
Emissions Trading



The Economics of Emissions Trading

The Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions

Introduction

Assignment of property rights and creation of a market for pollution contributes to achieve two results:

- 1. Efficient total amount of pollution is produced.
- 2. There is no way to reduce pollution without increasing production costs for firms.

Introduction

Suppose society has determined the total amount of pollution it is willing to tolerate.

Next issue is: what is the most costeffective way of achieving that target?


Cost Effectiveness: Example

Two types of plants: "efficient" and "inefficient".


Each plant if unregulated produces 100 units of emissions in a year.

EPA has target of cutting total emissions by 100 units (50%).

Cost Effectiveness: Example



What If The Regulator Does Not Know?



Information and Incentives

Regulator (EPA): wants to meet pollution target in the most **cost-effective** way, i.e., by requiring more emissions reduction from more efficient plants.

Problem: Regulator does not have all the **information** it needs.

Information and Incentives


Managers of plants: have very good information on how costly it is to reduce emissions at their plants.

Problem: Managers do not have incentive to reveal their information.

Emissions Trading

EPA states that each plant can legally produce up to 50 units of pollution.

- If a plant produces less than 50 units of pollution, it can obtain emission reduction credits. These credits can be bought and sold.
- E.g.: if plant 1 produces 40 units, it obtains 10 credits. Plant 1 can sell 10 credits to plant 2.
 Plant 2 can increase its pollution by 10 units.



Emissions Trading

Plant 1 obtains 30 emission reduction credits by reducing emissions by 80 units.

■ Plant 1 sells these credits to plant 2.

Plant 2 can therefore reduce its emissions by less than 20 units, instead of 50.

Clean Air Act Amendments in 1990: adoption of large-scale use of tradable permit approach to pollution control.

Amendments focus on control of emissions of sulfur dioxide produced when coal and oil are burned in electric utility boilers.

- Target: reducing yearly emissions of sulfur dioxide by 50% in 2000 with respect to 1980 levels.
- EPA distributed (for free) property rights for emissions among existing plants.
- At the end of each year, a plant has to show that its emissions are not greater than its property rights.

Property rights can be traded among plants without restrictions on the form of trades: bilateral private trades, auctions, etc.

Key issue: does the market achieve goal of allocating pollution rights efficiently?

Recent research shows that:

- Initially (early 1990s), few private trades of pollution rights.
- Mid-1990s: volume of private trades increased dramatically, from 130,000 to almost 12 millions per year.
- **#** Significant reduction in transaction costs.

Recent issue:

- In the US "inefficient" plants are located in the Midwest.
- Weather carries pollution back East (Adirondacks).
- New York state has forbidden its utilities from selling pollution rights to Midwestern plants.