On Choice and Preference Revealed Preference Theory in the light of Davidson s theory of action Erik Angner History and Philosophy of Science Dept. University of Pittsburgh While the likes of Amartya Sen have called for its rejection, Revealed Preference Theory (RPT) remains widely popular among economists. Articles relying on the theory are still accepted for publication in the most prestigious journals, textbooks keep treating it as the theory of preference, and the theory remains taught in graduate seminars. Moreover, RPT has been imported into philosophy by philosophers of science like Brian Skyrms (1998), and ethicists like Ken Binmore (1994). I take RPT to be an attempt to provide an operational definition of the notion of preference by identifying it with the notion of choice. In the present paper, I use Davidson s theory of action to argue that the theory of revealed preference so understood is based on a simple, but devastating, philosophical error. While any acceptable notion of preference is intensional, I claim, the notion of choice presupposed by RPT must be extensional. Since nothing can be both intensional and extensional, I conclude that it is impossible to identify preference with choice. Incidentally, my argument also shows what is wrong with an inference from a sentence of the form P chooses A over B to a sentence of the form P prefers A to B (as in We know people want this product since they choose to buy it ). Finally, I attempt to explain how the mistake could arise in the first place. In my view the mistake is an instructive one, and I try to say why. Psychologists and economists working in the rational choice tradition tend to assume that there are privileged descriptions of the alternatives facing the subjects, and of their actions in decision situations. However, the assumption that there are privileged descriptions of alternatives and actions is unjustified. How the observer-theorist should describe the alternatives facing subjects in decision situations, and the subjects actions, is an important, and largely open, question in the methodology of psychology and the social sciences.