $\mathcal{Q}(\overrightarrow{x})$ are called* equivalent *or* indistinguishable $(\mathcal{P}(\overrightarrow{x}) \equiv \mathcal{Q}(\overrightarrow{x}))$ *iff for every polynomial $p(\mathbf{n})$ there exists i_0 such that for every $i \geq i_0$ and every tuple $\overrightarrow{a}$ of bit strings we have that*

$$|\text{Prob}[\mathcal{P}(\overrightarrow{a})^{\mathbf{n}\leftarrow i} \rightsquigarrow 1] - \text{Prob}[\mathcal{Q}(\overrightarrow{a})^{\mathbf{n}\leftarrow i} \rightsquigarrow 1]| \leq 1/p(i).$$

Obviously, $\equiv$ is an equivalence relation on sequential process expressions.

We note that in the PIOA model, a notion of indistinguishability is considered where a separate machine compares views on runs of systems. However, for the results considered in this paper, this does not make a difference.

3 Single Machine Normal Form

In this section, we show that sequential process expressions can be turned into what we call single machine normal form.

As explained informally in Section 2.1, these normal forms correspond to probabilistic polynomial time IO automata (PIOAs) or Interactive Turing Machines (ITMs) which in every step read exactly one message (on some external channel) as input and produce at most one message as output, and which, in addition, have guards (M-terms) which allow them to reject or accept their input. If they reject the input, then the message sent is dropped and no further computation is carried out. (In this case, the master process is triggered by reading a message on start). The guards are deterministic Turing machines which run in polynomial time in the security parameter. If a process (in SMNF) is open, i.e., has free variables, then this corresponds to a non-uniform PIOA/ITM (with guards), and otherwise to a uniform one.

Guards add additional power to processes (or PIOA and ITM extended by guards). The machine itself could inspect the input and decide whether to accept or reject it, and in the latter case, would simply produce no output. However, the overall run time of machines is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter and is independent of the number of invocations to a machine. As a consequence, inspecting the input consumes resources. The idea behind the guards is that they are invoked anytime a message is sent on an input channel and that their run time is not added to the run time of the "main machine". Consequently, using guards, inspecting the input does not consume resources. In other words, guards of processes (or PIOA and ITM extended by guards) are devices of a machine whose run time may depend on the number of invocations (where within one invocation the run time is polynomial in the security parameter).

We will sometimes consider processes in what we call *simple* single machine normal form (SSMNF) where the guards accept all messages. We refer to the fragment of SPPC where all process are concurrent compositions of processes in SSMNF the *guard-free fragment of SPPC*.

A process expression in single machine normal form works as follows: Before processing a message on an input channel (a low channel), an M-term (the "guard") on this channel decides whether to accept or reject this message. The message is only processed further if the M-term accepts the message and otherwise the message is dropped. In the former case, the internal state is updated (via a high channel) depending on the current internal state and the current message, and next at most one message is written on an output channel (a low

channel). Further intuition is given below. Formally, the single machine normal form is defined as follows.

Definition 3. *We say that a sequential process expression $\mathcal{P}(\vec{z})$ is in* single machine normal form (SMNF) *if it is of the following form:*

$$\mathcal{S}_{\texttt{init}}(\vec{z}) \;||\; !_{q(\mathbf{n})}\, \mathcal{S}(\vec{z}) \tag{1}$$

where

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{S}(\vec{z}) \;=\; & \texttt{in}(c_{\mathsf{s}}, z).\sum_{c\in\mathsf{C}_{\texttt{in}}(\mathcal{P}(\vec{z}))} \texttt{in}(c, t_{\texttt{in}}(c, z, \vec{z}; x)).\Bigg(\texttt{out}(c_{\mathsf{ns}}, T_{\mathsf{ns}}(c, x, z, \vec{z})) \;||\; \\
& \Bigg(\sum_{c'\in\mathsf{C}_{\texttt{out}}(\mathcal{P}(\vec{z}))} \texttt{in}(c_{\mathsf{ns}}, t_{\texttt{out}}(c'; y, v)).\Big(\texttt{out}(c_{\mathsf{s}}, y) \;||\; \texttt{out}(c', v)\Big) + \\
& \texttt{in}(c_{\mathsf{ns}}, t_{\texttt{empty}}(y)).\texttt{out}(c_{\mathsf{s}}, y)\Bigg)\Bigg)
\end{aligned}
$$

and $\mathcal{S}_{\texttt{init}}(\vec{z})$ is defined in the same way except that $\texttt{in}(c_{\mathsf{s}}, z)$ is removed and every occurrence of z is replaced by ε (representing the initial state of $\mathcal{P}$).

The internal channels c_{s} and c_{ns} (which carry the current and the updated state, respectively) are defined to be high channels while all other channels are (external, and thus) low channels.

We say that a sequential process expression is in simple single machine normal form (SSMNF) *if it is in SMNF and the M-term $t_{\texttt{in}}(c, z, \vec{z}; x)$ accepts all incoming messages. We call the fragment of SPPC where all processes are concurrent compositions of processes in SSMNF the* guard-free fragment of SPPC.

Intuitively, the variable z stores the current state of $\mathcal{P}$. The M-term $t_{\texttt{in}}(c, z, \vec{z}; x)$ is the guard which is used to decide whether $\mathcal{P}$ accepts or rejects the input on c. This term takes as input the name of the channel c from which input shall be read, the current state z, and the external inputs $\vec{z}$. Its output is written into x. The C-term $T_{\mathsf{ns}}(c, x, z, \vec{z})$ computes the new state depending on the current state z, the output x of $t_{\texttt{in}}(c, z, \vec{z}; x)$, and the free variables $\vec{z}$. The M-term $t_{\texttt{out}}(c'; y, v)$ intuitively accepts an input a (which is the current state) if a encodes that the next output, say b, shall be written on c'. If $t_{\texttt{out}}(c'; y, v)$ accepts a, then y is substituted by a and v by b. The M-term $t_{\texttt{empty}}(y)$ works similarly. It only accepts a if a encodes that nothing shall be written on an output channel.

The following lemma tells us that every sequential process expression can be turned into single machine normal form. The proof of the following lemma is rather simple. Intuitively, the sequential process expressions $\mathcal{P}_1$ and $\mathcal{P}_2$ in this lemma are independent processes that may communicate (see also Section 2.1 and 4.1).

Lemma 4. *Let $\mathcal{P}_1 = \mathcal{P}_1(\vec{z})$ and $\mathcal{P}_2 = \mathcal{P}_2(\vec{z})$ be (possibly open) sequential process expressions such that $\mathsf{C}(\mathcal{P}_1) \cap \mathsf{C}_{\texttt{int}}(\mathcal{P}_2) = \emptyset$, $\mathsf{C}_{\texttt{int}}(\mathcal{P}_1) \cap \mathsf{C}(\mathcal{P}_2) = \emptyset$, $\mathsf{C}_{\texttt{in}}(\mathcal{P}_1) \cap \mathsf{C}_{\texttt{in}}(\mathcal{P}_2) = \emptyset$, and $\mathsf{C}_{\texttt{out}}(\mathcal{P}_1) \cap$*

$C_{out}(\mathcal{P}_2) = \emptyset$. Then, $\mathcal{P}_1$ and $\mathcal{P}_2$ can be turned into single machine normal forms $\mathcal{P}_1'$ and $\mathcal{P}_2'$, respectively, such that

$$
\begin{aligned}
\texttt{Prob}[(\mathcal{P}_1(\overrightarrow{a}) \mathrel{||} \mathcal{P}_2(\overrightarrow{a}))^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i} \rightsquigarrow 1] &= \texttt{Prob}[(\mathcal{P}_1'(\overrightarrow{a}) \mathrel{||} \mathcal{P}_2(\overrightarrow{a}))^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i} \rightsquigarrow 1] \\
&= \texttt{Prob}[(\mathcal{P}_1(\overrightarrow{a}) \mathrel{||} \mathcal{P}_2'(\overrightarrow{a}))^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i} \rightsquigarrow 1] \\
&= \texttt{Prob}[(\mathcal{P}_1'(\overrightarrow{a}) \mathrel{||} \mathcal{P}_2'(\overrightarrow{a}))^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i} \rightsquigarrow 1]
\end{aligned}
$$

for every i and tuple $\overrightarrow{a}$. In particular,

$$
\mathcal{P}_1 \mathrel{||} \mathcal{P}_2 \equiv \mathcal{P}_1' \mathrel{||} \mathcal{P}_2 \equiv \mathcal{P}_1 \mathrel{||} \mathcal{P}_2' \equiv \mathcal{P}_1' \mathrel{||} \mathcal{P}_2'.
$$

PROOF. We prove that $\mathcal{P}_1$ can be turned into single machine normal form $\mathcal{P}_1'$ such that $\texttt{Prob}[(\mathcal{P}_1(\overrightarrow{a}) \mathrel{||} \mathcal{P}_2(\overrightarrow{a}))^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i} \rightsquigarrow 1] = \texttt{Prob}[(\mathcal{P}_1'(\overrightarrow{a}) \mathrel{||} \mathcal{P}_2(\overrightarrow{a}))^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i} \rightsquigarrow 1]$ for every i and $\overrightarrow{a}$. Turning $\mathcal{P}_2$ into single machine normal form is done in the same way.

To define $\mathcal{P}_1'(\overrightarrow{z})$, we need to specify the C-term $T_{\mathtt{ns}}(c, x, z, \overrightarrow{z})$, the M-terms $t_{\mathtt{in}}(c, z, \overrightarrow{z}; x)$, $t_{\mathtt{out}}(c'; y, v)$, and $t_{\mathtt{empty}}(y)$, and the polynomial $q(\mathbf{n})$ in (1).

We start with the definition of $t_{\mathtt{in}}(c, z, \overrightarrow{z}; x)$. The variable z will be substituted by some representation of a process P_1. From P_1 together with $\overrightarrow{z}$, $t_{\mathtt{in}}(c, z, \overrightarrow{z}; x)$ can determine whether P_1 would accept or reject a given input a on c as follows: First, $t_{\mathtt{in}}(c, z, \overrightarrow{z}; x)$ determines from P_1 the set $t_1, \ldots, t_l$ of M-terms occurring in input processes $\mathtt{in}(c, t_i).P_1'$ associated with input contexts of P_1. Note that l is polynomially bounded in the security parameter. If $l = 0$, then this means that P_1 does not accept any input on c, and therefore, $t_{\mathtt{in}}(c, z, \overrightarrow{z}; x)$ will reject every input on c. Otherwise, given an input a, $t_{\mathtt{in}}(c, z, \overrightarrow{z}; x)$ will apply every t_i to a. If every t_i rejects a, then $t_{\mathtt{in}}(c, z, \overrightarrow{z}; x)$ rejects a as well. Otherwise, $t_{\mathtt{in}}(c, z, \overrightarrow{z}; x)$ copies a into the output x.

The C-term $T_{\mathtt{ns}}(c, x, z, \overrightarrow{z})$ evaluates $z = P_1$ based on x and $\overrightarrow{z}$. More precisely, if $z = \varepsilon$ and the security parameter is i, then $T_{\mathtt{ns}}(c, a, \varepsilon, \overrightarrow{a})$ does the following: $T_{\mathtt{ns}}(c, a, \varepsilon, \overrightarrow{a})$ computes and outputs a process Q by first applying $\rightarrow_{(c,a)}$ to $\mathcal{P}_1(\overrightarrow{a})^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i}$ and then, to the result, alternatively applying $\rightharpoonup$ and $\rightarrow$ until for the current process P_1 one of the following is true: a) P_1 is a process without output, b) $P_1 = \mathtt{out}(c, a) \mathrel{||} P_1'$ for some process P_1' without output and an external (i.e., low) channel c, or c) P_1 occurred before. (Note that if P_1 is a process with output on a high and a low channel, then $T_{\mathtt{ns}}(c, a, \varepsilon, \overrightarrow{a})$ further simulates the computation of P_1, i.e., have P_1 read the message on the high channel. This results in a process with output only on the low channel.) Analogously to Theorem 1, it is easy to see that this reduction of $\mathcal{P}_1(\overrightarrow{a})^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i}$ can be carried out by a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. If $z \neq \varepsilon$, then z is a process P_1. In this case, $T_{\mathtt{ns}}(c, x, z, \overrightarrow{z})$ simulates the reduction of this process in the same way as described above.

The M-term $t_{\mathtt{out}}(c'; y, v)$ receives as input a process, say P_1. If P_1 is a process without output, $t_{\mathtt{out}}(c'; y, v)$ rejects P_1. Otherwise, P_1 is of the form $\mathtt{out}(c, a) \mathrel{||} P_1'$ for some process P_1' without output and an external channel c. If $c \neq c'$, then again, $t_{\mathtt{out}}(c'; y, v)$ rejects P_1. Otherwise, y is substituted by P_1' and v by a.

The behavior of the M-term $t_{\mathtt{empty}}(y)$ is analogous to the one of $t_{\mathtt{out}}(c'; y, v)$. It accepts P_1 iff it is a process without output, and in this case, y is substituted with P_1.

We define the polynomial $q(\mathbf{n})$ to be the communication size $\mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{P}_1(\overrightarrow{z}))$ of $\mathcal{P}_1(\overrightarrow{z})$. Note that due to the M-term $t_{\mathtt{in}}(c, z, \overrightarrow{z}; x)$, the single machine normal form of $\mathcal{P}_1$ reads an input a on a channel c iff $\mathcal{P}_1$ would read a on c. In particular, if $\mathcal{P}_1$ currently can not read a on c (because there is no input process for c or all M-terms reject a), then the single machine normal form would not read a on c as well, and thus would not be activated in the first place. This guarantees that the single machine normal form is activated by receiving external messages exactly as often as $\mathcal{P}_1$, and therefore, it suffices to define $q(\mathbf{n})$ as done above. Without $t_{\mathtt{in}}(c, z, \overrightarrow{z}; x)$, the decision whether a can be read by $\mathcal{P}_1$ would only be made when evaluating $T_{\mathtt{ns}}(c, x, z, \overrightarrow{z})$. Hence, the single machine normal form would always be activated even if $\mathcal{P}_1$ would reject the input. In this case, the number of activations of the single machine normal form could not be bounded by $q(\mathbf{n})$.

Now, $\mathtt{Prob}[(\mathcal{P}_1(\overrightarrow{a}) \,\|\, \mathcal{P}_2(\overrightarrow{a})^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i} \rightsquigarrow 1] = \mathtt{Prob}[(\mathcal{P}_1'(\overrightarrow{a}) \,\|\, \mathcal{P}_2(\overrightarrow{a})^{\mathbf{n} \leftarrow i} \rightsquigarrow 1]$ is easy to verify. □

We note that Lemma 4 does not hold for SSMNFs since a process in SSMNF has to process all input messages. For instance, there is no SSMNF equivalent to the process expression $\mathcal{P} = \mathtt{in}(c_0, x).\mathtt{in}(c_1, y).\mathtt{out}(c_2, y)$: Assume that there is a process $\mathcal{Q}$ in SSMNF equivalent to $\mathcal{P}$. Let $q(\mathbf{n})$ be the communication size of this machine. An environment $\mathcal{E}$ could send $q(\mathbf{n}) + 1$ random messages on c_1 before sending a message on c_0, and then a random message m on c_1. The environment $\mathcal{E}$ will output 1 on $\mathtt{decision}$ if m is returned on c_{out}, and otherwise, if $\mathcal{E}$ is triggered on $\mathtt{start}$, it will output 0 on $\mathtt{decision}$. When interacting with $\mathcal{P}$, the message m will be returned to $\mathcal{E}$ on c_2. However, when interacting with $\mathcal{Q}$, no message will be returned since $\mathcal{Q}$ has already terminated as it can only process $q(\mathbf{n})$ messages. Thus, $\mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P} \not\equiv \mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{Q}$, i.e., it is not true that $\mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{Q}$.

Remark 5. *Lemma 4 does not hold, in general, when restricted to SSMNFs.*

4 Definition of Security Notions

In this section, we introduce the security notions strong simulatability, strong and weak black-box simulatability, and universal composability. We first need some more notation.

4.1 Channel Configurations

To define the security notions, we need to specify how different processes (describing the environment, the real/ideal adversary, the simulator, the real/ideal protocol) can be connected via channels. At the end of this section, we provide an example to illustrate the definitions.

Recall from Section 2 that $\mathsf{C}(\mathcal{P})$ denotes the set of channels of $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{int}}(\mathcal{P})$, $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{ext}}(\mathcal{P})$, $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}(\mathcal{P})$, and $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}(\mathcal{P})$ are the sets of internal, external, input, and output channels of $\mathcal{P}$, respectively.

The set of external channels of a process expression $\mathcal{P}$ is further partitioned into the set of *IO channels* $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{ext}}^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{P})$ and the set of *network channels* $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{ext}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P})$. Thus, the set of external channels of P is partitioned into the set of input IO channels $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{P})$, output IO channels $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{P})$, input network channels $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P})$, and output network channels $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P})$. We require

that if $\mathtt{decision} \in \mathsf{C}(\mathcal{P})$, then $\mathtt{decision} \in \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{P})$. Also, if $\mathtt{start} \in \mathsf{C}(\mathcal{P})$, then $\mathtt{start} \in \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{P})$.

We say that two process expressions $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$ are *compatible* iff they have the same set of external channels and these channels are of the same type, i.e., $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}) = \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{Q})$, $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{P}) = \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{Q})$, $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}) = \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{Q})$, and $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{P}) = \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{Q})$. They are *IO-compatible* iff they have the same set of IO channels and disjoint sets of network channels, i.e., $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{ext}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}) \cap \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{ext}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{Q}) = \emptyset$, $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{P}) = \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{Q})$, and $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{P}) = \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{Q})$.

Given sequential process expressions $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$, by $\mathcal{P} \upharpoonright \mathcal{Q}$ we denote the concurrent composition $\mathcal{P}' \parallel \mathcal{Q}'$ where $\mathcal{P}'$ and $\mathcal{Q}'$ are obtained from $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$ by renaming the internal channels of $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$, respectively, in such a way that $\mathsf{C}(\mathcal{P}') \cap \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{int}}(\mathcal{Q}') = \emptyset$ and $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{int}}(\mathcal{P}') \cap \mathsf{C}(\mathcal{Q}') = \emptyset$. The intuition is that $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$ are different processes (machines) which communicate via their external channels only as explained in Section 2.1 and 3. They should not interfere on their internal channels. It may help to think of $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$ to be in SMNF (with different high channels). By Lemma 4 this is w.l.o.g. The definition of $\upharpoonright$ is generalized to sequential process expressions $\mathcal{P}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{P}_n$ in the obvious way. To really match the intuition that different processes communicate, we introduce what we call valid process expressions.

A sequential process expression $\mathcal{P}$ is *valid* for a sequential process expression $\mathcal{Q}$ if

$$\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{ext}}(\mathcal{P}) \cap \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{ext}}(\mathcal{Q}) \subseteq \bigcup_{x \in \{\mathtt{in},\mathtt{out}\}, y \in \{\mathtt{net},\mathtt{io}\}} (\mathsf{C}_x^y(\mathcal{P}) \cap \mathsf{C}_{\overline{x}}^y(\mathcal{Q}))$$

where $\overline{x} = \mathtt{in}$ if $x = \mathtt{out}$, and vice versa. That is, external channels used both in $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$ are of the same "type" w.r.t. being network or IO channels and are of opposite "types" w.r.t. being input or output channels. Note that being valid is a symmetric relation. Given a set $\mathbf{Z}$ of sequential process expressions, we denote by $\mathbf{Z}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{Q})$ the set of all process expressions in $\mathbf{Z}$ valid for $\mathcal{Q}$.

We call $\mathcal{P}$ an *adversarial (adversarially valid) process expression* for $\mathcal{Q}$ if $\mathcal{P}$ is valid for $\mathcal{Q}$ and $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{ext}}(\mathcal{P}) \cap \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{ext}}^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{Q}) = \emptyset$. In other words, an adversarial process expression never connects to another process expression via the IO channels. By $\mathbf{Z}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{Q})$ we denote the set of sequential process expressions in $\mathbf{Z}$ adversarially valid for $\mathcal{Q}$. We write $\mathbf{Z}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{Q})$ to denote the set of all process expressions $\mathcal{P}' \in \mathbf{Z}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{Q})$ such that $\mathcal{P}' \upharpoonright \mathcal{Q}$ and $\mathcal{P}$ are compatible.

We say that $\mathcal{P}$ is an *environmental (environmentally valid) process expression* for $\mathcal{Q}$ if $\mathcal{P}$ is valid for $\mathcal{Q}$ and $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{ext}}(\mathcal{P}) \cap \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{ext}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{Q}) = \emptyset$. That is, an environmental process expression never connects to the network channels of a process expression. By $\mathbf{Z}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{Q})$ we denote the set of all process expressions in $\mathbf{Z}$ environmentally valid for $\mathcal{Q}$.

We call a sequential process expression $\mathcal{P}$

- *regular* if $\mathtt{start}, \mathtt{decision} \notin \mathsf{C}(\mathcal{P})$,

- *master* if $\mathtt{decision} \notin \mathsf{C}(\mathcal{P})$, i.e., $\mathcal{P}$ may use $\mathtt{start}$,

- *decision* if $\mathtt{start} \notin \mathsf{C}(\mathcal{P})$, i.e., $\mathcal{P}$ may use $\mathtt{decision}$, and

- *master decision* otherwise.

In what follows, by $\mathbf{R}$, $\mathbf{M}$, $\mathbf{D}$, and $\mathbf{MD}$ we denote the set of all closed regular process expressions, closed master process expressions, (open/closed) decision process expressions, and

(open/closed) master decision process expressions, respectively. In those cases where it is relevant to distinguish between open and closed process expressions, we explicitly specify $\mathbf{D}$ and $\mathbf{MD}$.

Example: To illustrate the above, let us look at the following typical configuration: $\mathcal{E} \mid \mathcal{A} \mid \mathcal{P}$ where $\mathcal{A}$ is adversarially valid for $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{E}$ is environmentally valid for $\mathcal{A} \mid \mathcal{P}$. That is, $\mathcal{A}$ only connects to (not necessarily all) network channels of $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{E}$ only connects to (not necessarily all) IO channels of $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{A}$. Intuitively $\mathcal{E}$ is the environment process, $\mathcal{A}$ is the adversarial process, and $\mathcal{P}$ is the real protocol. Moreover, let us assume that $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}$, i.e., $\mathcal{E}$ is a master decision process. It is helpful to think of $\mathcal{E}$ and $\mathcal{A}$ to be in SMNF. Often, $\mathcal{P}$ is the concurrent composition $\mathcal{P}_1 \mid \cdots \mid \mathcal{P}_n$ describing n parties (or machines) running a particular protocol. (As mentioned, by using bounded replication it is also possible to specify protocols with a polynomial number of parties.) Again, one can think of every $\mathcal{P}_i$ to be in SMNF.

Let us look at a run of such a system. As $\mathcal{E}$ is the master process and initially no other communication is possible since no other process has produced output yet, $\mathcal{E}$ can read a message on the start channel. (In case $\mathcal{E}$ does not read a message on this channel or the guard rejects the message, nothing will happen, and the run is completed.) After some computation, $\mathcal{E}$ will typically write a message on one of its external IO channels c to $\mathcal{A}$ or $\mathcal{P}$, say to $\mathcal{P}$. Then, $\mathcal{E}$ will have to wait for new input and by reading the message on c, $\mathcal{P}$ will be activated next, in case the guard on c of $\mathcal{P}$, more precisely one of the subprocesses $\mathcal{P}_i$ of $\mathcal{P}$, accepts the message. (Otherwise, $\mathcal{E}$ as the master process will be activated again via the `start` channel.) After some computation, $\mathcal{P}$ will typically send a message on some external channel, say on a network channel to $\mathcal{A}$, which activates $\mathcal{A}$, and $\mathcal{P}$ has to wait for new input, and so on.

4.2 Security Notions

We now define the various security notions. For strong simulatability as well as strong and weak blackbox simulatability we define two variants depending on whether or not the simulator may play the role of the master process.

The first definition will be used if the simulator is a regular process, and thus, not a master.

Definition 6. *Let $\mathbf{A}$ (adversaries), $\mathbf{I}$ (ideal adversaries), $\mathbf{E}$ (environments), and $\mathbf{S}$ (simulators) be sets of sequential process expressions, and $\mathcal{P}$ (the real protocol) and $\mathcal{F}$ (the ideal functionality) be sequential process expressions.*

Strong Simulatability: *$\mathrm{SS}_{(\mathbf{S},\mathbf{E})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ iff $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ are IO-compatible and there exists $\mathcal{S} \in \mathbf{S}\text{-}Adv_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F})$ (called* simulator*) such that $\mathcal{E} \mid \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \mid \mathcal{S} \mid \mathcal{F}$ for every $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{E}\text{-}Valid(\mathcal{P})$ (called* environment*).*

Strong Blackbox Simulatability: *$\mathrm{SBB}_{(\mathbf{A},\mathbf{S},\mathbf{E})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ iff $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ are IO-compatible and there exists $\mathcal{S} \in \mathbf{S}\text{-}Adv_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F})$ (called* simulator*) such that $\mathcal{E} \mid \mathcal{A} \mid \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \mid \mathcal{A} \mid \mathcal{S} \mid \mathcal{F}$ for every $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{A}\text{-}Adv(\mathcal{P})$ (called* adversary*) and $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{E}\text{-}Env(\mathcal{A} \mid \mathcal{P})$ (called* environment*).*

Weak Blackbox Simulatability: *$\mathrm{WBB}_{(\mathbf{A},\mathbf{S},\mathbf{E})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ iff $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ are IO-compatible and for every $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{A}\text{-}Adv(\mathcal{P})$ (called* adversary*) there exists $\mathcal{S} \in \mathbf{S}\text{-}Adv_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F})$ (called* simulator*) such that $\mathcal{E} \mid \mathcal{A} \mid \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \mid \mathcal{A} \mid \mathcal{S} \mid \mathcal{F}$ for every $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{E}\text{-}Env(\mathcal{A} \mid \mathcal{P})$ (called* environment*).*

As we will see, equivalently we can require that the simulator $\mathcal{S}$ may only depend on the communication size of $\mathcal{A}$ instead of $\mathcal{A}$ itself. In particular, all our results hold for both variants, and we therefore do not distinguish between them explicitly. Necessary adjustments in proofs will be pointed out.

Universal Composability: $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{A,I,E})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ *iff $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ are IO-compatible and for every $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{A}\text{-}Adv(\mathcal{P})$ (called* real adversary*) there exists $\mathcal{I} \in \mathbf{I}\text{-}Adv_{\mathcal{A} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F})$ (called* ideal adversary*) such that $\mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{A} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{I} \upharpoonright \mathcal{F}$ for every $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{E}\text{-}Env(\mathcal{A} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P})$ (called* environment*).*

In Section 5, we will consider a variety of different instances of the above security notions by defining the sets $\mathbf{A}$, $\mathbf{I}$, $\mathbf{S}$, and $\mathbf{E}$ to be one of the sets $\mathbf{R}$, $\mathbf{M}$, $\mathbf{D}$, and $\mathbf{MD}$. One such instance is $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M,M,MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$: Note that with $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-}Adv(\mathcal{P})$, $\mathcal{I} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-}Adv_{\mathcal{A} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F})$, and $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-}Env(\mathcal{A} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P})$ as required by $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M,M,MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ it follows that if $\mathcal{A}$ is a master process expression, i.e., contains $\texttt{start}$, then $\mathcal{E}$ is not allowed to contain $\texttt{start}$, i.e., $\mathcal{E}$ is just a decision process expression, since otherwise $\mathcal{E}$ would not be environmentally valid for $\mathcal{A}$. Conversely, if $\mathcal{A}$ is regular, i.e., does not contain $\texttt{start}$, then $\mathcal{E}$ may contain $\texttt{start}$. In other words, it is guaranteed that not both, the adversary and the environment, are master process expressions at the same time. Only at most one of them has this role.

We now define versions of strong simulatability as well as strong and weak blackbox simulatability for the case that the simulator may play the role of the master process. This is motivated by security notions considered in the PIOA model [4,5,30], where, due to renaming of ports, the simulator may play the role of the master process. While only strong blackbox simulatability is considered in the PIOA model, the versions of strong simulatability and weak blackbox simulatability defined below are inspired by the placement of the master process for strong blackbox simulatability in the PIOA model. The definitions given below also apply to the case where the simulator is restricted to be a regular process, and in this case they coincide with the definitions given above. Hence, it would have been enough to provide only one definition. However, since the previous definitions are simpler, we separate the two cases.

Definition 7. *Strong Simulatability:* $\texttt{SSsim}_{(\mathbf{M,MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ *iff the following conditions are satisfied:*

- *$\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ are IO-compatible,*

- *there exists $\mathcal{S} \in \mathbf{M}$ adversarially valid for $\mathcal{F}$ and such that $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{S} \upharpoonright \mathcal{F}$ are compatible except that, in addition to the external channels in $\mathcal{P}$, $\mathcal{S}$ may contain $\texttt{start}$ as input IO channel and if $\texttt{start}$ occurs in $\mathcal{S}$, then $\texttt{start}'$ may also occur in $\mathcal{S}$ as a new output IO channel, and*

- *$\mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E}' \upharpoonright \mathcal{S} \upharpoonright \mathcal{F}$ for every $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-}Valid(\mathcal{P})$ where $\mathcal{E}' = \mathcal{E}$ if $\texttt{start}$ does not occur in $\mathcal{S}$ and where $\mathcal{E}'$ is obtained from $\mathcal{E}$ by replacing every occurrence of $\texttt{start}$ by $\texttt{start}'$ otherwise.*

Strong Blackbox Simulatability: $\texttt{SBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M,M,MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ *iff the following conditions are satisfied:*

- *$\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ are IO-compatible,*

- *there exists $\mathcal{S} \in \mathbf{M}$ adversarially valid for $\mathcal{F}$ and such that $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F}$ are compatible except that, in addition to the external channels in $\mathcal{P}$, $\mathcal{S}$ may contain `start` as input IO channel and if `start` occurs in $\mathcal{S}$, then `start'` may also occur in $\mathcal{S}$ as a new output IO channel, and*

- $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{A}' \restriction \mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F}$ *for every $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-}Adv(\mathcal{P})$ and $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-}Env(\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P})$ where $\mathcal{E}' = \mathcal{E}$ and $\mathcal{A}' = \mathcal{A}$ if `start` does not occur in $\mathcal{S}$ and where $\mathcal{E}'$ and $\mathcal{A}'$ are obtained from $\mathcal{E}$ and $\mathcal{A}$, respectively, by replacing every occurrence of `start` by `start'` otherwise. (Note that `start` can not occur both in $\mathcal{E}$ and $\mathcal{A}$ since otherwise $\mathcal{E}$ would not be environmentally valid for $\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P}$.)*

In the above definition of SBBsim, we could also restrict $\mathcal{E}$ to be a decision process if $\mathcal{S}$ is a master process, i.e., if $\mathcal{S}$ is a master process, then only $\mathcal{A}$ may be a master process, but $\mathcal{E}$ may not. In this case, $\mathcal{E}'$ will always be $\mathcal{E}$. Both of these interpretations regarding the placement of the master process as defined in [4] for the PIOA model are possible. However, it is not hard to see that they are equivalent and we therefore do not explicitly distinguish between them, but simply assume the first mentioned definition throughout this paper.

Weak Blackbox Simulatability: $\texttt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ *iff the following conditions are satisfied:*

- $\mathcal{P}$ *and $\mathcal{F}$ are IO-compatible,*

- *for every $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-}Adv(\mathcal{P})$ there exists $\mathcal{S} \in \mathbf{M}$ adversarially valid for $\mathcal{F}$ and such that $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F}$ are compatible except that, in addition to the external channels in $\mathcal{P}$, $\mathcal{S}$ may contain `start` as input IO channel and if `start` occurs in $\mathcal{S}$, then `start'` may also occur in $\mathcal{S}$ as a new output IO channel, and*

- $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{A}' \restriction \mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F}$ *for every $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-}Env(\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P})$ where $\mathcal{E}' = \mathcal{E}$ and $\mathcal{A}' = \mathcal{A}$ if `start` does not occur in $\mathcal{S}$ and where $\mathcal{E}'$ and $\mathcal{A}'$ are obtained from $\mathcal{E}$ and $\mathcal{A}$, respectively, by replacing every occurrence of `start` by `start'` otherwise.*

In the above definition of WBBsim, we could also restrict $\mathcal{S}$ to be master only if $\mathcal{A}$ is master, i.e., $\mathcal{S}$ may contain `start` only if $\mathcal{A}$ does. In this case, we can always replace $\mathcal{E}'$ by $\mathcal{E}$. Also, just as for WBB, we can consider a version of WBBsim where the simulator may only depend on the communication size of $\mathcal{A}$. As we will see, all (four) variants are equivalent, and we will not distinguish between them explicitly. However, we point out necessary modifications in proofs.

Variants of SSsim, SBBsim, and WBBsim, including for example, $\texttt{SSsim}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$, $\texttt{SBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$, and $\texttt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ are defined in the obvious way.

5 Relationships between the Security Notions

In this section, we examine the relationships between the security notions introduced in the previous section. We prove some expected equivalences between the security notions and observe some surprising differences which would not be apparent without detailed analysis. The

proofs are carried out axiomatically. The axiom system is introduced in Section 5.1. We show that all of the axioms are sound, i.e., are satisfied in SPPC, except for one axiom, which is called FORWARDER. In Section 5.2, we show that FORWARDER is a *necessary* condition on protocols in order for universal composability to imply black-box simulatability or strong simulatability, i.e., if this axiom does not hold, then universal composability does not imply black-box simulatability (strong simulatability). In Section 5.3, we compare the security notions for the cases where the environment may play the role of the master decision process, and in Section 5.4 we restrict the environment to be a decision process. In Section 5.5, we study variants of strong and blackbox simulatability where the simulators may be master processes. All results are summarized in Section 5.6. Based on the FORWARDER axiom, we obtain a complete characterization of the conditions under which universal composability and blackbox simulatability are equivalent. Since the proofs are carried out axiomatically, our results immediately carry over to those computational models that satisfy the axioms (Section 6). These axioms can also serve as an abstract specification of a "reasonable" computational model for simulation-based security.

5.1 The Axiom System

To define the axioms (equational principles), we first introduce four variants of so-called *dummy adversaries*, which simply forward messages on network channels of protocols and are used to rename network channels and turn network channels into IO channels.

The first dummy adversary, called regular network dummy adversary, simply forwards messages received on channel $c \in \mathsf{C_{out}}$ to a copy c' of this channel and messages received on channel c' for a copy of a channel $c \in \mathsf{C_{in}}$ to channel c. The number of messages this dummy can forward is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter. Formally, a *regular network dummy adversary* is defined as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathsf{C_{in}}, \mathsf{C_{out}}, q(\mathbf{n})) \;\; &= \;\; \mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}} \\
&= \;\; !_{q(\mathbf{n})} \left(\sum_{c \in \mathsf{C_{out}}} \mathtt{in}(c, x).\mathtt{out}(c', x) \; + \right. \\
&\qquad\qquad \left. \sum_{c \in \mathsf{C_{in}}} \mathtt{in}(c', x).\mathtt{out}(c, x) \right)
\end{aligned}
\tag{2}
$$

where $\mathsf{C_{in}}$ and $\mathsf{C_{out}}$ are disjoint and finite sets of channel names, c' is a new copy of c, i.e., it has a new name, and $q(\mathbf{n})$ is a polynomial in $\mathbf{n}$. All channels in $\mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}}$ are considered network channels. Note that $\mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}} \in \mathbf{R}$.

The *regular IO dummy adversary* $\mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathsf{C_{in}}, \mathsf{C_{out}}, q(\mathbf{n}))$ is defined just as $\mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathsf{C_{in}}, \mathsf{C_{out}}, q(\mathbf{n}))$ except that the channels c' are declared to be IO channels. Again, we have that $\mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{P}) \in \mathbf{R}$.

The following two dummy adversaries are master process expressions. The first one is called *master network dummy adversary* and it works just as the regular network dummy adversary except that it also forwards messages received on $\mathtt{start}$ to $\mathtt{start}'$. More formally,

a master network dummy adversary is defined as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{D}_M^{\texttt{net}}(\mathsf{C_{in}}, \mathsf{C_{out}}, q(\mathbf{n})) \;=\;& \mathcal{D}_M^{\texttt{net}} & (3)\\
=\;& !_{q(\mathbf{n})} \Bigg(\sum_{c \in \mathsf{C_{out}}} \texttt{in}(c, x).\texttt{out}(c', x) + \\
& \quad\quad \sum_{c \in \mathsf{C_{in}}} \texttt{in}(c', x).\texttt{out}(c, x) + \\
& \quad\quad \texttt{in}(\texttt{start}, x).\texttt{out}(\texttt{start}', x) \Bigg)
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\mathsf{C_{in}}$, $\mathsf{C_{out}}$, $q(\mathbf{n})$, and the channels c' are defined just as in $\mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{net}}(\mathsf{C_{in}}, \mathsf{C_{out}}, q(\mathbf{n}))$. The channel $\texttt{start}'$ is a new channel and declared to be an IO channel.

The *master IO dummy adversary* $\mathcal{D}_M^{\texttt{io}}(\mathsf{C_{in}}, \mathsf{C_{out}}, q(\mathbf{n}))$ is defined just as $\mathcal{D}_M^{\texttt{net}}(\mathsf{C_{in}}, \mathsf{C_{out}}, q(\mathbf{n}))$ except that the channels c' are declared to be IO channels.

Now we are ready to state the axioms and equational principles we use. Further explanations follow below.

COM. For all sequential process expressions $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$:

$$\mathcal{P} \mid \mathcal{Q} \equiv \mathcal{Q} \mid \mathcal{P}.$$

ASC. For all sequential process expressions $\mathcal{P}$, $\mathcal{Q}$, and $\mathcal{R}$:

$$\mathcal{P} \mid (\mathcal{Q} \mid \mathcal{R}) \equiv (\mathcal{P} \mid \mathcal{Q}) \mid \mathcal{R}.$$

TRN. For all sequential process expression $\mathcal{P}$, $\mathcal{Q}$, and $\mathcal{R}$:

$$\mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{Q} \equiv \mathcal{R} \implies \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{R}.$$

SYM. For all sequential process expressions $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$:

$$\mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{Q} \implies \mathcal{Q} \equiv \mathcal{P}.$$

RENAME. For sequential process expressions $\mathcal{P}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{P}_k$ such that $\mathcal{P}_i$ is valid for $\mathcal{P}_{i+1} \mid \ldots \mid \mathcal{P}_k$ for every i:

$$\mathcal{P}_1 \mid \ldots \mid \mathcal{P}_k \equiv \mathcal{P}_1' \mid \ldots \mid \mathcal{P}_k'$$

where the $\mathcal{P}_i'$ are derived from $\mathcal{P}_i$ by consistently (w.r.t. the other $\mathcal{P}_j'$) renaming external channels ($\texttt{start}$ and $\texttt{decision}$ may not be renamed) and changing network channels to IO channels and vice versa.

RENAME-START.

$$\mathcal{E} \mid \mathcal{A} \equiv \mathcal{E} \mid !_{q(\mathbf{n})} \texttt{in}(\texttt{start}, \varepsilon).\texttt{out}(\texttt{start}', \varepsilon) \mid \mathcal{A}'$$

for every $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{M}$, $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{D}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{A})$, and $q(\mathbf{n}) \geq \texttt{comsize}(\mathcal{A})(\mathbf{n})$ where $\mathcal{A}'$ is obtained from $\mathcal{A}$ by replacing every occurrence of $\texttt{start}$ by the new channel $\texttt{start}'$.

REG-S-FORWARDER.

$$\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}} \restriction \mathcal{P}$$

for every $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbf{R}$, $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P})$, and $q(\mathbf{n}) \geq \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{P})(\mathbf{n}) + \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{E})(\mathbf{n})$ such that $\mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}} = \mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), q(\mathbf{n}))$ and $\mathcal{E}'$ is obtained from $\mathcal{E}$ by replacing every occurrence of network channels c of $\mathcal{P}$ by c' as in the definition of $\mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}}$.

REG-ADV-FORWARDER.

$$\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A}' \restriction \mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}} \restriction \mathcal{P}$$

for every $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbf{R}$, $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P})$, $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P})$, and $q(\mathbf{n}) \geq \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{P})(\mathbf{n}) + \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{A})(\mathbf{n})$ such that $\mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}} = \mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), q(\mathbf{n}))$ and $\mathcal{A}'$ is obtained from $\mathcal{A}$ by replacing every occurrence of network channels c of $\mathcal{P}$ by c' as in the definition of $\mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}}$.

MASTER-S-FORWARDER.

$$\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E}'_M \restriction \mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{net}} \restriction \mathcal{P}$$

for every $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbf{R}$, $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P})$, and $q(\mathbf{n}) > \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{P})(\mathbf{n}) + \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{E})(\mathbf{n})$ such that $\mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{net}} = \mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), q(\mathbf{n}))$ and $\mathcal{E}'_M$ is obtained from $\mathcal{E}$ by replacing every occurrence of network channels c of $\mathcal{P}$ by c' as in the definition of $\mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}}$ and replacing every occurrence of $\mathtt{start}$ in $\mathcal{E}$ (if any) by $\mathtt{start}'$.

MASTER-ADV-FORWARDER.

$$\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A}'_M \restriction \mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{net}} \restriction \mathcal{P}$$

for every $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbf{R}$, $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P})$, $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{D}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P})$, and $q(\mathbf{n}) > \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{P})(\mathbf{n}) + \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{A})(\mathbf{n})$ such that $\mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{net}} = \mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), q(\mathbf{n}))$ and $\mathcal{A}'_M$ is obtained from $\mathcal{A}$ by replacing every occurrence of network channels c of $\mathcal{P}$ by c' as in the definition of $\mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}}$ and replacing every occurrence of $\mathtt{start}$ in $\mathcal{A}$ (if any) by $\mathtt{start}'$.

FORWARDER$(\mathcal{P})$. There exists $\mathcal{D} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P})$ such that $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{ext}}^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathcal{D}) = \emptyset$, $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{D}) = \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}) \cup \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P})'$, $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{D}) = \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}) \cup \mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P})'$, and for every $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P})$:

$$\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{D} \restriction \mathcal{P},$$

where $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P})'$ consists of new copies c' of the channels in $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P})$, $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P})'$ consists of new copies c' of the channels in $\mathsf{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P})$, and $\mathcal{E}'$ is obtained from $\mathcal{E}$ by replacing every occurrence of network channels c of $\mathcal{P}$ by c'.

MMD-INCLUSION. For every $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbf{R}$:

$$\forall \mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P}).\forall \mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P}) : \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P}).$$

MD-INCLUSION. For every $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbf{R}$:

$$\forall \mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P}).\forall \mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{D}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P}) : \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P}).$$

The letters 'S' in the axioms REG-S-FORWARDER and MASTER-S-FORWARDER are reminiscent of "simple". All axioms, except for the last two, are equational principals on process expressions. The last two axioms allow us to combine a environment which may only access the IO channels of a protocol and an adversary, which may only access the network channels of a protocol, into an environment that may access both the IO and network channels of a protocol.

The following lemma states that all axioms, except for FORWARDER, are sound, i.e., are true in SPPC. These axioms are called *basic axioms* as they should be satisfied in most computational models for simulation-based security notions (see Section 6). As we will see, most of the relationships between the security notions only require the basic axioms to hold. We will only need FORWARDER to show that universal composability implies black-box simulatability (or equivalently, strong simulatability). The axiom FORWARDER is further discussed in Section 5.2.

Lemma 8. *All axioms mentioned above, except for FORWARDER, are sound, i.e., hold for SPPC. This is also true for the guard-free fragment of SPPC.*

PROOF. The proofs of the properties COM, ASC, TRN, SYM are trivial. The property RENAME is also obvious as the semantics of process expressions does not depend on the names of channels and whether they are network or IO channels.

In RENAME-START, the additional process expression on the right hand-side simply forwards the message on start (which by the definition of the semantics is always ε) via start$'$ to $\mathcal{A}'$. Since $q(\mathbf{n}) \geq \texttt{comsize}(\mathcal{A}) = \texttt{comsize}(\mathcal{A}')$, this process does not terminate before $\mathcal{A}$ ($\mathcal{A}'$) does, and thus, the signal on start is always forwarded. Note that if at some point $\mathcal{A}$ ($\mathcal{A}'$) ignores the start signal, then from that point on the system will not change, and in particular, nothing will be written on the channel decision.

The property MASTER-S-FORWARDER easily follows from the following observations: First note that $\mathcal{E}$ and $\mathcal{E}'_M$ behave exactly the same except that if $\mathcal{E}$ outputs/inputs a message on the (low) channel $c \in \mathsf{C}^{\texttt{net}}_{\texttt{ext}}(\mathcal{P})$, then $\mathcal{E}'_M$ outputs/inputs a message on the (low) channel c'. Since these channels are low channels and since by the definition of sequential process expressions at any time there is at most one message on a low channel, messages between $\mathcal{E}'_M$ and $\mathcal{P}$ are immediately forwarded by $\mathcal{D}^{\texttt{net}}_M$. Second, if $\mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P}$, and more precisely $\mathcal{E}$, receives a message on start, then in $\mathcal{E}'_M \upharpoonright \mathcal{D}^{\texttt{net}}_M \upharpoonright \mathcal{P}$ the dummy adversary $\mathcal{D}^{\texttt{net}}_M$ receives a message on start and by definition immediately forwards it to $\mathcal{E}'_M$ on start$'$. Then, $\mathcal{E}'_M$ behaves exactly as $\mathcal{E}$. Third, note that if $\mathcal{D}^{\texttt{net}}_M$ receives a message, then this message comes from $\mathcal{E}'_M$, $\mathcal{P}$, or start. If the message comes from start and $\mathcal{D}^{\texttt{net}}_M$ forwards this message on start$'$ but $\mathcal{E}'_M$ does not read the message, then the overall system stops. Thus, this can happen only once, and hence, in all other cases if $\mathcal{D}^{\texttt{net}}_M$ receives a message, the communication size of $\mathcal{E}'_M$ or $\mathcal{P}$ decreases (if the message was sent on start, then the communication size of $\mathcal{E}'_M$ will decrease when reading start$'$). By the definition of $q(\mathbf{n})$ it is therefore guaranteed that $\mathcal{D}^{\texttt{net}}_M$ will not terminate before $\mathcal{E}'$ and $\mathcal{P}$ do. The argument for REG-S-FORWARDER is similar.

For MASTER-ADV-FORWARDER note that if MASTER-ADV-FORWARDER receives a message, then this message must have been received from $\mathcal{A}'_M$, $\mathcal{P}$, or start. Now, the argument is analogous to the one for MASTER-S-FORWARDER; similarly for REG-ADV-FORWARDER.

It is clear that MMD-INCLUSION and MD-INCLUSION are sound. The arguments for the guard-free fragment of SPPC are the same. □

Remark 9. *In MASTER-S-FORWARDER it does not suffice to define $q(\mathbf{n})$ independently of* $\mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{E})$. *If $q(\mathbf{n}) = \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{P})(\mathbf{n})$, then consider for instance the environment $\mathcal{E}$ ($\mathcal{E}'_M$) which triggers $\mathcal{D}^{\mathtt{net}}_M$ via* $\mathtt{start}$ *$q(\mathbf{n}) + 1$ times. When interacting with $\mathcal{D}^{\mathtt{net}}_M$, $\mathcal{E}'_M$ will not be triggered via* $\mathtt{start}'$ *after the $q(\mathbf{n}) + 1$st time, however, $\mathcal{E}$ would be triggered via* $\mathtt{start}$. *Thus, $\mathcal{E}$ ($\mathcal{E}'_M$) can "observe" $\mathcal{D}^{\mathtt{net}}_M$ (see also the proof of Theorem 21).*

Similarly, in REG-S-FORWARDER it does not suffice to define $q(\mathbf{n}) = \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{P})(\mathbf{n})$ independently of $\mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{E})$. *Assume, for example, that $\mathcal{P}$ is of the form $\mathcal{P}_1 \rceil \cdots \rceil \mathcal{P}_k$ where the $\mathcal{P}_i$ model parties running a certain protocol. One of the parties may terminate before others do. Now, if $\mathcal{E}$ sends a message to a terminated party, say $\mathcal{P}_i$, then $\mathcal{P}$ will not consume resources as the message is simply ignored by $\mathcal{P}_i$ and no computation will take place. In particular, $\mathcal{E}$ can send an unbounded number of messages to $\mathcal{P}_i$ without $\mathcal{P}$ consuming any resources. Later, $\mathcal{E}$ can send a message to a non-terminated party $\mathcal{P}_j$ and will (possibly) obtain an answer. Now, if the dummy $\mathcal{D}^{\mathtt{net}}_R$ is plugged in between $\mathcal{E}$ and $\mathcal{P}$, then $\mathcal{E}$ can exhaust $\mathcal{D}^{\mathtt{net}}_R$, i.e., force it to terminate, by sending sufficiently many messages through $\mathcal{D}^{\mathtt{net}}_R$ to the terminated party. Then, when $\mathcal{E}$ sends a message to the non-terminated party, $\mathcal{D}^{\mathtt{net}}_R$ does not have any resources left to forward this message, and hence, $\mathcal{E}$ can detect the presence of $\mathcal{D}^{\mathtt{net}}_R$ because if the $\mathcal{D}^{\mathtt{net}}_R$ is present no answer will come back from the non-terminated party and if $\mathcal{D}^{\mathtt{net}}_R$ is absent the non-terminated party will receive the message from $\mathcal{E}$ and can send a reply.*

5.2 On the Necessity and Validity of FORWARDER

We show that

1. The axiom FORWARDER is necessary for universal composability to imply black-box simulatability and strong simulatability (Section 5.2.1).

2. The axiom FORWARDER is not true for all regular process expressions $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbf{R}$. But there are interesting classes of regular process expressions for which FORWARDER is satisfied (Section 5.2.2).

5.2.1 Necessity of FORWARDER

We show that the axiom FORWARDER is necessary for universal composability to imply black-box simulatability and strong simulatability, respectively.

Let $\mathbf{C}$ be a class of sequential process expressions. We say that $\mathbf{C}$ is *closed under renaming* if $\mathcal{P}' \in \mathbf{C}$ for every $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbf{C}$ where $\mathcal{P}'$ is obtained from $\mathcal{P}$ by renaming channels (this does *not* include turning a network channel into an IO channel or vice versa).

The following theorem is stated for a certain variant of universal composability ($\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$), strong black-box simulatability ($\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$), and strong simulatability ($\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$). In the following sections, we will identify various variants of universal composability as well as weak black-box simulatability equivalent to $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$. Also, there are various variants of strong black-box simulatability and strong simulatability equivalent to $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ and $\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$, respectively (see Section 5.6 for an

overview). To show these equivalences the following theorem is not needed, and hence, this theorem immediately carries over to other variants of security notions.

Theorem 10. *Let* **C** *be a class of sequential process expressions closed under renaming.*

1. *Assume that*

$$\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F}) \Rightarrow \mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$$

   for every $\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{C}$. *Then, FORWARDER*$(\mathcal{P})$ *for every* $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbf{C}$.

2. *Assume that*

$$\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F}) \Rightarrow \mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$$

   for every $\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{C}$. *Then, FORWARDER*$(\mathcal{P})$ *for every* $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbf{C}$.

PROOF. We first prove the case for strong simulatability. Let $\mathcal{P} \in C$. Under the given assumptions, we want to show that FORWARDER$(\mathcal{P})$.

Let $\mathcal{P}'$ be obtained from $\mathcal{P}$ by consistently renaming the network channels such that the set of network channels of $\mathcal{P}'$ is disjoint from the set of network channels of $\mathcal{P}$. Obviously, we have that $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{P}')$ since given the real adversary the ideal adversary can be obtained from the real adversary by renaming the network channels according to the renaming of network channels of $\mathcal{P}'$. Now, since with $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbf{C}$ we have that $\mathcal{P}' \in \mathbf{C}$ and by the assumption that universal composability implies strong simulatability, we obtain $\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{P}')$. Hence, there exists a simulator $\mathcal{S} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{P}')$ such that

$$\mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{S} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P}'$$

for all $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P})$. Note that $\mathcal{S}$ contains network channels from $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{P}'$. If c is a network channel in $\mathcal{P}$, then let c' denote the corresponding channel in $\mathcal{P}'$. Let $\mathcal{D}$ be obtained from $\mathcal{S}$ by switching the names of network channels, i.e., rename c to c' and c' to c. Now, it is obvious that

$$\mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E}' \upharpoonright \mathcal{D} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P}.$$

for all $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P})$ where $\mathcal{E}'$ is defined as in FORWARDER$(\mathcal{P})$. Thus, FORWARDER$(\mathcal{P})$ is true.

The proof for strong black-box simulatability is similar. Analogously to the previous case we conclude that $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{P}')$. Hence, there exists a simulator $\mathcal{S} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{P}')$ such that

$$\mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{A} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{A} \upharpoonright \mathcal{S} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P}'.$$

for all $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P})$ and all $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{A} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P})$. In particular, this is true if $\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}}$ as defined in REG-S-FORWARDER where we set $q(\mathbf{n}) = \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{P})(\mathbf{n}) + \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{S})(\mathbf{n}) + \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{E})(\mathbf{n})$. Now, together with REG-S-FORWARDER we obtain:

$$\mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E}' \upharpoonright \mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E}' \upharpoonright \mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}} \upharpoonright \mathcal{S} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P}' \equiv \mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{S} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P}'$$

for every $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P})$ where $\mathcal{E}'$ obtained from $\mathcal{E}$ as described in REG-S-FORWARDER. Now, defining $\mathcal{D}$ as in the previous case, we can conclude that FORWARDER$(\mathcal{P})$ holds true. □

In the above proof we have only used *very* basic properties of our computational model, which should be satisfied in most computational models for simulation-based security. Hence, the above theorem should be true in all such models.

5.2.2 On the Validity of FORWARDER

We show that not all process expressions satisfy FORWARDER. However, it is possible to identify an interesting class of process expressions that satisfy this axiom. The following terminology will become clear below.

Definition 11. *We call a sequential process expression $\mathcal{P}$ network predictable if it satisfies FORWARDER, i.e., if FORWARDER($\mathcal{P}$) holds.*

Non-network predictable process expressions. We now show that not all regular process expressions satisfy FORWARDER. It is useful to recall Remark 9. Intuitively, as seen in this remark, if the dummy is defined only depending on $\mathcal{P}$ but completely independent of $\mathcal{E}$, then the dummy should only react to inputs from the environment if $\mathcal{P}$ reacts to these inputs since otherwise the dummy may get "exhausted" by the environment. In other words, the environment can force the dummy to terminate before $\mathcal{P}$ does, and in this case, the dummy cannot forward messages anymore. However, in general, the dummy does not know on what channels $\mathcal{P}$ expects messages and it also does not know what messages $\mathcal{P}$ accepts. We use this intuition to show:

Proposition 12. *There exists $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbf{R}$ which is not network predictable.*

PROOF. Consider

$$\mathcal{P} = (\mathtt{in}(c,0).\mathtt{in}(c_0,x).\mathtt{out}(c_{out},x)) + (\mathtt{in}(c,1).\mathtt{in}(c_1,x).\mathtt{out}(c_{out},x)))$$

where c and c_{out} are declared to be IO channels and c_0 and c_1 are network channels. That is, the environment determines via a bit sent on the IO channel c (which is invisible to the dummy) on which network channel—c_0 or c_1—$\mathcal{P}$ will accept a message. Now, assume that there is a dummy $\mathcal{D}$ which satisfies the required conditions for FORWARDER($\mathcal{P}$). It is helpful to think of $\mathcal{D}$ to be in SMNF. By Lemma 4 this is w.l.o.g. Let us first consider the following environment $\mathcal{E}$ (which can easily be described as process expression): $\mathcal{E}$ randomly chooses a bit b and a number i between 1 and $\mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{D})(\mathbf{n}) + 1$. Then, $\mathcal{E}$ sends $i - 1$ randomly chosen messages, say of the length of the security parameter, on c_0 or c_1 where for every message $\mathcal{E}$ again makes a random decision on which channel—c_0 or c_1—to send the message. In all of these cases, $\mathcal{E}$ will not receive any answer but will be triggered on $\mathtt{start}$. Then, for the ith step $\mathcal{E}$ again chooses a random message, say m, then sends b on channel c after which $\mathcal{E}$ will be triggered through $\mathtt{start}$, and then sends m on c_b. Now, if $\mathcal{E}$ receives m back on c_{out}, then it outputs 1 on $\mathtt{decision}$ and otherwise (if $\mathcal{E}$ is triggered by $\mathtt{start}$) outputs 0.

We argue that $\mathcal{E}$ can distinguish between $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{D} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P}$, i.e., $\mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P} \not\equiv \mathcal{E}' \upharpoonright \mathcal{D} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P}$.

The dummy $\mathcal{D}$ can only forward $< \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{D})(\mathbf{n}) + 1$ messages from c'_0 to c_0 and c'_1 to c_1 before it terminates. Thus, if $\mathcal{E}$ chooses $i = \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{D})(\mathbf{n}) + 1$, which happens with non-negligible probability, the probability that $\mathcal{D}$ accepts messages on both c'_0 and c'_1 for all $\mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{D})(\mathbf{n})$ steps before the last message is sent by $\mathcal{E}$ must be negligible: Otherwise when $\mathcal{E}$ sends the last message to c_b and expects to obtain input on c_{out}, the probability that $\mathcal{E}$ in fact obtains input on this channel is negligible as $\mathcal{D}$ will be terminated with overwhelming probability. Thus, there is a non-negligible probability that $\mathcal{D}$ does not accept a message on

some of its input channels—c'_0 or c'_1. Consequently, $\mathcal{E}$ has a non-negligible chance of guessing this position in the run. In case $\mathcal{E}$ guessed correctly, it will output 0 since it will not obtain input on c_{out} but will be triggered on start. Thus, when interacting with $\mathcal{D}$ and $\mathcal{P}$, the environment $\mathcal{E}$ will output 0 with non-negligible probability while when interacting only with $\mathcal{P}$ it will always return 1. Hence, $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{P} \not\equiv \mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{D} \restriction \mathcal{P}$. $\qquad\square$

The proof of Proposition 12 indicates that in order to obtain a class of network predictable process expressions, one needs to make sure that the dummy can determine from the traffic on network channels on which channels the process accepts messages and of what shape the messages have to be in order to be accepted by the M-terms, since otherwise the dummy can be exhausted. This is why we call such process expressions network predictable.

Using length functions as in the version of PIOA in [6], the process $\mathcal{P}$ in the proof of Proposition 12 can also be expressed in PIOA. Therefore, we can remark:

Remark 13. *In the version of PIOA with length functions, protocols can be expressed that are not network predictable.*

In Section 6.1 we will see that FORWARDER can fail in PIOA even without length functions.

A class of network predictable process expressions. We now define a class of process expressions, called standard protocols, which in fact are network predictable.

Definition 14. *A process expression $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbf{R}$ is called a* standard protocol *if it is of the form $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{P}_1 \restriction \cdots \restriction \mathcal{P}_n$ where every $\mathcal{P}_i$ is in SSMNF.*

We note that the class of standard protocols contains the protocols expressible in the models proposed in [30] and [9]. As mentioned in Section 2.1, in a later version of the PIOA model [6], length functions allow to express certain M-terms (guards). Hence, by Remark 13, this yields a class of protocols which goes beyond the class of standard protocols.

We show:

Proposition 15. *Standard protocols are network predictable.*

PROOF. Let $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{P}_1 \restriction \cdots \restriction \mathcal{P}_n$ be a standard protocol. Define

$$\mathcal{D}_i = \mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathtt{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}_i), \mathtt{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}_i), \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{P}_i)(\mathbf{n})).$$

(Recall the definition of $\mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{net}}$ from Section 5.1). Hence, $\mathcal{D}_i$ simply forwards all message on network channels from and to $\mathcal{P}_i$. To see that

$$\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{P}_i \equiv \mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{D}_i \restriction \mathcal{P}_i,$$

for all $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P}_i)$, it suffices to observe that the number of messages that can be sent to $\mathcal{P}_i$ and that can be received from $\mathcal{P}_i$ before $\mathcal{P}_i$ terminates is bounded by $\mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{P}_i)$—a bound known by $\mathcal{D}_i$—since $\mathcal{P}_i$ accepts all messages sent on (network) channels. Thus, $\mathcal{D}_i$ only needs to forward $\mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{P}_i)$ messages. After $\mathcal{P}_i$ has terminated, $\mathcal{D}_i$ does not need to forward messages anymore.

Now, since the set of network channels of the $\mathcal{P}_i$ are pairwise disjoint, it is clear that with $\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{D}_1 \mathbin{\rceil} \cdots \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{D}_n$ we obtain that

$$\mathcal{E} \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E}' \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{D} \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{P}.$$

for every $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P})$. □

Proposition 15 can be extended to bigger classes of protocols. For instance to a class of protocols with a polynomial number of parties where messages addressed to a certain party have to be prefixed by the name of the party and its role in the protocol. More precisely, if the M-terms of parties accept exactly those messages prefixed with the correct recipient and role, a dummy can predict whether or not a message is accepted by a party.

5.3 Declaring the Environment to be the Master Decision Process

The following theorem states the relationships between the security notions introduced in Definition 6 in case the environment may play the role of the master decision process. Among others, it says that the notions strong simulatability, black-box simulatability, and universal composability coincide given that the real protocol $\mathcal{P}$ is network predictable, i.e., the axiom FORWARDER($\mathcal{P}$) is true. However, many of the relationships between the security notions are true independently of this axiom.

Theorem 16. *Let* $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{R}$.

1. $\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$.

2. $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$.

3. *The notions in 1. imply those in 2.*

4. *If* $\mathcal{P}$ *is network predictable, i.e., if FORWARDER($\mathcal{P}$) holds, then the in 1. and 2. mentioned security notions are all equivalent.*

The theorem holds both for the case where $\mathbf{MD}$ *only contains closed process expressions and for the case where* $\mathbf{MD}$ *may contain open process expressions.*

PROOF. Statement 1. From MMD-INCLUSION we easily obtain that $\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ implies $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$. It is easy to see that $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ implies $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$. We now show that $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ implies $\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$.

1. Assume that $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$.

2. The definition implies that $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ are IO-compatible and:
   $\exists \mathcal{S} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F}). \forall \mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P}). \forall \mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{A} \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{P}) : \mathcal{E} \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{A} \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{A} \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{S} \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{F}$.

3. Choosing $\mathcal{A}$ to be the regular IO dummy adversary $\mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{io}} = \mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathtt{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), \mathtt{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), q(\mathbf{n}))$ we obtain:
   $\exists \mathcal{S} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F}). \forall$ poly. $q(\mathbf{n}). \forall \mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{io}} \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{P}) : \mathcal{E} \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{io}} \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{D}_R^{\mathtt{io}} \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{S} \mathbin{\rceil} \mathcal{F}$.

4. Choose $\mathcal{S}$ as in 3., let $\mathcal{E} \in \textbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P})$, and $q(\mathbf{n}) = \texttt{comsize}(\mathcal{P})(\mathbf{n}) + \texttt{comsize}(\mathcal{E})(\mathbf{n})$. We have:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{P} \;&\equiv\; \mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{net}} \restriction \mathcal{P} && \text{(REG-S-FORWARDER)} \\
&\equiv\; \mathcal{E}'' \restriction \mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{io}} \restriction \mathcal{P} && \text{(RENAME)} \\
&\equiv\; \mathcal{E}'' \restriction \mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{io}} \restriction \mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F} && (\mathcal{E}'' \in \textbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{io}} \restriction \mathcal{P}), 3.) \\
&\equiv\; \mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{net}} \restriction \mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F} && \text{(RENAME)} \\
&\equiv\; \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F} && \text{(REG-S-FORWARDER)}
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\mathcal{E}'$ is defined as in REG-S-FORWARDER and $\mathcal{E}''$ is obtained from $\mathcal{E}'$ by declaring the renamed network channels c' of $\mathcal{P}$ to be IO channels. Since $\mathcal{E}$ is valid for $\mathcal{P}$ and all network channels of $\mathcal{P}$ occurring in $\mathcal{E}$ have been renamed according to $\mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{net}}$ and declared to be IO channels, it is clear that $\mathcal{E}'' \in \textbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{io}} \restriction \mathcal{P})$.

5. From 4. we immediately obtain that $\texttt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$.

Statement 2. It is obvious that $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ implies $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ since if the real adversary is regular, then so must be the ideal adversary because of the compatibility requirement for $\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{I} \restriction \mathcal{F}$. We now show that $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ implies $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$.

Assume that $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ and let $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P})$. We need to show (*): There exists $\mathcal{I} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F})$ such that $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{I} \restriction \mathcal{F}$ for every $\mathcal{E} \in \textbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P})$.

If $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{R}$, then (*) follows by the assumption $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$.

Assume that $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{M} \setminus \mathbf{R}$. Let $\mathcal{A}'$ be obtained from $\mathcal{A}$ by replacing every occurrence of $\texttt{start}$ by the new channel $\texttt{start}'$. Then, $\mathcal{A}' \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P})$. By assumption, there exists $\mathcal{I}' \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{A}' \restriction \mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F})$ such that $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A}' \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{I}' \restriction \mathcal{F}$ for every $\mathcal{E} \in \textbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{A}' \restriction \mathcal{P})$. Let $\mathcal{I}$ be obtained from $\mathcal{I}'$ by replacing every occurrence of $\texttt{start}'$ by $\texttt{start}$. Let $\mathcal{E} \in \textbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P})$. Since $\texttt{start}$ occurs in $\mathcal{A}$, we know that $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{D}$. The following completes the proof of the equivalence between the two variants of UC. In the second equation we use that $\mathcal{E} \restriction \,!_{q(\mathbf{n})}\,(\texttt{in}(\texttt{start}, \varepsilon).\texttt{out}(\texttt{start}', \varepsilon)) \in \textbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{A}' \restriction \mathcal{P})$ where $q(\mathbf{n}) = \texttt{comsize}(\mathcal{A})(\mathbf{n}) + \texttt{comsize}(\mathcal{I})(\mathbf{n})$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P} \;&\equiv\; \mathcal{E} \restriction \,!_{q(\mathbf{n})}\,\texttt{in}(\texttt{start}, \varepsilon).\texttt{out}(\texttt{start}', \varepsilon) \restriction \mathcal{A}' \restriction \mathcal{P} && \text{(RENAME-START)} \\
&\equiv\; \mathcal{E} \restriction \,!_{q(\mathbf{n})}\,\texttt{in}(\texttt{start}, \varepsilon).\texttt{out}(\texttt{start}', \varepsilon) \restriction \mathcal{I}' \restriction \mathcal{F} && (\text{Definition of } \mathcal{I}') \\
&\equiv\; \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{I} \restriction \mathcal{F} && \text{(RENAME-START)}
\end{aligned}
$$

Clearly, we have that $\texttt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ implies $\texttt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$. It is also obvious that $\texttt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ implies $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ since $\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{S}$ is the ideal adversary required in $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ where $\mathcal{S}$ is the simulator obtained from $\texttt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$.

We now show that $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ implies $\texttt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ which concludes the proof of statement 2.

1. Assume that $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$.

2. The definition yields that $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ are IO-compatible and:
$$\forall \mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P}).\exists \mathcal{I} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F}).\forall \mathcal{E} \in \textbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P}) : \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{I} \restriction \mathcal{F}.$$

3. Choosing $\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{io}} = \mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{io}}(\texttt{C}_{\texttt{in}}^{\texttt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), \texttt{C}_{\texttt{out}}^{\texttt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), q(\mathbf{n}))$ for some $q(\mathbf{n})$ we obtain:
$$\exists \mathcal{S}_{q(\mathbf{n})} = \mathcal{I} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{io}} \restriction \mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F}).\forall \mathcal{E} \in \textbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{io}} \restriction \mathcal{P}) : \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{io}} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{S}_{q(\mathbf{n})} \restriction \mathcal{F}.$$

4. Let $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P})$, $q(\mathbf{n}) = \texttt{comsize}(\mathcal{A})(\mathbf{n}) + \texttt{comsize}(\mathcal{P})(\mathbf{n})$, choose $\mathcal{S}_{q(\mathbf{n})}$ as in 3. and let $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P})$. We obtain:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P} &\equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A}' \restriction \mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{net}} \restriction \mathcal{P} && \text{(REG-ADV-FORWARDER)} \\
&\equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A}'' \restriction \mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{io}} \restriction \mathcal{P} && \text{(RENAME)} \\
&\equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A}'' \restriction \mathcal{S}_{q(\mathbf{n})} \restriction \mathcal{F} && (\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A}'' \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{io}} \restriction \mathcal{P}), 3.) \\
&\equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{S}'_{q(\mathbf{n})} \restriction \mathcal{F} && \text{(RENAME)}
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\mathcal{A}'$ is defined as in REG-ADV-FORWARDER, $\mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{io}}$ and $\mathcal{A}''$ are obtained from $\mathcal{D}_R^{\texttt{net}}$ and $\mathcal{A}'$ by declaring the renamed network channels c' of $\mathcal{P}$ to be IO channels, and $\mathcal{S}'_{q(\mathbf{n})}$ is obtained from $\mathcal{S}_{q(\mathbf{n})}$ by declaring the IO channels c' to be network channels and renaming them to c according to $\mathcal{P}$.

5. By observing that $\mathcal{S}'_{q(\mathbf{n})} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F})$ and that $\mathcal{S}'_{q(\mathbf{n})}$ only depends on $\mathcal{F}$, $\mathcal{P}$, and (the communication size of) $\mathcal{A}$, 4. immediately implies that $\texttt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ (for both variants of weak blackbox simulatability).

Statement 3. From $\texttt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ we know that there exists $\mathcal{S} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F})$ such that $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F}$ for every $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P})$. To show $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$, assume that $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P})$ and $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P})$. From MMD-INCLUSION it follows that $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P})$, and thus, $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F}$. Obviously, $\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{S} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F})$. Thus, defining the ideal adversary $\mathcal{I}$ to be $\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{S}$ concludes the proof.

Statement 4. Assume that FORWARDER$(\mathcal{P})$. It suffice to show that $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ implies
$\texttt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$. Let $\mathcal{D}$ be the dummy whose existence is guaranteed by FORWARDER$(\mathcal{P})$. Let $\mathcal{D}^{\texttt{io}}$ be obtained from $\mathcal{D}$ by declaring all the channels c' to be IO channels. (The channels c occurring in $\mathcal{D}$ remain network channels).

1. Assume that $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$.

2. The definition yields that $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ are IO-compatible and:
$\forall \mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P}).\exists \mathcal{I} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F}).\forall \mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P}) : \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{I} \restriction \mathcal{F}$.

3. Choosing $\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{D}^{\texttt{io}}$ we obtain:
$\exists \mathcal{S} = \mathcal{I} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{D}^{\texttt{io}} \restriction \mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F}).\forall \mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{D}^{\texttt{io}} \restriction \mathcal{P}) : \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{D}^{\texttt{io}} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F}$.

4. Choose $\mathcal{S}$ as in 3. and let $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P})$. We obtain:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{P} &\equiv \mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{D} \restriction \mathcal{P} && \text{(FORWARDER}(\mathcal{P})) \\
&\equiv \mathcal{E}'' \restriction \mathcal{D}^{\texttt{io}} \restriction \mathcal{P} && \text{(RENAME)} \\
&\equiv \mathcal{E}'' \restriction \mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F} && (\mathcal{E}'' \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{D}^{\texttt{io}} \restriction \mathcal{P}), 3.) \\
&\equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{S}' \restriction \mathcal{F} && \text{(RENAME)}
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\mathcal{E}'$ is defined as in FORWARDER$(\mathcal{P})$, $\mathcal{E}''$ is obtained from $\mathcal{E}'$ by declaring the renamed network channels c' of $\mathcal{P}$ to be IO channels, and $\mathcal{S}'$ is obtained from $\mathcal{S}$ by declaring the IO channels c' (which correspond to the IO channels of $\mathcal{D}^{\texttt{io}}$) to be network channels and renaming them to c according to $\mathcal{P}$.

5. By observing that $\mathcal{S}' \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F})$, 4. immediately implies that $\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$. □

By Theorem 10 and Proposition 12, to show Theorem 16, 4., we cannot dispense with the assumption that $\mathcal{P}$ is network predictable.

5.4 Restricting the Environment to be a Decision Process

In this section, we consider the case were for blackbox simulatability and universal composability the environment is restricted to be a decision process while the adversary may play the role of a master process. Interestingly, in this setting not all three security notions are equivalent even if the real protocol is network predictable.

We first note that certain variants of SS, BB, and UC do not make sense in case the environment is restricted to be a decision process as every two IO-compatible protocols would be related:

Remark 17. *We have that for all IO-compatible protocols $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ the relationships $\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$, $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$, $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$, and $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ are true since there are no master processes and therefore no computation can take place. Note that in UC if the real adversary is a regular process expression, then so is the ideal adversary, and thus, the two variants of UC are equivalent.*

Theorem 18. *Let $\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{R}$. Then,*

1. *$\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ iff $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ iff $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ iff $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$.*

2. *$\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ iff $\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$.*

3. *$\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ implies $\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$.*

4. *$\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ iff $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ iff $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$.*

5. *The notions in 1. imply those in 4. , and $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ implies those in 4.*

The theorem holds both for the case where $\mathbf{MD}$ and $\mathbf{D}$ only contain closed process expressions and for the case where $\mathbf{MD}$ and $\mathbf{D}$ may contain open process expressions.

PROOF. Statement 1. Using the definitions and MD-INCLUSION, it immediately follows that $\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ implies $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$. Clearly, $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ implies $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$. The converse is also true: If the real adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is regular, then $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F}$ because no one of the two process expressions contains $\mathtt{start}$, and thus, no computation takes place. We have that $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ and $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ are equivalent since if the real adversary contains $\mathtt{start}$, then the environment may not contain $\mathtt{start}$, and hence, belongs to $\mathbf{D}$. Similar to the proof of Theorem 16, 1. we now show that blackbox simulatability implies strong simulatability.

1. Assume that $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$.

2. The definition yields that $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ are IO-compatible and:
   $\exists\mathcal{S} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F}).\forall\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P}).\forall\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{D}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P}) : \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F}.$

3. Choosing $\mathcal{A}$ to be the master IO dummy adversary $\mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}} = \mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathtt{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), \mathtt{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), q(\mathbf{n}))$ we obtain:
$\exists \mathcal{S} \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F}).\forall$ polynomials $q(\mathbf{n}).\forall \mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{D}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P}) : \mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}} \upharpoonright \mathcal{S} \upharpoonright \mathcal{F}.$

4. Choose $\mathcal{S}$ as in 3., let $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P})$, and $q(\mathbf{n}) = \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{P})(\mathbf{n}) + \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{S} \upharpoonright \mathcal{F})(\mathbf{n}) + \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{E})(\mathbf{n})$. We have:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P} &\equiv \mathcal{E}'_M \upharpoonright \mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{net}} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P} && \text{(MASTER-S-FORWARDER)} \\
&\equiv \mathcal{E}''_M \upharpoonright \mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P} && \text{(RENAME)} \\
&\equiv \mathcal{E}''_M \upharpoonright \mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}} \upharpoonright \mathcal{S} \upharpoonright \mathcal{F} && (\mathcal{E}''_M \in \mathbf{D}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P}), 3.) \\
&\equiv \mathcal{E}'_M \upharpoonright \mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{net}} \upharpoonright \mathcal{S} \upharpoonright \mathcal{F} && \text{(RENAME)} \\
&\equiv \mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{S} \upharpoonright \mathcal{F} && \text{(MASTER-S-FORWARDER)}
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\mathcal{E}'_M$ is defined as in MASTER-S-FORWARDER and $\mathcal{E}''_M$ is obtained from $\mathcal{E}'_M$ by declaring the renamed network channels c' of $\mathcal{P}$ to be IO channels. Since $\mathcal{E}$ is valid for $\mathcal{P}$, all network channels of $\mathcal{P}$ occurring in $\mathcal{E}$ have been renamed according to $\mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{net}}$ and declared to be IO channels, and $\mathtt{start}$ has been renamed to $\mathtt{start}'$, it is clear that $\mathcal{E}''_M \in \mathbf{D}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P})$.

5. From 4. we immediately obtain that $\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$.

Statement 2. It suffices to observe that if the real adversary is not a master process, then no computation will take place.

Statement 3. This statement is obvious.

Statement 4. The reasoning here is similar to the one for the different variants of blackbox simulatability above. In addition we use that if the real adversary contains $\mathtt{start}$, then so does the ideal adversary.

Statement 5. The first implication was proved in Theorem 16 and the second implication immediately follows since if the real adversary contains $\mathtt{start}$, then so does the ideal adversary. $\qquad\square$

As illustrated next, $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$, or equivalently $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$, in general does not imply $\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ or $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ even if $\mathcal{P}$ is network predictable. Intuitively, in the proof of Theorem 16, 4. if the adversary may be a master process, then the simulator $\mathcal{S} = \mathcal{I}$ we obtain is also a master process. However, to show strong simulatability the simulator needs to be a regular process expression. The example used to prove the following theorem shows that in general master process expressions cannot be turned into regular process expressions without changing the behavior of the overall system. Therefore, the proof of Theorem 16 would not go through if the adversary may be a master process while the environment is a decision process.

Theorem 19. *There exist $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{R}$ such that $\mathcal{P}$ is network predictable and $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ does not imply $\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ and $\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$.*

To prove the theorem, we construct $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{R}$ and show the properties claimed.

Roughly speaking, $\mathcal{P}$ receives a bit x from the environment on an IO channel, returns an acknowledgment of receipt on a network channel, waits for a send request on a network channel, and then returns x on a network channel. The process $\mathcal{F}$ works exactly in the same way but if $x = 0$, then in the last step it will not return x.

Intuitively, a *master* process $\mathcal{S}$ which has only access to the network channels of $\mathcal{F}$ can simulate $\mathcal{P}$ using $\mathcal{F}$ because if in the last step $\mathcal{F}$ does not return an answer, $\mathcal{S}$ will be triggered, i.e., receives input on the channel start, and thus knows that $\mathcal{F}$'s answer was 0. If $\mathcal{S}$ is *not* a master process, then there is no way for $\mathcal{S}$ to know what x was, and therefore will not be able to simulate $\mathcal{P}$ (using $\mathcal{F}$). Now, the reason that $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ holds but $\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ and $\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ do not hold is that for the latter two security notions one requires that $\mathcal{P}$ can be simulated using $\mathcal{F}$ by a simulator that is *not* a master process, while for $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ the simulator (i.e., the ideal adversary) may be a master process.

Formally, the process expression $\mathcal{P}$ uses the following channels: $\mathtt{C}^{\mathtt{io}}_{\mathtt{in}}(\mathcal{P}) = \{c_0\}$, $\mathtt{C}^{\mathtt{net}}_{\mathtt{out}}(\mathcal{P}) = \{c_1, c_2\}$, and $\mathtt{C}^{\mathtt{net}}_{\mathtt{in}}(\mathcal{P}) = \{c_3\}$. Now, $\mathcal{P}$ is defined as follows:

$$\mathcal{P} = \mathtt{in}(c_0, t_{x \in \{0,1\}}).(\mathtt{out}(c_1, \mathtt{received}) \;||\; \mathtt{in}(c_3, \mathtt{send\text{-}req}).\mathtt{out}(c_2, x)).$$

where the M-term $t_{x \in \{0,1\}}$ only accepts a bit string a if it is 0 or 1. In this case, x is set to a. Clearly, $\mathcal{P}$ is network predictable: A possible dummy is

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{D} = \;&\mathtt{in}(c_1, \mathtt{received}).(\mathtt{out}(c'_1, \mathtt{received}) \;|| \\
&\mathtt{in}(c'_3, \mathtt{send\text{-}req}).(\mathtt{out}(c_3, \mathtt{send\text{-}req}) \;||\; \mathtt{in}(c_2, x).\mathtt{out}(c'_2, x))).
\end{aligned}$$

The channels of $\mathcal{F}$ are defined just as for $\mathcal{P}$ except that the network channels c_1, c_2, c_3 are renamed to c'_1, c'_2, c'_3. Also, $\mathcal{F}$ uses the internal channel $c'_{\mathtt{int}}$.

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{F} = \;&\mathtt{in}(c_0, t_{x \in \{0,1\}}).\Big(\mathtt{out}(c'_1, \mathtt{received}) \;|| \\
&\mathtt{in}(c'_3, \mathtt{send\text{-}req}).\big(\mathtt{out}(c'_{\mathtt{int}}, x) \;||\; \mathtt{in}(c'_{\mathtt{int}}, 1).\mathtt{out}(c'_2, x)\big)\Big)
\end{aligned}$$

where, formally, 1 is an M-term which only accepts the input if it is 1.
We now show:

Claim I. $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$.

Proof sketch of Claim I. By Theorem 18, we know that $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ iff $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$. To prove the claim, let $\mathcal{A} \in (\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R})\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P})$. We need to show that there exists $\mathcal{I} \in (\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R})\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{I})$ such that $\mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{A} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \upharpoonright \mathcal{I} \upharpoonright \mathcal{F}$ for every $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{D}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{A} \upharpoonright \mathcal{P})$. We will define a master process expression $\mathcal{S}$ which uses $\mathcal{F}$ to simulate $\mathcal{P}$. Then, $\mathcal{I}$ will be the concurrent composition of $\mathcal{A}$ (with start renamed) and $\mathcal{S}$.

The simulator $\mathcal{S}$ works as follows: It forwards messages on $\mathcal{F}$'s network channels from/to the adversary $\mathcal{A}$. If right after forwarding a message from the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ on c_3 to $\mathcal{F}$ on c'_3, $\mathcal{S}$ receives a message on start, then $\mathcal{S}$ sends 0 on c_2 because this situation occurs exactly when $\mathcal{F}$ is expected to send a message on c'_2 but does not do so because $x = 0$. In all other

situations where $\mathcal{S}$ receives a message on start, $\mathcal{S}$ forwards it on start$'$ (to the adversary $\mathcal{A}$). One can now show that $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction (\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{S}) \restriction \mathcal{F}$ where $\mathcal{I} = \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{S}$ is the ideal adversary, which concludes the proof of the Claim I. We point to [16] for a formulation of $\mathcal{S}$ as a process expression and a more detailed proof.

Claim II. $\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ does not hold.

Proof sketch of Claim II . The proof of Claim II is by contradiction. Assume that there exists a simulator $\mathcal{S}' \in \mathbf{R}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F})$ such that $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{S}' \restriction \mathcal{F}$ for every $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P})$. We construct a closed master decision process expression $\mathcal{E}' \in \mathbf{MD}\text{-Valid}(\mathcal{P})$ such that $\mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{P} \not\equiv \mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{S}' \restriction \mathcal{F}$. The environment $\mathcal{E}'$ works as follows: It generates a random bit, sends it on channel c_0, waits for acknowledgment of receipt (on channel c_1), sends a "send request" on c_3, and then checks whether the bit returned on c_2 is the one sent before. If at some point except at the beginning, $\mathcal{E}'$ receives a message on start, then $\mathcal{E}'$ writes 0 on decision and terminates. In other words, $\mathcal{E}'$ always expects to receive a message back from the process it is interacting with. Now, while in $\mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{P}$ the environment $\mathcal{E}'$ will output 1 with probability 1, it is not hard to show that in $\mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{S}' \restriction \mathcal{F}$ the environment outputs 1 with at most probability $1/2$ since the simulator does not know which bit was sent by $\mathcal{E}'$ to $\mathcal{F}$. Hence, $\mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{P} \not\equiv \mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{S}' \restriction \mathcal{F}$. This concludes the proof of Claim II. We point to [16] for a more precise formulation of $\mathcal{E}'$ as a process expression and a more detailed argument.

Claim III. $\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ does not hold.

The proof is similar to the one of Claim II. One simply chooses $\mathcal{A}$ to be a dummy adversary that forwards messages between $\mathcal{E}'$ and $\mathcal{S}'$.

This concludes the proof of Theorem 19. Note that by Theorem 10, 16, and 18 it follows that $\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ implies $\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ (but that the converse is not true if $\mathcal{P}$ is not network predictable). Hence, Claim III implies Claim II. It is open whether $\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ implies $\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ if $\mathcal{P}$ is network predictable.

5.5 Making the Simulator the Master Process

Theorems 18 and 19 show that SS (SBB) and UC (WBB) are not equivalent if the adversary may play the role of the master process and the environment is restricted to be a decision process even if the real protocol is network predictable. As mentioned, the reason for this is that to show that UC implies SS, we want to use the ideal adversary in UC as the simulator in SS. However, in SS the simulator has to be a regular process expression while in UC the ideal adversary may be a master process expression. In general, it is not possible to turn a master process expression into a regular process expression without changing the behavior of the overall system.

It is tempting to think that allowing the simulator to play the role of the master process would solve the above problem, and thus, would make UC (WBB) and SS (SBB) equivalent even if the environment may only be a decision process. In this section, we will see that this is not so. In a nutshell, the reason for this is that in UC the run time of the ideal adversary may depend on the run time of the real adversary while the run time of the simulator in SS

and BB has to be independent of the run time of the real adversary and the environment, and therefore, the simulator can be exhausted by these entities.

However, WBB is equivalent to UC if the simulator may play the role of the master process both in case the environment is the master process and in case the environment is restricted to be a decision process.

Recall that we have defined variants SSsim, SBBsim, and WBBsim of SS, SBB, and WBB in which the simulator may play the role of the master process in Definition 7.

We note that certain variants of SSsim, SBBsim, and WBBsim do not make sense as all IO-compatible protocols would be related:

Remark 20. *We have that* $\texttt{SSsim}_{(\mathbf{M,D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$, $\texttt{SSsim}_{(\mathbf{M\backslash R,D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$, $\texttt{SBBsim}_{(\mathbf{R,M,D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$, $\texttt{SBBsim}_{(\mathbf{R,M\backslash R,D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$, $\texttt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{R,M,D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$, *and* $\texttt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{R,M\backslash R,D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *are true for every IO-compatible protocols* $\mathcal{P}$ *and* $\mathcal{F}$ *since the left hand-side of* $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F}$ *and* $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A}' \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A}' \restriction \mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F}$ *do not contain* $\texttt{start}$, *and thus, no computation can take place. Consequently, if* $\mathcal{S}$ *does "nothing", then the process expressions on both sides are indistinguishable.*

Theorem 21. *1. There are no IO-compatible protocols* $\mathcal{P}$ *and* $\mathcal{F}$ *such that:* $\texttt{SSsim}_{(\mathbf{M\backslash R,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$, $\texttt{SBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M,M\backslash R,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$, $\texttt{SBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M,M\backslash R,D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$, *or* $\texttt{SBBsim}_{(\mathbf{R,M\backslash R,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$.

2. For every $\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{R}$*:* $\texttt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\texttt{SSsim}_{(\mathbf{M,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\texttt{SBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M,M,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\texttt{SBBsim}_{(\mathbf{R,M,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\texttt{SBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M,M,D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$.

3. For every $\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{R}$*:* $\texttt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{R,M,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\texttt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M,M,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\texttt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M,R,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$.

4. For every $\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{R}$*:* $\texttt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M,M,D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\texttt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M\backslash R,M,D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\texttt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M,M,D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$.

5. The notions in 3. imply those in 4.

PROOF. Statement 1. Assume that there exists $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ such that $\texttt{SSsim}_{(\mathbf{M\backslash R,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$. Hence, there exists $\mathcal{S} \in (\mathbf{M\backslash R})\text{-}\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F})$ with $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F}$. Let $q(\mathbf{n}) = \texttt{comsize}(\mathcal{S})$. Now, to distinguish $\mathcal{P}$ from $\mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F}$, we define an $\mathcal{E}$ that does the following: $\mathcal{E}$ triggers itself via $\texttt{start}$ $q(\mathbf{n}) + 1$ times. (It is straightforward to formulate $\mathcal{E}$ as a process expression.) If it interacts with $\mathcal{P}$, then $\mathcal{E}$ is in fact triggered $q(\mathbf{n}) + 1$ times, and in this case, $\mathcal{E}$ outputs 1 on $\texttt{decision}$. If $\mathcal{E}$ ($\mathcal{E}'$) interacts with $\mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F}$, then $\mathcal{E}'$ must be triggered through $\mathcal{S}$ via $\texttt{start}'$. However, since the communication size of $\mathcal{S}$ is $q(\mathbf{n})$, $\mathcal{S}$ cannot trigger $\mathcal{E}$ $q(\mathbf{n}) + 1$ times, and thus, $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{P} \not\equiv \mathcal{E}' \restriction \mathcal{S} \restriction \mathcal{F}$. The argument for the variants of SBBsim is similar.

Statement 2. This is an immediate consequence of the first statement, Theorem 16, and Theorem 18.

Statement 3. The implications from right to left are obvious. To see that $\texttt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{R,M,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ implies $\texttt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M,R,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$, first note that by Theorem 16 $\texttt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M,R,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ is equivalent to $\texttt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{R,R,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$. Now, if $\texttt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{R,M,MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ is the variant of WBBsim where the the simulator may only be master if the adversary is, then it immediately follows that the

simulator has to be regular. Hence, $\mathtt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ implies $\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ (and thus $\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$). In case, we consider the variant of $\mathtt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ where the simulator may be master independent of whether the adversary is master, we obtain that if the simulator is master even though the adversary is not, then the environment can be a master and can exhaust the simulator just as shown in statement 1. Consequently, this case can not occur. And hence, the simulator has to be regular if the adversary is.

Statement 4. The first equivalence follows from the fact that if the adversary is a regular process expression, then no computation can take place. It is also clear that WBBsim implies UC since the real adversary in parallel with the simulator provides the ideal adversary needed for UC. The implication in the other direction is more interesting:

1. Assume that $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$.

2. The definition yields that $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ are IO-compatible and:
   $\forall \mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-}\mathrm{Adv}(\mathcal{P}).\exists \mathcal{I} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-}\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}\restriction\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F}).\forall \mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{D}\text{-}\mathrm{Env}(\mathcal{A}\restriction\mathcal{P}) : \mathcal{E}\restriction\mathcal{A}\restriction\mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E}\restriction\mathcal{I}\restriction\mathcal{F}.$

3. Choosing $\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}} = \mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}}(\mathtt{C}_{\mathtt{in}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), \mathtt{C}_{\mathtt{out}}^{\mathtt{net}}(\mathcal{P}), q(\mathbf{n}))$ for some $q(\mathbf{n})$ we obtain:
   $\exists \mathcal{S}_{q(\mathbf{n})} = \mathcal{I} \in \mathbf{M}\text{-}\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}}\restriction\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F}).\forall \mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{D}\text{-}\mathrm{Env}(\mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}}\restriction\mathcal{P}) : \mathcal{E}\restriction\mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}}\restriction\mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E}\restriction\mathcal{S}_{q(\mathbf{n})}\restriction\mathcal{F}.$

4. Let $\mathcal{A} \in (\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R})\text{-}\mathrm{Adv}(\mathcal{P})$, $q(\mathbf{n}) = \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{A})(\mathbf{n}) + \mathtt{comsize}(\mathcal{P})(\mathbf{n}) + 1$, choose $\mathcal{S}_{q(\mathbf{n})}$ as in 3. and let $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{D}\text{-}\mathrm{Env}(\mathcal{A}\restriction\mathcal{P})$. We obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{E}\restriction\mathcal{A}\restriction\mathcal{P} &\equiv \mathcal{E}\restriction\mathcal{A}'_M\restriction\mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{net}}\restriction\mathcal{P} && \text{(MASTER-ADV-FORWARDER)}\\
&\equiv \mathcal{E}\restriction\mathcal{A}''_M\restriction\mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}}\restriction\mathcal{P} && \text{(RENAME)}\\
&\equiv \mathcal{E}\restriction\mathcal{A}''_M\restriction\mathcal{S}_{q(\mathbf{n})}\restriction\mathcal{F} && (\mathcal{E}\restriction\mathcal{A}''_M \in \mathbf{D}\text{-}\mathrm{Env}(\mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}}\restriction\mathcal{P}), 3.)\\
&\equiv \mathcal{E}\restriction\mathcal{A}'\restriction\mathcal{S}'_{q(\mathbf{n})}\restriction\mathcal{F} && \text{(RENAME)}
\end{aligned}$$

   where $\mathcal{A}'_M$ is defined as in MASTER-ADV-FORWARDER, $\mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{io}}$ and $\mathcal{A}''_M$ are obtained from $\mathcal{D}_M^{\mathtt{net}}$ and $\mathcal{A}'_M$, respectively, by declaring the renamed network channel c' of $\mathcal{P}$ to be IO channels, $\mathcal{A}'$ is defined as in the definition of WBBsim, and $\mathcal{S}'_{q(\mathbf{n})}$ is obtained from $\mathcal{S}_{q(\mathbf{n})}$ by declaring the IO channels c' to be network channels and renaming them to c according to $\mathcal{P}$.

5. Observe that $\mathcal{S}'_{q(\mathbf{n})}$ is adversarially valid for $\mathcal{F}$ and that $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{S}'_{q(\mathbf{n})}\restriction\mathcal{F}$ are compatible except that $\mathcal{S}'_{q(\mathbf{n})}$ contains $\mathtt{start}$ and $\mathtt{start}'$. Also, $\mathcal{S}'_{q(\mathbf{n})}$ only depends on $\mathcal{F}$, $\mathcal{P}$, and (the communication size of) $\mathcal{A}$. Consequently, 4. implies $\mathtt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ (for both variants of WBBsim).

Statement 5. It suffices to observe that $\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ implies $\mathtt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$, which is obvious. $\qquad\square$

5.6 Summary of the Relationships

In this section, we summarize the results proved in the previous sections. We have four classes of pairwise equivalent (variants of) security notions. In the following four corollaries

we present these classes. We then study the relationships between these classes. All results are also depicted in Figure 2. In this figure, (non-)implications that immediately follow from the ones depicted are not drawn.

The first class, which we call SS/SBB, consists of all variants of strong simulatability and strong black-box simulatability. There equivalence follows immediately from Theorem 16, 18, and 21.

Corollary 22. *All security notions in the class SS/SBB are equivalent, i.e., for every $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{R}$, we have:*
$\mathtt{SS}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{SSsim}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff*
$\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{SBB}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{SBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$
iff $\mathtt{SBBsim}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{SBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$.

The second class, which we call UC/WBB$_{env}$, consists of all variants of universal composability and weak black-box simulatability where the environment may be a master process. Their equivalence follows immediately from Theorem 16 and 21.

Corollary 23. *All security notions in the class UC/WBB$_{env}$ are equivalent, i.e., for every $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{R}$, we have:*
$\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{WBB}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff*
$\mathtt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$.

The third class, which we call UC/WBB$_{sim}$, consists of all variants of universal composability and weak black-box simulatability where the simulator is a master process and the environment is restricted to be a decision process. There equivalence follows immediately from Theorem 18 and 21.

Corollary 24. *All security notions in the class UC/WBB$_{sim}$ are equivalent, i.e., for every $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{R}$, we have:*
$\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff*
$\mathtt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$.

For the version $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ of universal composability, note that since real and ideal adversary have to be master processes, the environment can not be a master process.

The fourth class, which we call WBB$_{adv}$, consists of all variants of weak black-box simulatability where the simulator is a regular process and the environment is restricted to be a decision process. There equivalence follows immediately from Theorem 21.

Corollary 25. *All security notions in the class WBB$_{adv}$ are equivalent, i.e., for every $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{R}$, we have:* $\mathtt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ *iff* $\mathtt{WBBsim}_{(\mathbf{M}\backslash\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{D})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$.

We now summarize some of the basic relationships between the different classes.

Given a class $\mathbf{C}$ of regular process expressions, we will write, for instance, *SS/SBB $\Rightarrow$ UC/WBB$_{env}$ for $\mathbf{C}$* to say that, for every $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{C}$, if $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ are related with respect to some security notion in SS/SBB (since all of the security notions in one class are equivalent, it does not matter which one is chosen), then they are also related with respect to (all of) the security notions in UC/WBB$_{env}$. In particular, UC/WBB$_{sim}$ $\not\Rightarrow$ WBB$_{adv}$ for $\mathbf{C}$ means that

there exist $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{C}$ such that $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ are related w.r.t. the security notions in $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{sim}$ but not w.r.t. those in WBB_{adv}. In case $\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{R}$, we will omit $\mathbf{C}$ and simply say, for instance, $\mathsf{SS/SBB} \Rightarrow \mathsf{UC/WBB}_{env}$.

Corollary 26.   *1. $\mathsf{SS/SBB} \Rightarrow \mathsf{UC/WBB}_{env}$.*

2. *$\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{env} \Rightarrow \mathsf{WBB}_{adv}$.*

3. *$\mathsf{WBB}_{adv} \Rightarrow \mathsf{UC/WBB}_{sim}$.*

4. *$\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{sim} \nRightarrow \mathsf{WBB}_{adv}$.*

5. *In particular:*

    (a) *$\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{env} \Rightarrow \mathsf{UC/WBB}_{sim}$.*

    (b) *$\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{sim} \nRightarrow \mathsf{UC/WBB}_{env}$.*

    (c) *$\mathsf{SS/SBB} \Rightarrow \mathsf{UC/WBB}_{sim}$.*

    (d) *$\mathsf{SS/SBB} \nRightarrow \mathsf{UC/WBB}_{sim}$.*

PROOF. The first implication follows immediately from Theorem 16. The second implication was shown in Theorem 18, while the third one was proved in Theorem 21. Finally, 4. was stated in Theorem 19. The statements in 5. immediately follow from the previous ones.   □

We note that the real (and ideal) protocol chosen to prove 4. is network predictable, i.e., it satisfies FORWARDER.

We emphasize the following:

Remark 27. *The equivalences among the security notions in the different classes—SS/SBB, $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{env}$, WBB_{adv}, and $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{sim}$— as well as the relationships between these classes, as stated in Corollary 26, are proved based on only quite basic properties of the computational model, namely, the axioms listed in Section 5.1, excluding FORWARDER, plus the assumption that the runtime of processes are polynomially bounded in the security parameter (except for guards), which is the case for the models proposed in [5, 9, 30] (but not for some more recent models [8, 20, 23]). Also, the example showing that $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{sim}$ does not imply WBB_{adv} is quite basic. Hence, our work has identified basic properties relevant for the relationships between security notions. Also, the axiomatic approach allows us to carry over some of our results to other models and to more easily identify differences between the models (see Section 6).*

It is open whether or not WBB_{adv} implies $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{env}$. However, from Corollary 26 and Corollary 28, it follows that WBB_{adv} does not imply $\mathsf{SS/SBB}$ for protocols that are not network predictable, i.e., protocols that do not satisfy FORWARDER. (Otherwise, $\mathsf{SS/SBB}$ and $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{env}$ would be equivalent even for protocols that do not satisfy FORWARDER, which is a contradiction to Corollary 28 below).

In Theorem 10, we have shown that for $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{env}$ to imply $\mathsf{SS/SBB}$ it is necessary that FORWARDER is satisfied. This allows us to characterize when $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{env}$ and $\mathsf{SS/SBB}$ are equivalent. We write $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{env} \Leftrightarrow \mathsf{SS/SBB}$ for $\mathbf{C}$ if $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{env} \Rightarrow \mathsf{SS/SBB}$ for $\mathbf{C}$ and $\mathsf{SS/SBB} \Rightarrow \mathsf{UC/WBB}_{env}$ for $\mathbf{C}$.

Corollary 28. *Let* **C** *be a class of regular process expressions closed under renaming of channels (in the same sense used in Theorem 10). Then,*

$$UC/WBB_{env} \Leftrightarrow SS/SBB \text{ for } \mathbf{C} \quad \text{iff} \quad FORWARDER(\mathcal{P}) \text{ for every } \mathcal{P} \in \mathbf{C}.$$

PROOF. The only-if direction immediately follows from Theorem 10. For the if direction, first note that by Corollary 26 we know that $SS/SBB \Rightarrow UC/WBB_{env}$ for **R**. Given that $FORWARDER(\mathcal{P})$, we obtain that $UC/WBB_{env} \Rightarrow SS/SBB$ for **C** by Theorem 16. □

We emphasize:

Remark 29. *The proof of Corollary 28 only uses very basic properties (axioms) which should be satisfied in most computational models. Hence, the corollary should carry over to such models.*

Together with Proposition 15, Corollary 28 implies:

Corollary 30. *Let* **C** *be the class of standard protocols (see Definition 14). Then,*

$$UC/WBB_{env} \Leftrightarrow SS/SBB \text{ for } \mathbf{C}.$$

We note that this corollary does not hold for the class of all regular process expressions as there exist regular process expression which are not network predictable (Proposition 12). By Corollary 28, for those protocols, UC/WBB_{env} does not imply SS/SBB.

Corollary 30 tells us that if the environment may play the role of the master process, then for standard protocols (i.e., the class of protocols considered in the computational models by Pfitzmann and Waidner [30] and Canetti [9]) strong simulatability/strong black-box simulatability and universal composability/weak black-box simulatability are equivalent notions in SPPC. The main reason is that in SPPC, for standard protocols, the axiom FORWARDER is true (Proposition 15). Here we use that processes correspond to IO automata/ITMs *with* guards. Without guards, the proposition would not hold true.

6 Implications for Other Models

In this section, we discuss the implications of our results in SPPC for the PIOA (Section 6.1) and PITM models (Section 6.2), including differences between the models. In Section 6.3, we also briefly discuss the PPC and the Task-PIOA model.

6.1 The PIOA Model and Variants

We refer the reader to [5, 30] for a detailed description of the PIOA model. We examine the relationships between the security notions as considered for PIOA model. It turns out that the security notions UC and SBB are not equivalent in PIOA even if we assume that the environment may play the role of the master process and the FORWARDER axiom holds true. This seems counter-intuitive and suggests to slightly modify PIOA. We call the new version the buffer-free version of PIOA (BFPIOA). In BFPIOA, all our axioms are satisfied and all relationships obtained for SPPC carry over. Before studying the relationships between

the security notions, we go through the axioms listed in Section 5.1 and see which ones are satisfied in the PIOA model and which ones are not. This will help us to explain the differences between the PIOA model and SPPC. All of the following is independent of whether or not buffers can be queried an unbounded number of times.

On the validity of the axioms in Section 5.1. It is easy to see that the axioms COM, ASC, TRN, SYM, RENAME, RENAME-START, MMD-INCLUSION, and MD-INCLUSION are satisfied in PIOA. We will see that MASTER-S-FORWARDER, and MASTER-ADV-FORWARDER are satisfied as well.

However, the axioms REG-S-FORWARDER, REG-ADV-FORWARDER, and FORWARDER are not satisfied in case the environment/adversary connects only to the channels (or ports, to use the terminology of the PIOA model) of the dummy process, i.e., the environment/adversary is not allowed to access the channels of the protocol directly by renaming of channels. While without this assumption there is a configuration of the entities that makes the axioms true, our assumption better explains the problem pointed out in Theorem 32.

Proposition 31. *The axioms REG-S-FORWARDER, REG-ADV-FORWARDER, and FOR-WARDER are not satisfied in the PIOA model in case the environment/adversary connects only to ports of the dummy process.*

PROOF. The following example shows that REG-S-FORWARDER is not satisfied. The same example works for REG-ADV-FORWARDER and FORWARDER. The example uses that in the PIOA model entities always communicate through buffers which have to be triggered to deliver messages and which may be triggered by machines (typically the adversary/environment) other than those who write messages into the buffer.

Let $\mathcal{P}$ consist of one IO automaton M which receives a bit on an IO channel and forwards it on a network channel, i.e., writes it into a buffer connected to the adversary/environment. We assume that the buffer is scheduled by the adversary/environment. In what follows, we argue that REG-S-FORWARDER does not hold for $\mathcal{P}$.

If the environment (for which we may assume that it plays the role of the master process) sends a bit to $\mathcal{P}$, then $\mathcal{P}$ outputs the bit on the network channel and according to the computational model of PIOA, this bit is written into the buffer. Next the environment is triggered and it will trigger the buffer in which it expects to find the bit sent to $\mathcal{P}$ via the IO channel. In case there is no dummy between $\mathcal{P}$ and the environment, the environment will obtain the bit. Otherwise, if the environment and $\mathcal{P}$ are separated by a dummy, then the environment triggers the buffer which "sits" in between the environment and the dummy, and this buffer does not contain the bit since the dummy was never activated, and thus, could not write into this buffer. Thus, the environment can distinguish whether it only interacts with the protocol $\mathcal{P}$ or with the dummy and the protocol. Consequently, REG-S-FORWARDER does not hold in PIOA. □

We note that by Remark 13, the axiom FORWARDER fails in PIOA (for the same reason it fails in SPPC) even if all machines trigger their own buffers.

The above example does not work for the axioms MASTER-S-FORWARDER and MAS-TER-ADV-FORWARDER because after $\mathcal{P}$ wrote the bit into the network buffer, the dummy

will be triggered next as it is the master process. Hence, the dummy can write the bit into the buffer that sits in between the environment and the dummy, and then can activate the environment. More generally, since the dummy is the master it can copy all messages written by $\mathcal{P}$ to the buffers sitting in between the dummy and the protocol into the buffers which sit in between the environment and the dummy, and only then activates the environment. Therefore, MASTER-S-FORWARDER and MASTER-ADV-FORWARDER are satisfied in PIOA.

Relationships between the security notions in the PIOA model. We first show that, unlike SPPC, in the PIOA model, UC does not imply SBB in case the environment may play the role of the master scheduler even for standard protocols. (Recall Definition 14 for standard protocols.) This is mainly due to the fact that in the PIOA model IO automata have to communicate through buffers. Before we prove this statement, we note a difference in the definition of SBB as stated in the present work and the definition of SBB in the PIOA model.

In our definition of SBB we assume the simulator to sit between the adversary and the ideal protocol. In contrast, in the PIOA model, the simulator can completely "encapsulate" the adversary. In particular, messages sent from/to the environments to/from the adversary, may first go through the simulator, who can forward, drop, or modify these messages. We refer to this version of SBB by SBB_{PIOA}. Unfortunately, the way the adversary and the simulator are combined does not seem to have been rigorously defined in the PIOA model. We will therefore consider all interpretations that appear to be reasonable.

Theorem 32. *UC does not imply* SBB_{PIOA} *in case the environment may play the role of the master scheduler, even for standard protocols.*

PROOF. We define two standard protocols, a real protocol $\mathcal{P}$ and an ideal protocol $\mathcal{F}$, and show that $\mathcal{P}$ is at least as secure as $\mathcal{F}$ w.r.t. UC, but not w.r.t. SBB_{PIOA}.

Let $\mathcal{P}$ consist of one IO automaton M which receives a bit on an IO channel and forwards it on a network channel, i.e., writes it into a buffer connected to the adversary/environment. We assume that the buffer is scheduled by the adversary/environment.

Let $\mathcal{F}$ consist of one IO automaton M' which, just as M, has an IO channel and a network channel where the corresponding buffer is scheduled by the adversary. In addition, M' has a secure channel to itself. (Alternatively, one could introduce another machine M'' and two channels, one from M' to M'' and one from M'' to M', controlled by the sending machine, respectively.) M' works as follows: It receives a bit b_1 from the environment, generates a random bit b_2, and writes the two messages $(b_1,$ "environment") and $(b_2,$ "random") into the network buffer. M' chooses the order in which these messages are written into the buffer uniformly at random. Also, the messages are written into two different cells of the network buffer. This is possible by using the secure channel: First, M' writes the first message into the buffer, then M' uses the secure channel to trigger itself, and third M' writes the second message into the buffer.

Claim I. $\mathcal{P}$ is at least as secure as $\mathcal{F}$ w.r.t. UC.

Proof sketch of Claim I. The ideal adversary simply simulates the real adversary. In case the real adversary triggers the buffer to M to obtain the first message, the ideal adversary would trigger the buffer to M' two times to obtain both messages (if any) and would only use b_1 to

simulate the real adversary. The tag "environment" tells the ideal adversary which of the two bits to use.

Claim II. $\mathcal{P}$ is *not* at least as secure as $\mathcal{F}$ w.r.t. SBB_{PIOA}.

Proof sketch of Claim II. Assume that $\mathcal{P}$ is at least as secure as $\mathcal{F}$ w.r.t. SBB_{PIOA}. We distinguish four cases and lead them to a contradiction.

1. The simulator $\mathcal{S}$ is "empty", i.e., the ideal adversary $\mathcal{A}'$ (obtained by renaming channels of the real adversary $\mathcal{A}$) connects to the network buffer of M'. This obviously does not work because the network buffers of M and M' contain different information such that it is easy to specify $\mathcal{A}$, $\mathcal{A}'$, and an environment that tell $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ apart.

2. The simulator $\mathcal{S}$ connects to the network buffer of M' but the ideal adversary $\mathcal{A}'$ controls the clock channel of this buffer. This also does not work. Let the real adversary $\mathcal{A}$ be one that is triggered by the environment to read out the bit of the network channel. More precisely, $\mathcal{A}$ triggers the buffer to read out the first entry and forwards it to the environment. If $\mathcal{A}'$ triggers the first entry of the network channel of M', then this entry would be given to $\mathcal{S}$. In half of the cases this entry is (b_2,random), and thus, the simulator cannot figure out b_1. Hence, the bit forwarded by $\mathcal{S}$ to $\mathcal{A}'$ is wrong in half of the cases, and thus, so is the bit forwarded by $\mathcal{A}'$ to the environment.

3. The simulator $\mathcal{S}$ completely controls the network buffer of M', but the environment directly connects to $\mathcal{A}'$. There seem to be at least two reasonable different ways of how $\mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{A}'$ can be connected in this case. Recall that $\mathcal{A}'$ assumes to be connected to an input buffer that he schedules and $\mathcal{P}$ writes to:

   a) There is a buffer from $\mathcal{S}$ to $\mathcal{A}'$ controlled by $\mathcal{A}'$. Now the problem is that after $\mathcal{F}$ wrote the two messages into the buffer (which "sits" between $\mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{F}$), the environment, which is assumed to be a master scheduler, is scheduled and asks $\mathcal{A}$ ($\mathcal{A}'$) to deliver the bit from the network channel. The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ does this by triggering the network channel and forwarding the bit to the environment. If $\mathcal{A}'$ does the same, the buffer will be empty since the simulator was never triggered, and thus, could not write anything into the buffer between $\mathcal{A}'$ and $\mathcal{S}$. We note that this situation corresponds to the failure of REG-ADV-FORWARDER explained above.

   b) There is a buffer from $\mathcal{A}'$ to $\mathcal{S}$ controlled by $\mathcal{S}$ and a buffer from $\mathcal{S}$ to $\mathcal{A}'$ controlled by $\mathcal{S}$. The former buffer takes the scheduling messages from $\mathcal{A}'$ (which $\mathcal{S}$ has to pull by scheduling the buffer) and the latter buffer takes the message from $\mathcal{S}$ ($\mathcal{P}$ from the point of view of $\mathcal{A}'$) to $\mathcal{A}'$. But if now $\mathcal{A}'$ writes a (scheduling) message into the buffer to $\mathcal{S}$, then first the master scheduler, which is the environment, is scheduled. Hence, while interacting with the real protocol, the environment would obtain the expected bit from the adversary, in the ideal protocol, the environment is activated without obtaining a bit. Consequently, the environment can distinguish between the real and ideal setting. We note that even if the $\mathcal{S}$ were declared to be a master scheduler, this would not help, since in this case $\mathcal{S}$ can be exhausted by the environment, similarly to the next case.

4. The simulator $\mathcal{S}$ completely encapsulates $\mathcal{A}'$, i.e., all communication from/to $\mathcal{A}'$ first goes through $\mathcal{S}$. Now, no matter how the combination of $\mathcal{A}'$ and $\mathcal{S}$ is defined, the environment can distinguish between the real and the ideal setting, by exhausting $\mathcal{S}$ as follows: The environment picks a number i between 1 and $p(\mathbf{n})$ for some polynomial $p(\mathbf{n})$ bigger than the runtime of $\mathcal{S}$. Since the runtime of $\mathcal{S}$ is independent of the runtime of the adversary and the environment, we may assume that the runtime of the adversary is chosen in such a way that the adversary is never exhausted when executed with the environment, the real/ideal protocol, and, in the ideal setting, the simulator. Now, the environment asks the adversary to deliver the bit $i-1$ times. Before asking the ith time, the environment sends a random bit to the real/ideal protocol. Then, the environment asks the adversary again to deliver this bit. In the real setting, the environment will always obtain the bit. In the ideal setting, there is a non-negligible chance that the bit is not returned. The reason is that $\mathcal{S}$ does not know when $\mathcal{F}$ actually wrote a bit into the buffer, and hence, always has to check when asked to deliver the bit (via the adversary). But then, if i is big enough (and it is with non-negligible probably), $\mathcal{S}$ will be exhausted at some point and will not be able to deliver the bit. (The proof can make made more rigorous along the lines of the proof of Proposition 12.)

$\square$

We note that the security notions in the classes $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{sim}$ and WBB_{adv} are, just as for SPPC, also equivalent in the PIOA model. (Recall that these classes contain security notions where the environment may not play the role of the master scheduler.) Also, the relationships between these classes are as in the case of SPPC (see the right-hand side of Figure 2). This follows from the fact that the axioms needed to prove these relationships hold in the PIOA model. The non-implication from $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{sim}$ to WBB_{adv} can be shown by the same example as the one used for SPPC. Also, as for the case of SPPC, $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{env}$ implies $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{sim}$. Together with Proposition 32, this allows us to conclude that $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{sim}$ does not imply SBB_{PIOA}, even for standard protocols.

Proposition 32 and the failure of the axioms REG-S-FORWARDER and REG-ADV-FORWARDER seem counter-intuitive. The problem vanishes if the PIOA model is modified so that machines always trigger their own buffers. In effect, this is equivalent to not having buffers at all, which is why we call this fragment of the PIOA model the *buffer-free PIOA model (BFPIOA)*. This fragment is essentially as expressive as PIOA and very closely related to SPPC (except that SPPC can express systems with a polynomial number of copies of protocols, which can be addressed using the guard mechanism).

Relationships between the security notions in the BFPIOA model. In BFPIOA, exactly the same axioms as in SPPC are satisfied and the examples used to prove separation results also carry over from SPPC to BFPIOA. As mentioned in Section 2, starting from the work in [6], PIOA (and thus, BFPIOA) has a restricted form of guards. Similar to SPPC, this mechanism suffices to satisfy the forwarder property for standard protocols, but just as in SPPC, there are protocols expressible in BFPIOA which do not satisfy this property. In conclusion, we obtain for BFPIOA exactly the same relationships as for SPPC (see Figure 2).

6.2 The PITM Model

The PITM model [9] is tailored towards defining UC where the environment is a master process and the adversaries are regular processes i.e., $\mathtt{UC}_{(\mathbf{R},\mathbf{R},\mathbf{MD})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$. Depending on which entities are involved, different computational models are defined: the real model (involving the environment, the real adversary, and the real protocol), the ideal model (involving the environment, the ideal adversary, and the ideal functionality together with dummy parties), and the hybrid model which is a combination of the previous two models.

Therefore, it is not immediately clear how the security notions SS, SBB, and WBB, which involve a simulator, would be defined in PITM. Different variants are possible, and as we have seen, differences in the definitions may affect the relationships between the security notions. It is out of the scope of this paper, to extend PITM in order to define SS, SBB, and WBB. However, general points can be made.

The version of PITM as introduced in [9] does not have a mechanism, such as guards of SPPC, that would allow the FORWARDER axiom to be satisfied. In fact, in the PITM model this axiom even fails for classes of protocols for which it is satisfied in the SPPC and BFPIOA models. As a consequence of our results, which show that the FORWARDER axiom is necessary for SBB (SS) to imply UC, we obtain that UC does not imply SBB (SS) in the PITM model.

6.3 Other Models

In this section, we discuss at a high level how SPPC is related to the Probabilistic Polytime Process Calculus (PPC) [24, 27–29] and the Task-PIOA framework [11].

PPC. Though PPC and SPPC share a similar notation, there are some important differences in the execution model that mean that the results proven in this paper do not transfer. The first difference lies in the fact that SPPC's execution model is sequential in nature, just as in the PIOA and PITM models, while PPC's is concurrent. In particular, SPPC is carefully designed to guarantee that, at any time, only one output command is ready to send. This is not a purely syntactic constraint, but is also enforced in the execution model by partitioning channels into high and low priorities. In contrast, in PPC there might be several possible output commands ready to transmit to any of several possible inputs. The result is that communication can proceed arbitrarily, and any machine can talk to any other machine on any channel at any time, an execution model that is more closely related to that of the pi-calculus. Secondly, the '+'-operator in SPPC and the M-terms in SPPC cannot be expressed in PPC. However, these constructs are essential for formulating probabilistic polynomial-time machines with guards. Also, the inability of simulating M-terms in PPC means that the dummy axioms do not transfer. The problem here is that an attacker can exhaust any PPC expression by sending lots of useless messages. The match terms employed in PPC do not help because sending a message that fails a match term allows the attacker to 'zero' out entire processes at the cost of very few messages. Altogether, the expressivity of PPC seems unsuitable for the purpose of this paper.

Time-bounded Task-PIOA. The Time-bounded Task-PIOA framework also differs in significant ways from the PITM, PIOA and SPPC execution models. So, the SPPC results do not carry over directly to that model and a detailed study is out of the scope of this paper. Similar to PPC, one important point of difference is that in the Task-PIOA framework, the scheduling is non-sequential, rather than sequential as in SPPC, PIOA, and PITM. Also, task-PIOAs may be invoked an unbounded number of times, as for example in recent simulation-based models [8, 23]. Finally, while task-PIOAs may take non-deterministic actions, this is not the case for SPPC (and other simulation-based models).

7 Reactive Simulatability and Extensions of SPPC

In this section, we consider another security notion, called *reactive simulatability* in [5] and *security with respect to specialized simulators* in [10]. This notion has not drawn as much attention as the other notions studied in the present work because a general composition theorem for composing a polynomial number of copies of protocols along the lines of [9] or the present work was not known, and in fact, as recently shown is not possible in case the environment is uniform and strict polynomial-time [22]. Therefore, in the previous sections, we have concentrated on the other security notions and only very briefly cover reactive simulatability here. In our terminology, reactive simulatability is defined as follows:

Reactive Simulatability: $\mathrm{RS}_{(\mathbf{A},\mathbf{I},\mathbf{E})}(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{F})$ iff $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ are IO-compatible and for every $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{A}\text{-Adv}(\mathcal{P})$ and for every $\mathcal{E} \in \mathbf{E}\text{-Env}(\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P})$ there exists $\mathcal{I} \in \mathbf{I}\text{-Adv}_{\mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{F})$ such that $\mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{A} \restriction \mathcal{P} \equiv \mathcal{E} \restriction \mathcal{I} \restriction \mathcal{F}$.

The only difference between reactive simulatability and universal composability (UC) is that for the former notion the ideal adversary is allowed to depend on the environment.

It has been shown by Canetti [8] that reactive simulatability is equivalent to UC for non-uniform environments whose runtime may depend on the lengths of their input on the input tape. The fact that UC implies reactive simulatability follows simply from the order of quantifiers. For the other direction, one considers a "universal" environment which interprets (part of its) input as an encoding of another environment and simulates this environment. In this way, one effectively can quantify over all environments, and hence, switch the order of quantification over environments and ideal adversaries. When allowing the runtime of the environment to depend on the length of the input on its `start` channel, then in SPPC we obtain the same result. Moreover, one can show that with this extension of SPPC, the security notions in the classes $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{env}$ and $\mathsf{UC/WBB}_{sim}$ are equivalent, respectively; the axioms used to prove these relationships also hold true for the extension of SPPC.

Hofheinz and Unruh [21] show that for strictly polynomial-time, uniform environments reactive simulatability does not imply universal composability. While this result is shown in the PIOA model, it immediately carries over to SPPC in case the environment does not get auxiliary input, i.e., initially ε is written on the `start` channel.

8 Conclusion

We have carried out a thorough study of the relationships among various notions of simulation-based security, identifying two properties of the computational model that determine equivalence between these notions, namely the placement of the master process and the FORWARDER property. Our main results are that all variants of SS (strong simulatability) and SBB (strong black box simulatability) are equivalent, regardless of the selection of the master process, and they imply UC (universal composability) and WBB (weak black box simulatability). Conditions UC and WBB are equivalent as long as the role (master process or not) of the environment is the same in both. However, the variant of UC in which the environment may be a master process (as in [4,9]) is strictly stronger than the variants in which the environment must not assume this role (as in [30]). In addition, the weaker forms of WBB do not imply SS/SBB. Generally, making the environment the master process yields a stronger security notion. Hence, we recommend that in subsequent developments of the various models, the environment is always assigned the role of the master process. Current work on simulation-based security seems to follow our suggestion (see, e.g., [8, 20, 23]). We also prove a necessary and sufficient condition for UC/WBB to be equivalent to SS/SBB, based on the ability to define forwarders. This result already influenced current work on simulation-based security in that it motivates to consider computational models in which the runtime of machines may depend on the length of the input (see, e.g., [8, 20, 23]).

Our results show that the relationship between universal composability and black-box simulatability is more subtle than previously described. In particular, composition theorems based on UC do not necessarily imply those based on blackbox simulatability over any computational model in which the forwarding property is not satisfied.

The axiom system that we developed to prove many of our results allowed us to exhibit essential properties needed for establishing relationships between security notions. Also, many proofs became concise and simple. Finally, failure of axioms in certain models brought out weaknesses in these models. For example, it seems reasonable to adopt a buffer-free variant of PIOA and to consider different kinds of ITMs in the ITM model.

While our study concentrates on models where the runtime of processes is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter, some of our results, in particular those involving the issue of placements of the master process, should also carry over to models where the runtime of processes may depend on the number of invocations and the length of inputs [8, 20, 23], e.g., the necessary condition for the FORWARDER property, the relationships among notions for strong and black-box simulatability for all placements of the master process, and the non-implication of UC and SS (SBB) in case the environment for UC may not play the role of the master process. Our results have already influenced design decisions made in these models. However, we leave a more rigorous study of the relationships between the security notions in such models to future work.

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SS/SBB

Strong Simulatability
$\equiv$
Strong Blackbox

(No restriction on
who is master)

UC/WBB$_{sim}$

Universal Composability
$\equiv$
Weak Blackbox

(Simulator and adversary
may be master, but
not environment)

iff the FORWARDER property holds

UC/WBB$_{env}$

Universal Composability
$\equiv$
Weak Blackbox

(Environment
may be master)

WBB$_{adv}$

Weak Blackbox

(Only adversary
may be master)

Figure 2: Equivalences and implications between the security notions in SPPC

Figure 3: Probabilistic polynomial-time machines in SPPC