Assistant Professor of Economics
Tepper School of Business
Carnegie Mellon University
Posner Hall, 237
412 268 60 79,


My primary research interest lies in the domain of Mechanism Design, Market Design, and Optimal Income Taxation. My contribution to mechanism design includes the analysis of fundamental questions of implementation. In particular, [2] shows that in standard social choice environments with private types Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) is equivalent to dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DIC). Subsequent papers ([6], [7]) extend this result to environments with correlated types and non-linear utilities. In conjunction with the BIC-DIC equivalence, [8] analyzes also a purely mathematical question when a projection of two convex closed sets coincides with the intersection of their images.

Another paper [3] develops a novel geometric approach to mechanism design that exploits classical results from convex analysis and majorization theory to provide a tractable analysis of generally complex resource and incentive constraints. A subsequent paper [4] extends the geometric approach to environments with interdependent values.

My work on market design focuses on the analysis of a signaling mechanism in two-sided matching markets. This endeavor shows that the introduction of private signals facilitates match formation for a wide range of environments ([1]). Nevertheless, there are instances when signaling precludes match formation ([5]).

My paper on optimal income taxation ([10]) introduces endogeneous prices in a standard Mirleesian model. The distribution of income effects then social welfare not only directly, but also through its influence on the level of product prices in the economy. For competitive markets, the paper shows that the price effect on optimal marginal income tax is positive for normal goods, negative for inferior goods, increasing for luxury goods, and decreasing for necessity goods. For oligopolistic markets, the paper establishes that the optimal marginal income tax should be smaller for less competitive markets.

I am also involved in projects related to the theory of networks ([9]) .

  1. Coles, P., Kushnir A., & Niederle, M. (2013). Preference Signaling in Matching Markets. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(2), 99-134.
  2. Gershkov, A., Goeree, J. K., Kushnir, A., Moldovanu, B., & Shi, X. (2013). On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation. Econometrica, 81(1), 197-220.
  3. Goeree, J. K. & Kushnir, A. (2017). A geometric approach to mechanism design. Working Paper.
  4. Goeree, J. K. & Kushnir, A. (2016). Reduced form implementation with value interdependencies. Games and Economic Behavior, 99, 250-256.
  5. Kushnir, A. (2013). Harmful signaling in matching markets. Games and Economic Behavior, 80, 209-218.
  6. Kushnir, A. (2015). On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types. Economics Letters, 133, 4-6.
  7. Kushnir, A. & Liu, S. (2018). On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with non-linear utilities. Economic Theory, Accepted.
  8. Kushnir, A. & Liu, S. (2017). On linear transformations of intersections. Working paper.
  9. Kushnir, A. & Nichifor, A. (2015). Targeted vs. collective posting in social platforms. Working Paper.
  10. Kushnir, A. & Zurbrickas, R. (2018). Optimal Income Taxation and Endogeneous Prices. Working Paper