According to the standard account, strategies respond to various possible circumstances. I propose to conceive strategies rather as responding to various possible future decision situations (including all their internal factors). This is much more general since changing decision situations may arise in a foreseeable way not only due to information, as in the standard account, but also due to forgetfulness, so-called endogeneous changes of preferences and many other causes. The main problem, then, is to state an optimality criterion for such strategies. This is a problem since maximization of expected utility, which is fine for the standard case, is either unreasonable or not even meaningful (maximization of which utility?). The problem is serious, as the widely disagreeing literature on the issue displays. I want to propose a general solution to the problem by essentially referring, in a specific way, to a relation of superiority/inferiority between possible decision situations (which is part of the agent's subjective view). This will be the first part of my talk. In the second part, I would like to investigate and present how this framework provides new theoretical means for dealing with the prisoners' dilemma, Newcomb's problem, and related cases (and thus for settling the ongoing conflict between causal and evidential decision theory).

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