Eric Pacuit, University of Maryland
This project critically examines and develops logical systems for reasoning about communities of (rational and not-so rational) agents engaged in some form of social interaction. Much of this work builds upon existing logical frameworks developed by philosophers and computer scientists incorporating insights and ideas from philosophy (especially epistemology and action theory), game theory, decision theory and social choice theory. The result is a web of logical systems each addressing different aspects of rational agency and social interaction. This project focuses on the central conceptual and technical issues that drive these logical analyses. The main objective is to see the various logical systems as a coherent account of rational agency and social interaction.
The typical game playing situation involves a group of self-interested agents, or players, engaged in some " interdependent decision problem". Much of the traditional work in game theory has centered around the questions: What should Ann (Bob) do? or what is rational for Ann (Bob) to do? Game theorists have proposed various "solution concepts: as answers to these two questions (the most well known examples being the Nash equilibrium and dominance reasoning). However, in recent years a number of game-theorists, philosophers and logicians have moved away from directly asking ``what is rational for Ann (Bob) to do?" and tried to understand what does it mean for Ann (Bob) to act rationally in a given interactive situation. These two questions are quite different. In the first case, one looks at social or interactive situations in abstraction from their specific context, and tries to circumscribe, in a (quasi-)axiomatic fashion, criteria of rational decision making. In the other case, one looks at specific game playing situations, here at specific informational contexts, and tries to understand how this context will or should bear on the agents' decisions. In a joint book project with Olivier Roy, we are developing a theory of interactive rationality based on a theory of mutual and higher-order expectations. Of course, there are many issues that may be relevant for a player as she decides what to do in a game situation. One issue that we take to be particularly salient for the players is the fact that they are in a game situation with other (rational) agents. Exactly how the players incorporate the fact that they are interacting with other (actively reasoning) agents into their own decision making process is the subject of much debate. As we will show, subtle differences in assumptions about the players' informational attitudes will lead to alternative accounts of what constitutes rational play.
Jan-Willem Romeijn, University of Groningen
Single-case Chance and Statistics
Jan-Willem studied at Utrecht University, where he graduated cum laude in both physics and philosophy. After that he worked as a financial consultant for two years. From 2000 to 2004 he earned a doctorate in philosophy at the University of Groningen, for which I graduated cum laude in 2005. The first two years after that helectured in philosophy of science and statistics at the Psychology Department of the University of Amsterdam. Until 2009, heI carried out a research project on the intersection of cognitive psychology and philosophy of science in the University of Groningen. From this year onwards I will work on a research project concerning. More information can be found in his CV and List of Publications.
