GUIDEBOOK TO

ZEN AND

THE ART OF

MOTORCYCLE

MAINTENANCE

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A PHILOSOPHICAL BACKPACK—WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

As you remove and peruse the Western portion of your philosophical backpack, perhaps the first thing you will notice is the analytic knife, the standard instrument of classic Western reason (discussed and exemplified in *ZMM*, pp. 63–67 and 223). Altering the image from packets of information, we might say that the Western part of the backpack is made up of compartments (Reality, Knowledge, and Value) and that the compartments are in turn divided into such categories as idealism and realism, which are split into subdivisions, such as naïve realism and critical realism. Before you examine the contents of these compartments, you should be aware of a couple of things.

First, dividing philosophy into compartments is rather an arbitrary task. Nothing in the nature of humanity requires that it be done at all, and nothing in the nature of philosophy or in the nature of talk about philosophy requires that it be done in exactly *this* way. In a different context and for different purposes, philosophy might be divided differently or left undivided. Here it has been divided into the basic triad of Reality, Knowledge, and Value simply because that fits in well with the philosophical concerns of *ZMM*. My hope is to provide a handle on Western philosophy that is also a handle on the philosophies of Phaedrus and the narrator.

Second, our three compartments are not three separate, unre-lated, airtight bins of thought. Questioning in one of the compartments flows into questioning in the other two; an answer in one of the compartments has repercussions in the other two. For example, you might ask whether reality is necessarily mind-dependent, i.e., whether whatever exists can only exist insofar as it is present to some form of consciousness (a question in the Reality compartment), and you might go on to ask how an alleged reality that existed outside the field of awareness of any and every mind could be known (a question in the Knowledge compartment). If your answer to the Reality question is the idealist answer that everything real is real in and for some mind or other, that answer will have repercussions in the Value compartment. You won't be able—at least not logically—to think of things as having value in themselves, apart from the activity of a valuing mind.

In other words, philosophical thinking flows freely wherever the desire to understand and the questions generated by that desire take it. It does not come prepackaged, compartmentalized. Only *after* this thinking has left behind its products—a proposition or set of propositions that asserts and argues for a particular view—can the compartmentalization occur. A compartmentalizer, who may or may not also be the original thinker, can then take these thought products, compare them with others, and say that they pertain to this or that compartment and that they represent this or that category within the compartment. The compartmentalizer might work with compartments already available or craft some afresh; the person with the knife can slice reality one way or another—or not slice it at all. But neither the carving nor the compartmentalizing should be confused with the original thinking that is the heart and soul of philosophy.

You might look at this section, with its compartments and contents, as a sort of intellectual menu. A menu can list and describe various food offerings in ways that are both informative and tantalizing, but the menu itself is not the meal, and the menu cannot guarantee that the food will be tasty, digestible, and nourishing. That depends upon the match between, on the one hand, the food and cooking and, on the other, your palate and digestive system. The following menu of philosophical positions is bound to leave you feeling empty if you don't taste and chew some of the intellectual food that's offered, but even the best of philosophical cooks can't guarantee a match for your intellectual palate.

To change the metaphor, you might look at this section as a sort of intellectual map (see the introductory part of Section 3). A map has the advantage of portable utility, but it offers no substitute for the freshness of an actual intellectual journey. It can describe various places and tell you how to get to them, perhaps offering more than one route, but it can't take the place of your choosing a destination or a route, taking the trip, and arriving someplace. Nor can a map predict the satisfaction or dissatisfaction that you will feel during the trip or upon arrival. Similarly, this section describes various philosophical positions and some of the reasoning that has led thinkers to those positions, but it cannot take the place of your deciding to follow (and perhaps extend) or dismiss a particular line of reasoning, nor can it predict what might happen if you sample an unfamiliar way of thinking.

When intellectual mapping activity and its products are confused with or substituted for actual intellectual journeying, something very important is lost. Flesh and blood people like Phaedrus who try both to penetrate the mystery of life and make sense of their own lives—philosophers in the original sense, "lovers of wisdom"—are replaced by professional philosophers, specialists in abstract thinking who by their proficiency have earned a badge that can be worn or removed as the occasion demands. ("What do you want to be when you grow up?" "I want to be a philosopher." "I think I know a place where you can get that badge.") And just as a way of thinking is divorced from a way of living, so the resultant thought products—in the form of writings—are divorced from both the living and the thinking, and those who develop the skill of inspecting, naming, and classifying those thought products also usurp the name "philosophers," thus effecting a further degradation of the name. ("What do philosophers do?" "They investigate and classify the philosophical residue of other philosophers." "I think you've just given a 'circular definition.'" "Good point. I think you'd make a good philosopher.")

I think it's important here, before the mapmaking and the map reading begin, to draw attention to the difference between philosophy as a way of life, a life centering on the search for wisdom, and philosophy as badge-earning activity, activity that demonstrates either the ability for high-powered abstraction or the ability to analyze and categorize the philosophical residue of others. The point is not that one is bad and the other good—Quality can show itself in both. The point is that, if both are to flourish, philosophy as badge-earning activity should not be allowed to masquerade as philosophy pure and simple. Calling attention to the distinction between a map and a journey is one small effort in the direction of preventing the masquerade. Mapping activity can stimulate an intellectual journey and point to a philosophical way of life, but it is not in itself either one, and it can just as easily—perhaps more easily—point to and participate in philosophy as badge-earning activity.

I do not mean to suggest that mapping activity is worthless. That would be to trivialize in advance what I am about to do. ("Poisoning the well"—in this case, my own—is what a "good philosopher" might call it.) I just want to warn against a costly confusion—and perhaps also protect myself against the invective of Phaedrus. Phaedrus, you will recall, had angry words for those professional academicians who followed in the footsteps of Aristotle the Mapmaker, not the harder-to-find Aristotle the Journeyer. These professionals have reduced teaching and learning to naming and classifying and have thereby "smugly and callously killed the creative spirit of their students" (ZMM, p. 325). Such teachers might have been less prone to murder had they been more alive to the distinction between a map and a journey. Perhaps my emphasizing the distinction will call off the wrath of Phaedrus. Perhaps it will also modulate the voice of another ghost that you might hear in what follows, "the ghost of Aristotle speaking down through the centuries—the desiccating lifeless voice of dualistic reason" (ZMM, p. 326).

If you do experience a little desiccation from the carving, labeling, and compartmentalizing that follows, perhaps you will find relief in the flowing waters of the dialogue that appears as the final portion of this philosophical backpack. While the intellectual technique of naming and classifying, in philosophy and elsewhere, goes back to Aristotle, the dialogue as a mode of philosophical discourse goes back to Aristotle's teacher, Plato. I think it's quite fitting that this backpack conclude with the mode of discourse favored by "the essential Buddha-seeker" rather than with the mode favored by "the eternal motorcycle mechanic" (see ZMM, p. 331)—after all, ZMM concludes with the return of Phaedrus to the driver's seat.

REALITY

When you ask broad questions about reality, you have entered the area of philosophy known as metaphysics. The word itself was coined by Aristotle's followers sometime after Aristotle's death, when it was used as the title for a particular set of Aristotle's treatises. Why it was called *Metaphysics* is open to question. One speculation is that the title originally referred to the location of the work within the collection of one of Aristotle's followers (Adronicus of Rhodes). Since this set of Aristotle's treatises was located on the shelf "after" (*meta* in Greek) a work that dealt with "nature" (*physica* in Greek), the set was called *Metaphysica*. Another speculation is that Aristotle's followers coined the word as a way of saying that the treatises, because of their greater abstractness, should be studied only *after* the treatises dealing with nature. A third speculation is that the title was meant to indicate that the treatises went intellectually "beyond"—*meta* means "beyond" as well as "after"—the work on nature. Whatever the motivation behind the title, the book that was gathered together under the title raised questions that cut wide and deep. It asked about the fundamental principles, the causes and constituents, not simply of this or that sector of things, but of all things, of whatever is, of *being* as a whole. Ever since the time that Aristotle's wide-ranging book was given its title, metaphysics has been the area of philosophy in which the broadest questions about reality are asked. As was stated earlier, the work "metaphysics" has also come to be associated with the occult, with strange, seemingly inexplicable phenomena that go beyond what is ordinarily considered natural. When the word "metaphysics" is used in *ZMM* it is used in the Aristotelian, not the occult, sense.

Here are some examples of metaphysical questions: What is the nature of reality? Is all reality of one basic kind? What is it? If there is more than one kind, how many kinds are there and what are they? If mind or consciousness is a basic principle, how basic is it? Can there be any reality that is not contained in a mind? Is there one source or more than one source for all the things that are? If there is one source, does that source have an existence that is independent of all the things that come from it, or has it somehow entered into all the things that come from it, or is it somehow both independent of (transcendent) and present within (immanent) the things that come from it? If there is more than one source, what is

the relation between or among them? Are they on the same level, or is there a hierarchy? Are they antagonistic or cooperative? Whatever the source or sources, are they subject to change in any way or are they absolutely immutable? Is change real or illusory? Is permanence real or illusory? Are the many things of our experience really many or are they really one? Are they both one and many? Why is there anything at all rather than nothing?

As you can see, these are not the questions that you typically take along with you to spark a conversation at the hair salon. Why in the world would anyone ever ask them? One answer is that people ask them because they *can*, just as they climb the mountain because it is there. Another answer is that sometimes a crisis that removes a taken-for-granted sense of security brings on a metaphysical search for a new basis of security. If, for example, you are used to thinking of the gods as the immortal sources of everything else and you begin to lose faith in the existence of the gods, you may begin to search for some other permanent reality or realities that explain what is. According to the narrator's reading (*ZMM*, p. 336), this is how metaphysical speculation got started in ancient Greece.

REAL OR IDEAL?

Is reality "real" or "ideal"? That may seem like a strange question to ask, but it is not so strange if you know what the terms "realism" and "idealism" came to mean in the history of Western philosophy. At the outset, you should note that the philosophical use of those terms is quite different from that found in everyday conversation. In everday conversation, we might say that a person who tends to be a bit cynical about the purity of human motivation or who at least is very practical and down-to-earth is a "realist," whereas a person who tends to believe the best about people or who, in any case, strives to reach and maintain the highest standards is an "idealist." This is not the distinction that Western philosophical mappers have had in mind.

To become clear about the philosophical distinction, you first have to understand what is meant by "mind." A mind is a center of consciousness or awareness. As you read this section, various things may enter your awareness: the texture and coloration of the printed page, meanings of words and phrases and statements, ques-

tions about what I'm driving at and what difference that might make, and so on. Those things are "in" your mind—mental contents. If you reflect upon the awareness that somehow holds them, you are reflecting upon your mind. Notice that in doing so, you are not sensing or thinking about the physical object that we call the brain (unless perhaps this stuff is giving you a headache). Whether or not the mind is totally dependent upon the brain is a further question. Whatever the answer to that question, the fact remains that you can be aware of your awareness without being aware of the physical object that neurophysiologists study. It's that awareness of awareness that you should "keep in mind"—don't worry about what your brain is doing—as we talk about the distinction between philosophical realists and philosophical idealists.

Basically, a philosophical "realist" is a person who believes that a thing can be real without being either itself a mind or contained in a mind. Reality is not, as such, mind-dependent. Whatever is to be said about the prevalence or importance of mind in the universe, it is one thing to be real and another to be mental. A philosophical "idealist," on the other hand, says that a thing is real only insofar as it is a mind or contained therein. Reality, as such, is mind-dependent. A nonmental reality is a contradiction in terms. A realist looks at a motorcycle and says that it could really exist—or at least its real existence is conceivable—even if somehow all minds, all awareness, in the universe ceased to be. An idealist says that the motorcycle is mental stuff, through and through. Take away mind and you take away the cycle. In a mindless universe, a universe without awareness, there would be no visual consciousness. In such a universe, what would a motorcycle look like?

You can divide up philosophical realism in various ways. For example, you can divide it up according to how realists support their realism. If you divide it this way, your carving activity may yield "naïve realism," "critical realism," and "pragmatic realism." A "naïve realist" supports realism by saying that little or no support is called for. Of course things can be real without being present in a mind. It's a matter of common sense, like the sun rising and setting! The naïve realist says, Do you want to know how I refute the idealist position? I refute it by kicking this stone! (Samuel Johnson is reported to have refuted Bishop Berkeley's idealism in just this way.) The vast majority of human beings on planet earth are probably naïve realists, whether or not they have ever paid explicit attention to philosophical questions or debates.

(Of course, if you ask me how I know this, I might say something silly, like "It's a matter of common sense!") By the way, the word "naïve," as it's used here, is not a pejorative term. It is simply the mapper's way of noting the fact that realism can be and is embraced on more or less spontaneous grounds.

A "critical realist," on the other hand, takes the claims and arguments of idealists more seriously and believes that it's not enough to embrace realism spontaneously. It has to be carefully argued, not just proclaimed; and the case for realism has to be made in the face of the case for idealism. The critical realist is "critical" not in the sense of being "negative" but in the sense of being "careful and reflective."

The case for idealism might run something like this: When you are aware of something, what you are aware of is *in your mind*. You cannot be aware of what is *outside your mind*. If you say that you are aware of something outside your mind, for example a motorcycle, you are making the contradictory claim that you are aware of a motorcycle that is not in your awareness. If you are a determined realist, you might say, of course, that the mental motorcycle is caused by an extramental one, and you might add that you know the extramental motorcycle through the medium of the mental one. But how do you support such claims? Anything you could refer to by way of support, any evidence you could offer— for instance the exhaust fumes—would also be in your mind; otherwise you couldn't refer to it. So you still haven't bridged the gap between your mind and the alleged extramental thing. Sooner or later you will have to join the company of idealists and admit that it's all in the mind.

Before offering a counterargument, the critical realist might point out that such a line of thinking flirts with "solipsism," the view that "I myself alone" exist, as a mind, since everything else is only an entity in my awareness. The idealist might respond that the logic of idealism allows for the existence of more than one mind. Many of the things in my mind may be there through the influence of other minds, including the mind of my realist opponent. That makes more sense than saying that the things in my mind are somehow caused by things of an entirely different nature, extramental things. What could those mysterious extramental things be like? Any positive conception I could have of them would be in terms of some form of consciousness (visual consciousness, aural consciousness, tactile consciousness, intellectual consciousness,

etc.). Even my *conception* of the extramental is bounded by the mental. As to what the alleged extramental might be *in itself*, I haven't a clue. When I talk about other minds, on the other hand, at least I know what I'm talking about. Moreover, the idealist might continue, minds don't have to be on the same level. There can be a Big Mind, a Universal Mind, a Creative Mind, that causes and maintains everything that exist. Thanks to that Mind, everything that enters your mind doesn't begin to exist only when it enters your mind. It's already in the Universal Mind. And thanks to that Mind, the book that you're reading won't vanish out of existence when you leave the room!

As to the counterargument of the critical realist, to draw it out, let us use our analytic knife to carve out of critical realism a subcategory, "transcendental realism." Transcendental realists owe a lot of their inspiration to Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who was actually a transcendental idealist, not a transcendental realist. As a transcendental idealist, Kant rooted his version of idealism in the attention he paid to the *internal or necessary conditions* of possible experiential knowledge. He said that if you paid attention to those internal prerequisites, you would see that you can never really know things as they are in themselves, but only as they are shaped by your mind. The internal conditions that Kant had in mind included your sense of space and your sense of time and a number of species-wide categories, such as "substance," that you carry around with you (see *ZMM*, pp. 16–119 and p. 116, above). Since the time of Kant, the word "transcendental" has been associated in philosophy with a kind of thinking that seeks to support a position by calling attention to the internal conditions of knowing. Transcendental realists say that when you pay close attention to the conditions inherent in the process of knowing, you end up in the realist camp rather than the idealist camp.

A transcendental realist might argue as follows: When you have a desire to know something, you are consciously aiming toward what is—not toward a copy of what is or a mere substitute for what is or a mere mental content, but toward *what is*. Thus in your very desire to know, there is already an anticipatory awareness, a general notion of what reality is. It is toward the to-be-known toward which your desire to know is directed. Will you reach the target? That will depend upon your own resources and what you are trying to know. In some instances you will be successful through a combination of experience, understanding, and

judgment. To the data of experience you will bring questions that somehow indicate what you want to know. The tension of questioning will every so often yield to the eureka experience of insight. You've reached an understanding of how things might be, of a possible unity or relationship that you previously didn't know. However, not satisfied with an understanding of how things *might* be, you will press on. You will bring to your understanding reflective questions that seek to determine what conditions must be fulfilled if you are to know that your understanding is correct. If you are successful in determining the conditions, you will push on to see if you can determine whether or not the conditions are fulfilled. If you are successful in that, you will be ready to make judgments. You will have reached the to-be-known toward which you were aiming. You will be able to say something about what is, about reality. You don't have to confine your talk to mental contents, in spite of what the idealist says. You will have aimed further than that and gotten there. (You can find an extended version of this sort of argument in the work of the twentieth-century Canadian thinker Bernard Lonergan [1904–1984], especially in his master work, *Insight*.)

You might notice that the sort of argument that comes out of transcendental realism illustrates what was said earlier about the interrelatedness of the compartments of philosophy. Transcendental realists make use of epistemological considerations—claims reached within the compartment of Knowledge—to back up a metaphysical position—a position within the compartment of Reality. When they are doing that, of course, they are not thinking of themselves as passing from the Reality compartment to the Knowledge compartment and back again (unless they are trying to map their journey while they are taking it). They are simply going with the flow of their own questioning. There might have been a time when it was quite easy for seekers of wisdom to confine their attention to questions about reality without finding themselves raising questions about knowledge. That day is gone. At least, it's gone for thinkers who have passed through the trails carved out by the philosophers who ushered in the modern era, philosophers like Descartes and Hume and, especially, Kant. Once you've traversed those trails, you're bound to find Reality considerations and Knowledge considerations flowing into each other. The map is not the journey, but the journey is influenced by the maps you've seen.

The naïve realist says realism is simply a matter of common

sense. The critical realist says that the case for realism can and should be carefully argued, notably by using Knowledge considerations. The pragmatic realist says that the realist position is proved by asking the practical question, What difference does it make? If thinking of your life and the world in realist terms ("Reality is more than mental contents") is *more fruitful* than thinking of your life and the world in idealist terms ("It's all in the mind"), then realism makes a positive difference and you've got good grounds for adopting it. From a pragmatic viewpoint, the ultimate test of the truth of any position is whether or not that position *works*. Realism works.

How might a pragmatic realist argue that the realist perspective works better and is more fruitful than the idealist perspective? The argument might go something like this: When you're operating within a realist perspective, you don't expect reality to appear and act in ways that conform to all of your present thoughts about it—reality is more than mental contents. Your mental contents can be missing something. You can be *mistaken*! So you constantly try to bring your thoughts into line with a reality that is more than your thoughts, thus opening yourself up to progress in knowing. Similarly, as a realist you don't expect reality to conform to your wishes and desires—reality is not simply a projection of the mind. Reality *impinges* on you! So you constantly try to adjust your desires and your actions to the demands of a reality that overrides the constructions of wishful thinking, thus opening yourself up to progress in harmonious living. Belief in external reality leads to progress in knowing and living. Realism works.

But does idealism also work? asks the pragmatic realist. If you're operating within an idealist perspective and believe that everything is an event in the mind, is there anything that can call into queston the contents of your mind? Anything that can make you think that you may have been mistaken? Is there anything that can act as the standard for improving your understanding of things? Anything that can keep you from wishful thinking? Or that can spur you on to more harmonious, well-adjusted living? External reality might have done all of those things, but you've banished external reality. Perhaps, in spite of your idealist position, you act *as if* there were an external reality that urged you on to correct your thinking and adjust your living. But if that is the case, why not simply admit that realism works and is therefore true?

An idealist is not rendered speechless by such a realist chal-

lenge. The conversation never ends. An idealist can claim that what drives you toward greater perfection in knowing and living is not some extramental reality, but other minds, and above all the Big Mind. The Big Mind lures you on toward the perfection of its own mental universe. Thanks to the pull of the Big Mind, you are not satisfied with whatever is in your consciousness at a given time. You seek a fuller Truth and a greater Good, a Truth and a Good that owe their existence to the Big Mind. To this idealist counter, the pragmatic realist might respond that while such thinking might provide a certain comfort and even a certain motivation, you don't need it to function well in everyday life, whereas you do need the notion of extramental reality. If you see a car coming toward you, you'd better view it as an extramental reality and make an appropriate extramental move, and you had better not waste time thinking about what the Big Mind may be trying to impart to your little mind!

This last pragmatic realist move leads us to note a further point about pragmatic realism. It is not just a way of establishing the general realist outlook. It is also a way of working out the details within that outlook, a way of figuring out what counts as real. If you're thinking of something and want to know whether it's real, ask what difference the alleged reality makes in the world. If it doesn't make the slightest difference, if the world and your life in the world would be exactly the same even if the alleged reality were absent, that's a sign that you're not thinking of anything real at all. On the other hand, if in supposing the alleged reality's absence you see that the world would be quite different, perhaps even dysfunctional, that's a sign that you're thinking of something quite real.

Phaedrus performed a thought experiment along these lines when he was thinking of how to respond to people who questioned the existence of undefined Quality. He tried to imagine a world without Quality and found that in significant ways such a world would function abnormally. That to him was proof enough that Quality exists, whether or not it's defined. (See *ZMM*, pp. 193–194.) Interestingly, the narrator locates Phaedrus' response within "a philosophic school that called itself *realism*" (*ZMM*, p. 193, italics Pirsig's). The narrator must have had some version of pragmatic realism in mind.

So far we've divided realism according to the criteria by which it's established: spontaneously, theoretically, or pragmatically. We can also divide it according to the sorts of things that realists allow

in their world. One swift move of the knife and you have the categories "materialism" and "antimaterialism." A materialist thinks of the real world as populated by material things and nothing else. An antimaterialist denies that material things are the whole story of reality. Note that the antimaterialist needn't deny the existence of matter. An antimaterialist who is also an idealist would, of course, but an antimaterialist who is also a realist simply wants to make room for nonmaterial realities. The problem isn't matter. The problem is the materialist restriction.

To help us better understand the category of materialism, it might be useful to subdivide it into "deliberate materialism" and "nondeliberate materialism." If you're a nondeliberate materialist, you think of reality in material terms, but you don't say things like, "All reality is material" or "Those who believe in immaterial realities are wrong." You don't say such things because the distinction between the material and the nonmaterial hasn't occurred to you, at least not with any clarity. Your thinking is simply confined to categories that those who do make the distinction would call material. A number of the pre-Socratic, cosmological thinkers of ancient Greece seem to be categorizable as nondeliberate materialists. Those thinkers were trying to get at the one constant reality underlying and somehow permeating the many, changing things that make up the world, and when they thought they reached it, they called it water or air or fire (see ZMM, p. 336). You might call their thinking materialist, but they certainly weren't arguing explicitly and deliberately for materialism as opposed to antimaterialism. (Phaedrus makes a similar but perhaps more radical point about those thinkers, when he says that at that point in time "there was no such thing as mind and matter," since the dichotomy of mind and matter hadn't been invented yet—ZMM, p. 337.)

An example of deliberate materialism is modern "scientific materialism," according to which things only have real existence insofar as they have matter and energy; otherwise they exist only in the mind. (Despite the suggestion given by the label, if Phaedrus is right, such a view is "commoner among lay followers of science than among scientists themselves"—ZMM, pp. 209–210.) If you want to adopt this view critically rather than naïvely, you will have to take into account the antimaterialist challenge to scientific materialism.

One version of that challenge is to be found in ZMM. In a way,

the whole philosophy of Quality is a challenge to scientific materialism. More specifically, the narrator and Phaedrus make explicit remarks about the incoherence of scientific materialism. The narrator does so in the context of a ghost-story-telling session, in which he points out that scientific laws, from the scientific materialist viewpoint, are unscientific and unreal because they lack matter and energy—just like ghosts. After expanding on such ideas at some length (ZMM, pp. 28–32), the narrator confesses that he has "stolen" them from Phaedrus (ZMM, p. 33). As the narrator later recounts, Phaedrus reached a similar insight when he was thinking through his defense of Quality. Scientific materialism threatened to impale Quality on the "subjective horn" by saying that if Quality is not scientifically knowable, i.e., composed of matter and energy, it is therefore unreal and unimportant. Phaedrus saw that scientific concepts and laws themselves would be impaled and reduced, too. (See ZMM, pp. 209–211.) If you want to defend scientific materialism, then, you will have to say something about the status of scientific laws and concepts. More generally, you will have to say something about the status of mind. As the narrator puts it: "The problem, the contradiction the scientists are stuck with, is that of *mind*. Mind has no matter or energy but they can't escape its predominance over everything they do" (ZMM, p. 31, italics Pirsig's).

If you're a scientific materialist, you'll have to respond to this challenge, it seems, along one of two lines. The first is to the effect that concepts and minds (including the minds of scientists) are scientifically unreal but nonetheless important. If you say that, however, you seem to take away the point of the distinction between the real and the unreal. If the unreal can be as important as the real or even more important, perhaps the search for knowledge of reality ought to give way to a search for knowledge of the important. (In a way, Phaedrus' philosophical journey moved in the direction of such a shift. As an aspect of Quality, Importance is at the top of the metaphysical hierarchy, and intellectual reality, including scientific knowledge, is subordinate to it. However, Phaedrus did not hesitate to equate Quality with Reality, since he was not held back by scientific materialism.)

The second line of response is to the effect that concepts and minds do, after all, have a kind of matter or energy to them and are therefore real. Notice here that you can't get away with a facile identification of mind with brain. It's clear that you can be aware

of your mind and what's going on in it, your awareness and its contents, without being aware of your brain, its cells, and its functions. Similarly, someone could conceivably study the brain of a living person without knowing what is going on in that person's mind. There is *some* distinction between mind and brain. The matter and energy of the brain are scientifically detectable, but that is not the case with the alleged matter and energy in awareness and ideas. So if you're a scientific materialist, how will you back up your claim? Perhaps you will say that while mind and brain are distinct, mind is *reducible* to brain. Then the question becomes, What do you mean by "reducible"? If you mean that the matter and energy in the brain somehow permeate awareness and ideas, you are back to your unsupported claim. If you mean that mind, though not itself a form of matter, is totally *dependent* upon the brain and its functioning, it sounds like you are ready to admit that material reality isn't the only kind there is. (And, by the way, you won't establish the mind's total dependence simply by pointing out correlations between mental activity and brain activity. A number of logical fallacies—such as "causal oversimplification," "neglect of common cause," and "cause-effect confusion"—are easily committed along this line of reasoning.)

Among the antimaterialists, none is more important in the history of Western thought than Plato (427–347 B.C.). There is something to the view of Whitehead, cited approvingly by Phaedrus, that the rest of Western philosophy is nothing but "footnotes to Plato" (*ZMM*, p. 302), although we can't take this to mean that later thinkers did not take significant and varying journeys of their own. Later thinkers—at least the ones who left behind maps of their journeys—felt compelled to make use of the map left by Plato, if not as a means for getting their bearings on the journey itself, at least as an important reference point for when they got around to describing where they had traveled and where they had arrived. Plato's map became and remains the standard reference point. Phaedrus developed and formulated his philosophy of Quality, for example, with reference to Plato's similar but significantly different philosophy of the Good.

In Plato's view, material reality is a second-class, subordinate type of reality. The first-class type is a "Form" (also called an "Essence" or an "Idea"). If you want to understand what a Form is, first think of some beautiful object or person; then note that that object or person, however beautiful, is not Beauty Itself, not the absolute summit of beauty, not the ultimate standard by which all beautiful things and persons are measured. Tomorrow you might encounter something or someone more beautiful, and the day after you might encounter something or someone more beautiful yet. (For example, at the beginning of *Romeo and Juliet*, Romeo thought he was in love with a beautiful woman, but he soon discovered, when Juliet entered his life, that he hadn't known what love or beauty was.) If your ultimate standard of beauty were some particular object or person, you wouldn't be able to recognize surpassing beauty. The particular object or person would be the unsurpassable measure. Such recognition is not impossible, however, because, more or less faintly or sharply, you retain a notion of Beauty Itself—the "Form" Beauty. (If you are in love, you might be tempted to equate the standard with some particular person. In that case, maybe you ought to vary the example and think about the difference between a particular instance of justice and Justice Itself or between a particular instance of happiness and Happiness Itself—either that or accept the Platonist analysis that the person with whom you are in love is for you an exceptionally strong "reminder" of Beauty Itself.)

Forms lie behind and are the measure of every particular thing or event in the world. They are the measure not only of what we designate by abstract nouns like "justice" and "beauty" but also of what we designate by concrete nouns like "tree" and "horse." At the same time, in Plato's view, there is a marked contrast between the world of Forms and the world of particulars. Forms are nonmaterial, whereas particulars are material. (The exception is the particular human intellect, which thus bridges the two worlds.) Forms are permanent and changeless; particulars are changing. (Your ideas about Forms can change, but not the Forms themselves—hence, it's probably wise to avoid the label "Ideas.") Forms are indestructible; particulars are destructible. (Again, the exception is the human mind.) Forms are knowable intellectually—notably through the "dialectic," a process that moves toward the highest understanding of reality through the interaction of questions and answers or positions and counterpositions; particulars are knowable through the senses. Forms are perfect and most truly real; particulars imperfect and less real—they have a relationship to Forms that is analogous to that between shadows and the things that cast them. (*ZMM*'s explicit discussion of Plato's forms is found on pp. 330, 342–343.)

Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) accepted the reality of the nonmaterial entities that Plato called Forms. However, being more the "motorcycle mechanic" than the "Buddha-seeker" (*ZMM*, p. 331), he couldn't accept his teacher's devaluation of particular things; so he made a crucial move. He located the Forms *within* concrete, particular things. Now instead of two separate worlds, one of Forms and one of particulars, there was one world, a world of particular things.

Particular things, in Aristotle's view, have a certain permanence about them (a permanence that Plato finds only in the world of Forms), even while they are subject to change: A tree changes colors without ceasing to be a tree; a horse grows in size without ceasing to be a horse. And what is the root of this permanence or constant identity? It is the thing's *internal form*, or intelligible structure, a sort of "master pattern" that the intellect can detect when it penetrates beyond the thing's changing sensory qualities. Every particular thing in the universe has such a form, or structure, or pattern (or built-in "program," to use a computer analogy) and thus maintains a basic identity throughout its variations. On the other hand, particular things do change because of their "matter." Reality is thus made up of particular things that are each composed of form and matter. Those particular things are called "substances" (from the Greek, by way of a Latin translation that literally means "that which stands beneath"), because, owing to the internal presence of form, they have a constant identity that "stands beneath" the various changes that the senses detect.

Phaedrus claimed that with Aristotle's doctrine of particular substances, and not before then, the "modern scientific understanding of reality was born"—*ZMM*, p. 343. What did he mean by that? He probably meant something like this: The shift from a world of Forms to a world of *substances that contain forms* meant that you looked *within* things, not beyond them, for their explanation, and it meant that the sensory world was seen not as a distraction but as a gateway to the understanding of reality. This model paved the way for the empirical method of modern science, a method in which the full engagement and cooperation of senses and intellect is crucial.

Both Plato and Aristotle were "realists" in the sense that we have been using that term. Both accepted the reality (in Plato's case, the secondary reality) of material things; neither said that "being real" and "being mental" were synonymous. Plato and Aristotle were also "realists" in another sense, a sense that opposes realism to nominalism. A nominalist says that universal terms like "beauty" or "justice" or "horseness" or "humanness" are just names that we use to group together and talk about a number of particular things—and that those terms don't refer to anything real. Particular beautiful things really exist, but beauty as such does not really exist. Particular human beings really exist, but humanness as such does not exist. As opposed to a nominalist, a realist says that universal terms do refer to real entities. Plato says the terms refer to Forms that exist apart from particulars. Aristotle says the terms refer to forms that are real components within real existing things.

Thus, Plato and Aristotle are realists in two philosophical senses; materialists are realists in the first sense discussed, but not in the second; idealists are realists in the second sense but not in the first.

Are you thoroughly confused now? If not, how would you categorize the views of Phaedrus and the narrator?

ONE OR MANY?

Is reality one or many? If you say that it's basically one, you are a "monist." If you say that it's basically more than one, you are a "pluralist." If as a pluralist you say that reality is basically twofold, you are a "dualist." (Among pluralistic models, dualism alone has acquired a distinct numerical label, because the representatives of dualism have been many in number and strong in influence. Hence, Phaedrus found it somewhat awkward that he had reached a metaphysical position that seemed to invovle *three* basic realities—*ZMM*, p. 214.)

When you ask about reality's oneness or manyness, you might be wondering whether there is one or more than one *source* of all that is. If you answer that there is one and only one source, you are a monist of sorts. Jews, Christians, and Muslims—believing as they do in God the Creator—are all monists in this sense. But this type of monism—a "monism-of-source"—is a rather weak type of monism, since there can be one Source and at the same time a radical difference between that Source and everything else. ("Monism" is used in this weak sense in *ZMM* on p. 214.)

To arrive at a stronger type of monism, ask whether reality is

one in *kind* as well as in source. Is there one and only one basic kind of thing that is both the source and the substance of all that kind of thing that exists? Some of the early Greek cosmological thinkers (see *ZMM*, pp. 336–337) answered yes and hence were monists in a stronger sense. Thales of Miletus (sixth century B.C.), for example, said the One was water; Anaximenes (sixth century B.C.) said it was air. They both were saying that the many things of our experience are simply expressions of the One—different forms of water or air— and not, at bottom, anything different. Notice how much stronger—more One-ful—is their kind of monism than a monism-of-source: A Jew or Christian or Muslim, while granting that everything depends on the One God, isn't likely to grant that God's creatures are, at bottom, nothing different from God. A monism-of-kind is further exemplified by both thoroughgoing materialists and thoroughgoing idealists. The materialist says that everything is simply a variation on the theme of matter/energy; the idealist says that everything is simply a variation on the theme of mind. Both say that all is one in kind.

This stronger sense of "monism" is exemplified in *ZMM* on p. 226. Phaedrus came to see that he had shifted from his original position—a position involving three distinct entities: Quality, mind, and matter—toward an "absolute monism," with Quality being the "source and substance of everything." He thus found himself in the company of the great German philosopher, Georg W. Hegel (1770–1831). Although Phaedrus didn't explicitly note it, he also was in the company of another famous monist, Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza (1632–1677). Spinoza's monism is perhaps worth noting here, because Phaedrus' opponent at the University of Chicago, the chairman of the Committee on Analysis of Ideas and Study of Methods, was a Spinozist (*ZMM*, p. 309)—a touch of irony.

If you accept both a monism-of-kind and a monism-of-source, you still haven't reached the limit of monism. You can ask whether reality is one in *number*. Is there really one and only one thing? Is the common view that there are many distinct and separate things mistaken? Is our experience of manyness somehow illusory? A "monist-of-number" will say yes to all of those questions. There is not simply one source that gives rise to everything else; nor is there simply one kind of reality that is shared by the originating One and everything else. Rather, there is simply no "everything else"; there is only the One. The many in their manyness are an

illusion. They don't really exist in plurality. They are either false mental projections (a sort of cosmic dream or cosmic trick) or else real parts of the One (like the parts of your body), but in neither case do they have a separate reality of their own. All is One; One is all.

Enough said about monism. What about pluralism? For present backpack purposes, it will be enough to note a few things about *dualism*. Like monism, metaphysical dualism can be carved into several forms. For example, as with monism, we can split *source* from *kind* and thereby carve out two distinct dualisms. However, in contrast with monism, a dualism-of-source is "stronger" than a dualism-of-kind. If you believe in a dualism-of-source, you believe that there are two radically different principles or agents that give rise to all that exists; and most probably you also think that the world is a battlefield wherein those two agents and their offspring are in a constant struggle for supremacy. Reality is a struggle of Good against Evil, Light against Darkness, Spirit against Matter. (An example of this sort of dualism is Zoroastrianism, a religious and philosophical tradition that began in ancient Persia. Manichaeism, an offshoot of Zoroastrianism, attempted a synthesis between this sort of dualism and Christianity.)

Which of the two principles will win out? Perhaps you cherish a strong hope as to the outcome—but if you know for certain, then you're not the sort of dualist we're talking about. If you know for certain, it must be because you know that one of the two allegedly ultimate principles is really in charge, in which case only one of the two principles is truly ultimate (and history is just a stage for playing out a prewritten drama).

If you believe in a dualism-of-kind, you hold that there are two eternally distinct kinds of reality. You might hold that the two distinct realities are to be thought of as *separate things*. (For example, along with Plato you might think of Forms and particulars as separate things, or along with René Descartes [1596–1650] you might think of minds and bodies as separate—or at least separable—things.) On the other hand, you might think of the two distinct realities not as separate things but as two *distinct components* within a single thing. (For example, along with Aristotle you might think of form and matter as the coconstituents of a thing, or along with Taoist philosophy—see pp. 103–104—you might think of yin and yang as complementary forces running through every single thing or event.)

In either case, a dualism-of-kind doesn't necessarily imply a battle between the two kinds. Although you find a hint of such a battle in Plato's philosophy, inasmuch as the world of sensory particulars is said to distract you from the task of knowing the Forms, there is talk of the two working together. Sensory knowledge of a particular can be the occasion of your "recollecting" a Form, and in turn the knowledge of a Form (e.g., Justice) can provide the standard for adjusting and improving particulars (e.g., a concrete political situation). When you turn to Aristotle's modification of Plato's philosophy, the hint of a battle is gone, the suggestion of cooperation strengthened. Matter looks to form for structure and purpose; form looks to matter for a context in which to realize structure and purpose. Similarly, in Taoist philosophy, yang and yin are more like dancing partners than opposing boxers; they are meant to produce balance and harmony rather than mutual elimination.

If you like, you can split dualism-of-kind into *egalitarian* and *hierarchical* dualism. In the former case, your two kinds or principles are considered equal—or at least no explicit judgment is made as to the superiority of one over the other. In the latter case, one of the two kinds is considered superior. Plato's dualism of Forms and particulars is an example of hierarchical dualism. Another example is spirit-matter dualism in the context of a monotheistic religion. In that context, spirit is typically regarded as a higher form of reality than matter, since God is thought of as spiritual; on the other hand, matter is not to be thought of as worthless or as the enemy of spirit, since God is thought of as Creator of all, of matter as well as spirit. The hierarchical dualism in such a context remains a dualism-of-kind, not an antagonistic dualism-of-source. (Hence, the Manichaean attempt to blend a dualism-of-source with Christianity could have succeeded only at the expense of Christian monotheism.)

A clear example of egalitarian dualism is not easy to find in Western thought. Aristotle's dualism of form and matter is perhaps less blatantly hierarchical than Plato's dualism, since form and matter are explicitly thought of as complementary; but form is still considered the higher principle. Twentieth-century thinkers such as Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) and Jacques Derrida (1930–) hold that Western dualisms are so many variations on the theme of *presence* and *absence* and that, no matter what the variation, preeminence is always given to the principle representing presence.

Thus form (in contrast to matter) gives something definition and thereby calls it out of the background into the foreground, making it more present; mind (in contrast to body) makes something present in awareness. Are such thinkers right? Are there no exceptions? Maybe there are, but none come to mind.

If you want a clear example of egalitarian dualism, you perhaps need to turn to the East, to the yin-yang philosophy that is found within Taoism. Yin, the "female" principle (space, receptivity, openness—"absence"), and yang, the "male" principle (solidity, assertion, focus—"presence") are thought of as equally important as well as complementary. This equality is perhaps due to the fact that the Tao, the One that gives rise to the two, is not thought of as exclusively yin or exclusively yang but as both or, better, neither—or, perhaps better still, beyond "both" and "neither," since linguistic distinctions come only with the arising of duality. In this connection, you might want to consider the relation between Taoist thought and Phaedrus' philosophy of Quality (see *ZMM*, pp. 226–228 and above, pp. 114–115). Just as Tao is neither yin nor yang, so Quality goes "between the horns" (*ZMM*, p. 213), between subject and object, mind and matter. Just as Tao, if heeded, continually brings about a harmonious interaction of yin and yang, so Quality, if heeded, continually brings about a harmonious interaction of subjectivity and objectivity. An egalitarian duality rooted in Quality or Tao is seen as the antidote to antagonistic or hierarchical dualisms.

A final note before leaving "the one and the many." *ZMM* can easily be read as an antidualist book. In his Chautauqua discussions about "what is best" (*ZMM*, p. 7), the narrator tries to overcome various dualisms that seem to make for unharmonious contemporary living, such as the dualism of a classic, scientific, protechnological mentality and a romantic, aesthetic, antitechnological mentality. The narrator's attempt can be viewed as an extension of Phaedrus' climactic antidualist insight into Quality. A further and final bout with dualism, and the overcoming of "the biggest duality of all" (*ZMM*, p. 363), occurs when the narrator faces and somehow resolves, by one stroke, both the *intrapersonal* conflict betweet Phaedrus and himself and the *interpersonal* conflict between Chris and himself. As you tune in to this antidualist theme in *ZMM*, it may be helpful to keep in mind that dualism is not all of one stripe and that, accordingly, *ZMM*'s call for a nondualistic way of thinking and living is not necessarily a rejection of

all dualities. In this connection, it may be useful to note in advance that dualism, as well as being a position in the Reality compartment—a metaphysical position—is also a position within the Knowledge and Value compartments—an epistemological and axiological position. You may well find that the antidualist theme of *ZMM* is played more loudly and more clearly in those compartments.

CHANGING OR CHANGELESS?

Before you leave the Reality compartment, consider one more metaphysical question: Is reality changing or changeless? Clearly, what is in your *experience* is changing; and that holds both for your experience of the external and your experience of the internal. The book that is in front of you wasn't always in front of you and won't always be in front of you. It came to be there and will cease to be there: That is external change. The thoughts running through your mind right now weren't always there and won't always be there: That is internal change. If you equate reality with your experience, you will say that reality is changing, and perhaps you will wonder how anyone could ever think otherwise.

To begin to think otherwise you have to do one of two things (or both): find an unchanging dimension of experience or stop equating experience with reality. Some of the cosmological thinkers of the ancient Greek world (see *ZMM*, pp. 336–337) apparently took the latter route. They began to draw a distinction between the way things appear in experience and the way they really are, between surface *appearance* and underlying *reality*. On the surface, you might find many different changing and interacting things (such as minerals, plants, and animals), but beneath this world of variety and change lies a single, constant reality (such as water or air).

Why draw such a distinction? Why suppose a constant reality in addition to changing appearances? Perhaps what those early thinkers had in mind was something like this: If you equate reality simply with the changing and changeable things of experience, you might as well equate reality with chaos—but that is unthinkable. The world is a cosmos, an ordered and beautiful whole, not chaos, a disorderly and ugly flux. And you can't have a cosmos without an element of stability, without a constant that complements change.

One early Greek thinker, Heraclitus (540–475 B.C.), seemed to defy this rational need for the stable and constant. In equating reality with fire and in saying things like "All things flow" and "You can't step into the same river twice," he seemed to be saying that all is flux, that there is no such thing as an abiding substance. However, Heraclitus also claimed that there was a *logos*, a rational scheme, according to which the never-ending fluctuations occur. So it seems that Heraclitus too, despite his well-known emphasis on change, or "becoming," supposed something that made for stability.

The celebration of the stable and changeless reached its zenith in the philosophy of Parmenides (sixth–fifth century B.C.). He didn't just add another voice to the chorus that called for a stable complement to the changing aspect of reality; he banished the changing aspect altogether and equated reality with the changeless. How could anyone seriously hold such a view? Isn't change an obvious fact? It's an obvious appearance, Parmenides might say, but not an obvious reality. The truth about reality is reached through reasoning, not through the senses. (If we were presently browsing through the Knowledge compartment rather than the Reality compartment, we would say that Parmenides was a "rationalist" rather than an "empiricist.")

How does reasoning lead to the view that reality is changeless? Here is one way of reconstructing Parmenides' reasoning: What is not, Nonbeing, cannot *be*, because if it were, it would not be *Non*being. Hence, Nonbeing is impossible. But if Nonbeing is impossible, Being, what is, is necessary. (We can't say that there can't be *Nothing* without saying that there has to be *Something*.) Now, since Being is necessary, Being always is. (We can't say *both* that Something simply has to exist *and* that that Something might at some time not exist.) But if Being always is, it can neither come into existence nor pass out of existence. (We can't say that Something always is without also saying that this Something neither starts nor stops.) To say that Being neither comes into existence nor passes out of existence is to say that Being is changeless and, by the same token, that change is unreal. (When we say that Something really changes, we are saying that at least a part of this Something ceases to be or begins to be.)

In yielding to what he took to be the demands of reason, Parmenides made claims that flew in the face of common sense and thus invited ridicule. Even so, he did not lack supporters. His most

famous supporter, Zeno of Elea (495–430 B.C.), countered the ridicule with a series of paradoxes designed to show that change is illusory (see *ZMM*, p. 337) or at least that the idea of change involves logical difficulties. If you would like a sense of what those paradoxes were like, consider what is involved in your putting down this book. If you want to put the book down, you first have to move it *halfway* from where it is now to where you want to put it. You can't move it all the way without moving it through the halfway mark. But to get the book all the way to the halfway mark, you first have to get it halfway to the halfway mark because, again, you can't move it all the way without first moving it half of the way. Similarly, you can't get the book all the way to this quarter mark without first getting it halfway to the quarter mark. And so on indefinitely. Think about it. There are an infinite number of halfway points to traverse. If it takes a unit of time, however infinitesimal, to traverse each point, it will take an infinite number of units of time—hence, infinite time—to traverse them all. Thus, you can never put this book down—even if you don't find it gripping. Changing its location is a metaphysical impossibility. (Parmenidean laughter!)

The Parmenidean claim that change is illusory and totally unreal did not become a mainstay of Western thought. However, thanks to Plato, the changeless that Parmenides equated with reality pure and simple did come to be thought of as the *most real* part of reality. As *ZMM*'s narrator rightly notes, Plato worked out a synthesis that "tried to resolve differences between the Heraclitans and the followers of Parmenides" (*ZMM*, p. 343), a synthesis of the philosophy of the changing and the philosophy of the changeless. What is important to note here is that in that synthesis the changing and the changeless do not fare equally well. The changeless comes out clearly on top. Eternal Forms are deemed the truest reality, the most real, the really real; the changing particulars are deemed a second-class reality, less real than the Forms. Whatever reality those changing entities have, they have because they somehow *participate* in, share in the being of, the Forms. Take away that *participation* and you take away their reality.

Plato sounded a theme loudly and clearly: What is most real is what is most constant. You can hear that theme played in countless variations throughout the centuries of philosophy that came after Plato. For example, you can hear it in Aristotle's claim that reality is composed of particular *substances*, entities that retain a constant self-identity even while they pass through various adventures of superficial change, and you can hear it in the many different substance-philosophies that have arisen since the time of Aristotle (such as Descartes's dualistic philosophy, according to which there are two kinds of substance, "thinking things" and "extended things," and Spinoza's monistic philosophy, according to which there is one and only one substance, God or Nature). All substance philosophies share two beliefs: first, that a constant, self-identical entity somehow underlies whatever change occurs, and, second, that this self-identical entity is the primary reality and any changes are secondary—what is most real is what is most constant.

You don't have to study philosophy to be tuned in to this theme. It's such a catchy melody that you are probably tuned in to it in a number of everyday contexts. To notice it, just ask yourself what you take to be the most real instance of something or the core reality of something. Isn't it always something that lasts? What do you take to be the most real instance of, say, love? If you have ever used the phrase "true love," haven't you used it to refer to a kind of love that isn't shaken by hardship, a love that lasts? What do you take to be the core reality of a particular society? Isn't it some characteristic or set of characteristics that keeps on turning up, century after century, amid the appearance of variation? What do you take to be the core reality of yourself? What is the real you? Whether or not you reach a satisfying answer to this question, when you ask it aren't you looking for a constant, whether it be something manifest or hidden? Whether it be a matter of nature or nurture, the old Platonic theme continues to be heard—what is most real is what is most constant.

Of course, the countertheme—that change is more basic and more real than constancy—has also been sounded and heard throughout the centuries. The followers of Heraclitus have not been completely silenced, even though the influence of Plato's synthesis has muted their contribution to the symphony of Western thought. Moreover, in the twentieth century, the Heraclitan countertheme has increased in volume—thanks to the contributions of both scientists and philosophers.

The main scientific contributors have been the physicists. From the standpoint of twentieth-century physics, reality is basically a field of energy of which the elementary particles are condensations. Moreover, those elementary particles—for example, electrons—are only simplistically thought of as "particles"; com-

plementarily, they are to be thought of as "waves," as vibrating events. Material reality is a field of vibrations, dynamic through and through. The book you are holding, despite its apparent stability, is awhirl with activity. (Despite Zeno's paradoxes, it's a wonder that the book doesn't fly out of your hands!) From the standpoint of contemporary physics, the Parmenideans were right to claim a distinction between appearance and reality but wrong in their claim about where the illusion lies. What is illusory is constancy, not change.

The main philosophical contributors to the Heraclitan countertheme have been Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) and his followers, who are generally called "process thinkers." From the standpoint of process philosophy, the basic and most real realities are neither Platonic Forms nor Aristotelian substances but infinitesimal events on the micro level (termed "actual entities" or "actual occasions"). Such events, which might be thought of as drops of experience, link up to form the macro objects of our experience (things like trees and birds and bees). Despite our tendency to think of those objects as *substances*, as self-contained things (a tendency perhaps rooted in the grammatical structures of certain languages), they are not really substances. Rather, they are societies of *processes* interacting within ever larger societies of processes. Reality is process and nothing but process.

How does *ZMM*'s metaphysics fit in here? What is this philosophy's answer to the question whether reality is basically the constant or the changing, substance or process? Clearly, from the standpoint of Phaedrus and the narrator, what is most basic and most real is Quality. What then is Quality? Is Quality a substance or a process (or neither)? You might see an initial resemblance between Phaedrus' "Quality" and Plato's "Good." The narrator himself says that he would have thought the two identical were it not for certain notes that Phaedrus left behind (*ZMM*, p. 332). However, a key difference between the two is that while Plato's Good is a fixed Form, Phaedrus' Quality is "not a *thing*" but "an event," a causal event that produces subjects and objects (*ZMM*, p. 215, italics Pirsig's). Score one for process. Moreover, according to the narrator's train analogy (*ZMM*, pp. 254–255), Romantic Quality is not any "part" of the train—neither the engine, nor the boxcars, nor any of the train's contents—but rather the cutting edge of the *moving* train, of experience itself. Score two for process. On the other hand, Phaedrus responded to the question

"Why does everybody see Quality differently?" by noting that people carry around with them different sets of analogues based on different sets of experiences: "People differ about Quality, not because Quality is different, but because people are different in terms of experience" (*ZMM*, p. 224). This response suggests that Quality has a sort of fixed identity. (If Phaedrus were focusing on the process character of Quality, he might have simply said that Quality *is* different at every moment.) Score one for substance. Moreover, to return to the train analogy, while Romantic Quality is identified with the train's leading edge, Quality itself is identified with the "track" (*ZMM*, p. 254). Now the track is clearly meant to guide the train's motion (score another for process), but the track itself is something already there, a fixed entity (score one for substance).

Both the train analogy and the scorecard suggest that *ZMM* offers the beginnings of a new metaphysical synthesis, one with an emphasis opposed to that of Plato. Perhaps you will find in this inchoate synthesis a train of thought worth developing. If so, you might find fuel for the task by doing some reading in the area of process philosophy. In particular, you might find it thought-provoking to draw out some comparisons and contrasts between what *ZMM* says about Quality and what certain process thinkers (notably Charles Hartshorne and Alfred North Whitehead) say about God.

KNOWLEDGE

It is time to turn our attention from the Reality compartment to the Knowledge compartment, the compartment of philosophy that has traditionally been called epistemology (from the Greek word *episteme*, meaning "knowledge"—hence, "study of knowledge"). In doing so, we will temporarily put metaphysics in the background; but don't be surprised if you find your focus shifting back and forth between Reality and Knowledge. When you are exploring the "high country of the mind" (*ZMM*, p. 111), the highest peaks and widest panorama of human intellectual aspiration and achievement, it's quite natural to find your eyes jumping between a metaphysical gaze and an epistemological gaze. You may even reach a point where the two gazes seem to blend into one.

Here are some typical epistemological questions: What does knowledge involve? What are you doing when you are knowing? Is human knowing primarily a matter of sense experience? of some sort of intellectual intuition or insight? of rational activities or rational categories? of some sort of conscious or subconscious choice? Is human knowing a structured set of activities rather than a single activity? Whatever activities are involved in knowledge, what guarantees the proper performance of those activities? How is such performance recognized? Supposing proper performance of the right activities, what is reached thereby? Does human knowledge reach or fall short of reality? Does human knowledge *disclose* or *create* reality? What are the limits of human knowledge? Are the limits of human knowledge the same as the limits of reality?

For present backpack purposes, you can confine your attention to two major questions: What are you doing when you are knowing? and What are you reaching when you are doing it? When you ask the first question, you are wondering not about the content of knowledge but about the activity of knowing. You are wondering whether there is a particular activity or set of activities whose presence guarantees the presence of knowledge or whose absence indicates the absence of knowledge. When you ask the second question, you are wondering about the status of the content you reach through the activity. You are wondering, for example, whether what you reach is reality in the fullest sense, some less than fully genuine version of reality, or not reality at all.

EXPERIENCE, REASON, OR SOMETHING ELSE?

What are you doing when you are knowing? If you say that what you are primarily doing is experiencing, you can be labeled an "empiricist." If you say that what you are primarily doing is using reason in one way or another, you can be labeled a "rationalist." If you say that what you are primarily doing is willing or choosing or selecting, consciously or subconsciously, you can be labeled a "voluntarist." If you say that you are primarily feeling, you are an "emotivist." If you say that you are primarily intuiting, you are an "intuitionist." The list could go on.

You can take the analytic knife and carve up empiricism into "broad empiricism" and "narrow empiricism." If you are a "broad empiricist," you insist with every other empiricist that knowledge

be grounded in experience, but you do not insist that the pertinent experience be the sort of data that are delivered by the five senses. You do not equate "experience" with "awareness of sensory objects." Perhaps you will say—with John Locke (1632–1704)—that experience includes not only sensory data but also awareness of conscious activities, such as the activities of sensing, imagining, and understanding. For example, as you read this, you are not only experiencing black marks against a white background (a sensory datum); you are also experiencing your act of *seeing* those marks. Your act of seeing is not a sensory datum alongside the sensory datum of the black-on-white marks, but it is a datum of experience and a potential building block of knowledge. On the other hand, if you are a "narrow empiricist," you tend to think of experience only in terms of sensory data. Your basic contention is that we gather knowledge—at least *factual* knowledge—by gathering and working with the reports of our senses. Hence, if presented with a factual claim, as a narrow empiricist you are quick to ask about the sensory data that are available to support the claim. If no indication of pertinent sensory data is forthcoming, as a narrow empiricist you are quick to dismiss the claim.

If you're an empiricist, you don't deny that reason has a role to play in knowledge. You simply see that role as secondary. You are likely to point out, again with Locke, that when we enter the world, our minds are like blank tablets. As we fill those tablets with more and more sensory data, we begin to make various comparisons and contrasts and to notice spatial or temporal conjunctions among data. On the basis of those comparisons, contrasts, and conjunctions, we form various concepts and principles that we can use in connection with further sensory data to increase our factual knowledge. From an empiricist perspective, it is important to note that our concepts and principles (which are generally associated with "reason") would not be in our minds at all were it not for the stimulus of sense experience. Sense experience is the heart and soul of knowledge.

If you are a thoroughgoing narrow empiricist like David Hume (1711–1776), you may go so far as to say that factual knowledge in the strictest sense is only that which is verified within sense experience. In that case, you will regard various rational concepts and principles that are *not* verified within sense experience as *not* yielding genuine knowledge (however much they might be practically useful). Take, for example, the concept of "substance," that of a

constant, self-identical entity that underlies the various changes and fluctuations that the senses detect. Since in your sense experience you find no such constant entity but only a series of fluctuating impressions, you have to say—from a radical empiricist perspective—that no substances are *known* to exist.

At this point you might be tempted to say that while empiricism, at least in its narrowest form, may be a nice place to visit, you can't live there. You have to live as if there were substances, stable entities. You have to live as if the motorcycle you're riding is a constant thing and not just a series of impressions. So you might opt for a less radical version of empiricism, or you might opt for one or another epistemological opponent of empiricism. (One such opponent would be the version of rationalism provided by Kant, a version according to which the substantiality of the motorcycle is guaranteed by a rational category, "substance," without which no knowledge of motorcycles or anything else could possibly occur—see *ZMM*, pp. 114–119.)

If you are an empiricist, you don't necessarily deny that reason can deliver truths of its own, truths that are known through rational calculation or a rational manipulation of symbols rather than through attention to experiential data; but you are quick to point out that such "truths of reason" (also called "a priori truths" or "necessary truths") are not factual and, hence, bring us no news about the world. For example, mathematical truths—such as the truth that the angles of a triangle add up to 180 degrees—are truths of reason. They tell us about the relations among certain symbols but they don't tell us if those symbols have any referent in the "real" world, much less where the referent can be found. Knowing the just-stated truth about triangles, we don't know for a fact that triangular objects exist or where we might find one. For all we know, there might not be a single triangular object in the whole universe—and yet it would still be rationally evident that "a triangle's angles add up to 180 degrees."

The most important kind of truth, from an empiricist perspective, is factual truth, empirical truth. Truths of reason are sterile unless and until they find application in the world of facts, a world that is known primarily through experience. Besides, the empiricist argues, even the truths of reason depend upon the formation of concepts and symbols. We can't rationally "see" that certain concepts necessarily go together (such as "triangle" and "180 degrees") if we don't have the concepts to begin with. And where do

we get the concepts, if not from various conjunctions, comparisons, and contrasts that present themselves in sense experience?

A rationalist disagrees with the empiricist on several counts. A rationalist, broadly defined, is anyone who claims that the central and most important contribution to human knowledge comes from a human being's "higher faculties," from reason rather than from sense experience. More specifically, the rationalist claims, against the empiricist, that *concepts*—which are crucial to *all* human knowledge, both factual and a priori—are not simply copies or combinations or extensions of sense experience. Concepts are "things of reason."

In what way are concepts "things of reason"? The answer depends upon your version of rationalism. If you are a Platonic rationalist, you will say that your concepts are the result of your "recollection" of the Forms. Sensory experience might occasion the recollection, but the recollection itself is not a remembrance of a sensory experience but a remembrance of an intellectual vision that occurred when your mind was not trapped in a body and immersed in a world of sensory particulars. The once-upon-a-time vision of Forms remains imbedded in your consciousness, and the task of human knowledge is to raise those imbedded Forms from dimness to clarity, a task accomplished not by sense experience but by the dialectic, a process in which answers to questions are challenged by further questions and positions are pitted against counterpositions.

If you are a Kantian rationalist, you will say that the concepts involved in knowledge—at least the major ones—are "categories" of the mind, structures or molds through which you mentally lay hold of sensory objects. You don't derive these concepts *from* sensory data. Rather, you bring them *to* sensory data in order to "make sense" of the data. (Think here of the a priori category of "substance" without which we couldn't make sense of the varying patterns of sense data that we experience on the motorcycle— *ZMM*, pp. 117–119.) Paradoxically, without such rational— nonempirical—categories, empirical knowledge would not occur, for empirical *knowledge* involves making sense of data and not just collecting them.

Both Platonic rationalists and Kantian rationalists may be said to subscribe to some version of "innate ideas," insofar as both say that we do not simply derive concepts from sense experience and that at least certain concepts are part of our natural heritage as

human beings. When the battle in Western philosophy between the empiricists and the rationalists was at its height in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the rallying cries of the two camps were "blank tablet" and "innate ideas." Rationalism tends to go hand in hand with a belief in innate ideas, just as empiricism tends to go with the belief that the mind begins like a *tabula rasa*, or blank tablet.

As you might suspect, there are epistemological positions that seem to fall between "rationalism" and "empiricism." Kant's position might be regarded as an attempt at a middle way, insofar as Kant holds that human knowledge involves a *synthesis* of rational categories and sensory experience. However, Kant's position is much more clearly rationalist than empiricist, since he does not accept the blank-tablet notion and he does accept a version of innate ideas. Perhaps a genuine example of a middle position is that of Aristotle. Aristotle holds that we develop human knowledge by studying the concrete, particular things that can be observed with our senses. He does not depreciate the sensory world or the role played by our senses. If you think of Aristotle in *contrast* to Plato, you may well think of him as an out-and-out empiricist. On the other hand, Aristotle holds that when you study particular things, the key moment—as far as growth in knowledge is concerned—is when you grasp a thing's internal form. The form of a thing is not a piece of sensory data but an intelligible dimension of the thing. You grasp it not by some particular activity of one or more senses but by an act of understanding, an intellectual act, an insight. Hence, if you think of Aristotle in terms of what he has in *common* with Plato—an acceptance of form as a nonsensory reality—you will not regard Aristotle as an empiricist. You won't say that he is a rationalist, either, since he clearly emphasizes experience rather than some alleged a priori element in knowledge. Perhaps you will call him an "intellectualist," since he locates the heart of knowledge in an intellectual (nonsensory) act.

An epistemological "voluntarist" locates the heart of knowledge neither in the senses nor in reason but in the will, in the human capacity to tend toward or intend something and to express that intention through choices. What is it that you are willing or intending when you are in the process of coming to know something? Different versions of "voluntarism" will involve different answers to that question. Ironically, the one unacceptable answer from a voluntarist perspective—an answer that puts you outside

the voluntarist camp rather than within it—is "truth." If you say that the will to truth is a key element in the pursuit and attainment of knowledge, you've not said anything that an empiricist or a rationalist or an intellectualist has to deny. Empiricists, rationalists, and intellectualists can all say that the human knower is gripped by the will to truth and hence motivated to direct attention to sensory observations or to the rational manipulation of symbols or to the intellectual penetration of data. The voluntarist goes beyond this—or beneath it—and claims that a will to something else is the primary element, the chief motivator and guide, in the attainment of "knowledge."

A classic voluntarist epistemology is that of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). Nietzsche held that the "will to power" is at the heart of knowledge. In seeking and attaining knowledge, the knower is seeking and attaining ways of looking at things and talking about things that increase the knower's capacities of self-expansion, full functioning, and practical control. (By "power" Nietzsche meant primarily such capacities rather than the domination by one individual or group of another individual or group—though, of course, the drive to increase such capacities can frequently express itself in a drive toward domination.) As a knower, you might claim that your pursuit of knowledge is a detached pursuit of truth for truth's sake, but in fact, Nietzsche would say, your motivation is less pure than you think it is. The will to power both motivates your search and guides your selection of "facts" and interpretations along the way. If you object that you are conscious of a will to truth but not conscious of a will to power, Nietzsche can respond (as, more generally, any voluntarist tends to respond) that the primary motive for knowing needn't be something of which you are fully conscious—the will can work subtly and in subconscious ways. If you further object that some people claim to know things that make them feel humble, even despicable, rather than proud and powerful, Nietzsche can respond that even that sort of knowledge can mask a secret will to power. Perhaps these humble knowers believe that their acceptance of a humbling self-picture or world picture will eventually bring them a reward and a position of prominence. Perhaps, too, they secretly bear resentment toward the world's "winners" and they take self-aggrandizing glee—secretly or not so secretly—in the belief that such winners will eventually be brought low. (Nietzsche did in fact interpret Christianity along these lines.)

A voluntarist says, in sum, that you "see" and "know" what you *want* to. Why do you want to see and know whatever it is that you do see and know? Maybe you are driven, as Nietzsche says, by a will to power. Maybe you are driven by some other will: a will to security or a will to pleasure or a will to beauty or a will to Quality. You can imagine any number of different voluntarist epistemologies centering on different possible objectives of the will. What they all have in common is the belief that a will to something other than "pure" truth is the primary factor within human knowing.

In pointing out the central role of will within knowledge, a voluntarist isn't necessarily making a cynical or damning observation. A voluntarist isn't necessarily saying, "You *can* and *ought* to be engaged in a pure, disinterested, detached pursuit of truth, but instead, driven by a will to something else, you follow a path of self-interest and self-deception." Rather, a voluntarist might be saying, "You *can't* be driven simply by a pure will to truth" or "You *shouldn't* be driven simply by a pure will to truth" or both.

Why *can't* you be driven by a pure will to truth? A voluntarist might say that the search for truth is always grounded in a variety of human concerns and purposes. Take away those concerns and purposes and you take away the search. Moreover, once the search is started, if you insist on being guided by nothing other than a pure will to truth, the search may never reach closure. As long as you keep on thinking—and as a pure truth-seeker you will want to keep on thinking—new candidates for the sought-for truth will continue to present themselves. If you banish every concern except a concern for truth, what will keep you from expanding the field of candidates indefinitely? What will enable you to narrow the field? If in fact you do narrow the field, if you do make judgments, isn't it because more than a pure desire for truth is operating within you?

At this point, you might consider how Phaedrus' laboratory experience contributed to his break with mainstream rational thought and launched him on his philosophical journey "in pursuit of the ghost of rationality itself" (*ZMM*, p. 97). He discovered in the lab that hypotheses tended to increase rather than decrease as they were being tested. He thus came to see that scientific method, instead of moving us *toward* a settling of truth claims, moves us *away* "from single absolute truths to multiple, indeterminate, relative ones" and thereby contributes to rather than eliminates "so-

cial chaos" (*ZMM*, p. 101). What was the problem with scientific method? Phaedrus would later see, though he didn't quite put it this way, that in the pursuit of knowledge, scientific or nonscientific, a will to Quality is needed to complement and guide the will to truth. A detached will-to-truth, devoid of Quality awareness, is incapable of getting where it wants to go (unless with Nietzsche you suppose that such a will is really a disguised form of a death wish—in which case, the will to truth may well get its wish).

The narrator eventually discovered that Phaedrus' line of thought about science converged with the line of thought of an eminent scientist, mathematician, and philosopher, Jules Henri Poincaré (1854–1912) (see *ZMM*, pp. 232–242). Poincaré came to see that the scientific crisis of his era, a crisis regarding the foundations of the sciences, was rooted in a crisis regarding mathematical truth. The discovery of new geometries to rival that of Euclid raised a question about the nature of mathematical truth. Poincaré came to the conclusion that mathematical truth was neither *a priori*, a fixed part of human consciousness, nor *empirical*, subject to continual revision on the basis of experience, but *conventional*, a matter of definitions agreed upon to suit human convenience. Poincaré extended this idea of "conventionalism" to the facts and hypotheses of science. The question then became, How are the key facts and hypotheses selected? Poincaré's answer was that the subliminal self, on the basis of a felt *harmony* or order, preselects what comes to consciousness. Thus Poincaré, like Phaedrus, saw that when reason pursues knowledge, it requires an element of will other than simply a will to truth: It requires an orientation toward a harmony comparable to Phaedrus' Quality so it can select information on the basis of that orientation. Poincaré's "conventionalism" is another example of a voluntarist epistemology.

In addition to saying that you *can't* carry out the pursuit of truth simply on the basis of a detached and disinterested will-to-truth, a voluntarist might be saying that you *shouldn't* attempt to do so. The attempt is misguided and inhuman. The search for knowledge should be carried out within the context of human values, and knowledge itself should be seen as appropriately, as well as necessarily, value-laden. This insistence is a central and recurrent theme of *ZMM*. The "genetic defect" at the heart of Western rationality, a defect that produces a "structure of reason" that is "emotionally hollow, esthetically meaningless and spiritually empty" (*ZMM*, p. 102) resides in the divorce of reason from value. That divorce,

initiated in the ancient Greek world (on Phaedrus' reading) by the likes of Plato and Aristotle (see *ZMM*, pp. 342–345) and finalized in the modern scientific era, must be overcome. "The dictum that Science and its offspring, technology, are 'value free,' that is, 'quality free,' has got to go" (*ZMM*, p. 231). What is needed is an "expansion of reason" (*ZMM*, p. 150) in which the will's orientation to Quality is given a central place—a replacement of a narrowly rationalistic or empiricistic theory of knowledge with a more voluntaristic one.

An American philosopher who called for something similar was William James (1842–1910). In James's voluntaristic philosophy, Pragmatism, truth is thought of as belief that works, belief that leads to fruitful and satisfying consequences. If you want to know whether a particular belief or hypothesis that you are entertaining is true, be attentive to the consequences of the belief. If the consequences—in attitudes, in actions, and in the products of attitudes and actions—are good, if they are somehow satisfying, then you can say that the proposed belief is true; and if the consequences are not satisfying, you can say that the proposed belief is false. If later you find that a fruitful belief has become a fruitless or destructive one or, vice versa, a fruitless or destructive belief has become a fruitful one, you can say that the truth has changed. The idea that truth changes needn't be a source of intellectual embarrassment. Truth isn't to be thought of as some sort of eternal quality that certain beliefs have and others don't; it is to be thought of as something that *happens* (or fails to happen) to a belief as the consequences of the belief get played out. Truth is a *process*.

If you look closely from James's perspective, you will see a will (other than the will to truth) at work within human knowing, a will to good. The will to truth is subordinate to the will to good. Truth is a species of good, the good in the area of belief, that which it is good to believe. Hence, you should not think of the pursuit of truth as a detached, value-free exercise but as an intellectual effort directed and permeated by value concerns. You can perhaps imagine Phaedrus reading James and exclaiming, "Yes! Score one for the Sophists—the Platonic victory is not complete!" In Phaedrus' view, Plato's attempt to form a synthesis of truth (the special concern of the early cosmological thinkers) and good (the special concern of the Sophists) resulted in an "encapsulation" of good under truth. The Good became a Form, a dialectically attainable object of thought. Granted, it was the *highest* Form—but it was

still a Form, a fixed, unchangeable Idea rather than what the Sophists made it out to be, ever-changing reality itself (see *ZMM*, pp. 342–343). From Phaedrus' viewpoint, James's epistemology might be understood as a reversal of Plato's synthesis and a return to the Sophists' perspective.

Before we move on from the first epistemological question (What are you doing when you are knowing?), I'd like to call your attention to two more positions that seem to have special relevance to *ZMM*'s epistemology, "emotivism" and "intuitionism." In general, an emotivist is anyone who stresses the role of human feelings in any or all areas of human endeavor. For present purposes, it is important to take out the analytic knife and slice emotivism into "noncognitive emotivism" and "cognitive emotivism." A noncognitive emotivist contrasts feeling with knowing—where feeling has a central role to play, where knowledge, if present at all, is banished to the periphery. A cognitive emotivist, on the other hand, sees feeling as a potential medium of knowledge, at least in certain areas.

These two contrasting emotivist positions are both exemplified in twentieth-century ethical thought. Ethical thought (which will be looked at more closely in the Value compartment) seeks to understand the meaning and the grounds of beliefs or judgments about the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness of human actions. When we apply terms like "right" or "wrong" or "good" or "bad" to human actions, what do we mean by such terms? If we say, for example, that killing an innocent human being is morally wrong or that sharing with the needy is morally good, what do we mean by such statements? How do we know that our statements are correct? A noncognitive emotivist—for example, the British philosopher A. J. Ayer (1910–   )—might say that such statements simply express our feelings or attitudes toward certain actions, without expressing any knowledge about the actions. Hence, it would be just as improper to say that our statements are true or false as it would be to say that a crowd's cheers for its baseball team are truths or falsehoods. In effect, we are simply saying, "Boo, killing! Hurray, sharing!" On the other hand, a cognitive emotivist—for example, the German philosopher Max Scheler (1874–1928)—might say that your claims about killing and sharing are grounded in objective values that are knowable through human feeling rather than through sensing or reasoning. Your claims express both feeling and the value reality that feeling discloses.

press this disclosure through feeling.) Feelings are not just blind forces; they are windows to knowledge.

If you are an intuitionist, you hold that you can know certain things by an act of direct, nonsensory "seeing," or intuition. (The word "intuition" itself is derived from a Latin word, *intueri*, that means literally "to look at" or "to gaze within.") You don't necessarily deny the reality or importance of knowledge gained through sense experience or reasoning or some combination of sensing and reasoning, and you don't necessarily deny that some things known intuitively might also be known through empirical-rational means. You do, however, deny that all knowledge is reducible to empirical and rational activity; and most probably you hold that some very important things are only knowable through intuition. For example, you might hold that value is only knowable by intuition. You don't experience it with your senses, nor do you infer it by a rational argument. You know it intuitively or not at all. You might say, with Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), that you intuit the *oughtness* that is attached to doing or not doing certain things, like not killing the innocent; or you might say, with G. E. Moore (1873–1958), that you intuit the *goodness* of certain actions, like sharing with the needy. In either case, you will be claiming that your nonsensory intuitive act directly apprehends its proper object in much the same way that an act of seeing directly apprehends color.

At this point, you may, quite rightly, detect a family resemblance between intuitionism and the version of cognitive emotivism we have just discussed. Both claim a type of direct knowing that is not reducible to observation or inference. Both would be comfortable with the dictum of Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) that "the heart has its reasons that Reason doesn't know at all." The distinction between the two positions seems to turn on the "felt" (or "intuited") propriety of using the language of feeling or a language that connotes a kind of intuitive seeing. You could, of course, say that you *both* feel and intuit value.

Two things that intuitionists frequently say about intuition are worth singling out here, because they have special relevance to *ZMM*'s epistemological insights. One is that intuition is a sort of "inside" knowledge, a knowledge had by a sort of sympathetic entry into the thing known rather than by an external examination;

a kind of knowledge by identity rather than by confrontation. This is the idea of intuition that you can find in the writings of Henri Bergson (1859–1941), who described intuition with phrases like "intellectual sympathy." It is also the idea of intuition that young Phaedrus encountered in the writings of Albert Einstein, who said that the universal laws of the cosmos could only be reached by "intuition, resting on sympathetic understanding of experience" (quoted in *ZMM*, p. 99). That idea would be carried forward in the narrator's reflections (undoubtedly inspired by, if not inherited from, Phaedrus) about the relation of Quality to *caring* (*ZMM*, pp. 25, 247). Just as for Einstein the intuition of cosmic laws is rooted in a sympathetic understanding of experience, so for the narrator the intuition of Quality is rooted in caring about what one is seeing and doing. But for the narrator the flow goes both ways. Caring—which, you might care to note, involves both willing and feeling—is reciprocally related to Quality. The more you care in your knowing and doing, the more you see (or intuit) Quality. The more you intuit Quality, the more you care. "A person who sees Quality and feels it as he works is a person who cares. A person who cares about what he sees and does is a person who's bound to have some characteristics of Quality" (*ZMM*, p. 247).

The second frequently made and presently pertinent statement is that intuition is *holistic*. When you intuit, you see wholes in their wholeness. In contrast, when you are engaged in an *analytic* mode of thought, you seek to know things by breaking them down into parts and subparts (or, in the narrator's terms, concepts and subconcepts—*ZMM*, p. 86). The rational, analytic mode of thinking, exemplified in *ZMM*'s breakdown of a motorcycle (pp. 63–67), belongs to the "classic" mentality, whereas the holistic, intuitive mode belongs to the "romantic" mentality. In terms of *ZMM*'s landscape analogy (pp. 69–70), rational analysis is what you are doing when you are sorting the handful of sand into various piles on the basis of various criteria; intuition is what you are exercising when you grasp the entire handful of sand as a whole. As the analogy suggests, one and the same object can furnish the material for both rational analysis and intuition. While intuition might have its own proper objects (e.g., as some intuitionists suggest, value), it might also share objects with other modes of thought. You can analyze the motorcycle in terms of its parts and functions; additionally or alternatively, you can intuitively grasp

the cycle as the "right thing" for you, a vehicle that suits your style. In the latter case, your intuition is still a nonsensory act of knowing, even though the motorcycle is a sensory object—the cycle doesn't carry a visible label that says "right thing."

What are you doing when you are knowing? You have been considering various answers to that question, answers centering on distinct cognitional activities and issuing in distinct epistemological positions. Suppose that you take away the "ism" from those distinct positions and consider the distinct activities that have just been called to your attention. What do you see? Perhaps you see the empiricist's *sense experience,* the intellectualist's *understanding* of the forms of things, the rationalist's *reasoning* with categories in logical patterns, the voluntarist's *willing* of what is considered valuable, the cognitive emotivist's *feeling* of values, and the intuitionist's *intuition* of unanalyzed (though not necessarily unanalyzable) meanings and values.

Now look a little more closely. Do you perhaps see those six activities conveniently arranging themselves into two distinct epistemological trinities? Do you see emerging a "classic" epistemological trinity of *sense experience, understanding,* and *reasoning*? Can you imagine an implementation of scientific method that does not involve all three of those activities? Do you also see emerging a "romantic" epistemological trinity of *feeling, intuition,* and *will*? Can you imagine a "groovy" approach to life from which any of those is absent? It is perhaps not difficult to see the classic trinity as a *structure,* a set in which each element plays its proper role. It is quite a bit more difficult to see the romantic trinity as a structure—and maybe that's fitting.

You don't find a fully developed epistemology in *ZMM,* but you do find epistemological ideas that seem to be awaiting and even crying out for development—for example, the idea that there is a preconscious moment in knowing, a moment of Quality awareness or Quality intuition, which ought to be taken very seriously (*ZMM,* pp. 221–222). This is not the place to attempt a full development of the sort of epistemology that *ZMM* implies. It is, however, the place to note that an epistemology true to the spirit of *ZMM* would be an *inclusive* epistemology, one that overcomes the "noncoalescence between reason and feeling" that makes technology come across as ugly (*ZMM,* p. 149), one that bridges the classic-romantic split by somehow interweaving the classic and romantic epistemological trinities.

The first epistemological question, the question that we have been asking, focuses on the *activity* of knowing. The second epistemological question focuses on the *content* that is reached through that activity. This second question can be put in several ways: What is the status of the content of knowing? What are you knowing when you are doing what knowing requires? What do you reach when you genuinely know something?

When you know, does your knowing attain an object that is somehow independent of the mind with which you come to know it? If your answer is yes, you can be called an epistemological realist. If your answer is no, you can be called an epistemological idealist. As an epistemological idealist, you hold that what you know is always an object *within* your mind rather than an object *beyond* your mind, a mental reality rather than an extramental reality.

Earlier, in the Reality compartment, you had a look at *metaphysical* realism and idealism. Now you are having a look at *epistemological* realism and idealism. Interestingly or frustratingly (depending on how your mind works), the metaphysical and epistemological positions can be found in various combinations. You can be both a metaphysical realist and an epistemological realist. In that case, you hold that there is a reality that exists outside of mind or independently of consciousness (metaphysical realism), and you also hold that through your knowing activity you can actually reach such reality (epistemological realism). The motorcycle is a nonmental thing, and you can know it as it is. A second possibility is that you are a metaphysical realist and an epistemological idealist. In that case, you hold that there is an extramental reality (metaphysical realism) but that your knowledge takes you no further than a mental version of it, a version shaped by the structures and activities of your knowing mind (epistemological idealism). This was, more or less, the position of Immanuel Kant, who held that there was an extramental reality, a "thing-in-itself," a "noumenon," but that human knowledge is confined to the "thing-for-us," the "phenomenon"—an object of knowledge that has been shaped by the mind. The motorcycle is a nonmental thing, but you can only know a mind-shaped image of it. A third possibility is that you are a metaphysical idealist and an epistemological idealist. In that case, you hold that all reality is mental and that your

knowledge is confined to your mind's version of it. The motorcycle is always a mental thing, a projection of some consciousness or other, and you know it in the version that suits the consciousness that is yours. The fourth and final possibility is that you are a metaphysical idealist and an epistemological realist. In that case you hold that reality is essentially mind-dependent, but the Mind on which it depends is not the human mind, and the human mind in its knowing activity, can go beyond itself and reach the product of that Mind. The motorcycle *ultimately* derives its existence from the knowing activity of the Big Mind, but you can know it as it is with your little mind—which is also ultimately a product of the Big Mind. Certain "objective idealists" who followed Kant as well as certain "transcendental realists" (see above, p. 142) seem to hold something like this fourth position. (You're probably even more confused now. But be patient. . . .)

While these distinctions are rattling around in your mind, you might find it worthwhile to inspect yet another distinction, the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. It merits attention here because the distinction frequently arises in talk about knowledge (as well as in talk about reality), notably in lively discussions and debates among true believers in the just delineated four metaphysical-epistemological positions. More specifically, the terms merit attention because they figure prominently in *ZMM*'s philosophical talk. Phaedrus reached the climax of his metaphysical thinking in the context of facing a dilemma regarding the subjectivity or objectivity of Quality. His response to that dilemma provided the narrator with the basic tools for carrying out the philosophical task of *ZMM*, the overcoming of a certain kind of subject-object dualism and its spillover into other dualisms. If you want to understand *ZMM*'s philosophical thrust, sooner or later we have to pay some attention to the meaning of subject-object talk.

Basically, a subject is a knowing mind or a center of consciousness and an object is that which the mind knows or that which is present to consciousness. The terms "subject" and "object" are correlative: A subject is called a "subject" insofar as it is aware of an object; an object is called an "object" insofar as it stands, or at least *can* stand, in a certain relation to a subject. Take away all subjects and you take away all objects. Take away all objects and you take away all subjects. (Certain schools of Hindu thought would seemingly disagree with this and say that it is possible to reach a certain state of transcendental awareness in which all objects are absent and only the Pure Subject, Atman, remains. However, the present point about the correlativity of subject and object is a point about the basic meanings of words rather than about the ultimate nature of reality. If the Hindus are right about Atman, then Atman is a "Subject" only in a sense that goes beyond the basic meaning of "subject." Of course if you're in that state, you don't give a hoot about such terminological distinctions; you don't talk about it as a subject state—you don't talk about it at all.)

To see how subject-object talk becomes controversial, consider a readily available context—the context furnished by this book you are reading. As you read, you are aware of something. Given the distinction that has just been made, you can say that you are a subject and that what you are aware of as you read is an object. So far, there is not likely to be any disagreement among the proponents of various metaphysical and epistemological positions. Suppose you are asked what the object is. How do you answer? Suppose you answer, "Written words," and are asked, in turn, whether those words are simply visual entities, objects of sight, or also something else. You answer that the words are signs of meanings and that you are aware of those meanings through your mind. The object of your reading activity is meaning as well as visible words. (The throng of philosophical eavesdroppers is getting a bit restless—but there is no voiced disagreement yet.) Now you are asked, point-blank, whether you are reaching anything "real" when you read. (The eavesdroppers are at the edge of their seats.) You answer that the meanings themselves are not anything real, since they are merely mental, but that through those meanings you are coming to know certain realities, and that those realities are the ultimate objects that you are contacting through your reading. (Now the disagreements begin. By your response, you please the metaphysical and epistemological realists as well as the rationalists. But you alienate the metaphysical idealists, who are miffed about your exclusion of the mental from the real, the epistemological idealists, who are nonplussed about your supposition that mental contents reveal extramental realities, and the empiricists, who are baffled about your claim to know reality through a grasp of meanings rather than through sensory perceptions.)

Notice that, in this hypothetical scenario, the word "object" itself arouses no controversy. No one finds fault with the bare claim that there are objects in your awareness. The controversy

begins when you start to say certain things about the nature and status of those objects. Similarly, no one finds fault with the bare claim that you are a conscious subject. Controversy only arises when you begin to describe your activity as a reading subject.

Suppose, to vary the scenario slightly, you say that, when you read, you create meanings rather than discover them and that really there is no meaning in the text until you create it. If you say that, you please the voluntarist but disturb the rationalist. Perhaps the rationalist is disturbed to the point of berating you for being so subjective. Now notice what has happened. Subject-object talk has taken a strange semantic turn. It is perfectly okay to be a "subject"; but it's bad to be "subjective." Take a more or less neutral word and add a seemingly neutral suffix, and what do you get? A negatively charged word. How does that happen? Why is it an accusation to call someone subjective whereas it is simply descriptive to say that someone is a subject? Why is it bad for people to treat people like objects but good for people to be objective? How is it that "subject" and "object" are complementary, each calling for the other, whereas "subjectivity" and "objectivity" are commonly thought of as opposed, so that where one increases the other decreases?

The short and generic answer to all of these questions is that the history of language is complex and not revealed in dictionary listings of words and their derivatives. The longer and more specific answers would no doubt show how various thoughts about reality, knowledge, and value got packed into certain words at certain times through the influence of the dominant voices (individual or collective) of those times.

Of course, there can be different dominant voices at different times, and so words can carry layers of meanings. If we were to examine the words "subjective" and "objective" closely, we would probably find such layers of meaning, some more prominent than others; and each layer would contain a belief about reality, a belief about knowledge, and a value judgment all rolled into one and packed tightly into the word.

Consider, for example, the pejorative use of the word "subjective." When we use that word in a pejorative manner, we are not saying that it's bad for a subject to be a subject, a center of consciousness. We are not saying that a subject should become a more or less inert and opaque object or that the subject should become less a subject by deadening awareness. Rather, we are obliquely criticizing the *kind* of conscious activity that the subject is engaged in. Certain kinds of activity are called for since they lead to the right kind of relation to the object, and certain other kinds of activity ought not be performed since they lead to the wrong kind of relation. When the wrong kind of activity is present or the right kind of activity is absent, the word "subjective" is used pejoratively. What kind of activity is wrong? What kind of activity is right? The answers depend on what kind of epistemological and metaphysical beliefs are associated with the word.

You can use the word "subjective" pejoratively in more than one way. One way is to say that a certain statement is "subjective" and to mean by that that the statement is "unrealistic" and "nonempirical." Suppose that you are an empiricist (and also a naïve realist) and you don't find any empirical support for the statement in extramental reality. You might then infer that the statement is based on the wrong sorts of cognitional activities (e.g., on alleged intuitions), and accordingly you might wish to criticize the statement. You find that the word "subjective" already conveniently packages your criticism (because of one of the layers of meaning contained in it—a layer in which nonempirical consciousness is deemed inappropriate), so you express your criticism, at least initially, by means of that convenient label. Eventually, you may find yourself in a debate about knowledge and reality, but for now the label will do.

A second way to use the word "subjective" pejoratively is to accuse someone (e.g., an opponent in a disagreement) of being subjective and mean that he or she is being arbitrary or unreasonable or capricious. In such a case, you are advocating a rationalist approach to the settling of an issue. There is a correct way to think about things or do things in this situation, and reason—the use of appropriate concepts in logical patterns of thinking—will show the way. You want your opponent to listen to the voice of sweet reason, not the voice of his or her preferences or feelings or inklings; and perhaps also you want to avoid spending the time and the energy that sensitivity to feelings requires. You find packed into the word "subjective" a negative attitude toward nonrationalist, perhaps romantic, modes of consciousness, so you pull out this word and label your opponent with it. In this case, your use of the label may be counterproductive, since it is likely to incite more of the romantic modes of consciousness that you are calling into question by your use of the word "subjective."

As these two examples indicate, both empiricists and rationalists can use the word "subjective" in a negative way. In each case, subjectivity, which is "bad," is implicitly opposed to a kind of objectivity, which is "good"; but in the two cases, distinct—though not necessarily opposed—notions of subjectivity and objectivity are involved. In the empiricist view, you reach the true object of your knowing activity and are thus "objective" when your statements are grounded in sensory experience, but when your statements are not grounded in sensory experience, unfortunately, you are "subjective." In the rationalist view, you reach the true object of your knowing activity and are thus "objective" when your statements are grounded in rational activity, but when your statements are not grounded in rational activity, unfortunately, you are "subjective."

To make this distinction in another way, the empiricist is typically committed to a *correspondence theory* of truth, whereas the rationalist is typically committed to a *coherence theory* of truth. According to the correspondence view, truth consists of a match between what is in the mind and what is in reality. When what you're thinking matches up with or corresponds to external reality, then what you're thinking is the truth. How do you know that your beliefs correspond to reality? You know it through sensory experience. (At least that's the way an empiricist would put it.) According to the coherence theory, truth consists primarily of the sticking-together-ness, or coherence, of the various elements that enter into a given belief and of the various beliefs that enter into a point of view. When the contents of your mind cohere with and do not contradict one another, then you are in possession of truth. How do you know that your mental contents are coherent? You ascertain it through rational methods, such as analyzing, categorizing, and drawing inferences. Whether you think of truth in terms of correspondence or in terms of coherence, when you call someone's talk subjective you are implicitly saying that it falls short of the pertinent criteria for truth.

Can the terms "subjective" and "subjectivity" be used in a positive (not just neutral) way, and "objective" and "objectivity" in a negative way? They can. It has been done—notably by the great Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855). Pitting his own type of thinking (which has come to be called "existentialist") against that of the rationalists of his day, such as Hegel, Kierkegaard called for "passionate subjectivity" as opposed to life-

less objectivity. His was the kind of thinking that *ZMM*'s narrator would like to see somehow *included within* Western rationality. You can, if you like, follow Kierkegaard's lead and speak positively of subjectivity and negatively of objectivity. Notice, however, that it is one thing to speak positively of subjectivity and another to impart to the word "subjectivity" a positive charge, so that the word itself is readily available for positive use in a variety of contexts. This latter task may take some time. Notice, too, that in following Kierkegaard's semantic lead, you are seeking a reversal of positive and negative charges but not really a change of meaning. Subjectivity is still associated with the "romantic trinity" that we talked about earlier, and objectivity is still associated with the "classic trinity." (This is a strange semantic fact. Aren't classic activities—such as reasoning—activities of a human subject? Are there no objects in romantic consciousness?) Finally, notice that a reversal of charges only continues the opposition of "subjectivity" and "objectivity." There is a change of regime but not a genuine revolution. A genuine semantic revolution would convert a hierarchical dualism of opposed forces into an egalitarian duality of complementary aspects.

Now that you've taken notice of subject-object talk in a broad way, you are perhaps prepared to tune in more closely to the subject-object talk in *ZMM*. As a point of departure, consider the apparent dilemma that Phaedrus faces when his colleagues put to him a question concerning the Quality that he has been touting. They ask him whether Quality is objective, residing in observable objects, or subjective, residing only in the mind of the observer. Phaedrus sees that if he says that Quality is objective, either he will have to explain why Quality is not scientifically detectable or he will have to show how it *is* detectable. On the other hand, if he says that it is subjective, Quality will be dismissed as "a fancy name for whatever you like" (*ZMM*, p. 205). This initial posing of the dilemma illustrates some of the things that have just been noted. First, objectivity is presented as the "good guy" and subjectivity as the "bad guy." Phaedrus saves the day for Quality if he succeeds in associating it with objectivity (good company) and *dis*associating it from subjectivity (bad company). Second, objectivity is associated with the empirical activity of scientific detection and hence with the classic epistemological trinity, whereas subjectivity is associated with "whatever you like" and hence with the feeling and willing of the romantic trinity. Third, objectivity and subjectivity

are thought of as opposed and mutually exclusive possibilities. Quality has to be one or the other. It can't be both. Which is it?

How does Phaedrus meet the dilemma? First, he avoids the "objective horn" of the dilemma. He realizes that if he claims to see in objects something that science does not detect, he is going to come out "a nut or a fool or both" (*ZMM*, p. 207). Notice how this reaction is a concession to scientific pretensions of having a monopoly on the definition of "objectivity" (which involves an identification of the objective with the empirical) or, at least, to popular acceptance of such pretensions. Next, Phaedrus turns his attention to the "subjective horn" and grapples with the claim that Quality, if subjective, is "just what you like" (*ZMM*, p. 208). He sees that what rankles him in that phrase is the word "just," which functions as a put-down. If you get rid of the put-down word, you are left with what seems to be "an innocuous truism" (*ZMM*, p. 209). Of course, Quality is what you like. Why shouldn't it be? As Phaedrus probes the matter, he sees that authoritarians might be against this view of Quality, since from their perspective you should obey authority rather than go after what you like. Then he sees that the real challenge to this subjective view of Quality comes from "scientific materialism and classic formalism" (*ZMM*, p. 209), and so he considers each in turn.

Scientific materialism says that if Quality is subjective rather than objective, "what you like" rather than something knowable scientifically as composed of matter and energy, Quality is unreal and unimportant. Note that this involves a put-down of subjectivity in general as well as Quality in particular. Phaedrus sees that this position is naïve in that it makes scientific concepts and laws themselves unreal and unimportant, since scientific concepts lack matter and energy and cannot possibly exist apart from "subjective considerations" (*ZMM*, p. 211). The narrator makes that point with stronger language, very early on in *ZMM*, in the context of a "ghost story": The laws of science are "ghosts" and a "human invention," and "the world has no existence whatsoever outside the human imagination" (*ZMM*, p. 31). (Phaedrus, after he has worked through the subjectivity-objectivity dilemma, will use equally strong idealist language when he says that we "create the world in which we live. All of it. Every last bit of it"—*ZMM*, p. 225.) Phaedrus' rebuttal of scientific materialism clearly involves large doses of idealism. Realizing that, Phaedrus backs off from such a line of response, because idealism, though logical, just won't

make it in a freshman composition course—it's "too far-fetched" (*ZMM*, p. 211). Is Phaedrus, at this point, backing off from idealism or is he backing off from *professing* idealism?

Classic formalism says that if Quality is subjective, is just what you like, then Quality is just a matter of "romantic surface appeal" (*ZMM*, p. 211) rather than something susceptible to classic "overall understanding" (*ZMM*, p. 212). The implication is that if you are in your right mind and a teacher to boot, you want understanding to take precedence over emotions, so you should give up all this subjective stuff and come back to the objective, classic pronouncements about Quality that you can find in textbooks. Phaedrus just doesn't buy this. It would require a cowardly retreat from where his thinking has arrived.

In the end, Phaedrus has an insight that allows him to split the horns of the dilemma: Quality is neither objective nor subjective but a third entity, an entity that is the parent of both subjects and objects, of mind and matter. Two questions come to mind with regard to Phaedrus' crowning insight: How does that insight overcome the dilemma? What bearing does Phaedrus' insight have on the overcoming of subject-object dualism? Let's consider each of those questions briefly before we move on to the Value compartment.

How does Phaedrus' insight overcome the dilemma? At first glance, the answer seems simple: If Quality is *neither* objective nor subjective, the problems associated with either of those labels are avoided. However, when you ask *in what sense* Quality is proclaimed to be neither objective nor subjective, things get more complicated. According to Phaedrus, Quality is neither objective nor subjective in the sense that it is neither "a part of matter" nor "a part of mind" (*ZMM*, p. 213). To say that Quality is neither mind nor matter is to make a claim about reality, a *metaphysical* claim—and an important one at that. However, it seems that Phaedrus' opponents are posing a dilemma that is at least partly, and perhaps mainly, an *epistemological* dilemma. They want to know how Phaedrus *knows* the Quality that he talks about. Does he know it objectively, through the classic methods that science has perfected? If so, they seem to be saying, let him show us the pertinent method or instrument that we too may use it and see. On the other hand, if he knows it subjectively, through romantic modes of consciousness, then his "knowledge" doesn't amount to much more than poetry—it can please, but it can't prove. (Notice how complex and potentially confusing subject-object talk can be.

The derivatives "subjective" and "objective" can be taken both as metaphysical terms, referring to kinds of reality, and as epistemological terms, referring to ways of knowing.) You might imagine Phaedrus' opponents, on this epistemological reading of the dilemma, continuing to jab at Phaedrus with the subjective horn even after Phaedrus' enthronement of Quality as the third member of the metaphysical trinity. "Granted that Quality is to be thought of as neither mind nor matter," they might say to Phaedrus, "how do you *know* that this alleged nonmental, nonmaterial reality is actually a reality and not just a creation of *your* mind?" Phaedrus can respond to that question in several ways. He can challenge the narrow view of knowledge that seems to underlie the dilemma. Objections to subjective talk may show themselves objectionable when they are subjected to objective scrutiny. He can develop and present a more adequate and inclusive view of knowledge. He can make some specific comments—he eventually does so—on how Quality is known. The point to be made here is simply that a full and Westernly rational (nonmystical) resolution of Phaedrus' subjectivity-objectivity dilemma seems to require epistemological reflections as well as metaphysical insight. (Complementarily, the narrator eventually sees that Poincaré's epistemological reflections about the preselection of facts would be well served by the addition of Phaedrus's metaphysics—*ZMM*, pp. 241–242.)

How does Phaedrus' insight bear on the overcoming of subject-object dualism? His insight is that Quality is the parent of subjects and objects. We need to unpack that insight a bit before we can draw out its implications. Quality is an event—an event "known" (but not through subject-object knowing) in a preintellectual moment of awareness. At that Quality moment, both subject awareness and object awareness (hence, both subjects and objects) are made possible. How so? Under the stimulus of Quality, the human subject creates the world of objects and through object awareness creates itself as subject (see *ZMM*, pp. 215, 221–222, 225).

In what sense do we "create" the world? More than one interpretation of Phaedrus' view is possible. If we interpret his view in a loosely Kantian manner, we will say that the world we know and are active in is a world shaped by our modes of consciousness and by various cognitional activities. The world we live in is a humanly shaped world, not a world of "raw stuff." We are creative shapers. The ultimate source and creator is Quality. Hence, when Phaedrus discovers the Sophists, he takes to the Sophist dictum that "man is the measure of all things," since that formulation regards human beings as creative participants rather than as the ultimate source (see *ZMM*, p. 338).

To see how Phaedrus's philosophy of Quality (as well as the narrator's elaborations of it) contends with subject-object dualism, we have to become clear about the dualism in question. What sort of subject-object dualism is the problem? The problem is not the bare duality of subject and object. *ZMM* does not seek to do away with subjects or objects or even the distinction between them. The problem seems to center on the *relation* of subject and object. How do you, as a human subject, relate to the world of objects, to the things you know and the things you do, and how do you see that relation? Do you take the side of the objects and relate to the world in an "objective" manner? Do you take the side of the subject and relate to the world in a "subjective" manner? Do you see your way of relating as a matter of exclusive choice, such that you can relate in one way or the other but not in both, except perhaps at different times? Are you forced to choose between the poet in yourself and the scientist?

The forced choice between the mentality of the poet and the mentality of the scientist is rooted in a *distancing* between subject and object, a distancing that is at the heart of the subject-object dualism that *ZMM* seeks to overcome. The object is "out there"; the subject is "in here." We seem forced to choose between living in accord with what is "out there" and living in accord with what is "in here." If we choose the former, we confine our consciousness to detached modes that are apt for revealing what is out there. We don't let our subjectivity—thought of here in terms of the romantic trinity of willing, feeling, and intuiting—get in the way. If on the other hand we choose subjectivity, we can let ourselves go and be affectively engaged in what we do, give expression to our feelings, hopes, and desires, and if we like create an imaginary world. But don't confuse this imaginary world with the *real* world. The real world is the world of scientific *discovery*, not the world of poetic *creation*. In this choice between the scientist and the poet, social acceptance of our choice may depend upon who is "winning" at a particular stage of culture, the scientists or the poets. In the last few centuries, in Western culture, the scientists and their followers have tended to be the winners.

The alleged distance between subject and object begins to vanish when we start to look at the world the way Phaedrus looks at it. Subject and object are intimately related, since both spring from the Quality event and since both "grow toward Quality or fall away from Quality together" (ZMM, p. 293). Moreover, since the subject "creates" the object, there is no need to think of creation as the exclusive prerogative of the poet. The scientist creates also, whether or not it is recognized. And there is no cause for shame here. Being creative is bad science only when we mistakenly think of subjects and objects as distanced to begin with. Whether or not science is good science does not hinge on whether or not we keep poetic creativity at bay. It hinges on whether or not we tune in to Quality and we engage in the creating-discovering tasks of science. Similarly, good poetry (and good art in general) hinges on our tuning in to Quality. We are either poet-scientists or scientist-poets, depending on our focus. We do well what we do, and we are not arbitrary and capricious (see ZMM, p. 241) when through caring (ZMM, pp. 25, 247–248, 267) and peace of mind (ZMM, pp. 146, 264–267) we allow Quality to stimulate and guide the fusion of subjectivity and objectivity into creative discoveries and illuminating creations.

VALUE

The last compartment in our backpack to consider is the compartment of Value. We can keep our visit to that compartment relatively brief, not because Value is less important (Value, by its very definition, is *all* that is important) but because a number of things have already been said about Value and about Value talk in the other compartments, as well as in other parts of our backpack.

Talk about Quality is talk about Value. The name for the general branch of philosophy that is concerned with Quality or Value is "axiology" (the study of that which is worthy—*axios* in Greek). Axiology is commonly divided into ethics and aesthetics. The kind of worth that ethics focuses upon is the goodness or badness that can be found in human activity. The kind of worth that aesthetics focuses upon is the beauty or ugliness that is to be found in nature or art. Let's have a look at ethics and aesthetics in turn.

Ethics is concerned with knowing what human actions have what worth and why. What human actions are "good" or "right"? What human actions are "bad" or "wrong"? What makes human actions "good" or "right" rather than "bad" or "wrong?" As the use of quotation marks might indicate, there are different ways of understanding the key terms that are used in ethics. On its most fundamental level, ethics is concerned with sorting out the meaning of those terms. On less fundamental levels, ethics is concerned with saying something about this or that specific area of human activity or about this or that particular action.

To begin, let's make a distinction between "journey ethics" and "map ethics," between the kind of ethical thinking that might arise and be carried out within the context of your own life's journey and the kind of ethical thinking that goes on when you take up the formal study of the "maps" left behind by various ethical thinkers. In the first case, your focus is on your own actions, your own living. You begin to raise questions about what's good and bad in the way you are living and about what changes you might make. You don't just want to think or talk about what's good or right; you want it to be there, in your life. In the second case, "map ethics," the focus is on *talk* about good or bad actions and about the meaning of the terms involved in such talk. Your immediate goal is to become clear about such talk. You can, of course, pass from journey ethics to map ethics: Life's quandaries can drive you to seek light in the writings of others. You also can pass from map ethics to journey ethics: A particularly stimulating book or teacher might drive you to convert academic questions into real questions and begin an actual search instead of just faking one (see ZMM, p. 184). It is also possible, however, that you engage in journey ethics or map ethics by itself. When you isolate map ethics, you have a good example of the Platonic, formal "encapsulation" of Quality that Phaedrus was worried about (ZMM, p. 342). Good becomes simply an object of thought.

You can divide both journey ethics and map ethics into *deontological* and *teleological* forms of thinking. If your thinking is deontological (from the Greek *deon*, meaning "the obligatory"), your concern is with the *rules* (or principles or duties) that you should follow. You believe that if you know and apply the right

rules, your actions will be morally good, and if you don't, they will be morally bad. The consequences of an action are irrelevant to the action's moral worth. If an action makes you and everyone else miserable but it follows the rules, it still is a morally good action. If an action makes you and everyone else happy but fails to follow the rules, it still is a bad action. If, on the other hand, your thinking is teleological (from the Greek *telos*, meaning "end" or "goal") your concern is with the *goals* or consequences toward which your actions tend. You believe that actions that tend to promote the realization of the right goals are good and actions that tend to promote the realization of bad goals are bad. Rules, at best, are guidelines that indicate what sorts of actions are likely to bring about good or bad consequences. If you follow a rule for the sake of following a rule while knowing that in so doing you will bring about bad consequences, you act wrongly. If you deviate from a rule because you see that in so doing you will bring about good, you act rightly. (Phaedrus says that Quality is the goal of method—*ZMM*, p. 305. Does that put him in the teleological camp?)

Depending on where the rules come from, a deontological approach can be authority-based or reason-based. We can accept some particular authority (familial, legal, religious, etc.) as the source of the rules of right living, or we can attempt to work out the rules rationally. The classic example of rational deontological ethics is the ethical system of Immanuel Kant. Kant held that all the rules of ethics could be reduced to a sort of master rule. He provided several different formulations of that rule, which he called the categorical imperative. What those formulations seem to have in common is that they all call for a respect for rationality itself, the source of all rules. Most of Kant's formulations amount to different versions of what has come to be called the principle of universalizability. According to that principle, whenever you are wondering about the rightness of any action that you are thinking of taking, you should ask yourself whether you can reasonably will that everyone in a similar situation, not just you, be allowed to perform the type of action in question. If you cannot rationally will it, then you should consider the action contrary to reason and, therefore, contrary to duty. You shouldn't do it. Suppose, for example, you are thinking of making a false promise in order to get out of some difficulty. Can you rationally universalize that kind of behavior? Can you rationally will anyone to feel free to make false promises to alleviate difficult situations? If there were general per-

mission for such behavior, it is likely that you would become a victim of another's false promise and find your trust betrayed. But more to the point of Kant's logical argument, all promises would eventually become so meaningless that no one could ever rely on another's promise. The action, universalized, defeats itself. False promises make false promises impossible. You can't rationally will what is self-contradictory. Contradictions are the no-no of reason. It is not right to mess with Father Reason; so the action you're contemplating is wrong.

For a teleological ethicist, the main question is, What is the proper goal of human activity? Two examples of teleological ethics come to mind: utilitarian ethics and Aristotelian ethics. If you are a utilitarian following in the footsteps of the English philosophers Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), your goal is to maximize pleasure or happiness and minimize pain or unhappiness *among the people affected* by your actions. Hence, when more than one course of action or nonaction is open to you, as a good utilitarian, you ask for each course of action how many people will benefit or be hurt and how much. You include yourself in this calculation, but you don't give yourself special preference. The utilitarian approach seems hard to fault until you notice that producing the greatest happiness or the least unhappiness for the majority of people can conceivably be connected with fostering or tolerating inhumane treatment of a minority—something that a deontologist should be quick to point out and condemn.

For Aristotle and Aristotelians, the goal of human activity is happiness, just as it is for certain utilitarians. However, in contrast to utilitarians, Aristotelians conceive of happiness "objectively" (there's that word again) and "naturalistically." Happiness is an objective condition that might or might not correlate with subjective satisfaction. Happiness consists of the completion or fulfillment of your human nature. By nature, you have certain tendencies and capacities that define you as a human being. Your task as a human being, your built-in, or "natural," goal, is to actuate and develop your natural tendencies and capacities rather than leave them dormant or, worse, do things that thwart their expression and development. (Notice that for Aristotle what is "natural" in us doesn't automatically come to fruition. If you don't cultivate your nature, you can easily develop and become accustomed to an "unnatural" way of living. Mencius, a Confucian thinker in ancient China, said something similar.) To the extent that you succeed in

bringing your nature to completion and living out of that perfected nature, you are happy. Along with this objective state of happiness comes a certain feeling of satisfaction—from Aristotle's viewpoint, the best satisfaction available to human beings. But feelings of satisfaction, as such, should not be the ultimate goal of your striving. You can feel a sort of satisfaction while living in unnatural and unhealthy ways. You can live antisocially and inhumanely and still enjoy a kind of satisfaction. From an Aristotelian viewpoint, that sort of "happiness" is likely to be short-lived, but even while it lasts it is not the happiness that Aristotelians see as the goal of human life.

At this point you might be tempted to think that for utilitarians the goal (or good) is social, whereas for Aristotelians the goal is individual. Utilitarians talk about benefiting as many as possible. Aristotelians talk about fulfilling your own nature. However, in the Aristotelian view, human nature is intrinsically social: Aristotelians hold that we are naturally oriented toward developing our powers *within* society and *for* society. If you have no desire to cooperate with others and benefit others, something in your human nature is not being tended. Developing yourself goes hand in hand with making a social contribution. Hence for Aristotelians as well as for utilitarians, the good is social.

With these teleological approaches in mind, consider again the question about the morality of making false promises. What would a utilitarian say? A utilitarian would probably say, "It depends." The accumulated wisdom of the human race indicates that such behavior tends to generate more harm than good for all concerned, so you should probably start with the idea that making a false promise is a bad thing to do. On the other hand, if you have good reason to think that, in the particular circumstances, the net good that will come of your making a false promise—net good for all concerned, not just for you—will be greater than the net good that will come of your avoiding such a promise, then you have good reason to consider the making of a false promise morally good in this instance. (A utilitarian who would respond in this way is generally called an act utilitarian, as opposed to a rule utilitarian—a distinction that you needn't bother with here.)

What would an Aristotelian say? An Aristotelian would probably point out that we are by nature oriented toward using speech to promote a number of social ends, such as sharing knowledge, facilitating cooperation, and fostering mutual trust. The use of speech that is under consideration (making a false promise) does not fit in with our natural orientation and, in fact, works against it. It is an action that moves us away from the human good rather than toward it. It is a bad thing to do.

Now let's get out the analytic knife and split ethical thinking one more time, this time into "action-centered" thinking and "virtue-centered" thinking. Your thinking is action-centered when you focus on particular actions or on specific kinds of actions and ask whether those actions are ethically good or bad, and based on what criteria. Needless to say, the specific kinds of actions that you can ask about are numerous, and if your focus is on particular actions rather than on kinds (for example, all the actions that come into question on your life's journey, or all the actions that come up for consideration in map ethics—e.g., in a case-study approach), the number of foci is limitless. For practical reasons, you won't attempt the impossible task of inquiring about every conceivable action. You'll confine your attention to as many examples as you need to get a grasp on how different ethical systems apply their principles. Perhaps in the process you'll find yourself modifying the principles of a given system (for example, you might try to find a way to safeguard minority interests within a basically utilitarian approach); perhaps you'll find yourself shifting your own allegiance from one ethical approach to another (for example, you might decide that minority interests cannot logically be safeguarded within a utilitarian approach and that, accordingly, the utilitarian approach should be jettisoned). In any case, the thrust of your ethical thinking will be to throw ethical light on various actions and to find a guide for the decisions that determine your actions.

In a virtue-centered approach, the focus is not on the actions themselves but on the *habits* that underlie actions. If you are virtue-centered, you believe that in the actual living of a good life, cultivating good habits is more important than simply learning the decision-making technique that might be associated with action-centered ethics. So your inquiry is focused on the sources, the nature, and the purposes of habit. What kinds of habits are good habits or virtues? What kinds of habits are bad habits or vices? Are virtues meant to facilitate a sort of automatic following of rules (hence, useful in a deontological framework)? Are virtues meant to serve the attainment of life's goal (hence, useful in a teleological framework)?

Aristotle provides the classic example of virtue-centered ethics within a teleological framework. In Aristotle's view, as noted above, the goal of life is happiness, understood as an objective condition involving the full development and actuation of human nature. How do you develop and actuate your nature? By developing virtues and living out of them. Virtues are stable dispositions that facilitate your living in accord with your nature in a regular, spontaneous, and enjoyable way. If you don't develop virtue, you might live in accord with your nature part of the time, but there is nothing in you to ensure constancy in that. Moreover, without virtue, you might find that even when you act in a way that accords with human nature, you experience it as "going against the grain," since the "grain" might consist of a set of bad habits that amounts to a sort of antinature within you. Consider, for example, what life is like when you have and when you don't have the virtue that the ancient Greeks called temperance. If you have the virtue of temperance, you are disposed to consume food and drink moderately, in ways and in amounts that are healthy and that harmonize with the other activities that a full human life involves. When you have the virtue, you *enjoy* being moderate, and you don't take pleasure in eating too much or drinking too much. Moderation comes easy for you and frees you up for other things in life. On the other hand, when you don't have temperance, you might eat and drink moderately part of the time, and the rest of the time you wish you had. Moreover, if you have developed a habit of overconsumption, moderation is neither easy nor enjoyable. But the satisfactions that attend your overconsumption are short-lived and bring in their wake a host of health problems and a general stunting of your range of activity. Hence, an Aristotelian might argue, you should include virtue in your ethical thinking and not leave home without it.

What virtues are there? Aristotle divides virtues into "intellectual" and "moral." Intellectual virtues are those habits of mind that facilitate our movement toward the good of the mind, or truth. Moral virtues are those habits of feeling and willing that facilitate our movement toward the good in practical, social living. There are as many different moral virtues as there are specific arenas of life or specific "parts" of consciousness that are well served by the development of habits. (For example, the virtue of courage is pertinent to those times and places when you have to deal with the dangerous and the difficult and/or control your fear.)

What those habits have in common, according to Aristotle, is a disposition toward the mean (the golden mean, as it was later called). The mean is a degree or a kind of feeling, willing, or doing that avoids both excess and defect. It is not a fixed quantity or something that can be figured out with a mathematical formula. It can vary from situation to situation. If you have prudence (a sort of master virtue) in a specific area of human activity, you will *see* the mean, and if you have whatever other virtue is called for, you will *live* it. If you have neither, you're in trouble. (There are times in dealing with the dangerous and difficult when courage calls for standing firm and times when courage calls for walking away. If you have courage, you'll know what the mean is and hit it. If you don't have courage, ask a prudent person for advice. If you can't find a prudent person, run.)

If you want to go further into Aristotle's list of virtues, you can do so by reading his *Nicomachean Ethics*. Alternatively, or additionally, you can devise your own list by asking yourself what sorts of virtues seem to be especially called for in the contemporary world. You may well end up with a list quite different from that of Aristotle, since the societies served by the virtues differ markedly. If the narrator of *ZMM* were devising such a list, we would probably find the virtues of "caring" and "peace of mind" high on it.

Before we move on from our brief perusal of ethics to an even briefer perusal of aesthetics, you might find this a good time to reconsider Phaedrus' rage against Aristotle. Phaedrus sees in Aristotle's thinking a tremendous demotion of Quality. That demotion first is noted in Aristotle's approach to rhetoric (which is the context in which, on Phaedrus' reading, Quality makes an appearance and is celebrated by the Sophists). As Phaedrus sees it, by making rhetoric a branch of Practical Science, Aristotle isolates it "from any concern with Truth or Good or Beauty, except as devices to throw into an argument" (*ZMM*, p. 329). You might note here that for Aristotle *ethics* is a branch of Practical Science, and ethics is quite clearly concerned with *good*. Why does Phaedrus say that Aristotle's Practical Science is unconcerned with Good? If you want to give Phaedrus the benefit of the doubt, you can say that in Practical Science, Aristotle may be concerned with the human good as an objective of human striving, but he is not concerned with Good as a kind of primary metaphysical reality, in the way that Phaedrus' Quality is. Otherwise, you can say with the narrator that, in dealing with Aristotle, Phaedrus is "unfair" because he has

"an axe to grind" (*ZMM*, p. 328). That unfairness appears again when Phaedrus notes that Aristotle deals with the Good in "a relatively minor branch of knowledge called ethics" (*ZMM*, p. 344). Is ethics really a minor branch of knowledge for Aristotle? It is in the context of ethics that Aristotle discusses the place of both practical and theoretical knowledge in human life. In that context (in favor of Phaedrus' interpretation), Aristotle pays high tribute to theoretical knowledge and sees it as intrinsically higher than practical knowledge. On the other hand (against Phaedrus' interpretation), Aristotle sees a life focused on theoretical knowledge as divine rather than human. The *human* good requires action and attention to practical knowledge.

At least in part, and perhaps in large part, Phaedrus' reaction against Aristotle is an aesthetic one. From Phaedrus' viewpoint, Aristotle takes *aretê*, all-around excellence (*ZMM*, p. 341), something to be known intuitively and appreciated holistically, and chops it up into a bunch of rationally divisible virtues—and the net result is ugly.

AESTHETICS

If one face of Value is moral goodness, another face of Value is beauty, the traditional concern of aesthetics (derived from a Greek word for "sensory perception"). As the word "aesthetics" suggests, beauty emerges on the sensory level. Does it stay there? If you think it does, you will agree with the saying, "Beauty is only skin deep," since the senses of themselves seem to get no further than surfaces. You might also agree with the saying, "Beauty is in the eye of the beholder," if you think that beauty's emergence on the sensory level is due to the fact that it properly exists *in* sensory experience and nowhere else.

Does beauty stay on the sensory level? Both our experience and our language suggest that it doesn't. Doesn't that which you call beautiful evoke feelings that are more than sensations or perceptions? Isn't there a sense in which things grasped intellectually can have a kind of beauty—what *ZMM*'s narrator would call "classic" beauty—that is associated with order and clarity? Can a mathematical equation be beautiful? Poincaré would certainly say so, and he's certainly not alone. And what about spiritual beauty? Aren't there ideals that draw us by their beauty? Aren't there

people whom we call beautiful not because of the way they attract us on the sensory level but because of the way they live? Doesn't that indicate that we "see" (nonsensorily) a beauty beneath the surface? It seems that beauty, as we experience it, can have many modes and exist on many levels. To express this in terms of language, we can say that "beauty" is an analogical term: It can be used in different ways in different contexts. Perhaps it is fair to say that if "beauty" is an analogical term, the primary analogue is beauty on the sensory level, beauty as the kind of thing we experience when we take in a particularly marvelous Rocky Mountain sunset and say "Wow!"

We can press this business of analogy a bit further and ask how it works. Is there some element that is present in a prominent or striking way on the level of the primary analogue (the level of sensory beauty) and which is also present in a different way or to a different degree on other levels of beauty? Is there some common element that makes all kinds of beautiful things beautiful? If there is not a common element, is there at least a "family resemblance"? (The notion of a "family resemblance," as it is used in linguistic philosophy, is itself the result of an analogy. Just as we can see a resemblance among members of the same family even though there is not a single feature that all members have in common, so we can see a family resemblance among the distinct uses of certain words, even though there is not a single feature that all the uses have in common.) Is there a common element or a family resemblance among such disparately beautiful things as an ocean sunset, a sterling performance of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, a cherished piece of writing, a motorcycle ride in the country? (I'm going to leave that question hanging—for now . . .)

Is beauty only in the eye of the beholder? Here comes the subject-object question again, popping up its ugly head, right here in the context of talk about the beautiful. It is clear that the *experience* of beauty is in the subject of the experience, in the "eye of the beholder." However, it seems equally clear that when we experience beauty, we experience *something* as beautiful and we say that that something *is* beautiful. What do we mean by this? We don't mean that we have made a metaphysical discovery about a type of reality. Nor are we calling attention to certain cognitional activities through which an entity called beauty might be rationally known. We are not making a metaphysical statement and we are not making an epistemological statement. We are making an aes-