WPCŞ {'NkM$%^D$4(i00' >lDz',-.rh3vVicTnH{H_==Q%#X"41xG(t{AX͊.W1Ew`-@ HJmdeea`X Ȉ@%ƻuK {.JP`aN[(  ؽ;>OZfuE+'ۓ e5#j났̩UDQK^-L|]EE] ߢQ{IvH)y$ t'v&([5I&kQ/r`,R4WP /,.Q  t$  82    _ԀXXMeta.#XxXL#XXx#XxXԗ#XXx.7,1072b19!21,myemphasis.#XxX#  t$  64    _ԀXXMeta.#XxXI#XXx.9,1074b27!34.#XxXԗ# :  t$  2    _XXԀJ.R._Catan_#XxXG#XXx. TheAristotelianAporiaConcerningSeparateMind,TheModernSchoolman46(1968),49.  t$  66    _XXԀIbid.,p.219.#XxXH#  t$  78    _XXԀMeta..10,1075b19!24.#XxXH#  t$  83    _ԀXXThisisinitiallyseeninhisdiscussionoftheactiveintellect#XxXI#. d  t$  65    _XXԀJ.Owens. TheRelationofGodtoWorldintheMetaphysics,intudessurlaMtaphysiquedAristote:Actes  duV#XxXH#, ,XXxe#XxX ,,##XXxԀSymposium_Aristotelicum_.Ed.P._Aubenque_Ԁ(Paris:J._Vrin_),1979,pp.207!222.#XxXf#  t$  57    _XXԀCf.Aristotle,PhysII.8,199a302,andcf.Lear,Aristotle,p.35.   t$  70    _ԀXXPerfectionentailsthesensesproperorientationtowardsthebestandhighestofitsobjects.Forthehuman  cognitiveactivity,thoughtandcontemplationwillbe mostperfectandpleasurablewhenitisdirectedtowardsthe worthiestofitsobjects...andthepleasureperfectstheactivity.(NicomacheanEthics(EN)X.4,1174b20and#XxXI#XXx b 1174b21!3.Vol.2.Trans.W.D.Ross,revisedbyJ.O.Urmson)#XxX#  t$  80    _ԀXXDAIII.4,430a2!4.#XxXI#   t$  63    _XXԀCf.DAIII.5,23: [Thoughtinitsactivestate]doesnotsometimesthinkandsometimesnotthink.#XxXH#  t$  61    _XXԀCf.Plato.Timaeus30cand44c.#XxXH#  t$  24    _ԀXXԀRoss,Aristotle,p.149.#XxXI#  t$  10    _XXԀDAII.3,#XxXH#XXx415a1!2#XxXԚ#   t$  25    _XXԀMeta.,.8,1049b2429;Rosscomments: ...whattheactivereasonactsonisthepassivereason,whichisasort  ofplasticmaterialonwhichactivereasonimpressestheformsofknowableobjects.(Ross,Aristotle#XxXH#XXx,p.150)#XxXԌ#   t$  21    _XXԀItisRosscontention,andofmostAristoteliansfollowingRoss,that)1+/shouldbetranslatedas inthe  soulandnot inthecaseofthesoul.(Ross,Aristotle,p.149no.1) #XxXH#  x  t$  3    _ԀXXIbid.  t$  4    _XXԀDeAnimaIII.5,430a1416.   t$  6    _XXԀAlivingbodyismadeupofitsdiverseorganicparts.Cf.Meta.#XxXG#XXx #XxX#XXx.10,1035b2021andGenerationofAnimalsI.1,  715a10.Thedefinitionofanorgandependsuponthelivingstatusofabodyofwhichitisapart;knowledgeofthefunctionofanorganpresupposesitsoperationwithinalivingbody.Cf#XxX#XXx.S.#XxXm#XXxԀEverson.#XxXԴ#XXx Psychology,inThe : CambridgeCompaniontoAristotle,p.184;alsoforafullerdiscussion,cf.J.L#XxX#XXxԀAckril.#XxX#XXxԀ AristotlesDefinitionsof O #XxX#XXxpsuch#XxXԚ#XXx,ArticlesonAristotle.Vol.4.Eds.J.Barnes,M.Schoefield,andR.Sorabji.(London:GeraldDuckworth  &CompanyLimited),1979,pp.#XxX#XXx70ff.#XxX#   t$  22    _XXԀLear,Jonathan.Aristotle:TheDesiretoUnderstand.(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress),1988,p.137#XxXH# l  t$  7    _XXԀ#XxXG#XXxCf.Taylor,A.E.Aristotle.(NewYork:DoverPublications,INC.),1955,p.77.#XxXԍ#XXx#XxX*# ?  t$  8    _XXDAII.2,413b1113.ThisascensioniscomparabletoAristotlesfamouspassageinMeta.A,whereheexplainsthe  ascendingdegreesoftheScalaNaturae#XxXG#XXx:thepassagefromsensationthroughmemory,experience,andartto u theoretical#XxXH#XXxknowledge.#XxX#  t$  67    _XXԀIbid.,pp.219!20#XxXH#. #  t$  54    _XXԀInDAIII.4,429a2627,Aristotlecapturesthediscontinuityoftheactiveintellectfromthepassiveintellect,though  notyethavingdistinguishedbetweenthetwo: Itwasagoodideatocallthesoultheplaceofforms,thoughthisdescriptionholdsonlyofthethinkingsoul,andeventhisistheformsonlypotentially,notactually.Thus,theactiveintellectdoesnotdependontheobjectsofsenseorgans.Cf.Rist: Whereas...theorganisaffectedbysomething O external(DA417b20),inthecaseofThought,thatisthegraspofuniversal...thestimulationisprovidednotbythe  objectsofThought...butbytheActiveIntellect.ThisiswhytheprocessofThoughtdoesnotdependonthepossessionoforgans.(Rist, Notes...,19)Ross,infact,arguesthattheactiveintellectseemstopossesactualknowledgeindependentlyofthepassiveintellect#XxXH#.XXxHewrites: Similarly,thefactthatactivereasonalreadyknowsall  c intelligibleobjectsmakesitpossibleforthepassivereason,initselfapotentiality,actuallytoknow,andforthe  P  knowableactuallytobeknown.#XxXq#XXx(Ross,Aristotle,p.150)#XxX#   t$  68    _ԀXXT.deKoninck. AristotleonGodasThoughtThinkingItself,ReviewofMetaphysicsXLVII,No.3(1994),496.#XxXI# d   t$  29    _XXԀReferencetolightasametaphorofactiveintellectseemstobeareminiscenceofPlatosdepictionoftheIdeaof  theGoodthroughthesymbolicuseoftheSun(cf.Rep.507b509d),asmentionedintheIntroductiontothisText.#XxXH#   t$  9    _XXԀMorespecifically,thepassiveintellectpresupposesthe-)%;#XxXG#XXxԀ(imagination)ofthesensitivesoulinorderthatit  mayoperateconceptually.Cf.DAI.1,403a89andIII.7,431a1617.#XxX#  t$  30    _XXԀRoss,Aristotle#XxXH#XXx,p.150#XxXԝ#.  t$  11    _XXԀItshouldbenotedthatAristotlesteachingofanascensionofactualityorformdoesnotpresupposeaphysical  evolution.TheAristoteliannotionofdevelopmentpertainstothespeciesitselfwithinagenus.Therecanbenopassageassuchfromonegenus#XxXH#XXxԀintoanother.However,therearemomentsinhiscorpuswhereAristotleadmitsto : thedifficultyofidentifyingproperdelineationsbetweensomegenera#XxXԤ#XXx.Cf.Guthrie,W.K.C.TheGreek O Philosophers:From_Thales_ԀtoAristotle.(NewYork:Harper&Row),1975,pp.140and144.In#XxXԒ#XXxԀfact,Aristotle  wouldprobablydisagreewithDarwinstheoryofevolution.Ifactualitynecessarilyprecedespotency,thenanactualbeingmustalreadyexistinorderfordevelopmenttooccur.Therefore,#XxXԝ#XXxԀAristotlesnotionofdevelopmentrequiresa N  perfectagentatthebeginningofaprocessofgrowthinorderforsomethingcomparabletotheagenttoemerge,whereasDarwinsnotionofevolutionentailsagradualdevelopmenttowardsperfectiondevoidofanactiveagent  ( temporallypriortothedevelopingspecies.Inotherwords,whereasDarwinassertsthepossibilityofevolutiontooccurfromone_infima_Ԁspeciesintoanother,Aristotledenouncessuchastransition:changeonlyoccurswithinthe b   individualspecimenwithintheunchangingspecies.#XxX#XXxԀCf.CategoriesIIIandV.#XxXԚ#XXxԀForfurtherresearchontherelation ' w  betweenDarwinandAristotle,cf._Etienne_Ԁ_Gilson_.FromAristotletoDarwinandBackAgain:AJourneyinFinal  <  Causality,Species,andEvolution.Trans.J.Lyon.(NotreDame,Indiana:UniversityofNotreDamePress),1984.   t$  59    _XXԀCf.Ross,Aristotle,p.181: ...God[Thought]istheefficientcausebybeingthefinalcausenotinthesenseof  beingsomethingthatneverisbutalwaysistobe.Heisaneverlivingbeingwhoseinfluenceradiatesthroughtheuniverseinsuchwisethateverythingthathappens...dependsonHim.#XxXH#   t$  26    _XXԀThatis,theactiveintellectmakesallthingsbyraisingtheformoftheobjectinquestiontoastateofabstraction.#XxXH#  t$  31    _XXԀDAII.7,418b1121.#XxXH# I  t$  32    _XXԀDAII.7,418b12.Cf.alsoRoss: Lightistheconditionofamediumwhichhasbeenmadeactuallytransparentby  thepresenceofanilluminant,anditisitsactualitythatmakesitpossiblefortheeyewhichcanseeactuallytosee,and u forthevisibleobjectactuallytobeseen.(Ross,Aristotle#XxXH#XXx,p.150)#XxX#  t$  47    _XXԀDAIII.5,2022.#XxXH# a  t$  60    _XXԀJ.M.#XxXH#XXxԀRist.TheMindofAristotle:AStudyinPhilosophicalGrowth.(Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress),  1989,p.16.#XxXԐ#  t$  69    _XXԀIbid.,492.#XxXH#  t$  20    _XXԀDAIII.5,10!14.#XxXH#  t$  48    _XXԀDAIII.5,2325.#XxXH#  t$  71    _ԀXXPhys.III.6,207a8!150#XxXI#.  t$  50    _XXԀCf.Ross,Aristotle,p.152.#XxXH#  t$  51    _XXIbid.;cf.alsoHamlyn,Aristotle,p.142.#XxXH# R  t$  52    _XXԀItisinterestingtonotethatT.IrwinandG.Finehaveoptedforthisinterpretation,thoughtheyadmitthat  Aristotlecouldalsobereferringtothepassiveintellect: Andwithoutthisnothingunderstands.Aristotle:Selections.Trans.,Intro.,Notes,andGlossarybyT.IrwinandG.Fine.(Indianapolis: : HackettPublishingCompany,Inc.),p.202andno.32.#XxXH#  t$  53    _XXԀCf.Ross,Aristotle,pp.15253andHamlyn,Aristotle,p.142.#XxXH#  t$  72    _XXԀdeKoninck, AristotleonGod...,495#XxXH#.  t$  73    _XXIbid.,496.#XxXL#XXx#XxXԜ#   t$  74    _ԀXXAristotlesreferencestoprivationasanaspectofchangearefoundinPhys.#XxXI#XXx1.7!9,189b30!192b4;cf.alsode  Koninck, AristotleonGod...,#XxX#XXxԀ497.#XxXԍ#   t$  75    _ԀXXdeKoninck, AristotleonGod...,#XxXI#XXxԀ498.#XxXԷ#  t$  76    _ԀXXIbid.,495.#XxXI#   t$  27    _XXԀR.D.#XxXH#XXxHicks.#XxXԑ#XXxAristotlesDeAnima.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress),1907,p.499;cf.alsoRist: Allthe  objectsofthoughtaremadeintocharacteristicsofthePassiveIntellectwhichthusismadeorbecomesallthings.Thuswhenonethoughtgiveswaytothenext,thePassiveIntellect,nowmadeofonekindofthought,ismadeintoanother.#XxX#XXxԀ(J.M.#XxXԼ#XXxԀRist. NotesonAristotle,deAnimaIII.5,ClassicalPhilology61(1966),10#XxX#) 3  t$  33    _XXԀHicks,R.D.AristotlesDeAnima.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress),1907,p.502.#XxXH#XXx#XxX#Ԁ   t$  55    _ԀXXS.D.Ross.AristotlesdeAnima.(Oxford:ClarendonPress),1964,pp.149!50.#XxXI#ԀXXxAccordingtoRoss,theactive  intellectis somethinginusthatactuallyknowsalready,someelementthatiscutofffromourordinaryconsciousnesssothatwearenotawareofthispreexistingknowledge.Rossclaimisthattheactiveintellectpossessesactual b knowledgepriortoitsinfluenceonthepassiveintellect.However,RistarguesthecontrarytoRoss.AccordingtoRist,theactiveintellectdoesnotpossesspreexistingactualknowledge,butisa powerwhichenablessuchknowledge[actualknowledge]tobeabstractedbythePassiveIntellect.(Rist, Notes...,11)#XxX#  t$  43    _ԀXXRoss,Aristotle,p.149#XxXI#XXxno.1.#XxXԬ#  t$  44    _ XXCf.Rist, Notes...,8. #XxXO#    t$  12    _XXԀCf.D.W.#XxXH#XXxԀ#XxXԚ#XXxHamlyn.Aristotle:DeAnima,BooksIIandIII.Trans.andIntro.D.W.Hamlyn.(Oxford:Clarendon  Press),1993,#XxX#XXxp.136.#XxXԳ#  t$  13    _XXԀRobinson,T.A.AristotleinOutline.(Indianapolis:HackettPublishingCompany,Inc.),1995,pp.49!50.#XxXH#  t$  14    _XXԀDAIII.4,429a1324#XxXH#  t$  15    _ԀXXDAIII.4,429b30#XxXL#.   t$  16    _XXԀAristotleslanguageofdependenceenforceshisthesisthatthereisanontologicalascensionofactivities:thepower  ofsensibilitydependsuponthevegetativepower,andtheintellectdependsuponnotonlyitsproximatematter,thesensepowers,butalsothevegetativepower. Nowitisbymeansofthesensitivefacultythatwediscriminatethehotandthecold...theessentialcharacteroffleshisapprehendedbysomethingdifferenteitherwhollyseparatefromthesensitivefacultyorrelatedtoitasabentlinetothesamelinewhenithasbeenstraightenedout....Againinthecaseofabstractobjectswhatisstraightisanalogoustowhatissnubnosed;foritnecessarilyimpliesacontinuum.(DAIII.4,429b1418)Aswithformsdependenceonaparticularmatter,thepassiveintellectisdependentonsense N  data.#XxXH#  t$  17    _XXԀDAII.5,417a6.#XxXH# >  t$  18    _XXԀCf.#XxXH#XXxHamlyn,Aristotle,p.#XxXԕ#XXx136#XxX#  t$  19    _ԀXXDAIII.8,431b21#XxXL#.  t$  77    _XXIbid.,499.#XxXH#   t$  46    _XXԀCf.Rist, Notes...,8: EverysoulthereforecontainsitsownindividualActiveandPassiveIntellect.#XxXH#  t$  45    _ԀXXMeta..3,1071a20!21#XxXL#.  t$  28    _XXԀDAIII.5,430a17#XxXH#.  t$  41    _XXԀRist, Notes...,14.#XxXH#   t$  42    _XXԀA.#XxXH#XXxԀMansion. Limmortalitdel medaprsAristote,RevuePhilosophiquedeLouvain,51(1953),468.#XxXԍ#XXxԀ  Mansionisemphasizingthatpassiveandactiveintellectsarewaysofspeakingoftheintellectinitselfwhentheintellectivesoulcooperateswithaorganizedbody.Theintellectinitselfistobeseenasimmortal.However,when :  oneconsiderstheintellectasanactivitywithintheunionofsoulandbody,onecanidentifypassiveandactivestates e totheintellect.Whereastheintellectinitselfisthegenus,thepassiveandactiveintellectsarethespecies.   t$  34    _XXԀCf.DAI.4,408b29: Thoughtismoredivineandimpassible[thanthebody,orvehicle].Alsocf.DAII.1,  413a4!8: Fromthisitisclearthatthesoulisinseparablefromitsbody,oratanyratethatcertainpartsofitare(ifithasparts)!fortheactualityofsomeofthemistheactualityofthepartsthemselves.Yetsomemaybeseparablebecausetheyarenottheactualitiesofanybodyatall.Further,wehavenolightontheproblemwhetherthesoulmaynotbetheactualityofitsbodyinthesenseinwhichthesailoristheactualityoftheship.#XxXH#  t$  35    _ԀXXHicks,Aristotle,p.502.#XxXI#   t$  40    _XXԀDAIII.5,20.E.Barbotinremarksthattheactiveintellect retrouvelamortlasimplicitdesonessence.  (E#XxXH#XXx.Barbotin.#XxX%#XXxLaThorieAristotliciennedelintellectdaprsThophraste.(Louvain:PublicationsUniversitaires u deLouvain),1954,#XxXw#XXxp.166)Rist,however,thinksthatBarbotinsclaimcouldbemisleading.AccordingtoRist,the :  ...ActiveIntellectisalwayssimple.Duringlife,however,itnotonlyexistsinitself,butalsoaffectsthePassiveIntellect.(Rist, Notes...,19no.17)#XxXP#  t$  39    _XXԀCf.Ross,Aristotle,p.150.#XxXH#  t$  49    _XXԀDAI.4,408b2432.#XxXH#  t$  5    _ԀXXDAII.1,412a27,trans.J.A.Smith.#XxXH#  t$  23    _ԀXXDAIII.5,1517.#XxXI#  t$  36    _ԀXXDAIII.4,429a15#XxXL#.  t$  38    _XXԀMeta..3,1070a2526#XxXH#.  t$  37    _XXԀCf.Rist, Notes...,13!14.#XxXH#  t$  58    _XXԀMeta.#XxXH#XXx.7,1072b14.#XxXԛ#  t$  79    _XXԀDAIII.4,429b26.#XxXH#  t$  62    _XXԀMeta..7,1073a45,1112. !  _    8xXXdd8  THEARISTOTELIANAPORIAOFTHOUGHT(_*&_)INTHEDEANIMAAND   METAPHYSICS   7byMarkJ.NyvltPh.D.BostonUniversityDepartmentofPhilosophyMarkJ.Nyvlt1196AustinSt.HydeParkMA02136U[.[S\.\A].](617)3643473geisternyvlt@hotmail.com  >!   ABSTRACT   I  InhisDeAnima(_! #_Ԁ_1+/9'_)II.2,413b130,Aristotleraisesthefundamentalquestionof  thenatureofthesoul.Thisquestionissustainedthroughouthisreflectionofthepassiveandactiveintellects(DAIII.5),culminatinginafurtherdiscussionof'inAristotlesMetaphysics.7& v 9.Aristotleproposesadoctrineofthesoulthatconsidersthepowerofnutritionandofsensationwithinthatoftheintellect;theactivitiesofthesensitivepowercomprisethoseofthenutritive,andtheactivitiesoftheintellectcomprisethoseofthesensitiveandthenutritivepowers.Thisascendinglineageofpowersis,then,suddenlyinterruptedinAristotlesaccountoftheintellect.Thepoweroftheintellectpresupposespassiveandactivestates.InDAIII.5,Aristotledistinguished  g theseparableactivityoftheactiveintellect,albeitoperativeinthesoul(__Ԁ_)_Ԁ_1+/_)duringthe  T  humansoulsexistence,andthendistinguishesitfromthepassiveintellect,whichisnotseparable.Thus,afissureoccursbetweenthepassiveintellect,whichpresupposesthesensitiveandnutritivepowers,andtheactiveintellect,whichoperatesindependentlyofthepassiveintellect.Whereasthepassiveintellectsknowledgepresupposestheactivitiesofthenutritiveandsensitivepowers,theactiveintellectsknowledgeissolelyofitself;ithasimmediateselfknowledge.  Thecharacteristicsoftheactiveintellectresemblethoseof'asdepictedinMeta..7   &9.TheAristotelianaporia,then,isthis:becauseAristotleadvancesanascendingscaleof  psychicalactivitiesintheScalaNaturae,eachpresupposingtheotherafterthepowerofnutrition, l afissurecanbeidentifiedonceAristotlepostulatestheontologicalseparationoftheactiveintellectfromthepassive,and,afortiori,aseparationof'fromtheprecedinggradesofbeinginNature. F 'remainsaseparate,independentlypureform,devoidofanydegreeofpotency;itsknowledge 3 isofitself.Thus,itsoperationdoesnotpresupposetheloweractivitiesofNature,and,afortiori,  p thepowerofthehumanintellect.Thefissureitselfiscomparabletoachasmbetweenmatterandform,which,insensiblebeings,consistofaunity.Toassert'statusasapureformdevoidof J matterentailsaradicalseparationof'fromtherestofNature.  7   ZZ  TheAristotelianAporiaofThought(')intheDeAnimaandMetaphysicsY  byMarkNyvltY~Z^ZIntroduction     SincethetimeofPlatoandAristotle,theineluctablequestionofthestatusofThought #  1      ׀has ` preoccupiedphilosophersofeverygeneration.ThequestionaddressestheprimacyofThoughtoritssubordinationtoamoreactualandontologicallypriorprinciple.Aristotleinexorablyarguesforthesovereignprimacyof',whichaloneassumesthisnoblestatus,sinceitconfersintelligibility  >  tothearrayofdeterminablesubstances,bothsensibleandimmaterial,inNature(_-A%'_).Thus,   'remainstheultimateandconduciveconditionfordevelopmentinNature;eachsubstance   attainsitsparticularendduetotheubiquitousinfluenceoffinalcausalitythat'exercisesover | Nature.  Aristotlesassertionof'astheprimaryprincipleofNature,however,establishesa 0 fundamentals!#;(aporia)tohisgeneralphilosophicalproject,whichisexpressedinhisDe  Z AnimaandMetaphysics. 4   TheoneaporiathatAristotleinvestsasignificantamountoftimeandenergyinresolving  istheseparateandineffectivenatureofPlatosForms.AccordingtoAristotle,PlatosFormsdonotinherentlypossessthegenerativepowerresponsibleformovementanddevelopmentinNature.Aristotle,however,claimstohaveovercomethePlatonicaporiaoftheseparabilityoftheForms L"  fromtheirparticularinstantiationinsensibleobjectsbyreducingthestatusofFormtoaninherent,unifyingprincipleofmatter,operativewithinsensibleobjects.TheAristoteliannotionofForm, &P!$ therefore,assumesanimmanentstatus,withoneexception:'itself. '*#&   InhisDeAnima,Aristotleadvancestheclaimthatthepassiveintellectasapower(')of e thesoul(1+/9)presupposesforitsactivitythenutritiveandsensiblepowers.However,inhis ? discussionoftheactiveintellect(!5)! ),Aristotleintroducesaseveranceofitsactivity   fromtheprecedingpowersofthesoul!aseverancethataccordstheactiveintellectwithaseparate,selfsufficientstatus.This,afortiori,appliesto'itself,aspresentedintheMeta..7&9.Both  h theactiveintellectand'itselfdonotpresupposefortheiroperationstheactivitiesofpreceding B  powers.Thus,whileAristotleconjuresasolutiontothePlatonicaporiaoftheseparationofthe   Forms,AristotleequallygenerateshisownaporiaoftheseparationoftheactiveintellectintheDA [  and'intheMeta.Withhisexpositionoftheactiveintellectandof',Aristotleintroduces 5 adiscontinuitybetween'andNature.Theassertionoftheseparabilityandtranscendenceof  'entailsaseverancebetweenmatterandform,theunityofwhichAristotleadamantlyattempts  topreserveinordertoovercomethePlatonicaporia. ^   ThereisacorollarytothisAristotelianaporia.Aristotleattributesanactiveroletothe 8 objectofknowledgeasproducingtheforminthehumanintellect(').However,Aristotles w accountoftheactiveintellectdefiesthisprinciple:theactiveintellectdoesnotreceiveformsfrom Q  without,asthepassiveintellectdoes;rather,theactiveintellect,itwouldappear,alreadyinherentlypossessesforms,i.e.,ithasimmediateapprehensionofconceptualcontent.Thus,Aristotlereverseshisprincipleoftheacquisitionofknowledgewithrespecttotheactiveintellect.  IntheDAIII.5,Aristotlecomparestheactiveintellecttolight.AsJ.R._Catan_Ԁhas 'T!$ demonstrated,thethemeoflightisaprevalentsymbolforancientGreeks._ #  2      _ԀWhile,ontheonehand, ).#& Aristotleusesthesimileofthelighttodescribethenatureoftheactiveintellectandtoovercome m+%( thePlatonicaporia,he,ontheotherhand,seemstorendertheactiveintellectsroleakintoPlatos e worldofForms.Accordingto_Catan_,? #  3      ׀thebackgroundPlatonictexttotheAristotelianaporiaofthe ? separationoftheactiveintellectisfoundintheRep.508e509b.3     InhisDAIII.5,Aristotledescribesthepassiveandactiveintellectsinthisway: Andinfact   Thought...iswhatitisbyvirtueofbecomingallthings,whilethereisanotherwhichiswhatitisbyvirtueofmakingallthings:thisisasortofpositivestatelikelight;forinasenselightmakespotentialcoloursintoactualcolours.C} #  4      ׀TheactiveintellectseemstoassumetheroleofPlatos   worldofForms,andmaintainsaseparatestatuswithrespecttotheprecedingpowers.Thus,inthislight,Aristotleestablishesadiscontinuitybetweenthelineageofpowersinthesoul,i.e.,thepowersofthenutritive,sensible,andpassiveintellect,ontheonehand,andtheactiveintellect,ontheother.  Aristotlesexpositionof'intheMetaphysicsisalso_aporetic_,sincethereexistsa  discontinuitybetweenNatureand',whichistheprincipleofintelligibilityofNature.' ^ knowledgeexcludestheformsofNature:itsknowledgeisonlyofitself.Thereis,then,aseverancebetweenthesourceofintelligibilityandNature.$  Thisistheaporiathatremainstobeconsidered.If'isseparate,thenhowcanhigher Q  formspresupposethelowerfortheiroperations?'wouldpresupposetheformorsoulof +" humanityashumanitypresupposesNature.Thus,'wouldpresupposeNature.Severaleminent $  Aristotelianscholars,suchas_T.de_ԀKoninck,haveattemptedtoovercomethechasmbetween' %z" andNaturebysuggestingthatformisnotanexclusiveprinciple,butinclusive.Consequently,', 'T!$ asthemostperfectofforms,mustincludetheprecedingstagesofform.However,theAristotelian ).#& aporiacontinuestobeunresolved.Imerelysuggestasaconclusiontothispaperthatonewayto e overcomethisaporiaoftheseparationof'istoconsideritasexercisingnotonlyafinalcausal ? role,butalsoaformalone. DEANIMA   f   IntheDA,Aristotleessentiallydefinesthesoulasan actualityofthefirstkind >  [) 7/ ]ofanaturalbodyhavinglifepotentiallyinit. #  5      ׀Astheactualityofalivingbody,Q} #  6       }  thesoulistheformofthebody,andfunctionsaccordingtoafinalcausalrole.Analogously,asthebodyhasdevelopmentalstagesofgrowth,so,too,doesthesoul.Theorderofdevelopmentnecessarilypresupposestheprincipleofinclusion.Thatis,thehigherdevelopedapowerofthesoul   is,themoreitsactivitiesincludeandpresupposethelowergradesofsoul,althoughthelowergradesmayoperateindependentlyofthemorehighlydeveloped.T #  7      ׀Aristotleassertsthreegradesof Z psychicallife,eachincludingactivitiesthatareorganizedwithinanontogeneticorder:thenutritive,thesensitive,andtherational.Up  #  8      ׀Thisascendingscaleofthesoulsactivitiesfurtherentailsthegrades s ofactuality,ofform,operativewithinsimpleorcomplexstructuresofbodies(_%E)_).The M  sensitiveactivityofthesoulpresupposesandincludestheactivityofthenutritivepower,whereastherationalactivitypresupposesandincludestheprecedingtwo.m #  9      ׀Thenutritivesoulcanoperate ? independentlyofthesensitiveandrationalgradesofsoul: Forthepowerofperceptionisneverfoundapartfromthepowerofselfnutrition,while!inplants!thelatterisfoundisolatedfromtheformer.8 #  10      ׀Theascensionofthesoulsactivitiesculminatesintherationalpower,locatedwithin  h thehumanbeing._o #  11      _ B  )  AristotlesdiscussionofhumanrationalthoughtislocatedinDAII.2,413b2530,and,a   fortiori,III.45.TheinterplayofpotencyandactualityinbeingsfurnishesAristotlewiththe [  conceptuallandscapetodiscusshumanthoughtinrelationto',situatedatthesummitofthe 5 ScalaNaturae.Withintherationalsoul,Aristotlemakesafundamentaldistinctionbetweenthe  passiveandactiveintellects,thelatterenigmaticallycharacterizedasindependentandseparablefromallpotencybecauseofitsactive,purelyselfreflective,andsimplenature. ^ 8    `     h      p  8  TheaporiaintheDeAnima  e   InDAIII.4,Aristotleconnectsthepassiveintellectsoperationswiththoseofthesense = organs.Asthesenseorganreceivestheformofitsobject,whichthenaffectstheorganbythequalitiesoftheobject,thepassiveintellectalsoreceivesandcontainstheformofitsobject,whichaffectsthepassiveintellect.However,unlikethesenseorgan,thepassiveintellectisaccordedanonphysicalstatus,and,thus,isnotconsideredasanorgan. #  12      ׀Ifthepassiveintellectisnotan @  organ,Aristotleschallengeistoexplainhowthepassiveintellectisakintosenseorgans.Hewillemploylanguageofpotencyandactualitytoexplainthiskinship.Becausethepassiveintellectisunmixedwithanything,ithasthepotentialtobecomeidenticalwithwhateverformisimpresseduponit.Onlyuponitsreceptionofaformistheintellectawakenedfromitsdormantstate.Theinterplaybetweentheformreceivedandthepassiveintellectisalsoakintoprimemattersreceptionofform; #  13      ׀beforethepassiveintellectreceivestheformofitsobject,itisnotreal,asprimematter \ isnotrealdevoidofform.SR8  Ifthinkingislikeperceiving...thethinkingpartofthesoulmustthereforebe,whileimpassible,capableofreceivingtheformofanobject;thatis,mustbepotentiallyidenticalincharacterwithitsobjectwithoutbeingtheobject.Thoughtmustberelatedtowhatisthinkable,assenseistowhatissensible.Therefore,sinceeverythingisapossibleobjectofThought,mindinorder...todominate,thatis,toknow,mustbepurefromalladmixture;forthecopresenceofwhatisalientoitsnatureisahindranceandablock:itfollowsthatitcanhavenonatureofitsown,otherthanthatofhavingacertaincapacity.ThusthatinthesoulwhichiscalledThought...is,beforeitthinks,notactuallyanyrealthing. #  14      ׀%x"   8      Thus,thepassiveintellectispotentiallyidenticalwithitsobject,i.e.,theformofthesensibleobject, 'R!$ Ѐbutis actuallynothing,untilitthinks. #  15      ׀Thepassiveintellectisapotencyofthewholeperson e andisdependentuponthesenseorgansofthebody.Inthisway,Aristotlemaintainsacontinuityofpotencyandactualityofpriorgradesofbeing.} #  16      ׀Aswiththepowerofsensation,which hasno   actualbutonlypotentialexistence,m  #  17      ׀thepassiveintellectpersedoesnotexistuntilitthinks.Prior   tothispoint,itispotentiallyeverything.  #  18        h   Thereceivedandcontainedformthenbecomesconceptualizedbytheactiveintellect,whichenablestheintellecttobecomeidenticalwiththeformoftheobject. Thesoulisinawayallthings(1+/)m)!E'%)!5)).  #  19      ׀Paradoxically,inbecomingidenticalwiththeobject, [  theintellectbecomesanobjecttoitself,andknowsitself.Theselfreflectiveactivitycharacterizesthenatureandfunctionoftheactiveintellect,whichAristotlepresentsinDAIII.5. Sinceinevery  classofthings,beginsAristotle,*\8  asinnatureasawhole,wefindtwofactorsinvolved,amatterwhichispotentiallyalltheparticularsincludedintheclass,and_a_Ԁcausewhichisproductiveinthesensethatitmakesthemall(thelatterstandingtotheformer,ase.g.anarttoitsmaterial),thesedistinctelementsmustlikewisebefoundwithinthesoul.}< #  20      %   ЇMTheco!principlesofnature,matter,andefficientcausethatmakesallthings,areparadigmaticinAristotlesdiscussionofthenatureoftherationalsoul.Hestatestwocentralideas.First,thoughdistinctfromeachother,theactiveandpassiveintellectsoperateinthesoul;__Ԁ_)_Ԁ_1+/_Ԁrefersto   thelocusoftherespectiveactivitiesofbothstatesofintellect.= #  21      ׀Thedistinctionbetweentheactive   andpassiveintellectsentailstheirseparate,yetcooperative,activities.  Second,theactiveintellectdoesnotmakeallthingsex_nihilo_.Theactiveintellectoperates B  onpreexisting materialprovidedbythepassiveintellect.Infact,the materialuponwhichtheactiveintellectworksisthepassiveintellectitself.Theactiveintellect,then,assumestheroleofraisingthatwhichispotentialtoastateofactuality.Itisacausallypriorprinciplethat makesathingintelligibleandallowstheintellecttobeidenticalwiththeformofitsobject.S #  22      ׀Thus,lines10  14ofDAIII.5expresstwointeractivestatesofintellectoperativewithinahumansoul.    Thenatureofthesetwodistinctintellectualactivitiesisexplainedinthesubsequentlines. AndinfactThought,aswehavedescribedit,iswhatitisbyvirtueofbecomingallthings,whilethereisanotherwhichiswhatitisbyvirtueofmakingallthings.... #  23      ׀Thepassiveintellect w assumestheroleofapprehension.-\ #  24      ׀Thatis,knowledgeisidenticalwiththeformofitsobjectby Q  virtueofthepassiveintellectsapprehensionoftheformoftheobject.Whilethepassiveintellect +" becomesallthings,theactiveintellect makesallthings.Thenatureoftheactiveintellectistoenablethepassiveintellecttoapprehendandbecomeitsobject,i.e.,determinedbytheformofthe %z" object.Theactiveintellectistheconditionforthepassiveintellectsgraspingitsobject.AristotleisconsistentwithhisteachingintheMetaphysics: ? e8  Forfromthepotentialtheactualisalwaysproducedbyanactualthing,e.g.manbyman,musicianbymusician;thereisalwaysafirstmover,andthemoveralreadyexistsactually.Wehavesaidinouraccountofsubstancethateverythingthatisproducedissomethingproducedfromsomethingandbysomething,andisthesameinspeciesasit.9 #  25      ׀ h   ӀInDAIII.5,1517,then,thepassiveintellectisanalogoustomatterbybecomingallthings,andthe B  activeintellectisanalogoustotheefficientcausebymakingallthings(! !5)).t #  26      ׀As   mentionedabove,theactiveintellectdoesnotmakethingsoutofnothing.Rather,asHicksparaphrases,itsactivityoperatesby makingthingsofonekindintothingsofanother, #  27      ׀which 5 accountsforthemovementofthepassiveintellect.  Theactiveintellect isasortofpositivestatelikelight;forinasenselightmakespotentialcoloursintoactualcolours. #  28      ׀Likeanefficientcause,theactiveintellectmakesallthingsasalight ^ illuminatesthatwhichispotentialtoactual;potentialcoloursbecomeactualbyvirtueofthelight.g`  #  29      ׀ 8 Theactiveintellectisrelatedtotheintelligibleaslightistothevisible.n  #  30      ׀However,theactive w intellectdiffersfromlight.Lightisdefinedasanactualtransparentmediumthroughwhichcoloursandobjectsmaybeseenbytheeye.Lightisthestateofactualtransparencyinalivingorganism,andlightisanactualitythatfunctionsasaneffectivemedium.u #  31      ׀Theactiveintellectisnota   mediumbetweenthepassiveintellectanditsobject.Rather,theactiveintellecthasimmediateapprehensionofitsobject,sinceitsknowledgeisofitself.Theanalogybetweentheactiveintellectandlightisaccurateonlyinthisway:boththeactiveintellectandlightareathirdelementinrelationtothepassiveintellectanditsobject,andtheorgan,i.e.,theeye,toitsvisibleobject.wU #  32           Lines18!19ofDAIII.5begintheAristotelianaporiaoftheactiveintellect.Theselines [  describetheactiveintellectinthefollowingway: Thoughtinthissenseofitisseparable 5 (/3#%)?'),impassible(_s!9'_),unmixed(sA'),sinceitisinitsessentialnatureactivity(for  alwaystheactiveissuperiortothepassivefactor,theoriginatingforcetothematter).Inline22,Aristotledescribestheactiveintellectas/3#% ;'.ItisHickscontention,agreeingwith_Zeller_, ^ that/3#%)?'doesnotmeanseparable,but actuallyseparatei.e.notinvolvedinphysical 8 life.l #  33      ׀Here,theactivitiesofthebodyoperateindependentlyoftheactivitiesof'.! #  34      ׀Hicks w furtherarguesthatthethreepredicatescharacterizingtheactiveintellectinDAIII.5 wereapplied Q  to'in[DAIII.4]beforeanymentionhadbeenmadeofthedistinctionbetweenactiveand +" passiveintellect. #  35      ׀Hiscentralclaimisthatthesethreepredicatesfirstapplytothepassiveintellect e beforetheycanbeappliedtotheactiveintellectinDAIII.5.InDAIII.4,429a15,Aristotleargues ? thattheintellectingeneralisnotmixedwiththebodyandis_s!9'_Ԁ(impassible),buthasthe   capacityof receivingtheformofanobject;thatis,mustbepotentiallyidenticalincharacterwithitsobjectwithoutbeingtheobject.} #  36      ׀InDAIII.5,/3#%)?'and_s!9'_Ԁcharacterizetheprimacy  h oftheactiveintellectoverthepassive: foralwaystheactive(!)issuperiortothepassive B  factor,theoriginatingforcetothematter.Strictlyspeaking,then,thepassiveintellectinDAIII.4   isnot_s!9'_Ԁastheactiveintellectis,but!)?',thereceptorofforms,and,asaresult,it [  isaffectedbytheforms.Theactiveintellectisclearlyunaffectedbythereceptionofforms.OnlyinDAIII.5doesAristotlenaturallymakeadistinctionwithintheintellect.Theintellectnow  possessespassiveandactivepowers.Therefore,Aristotlesuseof/3#%)?'and_s!9'_ԀinDA  III.5assertstheseparationoftheactiveintellectnotonlyfromthebody,butalsofromthepassiveintellect./3#%)?'mustthenmeanseparablefromthepassiveintellect.2 #  37       8   However,theaoristparticiple/3#% ;'alsoindicatesthattheactiveintellectisseparated w afterthedeathofthesoul.AristotlerecapitulatesthisteachinginMeta..3,1070a2526inrelation Q  tothedegreeofseparationentailed: Butwemustexaminewhetheranyformalsosurvivesafterwards.Forinsomecasesthismaybeso,e.g.thesoulmaybeofthissort!notallsoulbutthereason;fordoubtlessitisimpossiblethatallsoulshouldsurvive. #  38      ׀Inthispassage,Aristotledoes %z" notmakethedistinctionbetweentheactiveandpassiveintellects,butspeaksmerelyoftheintellect e toutcourtthatsurvivesdeath.WhereasinDAIII.5,thedistinctionisclear:thepassiveintellect ? belongstothesoul,whichistheactualityofalivingorganism,and,consequently,thepassiveintellectisunabletosurvivethisorganismsdeath. #  39      ׀Thepassiveintellect,therefore,isrelegated   tothepartofthesoulthatdoesnotsurvivedeath,whiletheactiveintellectdoessurvive.Asmentionedabove,theimplicationhereisthattheactiveintellectisnotseparatedinsofarasthesoulremainsalive,butisseparatedatdeath: Whenseparated(/3#% ;')[fromthepassiveintellect],   itisalonejustwhatitis,andthisaboveisimmortalandeternal....U #  40      ׀_Rist_Ԁcapturestheinevitable [  conclusionwithrespecttoAristotlestwoterms/3#%)?'and/3#% ;': Sincethenthereisa 5 timewhentheActiveIntellectisnotseparatedbutlinkedinsomewaytothePassive,asefficientcausetomatter,andsince,however,separationdoesoccuratdeath,thenduringamanslifetime  hisActiveIntellectmustnotbeseparatedbutseparable. #  41      ׀However,itisMansionscontentionthat ^ Aristotleupholdstheviewthattheactiveintellectisnotdivineandimmortal.Mansionwrites: 8 r8  ilne_sagit_Ԁplusde_lintellect_Ԁagent_ou_Ԁ_actif_,mais_uniquement_Ԁ...delapureessencede_lintellect_.Dela_sorte_,demme_que_Ԁ_Aristote_Ԁyoppose_lintellect_Ԁ_potentiel_Ԁ_ou__passif_,_fonction_Ԁ_caractristiquement_Ԁhumaineetdoncprissableavec_lhomme_,demmeauraitilpudireetdoitondirepour_linterprter_Ԁcorrectement,_que_Ԁ_lintellect__actif_Ԁestprissabledelammefa onetpourlammeraison. #  42      ׀+"   ЇHInotherwords,Mansionsthesisisthatthepassiveandactiveintellectsareonlyfeaturesoftheessence(%;)oftheintellectinse.However,AristotledoesnotmentionanywhereinDAIII.5 ? thatheisspeakingoftheessenceoftheintellect,ashespeaksofessencessoofteninvariousothertexts,and,consequently,/3#% ;'must,then,refertotheactiveintellect,whichisimmortaland   divine,andthereforeseparatefromthepassiveintellectatdeath.However,theactiveintellectcooperateswiththepassiveintellectinthesouluntiltheyareseparated.  Both/3#%)?'and/3#% ;'indicateatentativeunionofbothstatesofintellectinone   person. #  43      ׀Thatis,bothtermsimplyatimewhentheactiveintellectisnotseparatedfromthepassive [  intellect.Thus,iftheactiveintellectisoperative__Ԁ_)_Ԁ_1+/_,thenitcannotbecompletely 5 transcendent. #  44      ׀Theactiveintellectisnotasingletranscendentintellectgoverningthepluralityof  passiveintellects,as_Avicenna_Ԁadvocates.Thebriefmentionofarttoitsmaterialinline12ofDA  III.5supportsthisclaim.Asaparticularmanisthefatherofthisparticularson, #  45      ׀so,too,aformof ^ artinthemindofaparticularartististheefficientcauseofthisparticularproduct.Thus,Aristotlearguesthataparticularactiveintellectisoperativeinaparticularsoul,anditsfunctionisto makeallthings,asthesculptormakesaproduct.8 #  46       Q    Aristotlecontinues: Actualknowledgeisidenticalwithitsobject:intheindividual,potentialknowledgeisintimepriortoactualknowledge,butabsolutelyitisnotpriorevenintime. $  Itdoesnotsometimesthinkandsometimesnotthink.y #  47      ׀Theactiveintellectsselfknowledgeis e notakintothatofthepassiveintellects,whichisaffectedbythetransientpassionsofsensation.Furthermore,theactiveintellectsselfknowledgeisunabletodirectlyinformthepassiveintellect.Thus,Aristotleclearlyperceivesanimpenetrablefrontierthatdividesthepassiveandactiveintellects,suchthatthepassiveintellectcooperateswiththelowerpowers,whiletheactiveintellectinseselfoperates. B    AristotleconcludesDAIII.5withthefollowingclaim: Whenithasbeenseparated   (/3#% ;')itisthatonlywhichitisessentially,andthisaloneisimmortalandeternal(wedonot [  remember,however,becausethisisimpossibleandthepassivereasonisperishable);andwithoutthisnothingknows.~U #  48      ׀Theactiveintellectisunaffected,immovable,andsimpleinitsnature.  Aristotleseemstoarguethattheactiveintellectisimmortalwhenseparatedfromthepassiveintellectandthesoulinwhichthepassiveintellectoperates.Thepassageinbrackets wedonot ^ remember(__Ԁ_ A _Ԁ 7)isareferencetoapassagefoundearlierintheDeAnima: 8 {Ӏ8  Thusitisthatthinkingandreflectingdeclinethroughthedecayofsomeother w inwardpartandarethemselvesimpassible.Thinking,loving,andhatingareaffectionsnotofThought,butofthatwhichhasThought,sofarasithasit.Thatiswhy,whenthisvehicledecays,memoryandlovecease;theywereactivitiesnotofThought,butofthecompositewhichhasperished;Thoughtis,nodoubt,somethingmoredivineandimpassible.Thatthesoulcannotbemovedisthereforeclearfromwhatwehavesaid,andifitcannotbemovedatall,manifestlyitcannotbemovedbyitself. #  49      ׀$!   Memorydoesnotsurvivedeathfortworeasons:1)sincetheactiveintellectisimpassible,itdoes &g # notaccountfororapprehendtheparticular,factualdataofeverydaylife,whereas2)thepassiveintellectwhichdoesapprehenddataperishesatthedeathoftheindividual. #  50      ׀Inthislight,thelast ? fivewordsofDAIII.5,andwithoutthisnothingthinks,offeratleastfourdifferentpossible   interpretations:U #  51      ׀1)withoutthepassiveintellect,theactiveintellectknowsnothing;2)andwithout   theactiveintellect,thepassiveintellectknowsnothing; #  52      ׀3)withoutthepassiveintellect,nothing  h knows;and4)withouttheactiveintellect,nothingknows.Ross,followedby_Hamlyn_,ultimatelyadherestothelastinterpretation,thatwithouttheactiveintellect,nothingknows,grantingtheactive   intellectaneternalstatus,astatusthatexercisesarolesimilartothatof'inMeta..7&9, [  thoughtheyarenotidentical. #  53       5   Thus,Aristotleappearstohavecreatedafissurebetweentheactiveintellectandthelowerlevelsofthesoulspowers,whichNisseen_NOoccursO__OOin_Ԁline23ofDAIII.5withtheterm/3#% ;'  (separation).Oncewhollyseparatedfromthepassiveintellect,theactiveintellectiswhollyindependent,separate,andtranscendenttothepassiveintellect.ZK  #  54      ׀Furthermore,itsactivityisno 8 longerdirectedtotheraisingofthepotentialobjectsof'tostatesofactuality.Itsactivityis e nowpurelyselfdirected.Inotherwords,thenowseparatedandimmortalactiveintellectispurelyselfreflective.ThereisverylittleevidenceprovidedbyAristotlethatcandefendRosshypothesisthattheactiveintellectis somethinginusthatactuallyknowsalready,someelementthatiscutofffromourordinaryconsciousnesssothatwearenotawareofthispreexistingknowledge.U #  55      ׀The  h activeintellectdoesnotapprehendexternalimages,sinceitisselfreflective.Rather,itisthe B  necessaryconditionfortheattainmentofactualknowledge.Thus,theactiveintellectdoesnot   presupposetheactivityofthepassiveintellect,and,consequently,doesnotpresupposeanystagethatthepassiveintellectpresupposes.Theactiveintellectsseparateandimmortalstatusexemptsitfrombeingaffectedbymemoryandotherbodilypassions.Itisforthisreasonthat,onceseparatedfromthepassiveintellect,theactiveintellectdoesnotremember.Becausememoryisanactivity  ofthepassiveintellect,itbelongstoparticularsensibledata.Theactiveintellectoperatesbyuniversalconceptsandis,therefore,devoid,andindependent,oftheparticularsensibledataofNature.Whereasthepassiveintellectpresupposesthelowergradesofsoul,theactiveintellectisseparatefromthepassiveintellect,albeitcooperativewithitinthesoulduringthelifeofthebody.Thus,theactiveintellectisapowerthatenablespotentialobjectsofitselftobecomeactual,whileititselfisunaffected,sinceitsproperobjectisitself,adepictionakintothatof'inMeta..7 $  &9. %z" Ї METAPHYSICS.7&9  e   AcentraldoctrineinAristotlesmetaphysicsisthatformalcausalityisexpressedviaefficientandfinalcausality.Inotherwords,insensiblesubstances,efficientandfinalcausalitycoalescewithformalcausality.Efficientandfinalcausalityaremutuallyexclusive,sinceasaprimaryprincipleofchange,theefficientcauseisfullyactual,butonlyformisactual.Thus,efficientandfinalcausalitymustcoalesce.  #  56      ׀Finalandformalcausalityalsocoalesceduetothefact @  thatfinalcausalityisitselftherealizationofformalcausalityinherentlyoperativeineachsensiblesubstance.U #  57      ׀ Y    InMeta..7&9,Aristotlepresents'asfinalcausality,theunmovedmover.Although 3 itisapureformdevoidofmatter,itcannotbeaformalcause,since'iswhollytranscendentto   sensiblesubstancesandnotanimmanentprincipleanimatingthedevelopmentofNature.'  movesNaturebybeingitsobjectofdesire, #  58      ׀whileititselfremainsunmoved.Noris'an \ efficientcauseperse.'isanagentofmovement,butonlyasafinalcause.po #  59      ׀FollowingRoss, 6 _Rist_Ԁaddsthat'isan7# thatis ...anefficientcauseonlyintheoddsenseofbeinga u finalcause,thatis,indirectly.{ #  60      ׀Thus,'remainsatranscendentfinalcausetothetransient O  sensibleworldofNature. )"   ThereareafewpassagesinMeta.whereAristotlepossiblyalludestoanimmanentactivity e of',guidingthedevelopmentofhistory.InMeta.,1075a15,1076a4,and1075a19,Aristotle ? analogouslydescribes'relationtoNatureasacaptainsrelationtohisarmy.Thecaptain   knowshisarmy,and,thus,ordersitaccordingtohisknowledge.Likewise,'issaidtohave   knowledgeofNatureandorderitaccordingtoitsknowledge.Thiswouldfurtherimplythat'  h hasforeknowledgeorforesight(_!#?_)ofNature,asPlatobelieved., #  61      ׀Ross,however,drawsthe B  conclusionthatasaseparatefinalcause,'isignorantofNature,sinceapartfromtheseobscure   andambiguouspassages,Aristotlegenerallyuseslanguageoftranscendencewhenhespeaksabout [  '.'onlyknowledgeisofitself:itis?%'9% 3'?%',athinkingofthinking.As 5 aselfreflectingsubstancethatmovesthesensibleworldfromwithout,itremainsapureformdevoidofmatter.Aristotlewrites:8  Itisclearthenfromwhathasbeensaidthatthereisasubstancewhichiseternalandunmovableandseparatefromsensiblethings.Ithasbeenshownalsothatthissubstancecannothaveanymagnitude,butiswithoutpartsandindivisible....Butitisalsoclearthatitisimpassiveandunalterable;foralltheotherchangesareposteriortochangeofplace.U #  62      +"   Aristotleconfirmsthesimplicityandseparabilityof'bydenyingtheclaimthat'isa %z"  substantialextensionoftheScalaNaturae.If'weretocontainadegreeofpotency,itwould, 'T!$ likeallsubstancescontainingpotency,growfatiguedandthinkintermittently.+ #  63      ׀Consequently,' e  wouldrequireapriorprincipleuponwhichtodependforitsactivity.8  First,then,if Thoughtisnottheactofthinkingbutapotency,itwouldbereasonabletosupposethatthecontinuityofitsthinkingiswearisometoit.Secondly,therewouldevidentlybesomethingelsemorepreciousthanThought,viz.thatwhichisThoughtof.ForboththinkingandtheactofThoughtwillbelongeventoonewhothinksoftheworstthingintheworld,sothatifthisoughttobeavoided(anditought,forthereareevensomethingswhichitisbetternottoseethantosee),theactofthinkingcannotbethebestofthings.ThereforeitmustbeofitselfthatthedivineThoughtthinks(sinceitisthemostexcellentofthings),anditsthinkingisathinkingonthinking.U #  64         Thus,'intellectualactivityisathinkingonthinking(?%'9% 3'),anditsactof 8 intellectionmustbegeneratedfromwithinitself,notonlybecauseitisdevoidofpotency,but,a w fortiori,itispurelysimple.Ifitwerenotsimple,itwoulddependuponsomeotherprinciple Q  externaltoit. SOMEREACTIONS  %z"    Rossinterpretationoftheseparatenatureof'anditsexclusiveselfknowledgewas 'R!$ upheldbyJosephOwens._ #  65      _ԀAccordingtoOwens,'perfectionexcludesknowledgeofother e  formsinNature.Withrespectto'knowledgeofNature,Owenswritesthefollowing: Thetext ? [Meta.]isatpainstoshowthatseparatesubstanceisaknowingofitsownself.Itimpliesthatfor   aseparatesubstancetoknowanythingelsewouldmeanachange,andachangefortheworse. #  66      ׀   Owensclaimisbasedontheprinciplethattobeaperfect,actualsubstanceimpliesbeinglimitedtoitself:aperfectsubstanceisonethatislimitedandfinite,whereasanimperfectsubstanceisonethatisunlimitedandinfinite.',asafinitesubstance,ismoreperfect,and,consequently,does   notknowtheinfinitenumberofsubstancesofNature.'wouldknowNatureifitwerean [  infinite,imperfectsubstance. Butinpointoffact,contendsOwens, [Thought]isfinite.Itcontainsonlyitsownperfection,nottheperfectionsofotherthings.Inknowingitself,itdoesnotknowthem.Thereversedoeshold....Fromsensiblethingsonecanattaintoknowledgeofthe_supersensible_Ԁsubstances.Butonecannotreasonviceversa.Y #  67      ׀Thus,OwensdevelopsRoss ^ conclusionthatasatranscendent,separate,selfreflectingsubstance,'knowsnothingofNature, 8 sinceitisfinite,i.e.,perfect.  However,accordingtoT.deKoninck,one couldnot...bemorecompletelymistaken.[\ #  68      ׀ Q  DeKoninckarguesthatasformbecomesmoreperfect,themoreitincludesotherforms.Analogous +"  tothehumanintellect,whichapprehendstheformsofsensibleobjects,afortioridoesthedivine $  'apprehendtheprecedinglevelsofforminNature.| #  69      ׀Tobeperfectistobecompleteandself e  sufficient.!U #  70      ׀Thatis,itis thatfromwhichnothingiswanting.Y #  71      ׀Perfectionin'doesnot ? excludeknowledgeofwhatisposteriorto'.'knowledgeofoneobjectdoesnotexclude   theknowledgeofanother:'knowstheotherobject concomitantly, #  72      ׀for themoreperfectthe   form,arguesdeKoninck, thelessitexcludesandthemoreperfections,orotherforms,itcontains.  #  73      ׀Rather,itismatterwhichexcludesperfections,sincematterentailscontraries,and B  contraries,inturn,entailpotencyandimperfection.Thesubjectofcontrariesismatteritself.x  #  74      ׀   Form,astheuniversalprincipleinfinitelycorrelatedwithaplethoraofindividuals,isinclusive,whereasmatterreceivesoneformatatime,inasuccessiveorder,  #  75      ׀allowingforchange,and 5 admittingadegreeofpotency.Tosuggest'isignorantoftheformslocatedinNatureisto  suggestthat'possessesadegreeofpotency,and,consequently,cannotbeperfect. Toattribute  ignoranceunderanyformtoGod,saysdeKoninck, wouldclearlyonAristotlesprinciplesbetointroducebackintoGodwhathehasdenied,namely,potency!imperfection,acontradiction_in 8 termswhenspeakingofthemostperfectbeing. #  76      ׀',consideredastheformofformspar e excellence,mustnecessarilyincludeandknowothermoreimperfectforms,duetoitsperfectnature. ? Exclusionisalwaysposteriortoinclusion.AsdeKonincksays, youcanonlydividewhatwaspreviouslyone;priortoseparatingonethingfromanotherinyourmind,youmusthavethembothtogethersomehow.Hereagainitleapstotheeyethatinclusionispriortodivisionorexclusion,} #  77        h thatactuality,orform,ispriortopotency,ormatter.8  AndallotherthinkersareconfrontedbythenecessaryconsequencethatthereissomethingcontrarytoWisdom,i.e.tothehighestknowledge;butwearenot.For [  thereisnothingcontrarytothatwhichisprimary;forallcontrarieshavematter,andthingsthathavematterexistonlypotentially;andtheignorancewhichiscontrarytoanyknowledgeleadstoanobjectcontrarytotheobjectoftheknowledge;butwhatisprimaryhasnocontrary.  #  78      ^   Thus,'isnotignorantofotherforms,since'doesnotpossessanycontrariesasmatterdoes, w andsoismostperfect.  AccordingtodeKoninck,Aristotlesclaimisthat'isaneternal,indivisible,simple,and +" purelyactualsubstance,separatefrom,yetnotignorantof,Nature.Infact,Aristotlesdoctrineof 'isananswertoaquestionraisedintheDAIII.4(429b26): isThoughtapossibleobjectof %z" Thoughttoitself? #  79      ׀Aristotleanswersinthefollowingway: e  PP8  Thoughtisitselfthinkableinexactlythesamewayasitsobjectsare.Forinthecaseofobjectswhichinvolvenomatter,whatthinksandwhatisthoughtareidentical;forspeculativeknowledgeanditsobjectareidentical.$U #  80      Q    QPP    Aristotleisarguingthat'hasimmediateapprehensionofitself,suchthattheactofthinkingand   theobjectof'areidentical.Itispreciselytheclaimthat'issimultaneouslysubjectand  h objectthatcharacterizesAristotlesphilosophyasspeculative.R񀀀Theabovecitation,then,depictsRSSUUUU'V,then,isVWaspWXpXureactuality,since B  1)itisdevoidofmatter,and2)itgraspsitselfimmediately,thusapprehendingitselfwithoutthemediatingroleofcontraries,sincecontrariesincludematter,and,thus,potency.  AristotlefurtherconfirmsthisinMeta..7inanextraordinarypassage: AndThought 5 thinksitselfbecauseitsharesthenatureoftheobjectofThought;foritbecomesanobjectofThoughtincomingintocontact  #  81      ׀withandthinkingitsobject,sothatThoughtandobjectarethe  same.  #  82      ׀Thus,inthesameactofthinking,'anditsobject,i.e.,itself,arereciprocallyordered ^ insuchawaythatoneisnotsubordinatetotheother,sinceboththesubjectandobjectentailtheonesimpleactivityof'. w  Q   CONCLUSION  e   TheAristotelianprinciplethatthelowestbeingispresupposedinthehigherintheascendingscaleofbeingsgeneratesproblemswhenconsideringtherelationof'withNature.Aristotle   introducesadiscontinuityofsubstantialdevelopmentinassertingtheseparabilityandtranscendencyof'fromNature. #  83      ׀Thediscontinuityisanalogoustotheseparationofmatterfromform.'  f becomespureformdevoidofallmatter,whichcharacterizesNature.'andNatureopposeeach @  otherand,thus,adiscontinuityofsubstancesismaintained.Ifacontinuityweretohavebeenpreserved,Aristotlewouldhavebeencompelledtoadmit'assimilationofhumanitysnature, Y  and,afortiori,ofitsrationalactivity,theculminatingstageofthesentientworld,whichhuman 3 reasonpresupposes.  ItwouldappearthatdeKoninckistryingtoovercomethefissurebetween'andthe  precedinggradesofform.Hestillmaintainsthetranscendencyandseparatestatusof'.By \ asserting'knowledgeofNature,Aristotledoesnotreduce'toasubstancewithadegree 6 ofpotency.'is)__Ԁ_?_,perfectionitself,andisnota A',apotency. Neitherin u Chapters7or9[oftheMeta.],noranywhereelseinAristotleforthatmatter,doesknowledgeofone O  reality,forinstance,ofself,entailignoranceofanother. } #  84      ׀Aristotlesobjective,accordingtode )" Koninck,ismerelytodenyattributingpotencyordependenceinto'. $    DeKoninckupholdsRossandOwensclaimforthetranscendencyandseparabilityof' %x" fromNature,butdeniestheirconclusionthat',asaselfthinkingsubstance,isignorantofthe 'R!$ precedinglevelsofforminNature.Thus,deKoninckattemptstoresolvetheAristotelianaporia ),#& oftheseparationof'inMeta.,and,byimplication,inDAIII.5.However,evenbydenying e 'ignoranceofNature,deKoninckdoesnotseemtoresolvetheAristotelianaporia.'still ? remainsseparate,anditsactivitydoesnotpresupposetheloweractivity.Inotherwords,theloweractivitiesdonotculminatein'self!thinkingactivity.Theuninterruptedlineageofsubstantial   activitiesstops,ashasbeenshown,atthepassiveintellect.TheonlymannerofovercomingtheAristotelianaporiaisbyasserting'tobefinalandformalcause,immanentlyoperativewithin B  theNaturesstagesofitsselfrealization.Onlybytakingthispathcantheseparationbetween'   andNaturebeovercome.Inotherwords,byintroducinginto'formalcausality,',asthe [  sourceofNaturesintelligibility,candirectlypenetratethelowestmaterialfibreoftheworldandeffectitsgrowthmerelybyknowingit,since'knowledgeofNaturewould,inthislight,bea  formofselfknowledge.Thus,'asfinalandformalcausalityextendstheactivityand  knowledgeof'totheentirecosmos.