

# Externalities

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# Consumption Externalities

# Production Externalities

# Consumption Externalities

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- # Occurs when one consumer cares directly about another consumer's consumption or a firm's production.
  - # Negative consumption externalities: smokers, automobile pollution.
  - # Positive consumption externality: neighbor's flowers.
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# Production Externalities

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- # Production possibilities of one firm are influenced by choices of another firm or consumer.
  - # Negative production externality: fishery cares about pollutants dumped by upstream firm.
  - # Positive production externality: R&D of one firm has positive effects on R&D of other firms.
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# Crucial Feature of Externalities


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- # There are goods people care about that are **not** sold on markets: no market for automobile pollution, pollutants, etc.
  - # Absence of markets implies equilibrium when there are externalities is **inefficient**: too much negative externalities, not enough positive ones.
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# Example: Smoking


1  
*smoke*

0



*money*


# Example: Smoking



# Example: Smoking

1  
*smoke*

0



$E'$

*money*

# Example: Smoking

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At an efficient equilibrium we have:

$$MRS_A(\text{money}, \text{smoke}) = MRS_B(\text{money}, \text{smoke})$$



# Example: Smoking

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- # Introducing a market for smoke improves the utility of both consumers.
  - # Problem with setting up such market: poorly defined property rights.
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# Example: Smoking

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- # Q: If a market for smoke can be organized, how much smoke will be produced?
  
  - # A: In general, it depends on the initial distribution of property rights.
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# Example: Production Externalities

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# Firm S produces:

1. steel  $s$ ;
2. pollution  $x$ , which is dumped into a river.

# Firm F, a fishery, is located downstream and is adversely affected by S's pollution.

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# Example: Production Externalities

# Cost function for S:

$$c_s \left( \underset{+}{s}, \underset{+}{x} \right)$$

# Cost function for F:

$$c_f \left( \underset{+}{f}, \underset{+}{x} \right)$$

# Example: Production Externalities

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# Profit maximization for S:

$$\max_{s, x} p_s s - c_s(s, x)$$

# Profit maximization for F:

$$\max_f p_f f - c_f(f, x)$$

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# Example: Production Externalities

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Optimal choices for S:

$$p_s = \frac{\partial c_s(s, x)}{\partial s}$$

$$0 = \frac{\partial c_s(s, x)}{\partial x}$$

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# Example: Production Externalities

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Optimal choice for F:

$$p_f = \frac{\partial c_f(f, x)}{\partial f}$$

# Example: Production Externalities

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- # When setting optimal quantity of pollution, the steel firm does not take into account the cost of pollution for the fishery.
  - # **Social cost** of steel production: increase in the cost of fishing associated with an increase in pollution.
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# Example: Production Externalities

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# What does a Pareto efficient production plan for steel and fish look like?

# Suppose the two firms merged:

$$\max_{s, x, f} p_s s + p_f f - c_s(s, x) - c_f(f, x)$$

# Example: Production Externalities

Optimal choice of  $f, s, x$ :

$$p_s = \frac{\partial c_s(s, x)}{\partial s}$$

$$p_f = \frac{\partial c_f(f, x)}{\partial f}$$

$$\frac{\partial c_f(f, x)}{\partial x} = - \frac{\partial c_s(s, x)}{\partial x}$$

# Example: Production Externalities


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Compare pollution produced by merged firm pollution produced by steel firm:

$$-\frac{\partial c_s(s^{**}, x^{**})}{\partial x} = \frac{\partial c_f(f^{**}, x^{**})}{\partial f} > 0$$

$$-\frac{\partial c_s(s^*, x^*)}{\partial x} = 0$$

# Example: Production Externalities



# Example: Production Externalities

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- # At the Pareto efficient level of production, the profits of the **merged firm** are larger than the sum of the profits of the two firms.
  - # How can the Pareto efficient outcome be achieved?
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# Internalizing Production Externalities: Taxation

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- # Steel firm faces the **wrong price** for pollution, i.e., zero.
- # To correct this, impose a quantity tax  $t$  on pollutants:

$$\max_{s, x} p_s s - c_s(s, x) - tx$$

# Internalizing Production Externalities: Taxation

# Optimal choice of pollution with tax:

$$-\frac{\partial c_s(s, x)}{\partial x} = t$$

# Optimal choice of  $t$ :

$$t^* = \frac{\partial c_f(f^{**}, x^{**})}{\partial x}$$

# Internalizing Production

## Externalities: Create Market

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- # Missing market.
  - # Create market by assigning fishery the right to clean water. Fishery can sell right to steel firm.
  - # Or, create market by assigning steel firm the right to pollute water. Steel firm can sell right to fishery.
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# Internalizing Production Externalities: Create Market

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- # The amount of pollution does not depend on how property rights are distributed (different from consumption externalities).
- # Distribution of property rights affects firms' profits.

# Production Externalities: Incentives Are Already There

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- # Steel firm and fishery have an incentive to merge (higher profits): why don't they merge?!
- # Or, somebody could buy both firms, merge them, and then enjoy higher profits.